Two related issues with how the proxy handles client-supplied
``api_base`` / ``base_url`` overrides on chat-completion requests:
1. **SSRF gate bypass** — ``check_complete_credentials()`` returned
``True`` for any non-empty ``api_key``, allowing the
``is_request_body_safe`` ``banned_params`` loop to admit ``api_base``
/ ``base_url`` values that point at private (RFC 1918), loopback,
link-local, or cloud-metadata addresses. Now: when the gate sees a
client-supplied ``api_base`` / ``base_url``, it runs the URL through
``litellm_core_utils.url_utils.validate_url`` (DNS-resolves, blocks
internal/IMDS/LL networks, defends against rebinding). Rejection
raises with a clear message.
2. **Admin-config leak on base override** —
``get_dynamic_litellm_params`` only carried the three clientside keys
(``api_key``, ``api_base``, ``base_url``) from request to upstream
call. Other admin-configured fields on ``litellm_params`` —
``organization``, ``extra_body``, ``extra_headers``, ``api_version``,
``azure_ad_token``, AWS / Vertex creds, etc. — flowed through
unchanged. With base redirected to a client-controlled server, those
admin secrets were sent to the attacker. Now: when ``api_base`` /
``base_url`` is in ``request_kwargs``, drop those admin-config
fields from ``litellm_params`` unless the caller re-supplied them.
Tests cover the SSRF-target rejection per URL field, the admin-secret
clearing on base override, the don't-clear case when only ``api_key``
is overridden (BYOK pattern), and the don't-overwrite case when the
caller resupplies fields like ``organization`` themselves.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(vertex passthrough): log :embedContent and :batchEmbedContents responses
* test(vertex passthrough): add unit tests for :embedContent and :batchEmbedContents logging
* fix(vertex passthrough): extract input text from request body for embedContent token counting
* fix(vertex passthrough): add embedContent and batchEmbedContents to TRACKED_VERTEX_ROUTES
* fix(vertex passthrough): detect Google AI Studio URLs in embedContent handler
* test(vertex passthrough): add unit test for Google AI Studio URL embedContent provider detection
* style: black format vertex_passthrough_logging_handler
The enterprise package ships under the BerriAI Enterprise License defined
in enterprise/LICENSE.md, which is not an SPDX-listed license. Declare it
via PEP 639's LicenseRef-Proprietary expression so metadata-reading tools
(PyPI classifiers, Nexus IQ, pip-licenses) resolve it instead of reporting
License-None. The existing license-files entry already ships the full terms.
Previously, an admin JWT sending a stale/typo'd/missing x-litellm-team-id
on an LLM API route received a hard 404 from get_team_object, blocking the
request. Restore pre-PR admin behavior: if the header can't be resolved,
skip team attribution and proceed with admin access, logging a warning
with the header value and route so the misconfigured caller is diagnosable.
Replaces the rm-and-symlink hack with a plain actions/checkout
using path: docs/my-website. The previous approach failed on this
branch because docs/my-website no longer exists in the repo (its
parent docs/ directory was also removed), so ln -s had nowhere
to create the symlink.
Also adds the same checkout step to test-unit-documentation.yml,
which was silently relying on docs/my-website existing in-tree
for test_env_keys.py and test_router_settings.py.
The documentation source has moved to a separate repository,
BerriAI/litellm-docs, served at docs.litellm.ai. This PR removes
docs/my-website/ from this repo and updates README.md, AGENTS.md,
and CLAUDE.md to direct doc contributions to the new repo.
Also fixes a broken relative link in
litellm/integrations/levo/README.md.
The existing CI symlink in .github/workflows/test-code-quality.yml
(which clones litellm-docs and symlinks docs/my-website to it for
tests/documentation_tests/*) continues to work without change.
Extract the admin team-header attachment into a helper so
auth_builder stays under the 50-statement lint threshold; apply
black formatting to the two files flagged on the prior commit.
No behavior change.
Scope the header-driven team fetch to LLM API routes so admin
management routes keep the pre-existing bypass behavior (no
phantom teams, no 404s on mgmt calls). Team context is threaded
onto UserAPIKeyAuth so spend logs, rate limits, and team_models
attribution are correctly applied when admins act on behalf of
a team via x-litellm-team-id.
* fix(proxy): honor object_permission for managed vector store access
* perf(proxy): preload team object_permission on UserAPIKeyAuth
Populate team_object_permission during virtual-key and JWT auth when the
team is loaded, so can_user_access_vector_store uses it in memory first
and only falls back to get_object_permission by id when missing.
Made-with: Cursor
* fix(team_endpoints): auto-add SSO team members to org for proxy admins
* test: proxy_admin vs team_admin security boundary for team→org move
* screenshots: before/after for team-org SSO fix
* fix(team_endpoints): restore staging security features dropped in SSO commit
Co-Authored-By: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan@berri.ai>
* style: black formatting for team_endpoints
Members tab column reads this field; dropping it from the type in the
previous revert broke the type check without affecting the reverted
render logic.
MCP server CRUD endpoints (/v1/mcp/server*) were bundled with MCP
tool-call / passthrough endpoints under llm_api_routes, so setting
DISABLE_LLM_API_ENDPOINTS=true on admin-only nodes also blocked the
Admin UI from listing, adding, or attaching MCP servers.
Separate mcp_inference_routes (data-plane, gated by
DISABLE_LLM_API_ENDPOINTS) from mcp_management_routes (control-plane,
gated by DISABLE_ADMIN_ENDPOINTS). Keep mcp_routes as a union for
backward compat with allowed_routes=["mcp_routes"] virtual key configs.
Upgrade is_management_route to pattern-aware matching so
/v1/mcp/server/{path:path} resolves for concrete IDs.
The `_test-unit-services-base.yml` reusable workflow attached every job
to the `integration-postgres` GHA environment to read three "secrets":
DATABASE_URL, POSTGRES_USER, POSTGRES_PASSWORD. These are not secrets —
the postgres service container is spawned per-job on localhost and
destroyed with the job, so the user/password are bootstrap values for a
throwaway container and the URL is always `postgresql://…@localhost:…`.
Each environment attachment produces a "temporarily deployed to
integration-postgres" deployment record, which the PR timeline renders
as a message per matrix shard per push. With 14 proxy-db shards that's
~14 notifications per push, drowning the PR conversation.
Changes:
* Hardcode POSTGRES_USER/POSTGRES_PASSWORD/POSTGRES_DB and the derived
DATABASE_URL in `_test-unit-services-base.yml`.
* Delete the `environment: integration-postgres` attachment.
* Delete the `secrets:` declarations on the reusable workflow and on
the two callers (test-unit-proxy-db.yml, test-unit-security.yml).
* The `services:` container still starts a fresh postgres per job;
the connection string now matches what the container boots up with.
Security review: no regression. The environment wasn't gating anything
real — no protection rules configured, no approval gates, and the
branch restriction is already enforced by `on: push: branches: [...]`
on both caller workflows. Zizmor pedantic-mode findings are identical
before and after (same 6 pre-existing findings, zero new ones).
The `integration-postgres` environment and its three "secrets" in repo
settings are now unreferenced and can be deleted from repo admin.
