veritas-kanban/docs/security.md

Veritas Kanban Server - Security Guide

Overview

The Veritas Kanban server includes a flexible authentication and authorization system to protect API endpoints and WebSocket connections from unauthorized access.

Quick Start

Development (Localhost Bypass)

For local development, enable localhost bypass:

# .env
VERITAS_AUTH_ENABLED=true
VERITAS_AUTH_LOCALHOST_BYPASS=true

This allows unauthenticated requests from localhost/127.0.0.1 while still requiring auth for remote connections during development. In NODE_ENV=production, localhost bypass is not honored for HTTP or WebSocket auth, even if an old .env file still enables it.

Production

For production, configure API keys:

# .env
VERITAS_AUTH_ENABLED=true
VERITAS_AUTH_LOCALHOST_BYPASS=false
VERITAS_ADMIN_KEY=your-secure-admin-key
VERITAS_API_KEYS=agent1:key1:agent,dashboard:key2:read-only

Remote/Server Mode

Remote access must follow the v5 remote security posture in ADR 0002. In short: prefer one trusted origin for the web client, /api, and /ws; keep auth enabled; disable localhost bypass outside loopback; use HTTPS, VPN, or a trusted tunnel for browser/mobile sessions; and use exact origins instead of wildcard CORS.

Authentication Methods

Clients can authenticate using any of these methods:

1. Authorization Header (Recommended)

curl -H "Authorization: Bearer your-api-key" \
  http://localhost:3001/api/tasks

2. X-API-Key Header

curl -H "X-API-Key: your-api-key" \
  http://localhost:3001/api/tasks

3. Query Parameter (WebSocket)

const ws = new WebSocket('ws://localhost:3001/ws?api_key=your-api-key');

HTTP requests do not accept API keys in query strings. Use headers for HTTP and reserve the WebSocket api_key query fallback for clients that cannot send auth headers during the upgrade.

Roles and Permissions

v5 planning note: the current role model is intentionally small. The planned multi-user model expands this into workspace-scoped owner, admin, member, reviewer, read-only, and agent roles with scoped agent tokens. See v5 Identity, Workspace, and RBAC Model.

Role	Read	Write	Admin Actions
admin	✅	✅	✅
agent	✅	✅	❌
read-only	✅	❌	❌

Role Details

• admin: Full access to all endpoints including sensitive operations
• agent: Can read/write tasks, run agents, manage worktrees. Intended for AI agents like OpenClaw
• read-only: Can perform read endpoints, including documented read-like POST checks. Suitable for dashboards and monitoring

Agent self-service routes are still permission-scoped. Read-like checks such as agent routing and permission checks require agent:read; approval requests require task:write; approval review, routing configuration, and permission elevation require admin:manage.

v5 Auth Context

Authenticated REST requests and WebSocket connections now carry a shared auth context for the v5 RBAC migration:

Field	Description
role	Current compatibility role: admin, agent, read-only
userId	Local fallback user ID until persisted users are enforced
workspaceId	Local fallback workspace ID until workspace scoping lands
actorType	user, agent, service, or localhost-bypass
authMethod	disabled, session, api-key, device-session, or localhost-bypass
tokenName	API key name when authenticated with a configured key
permissions	Role-derived permission list used by new route guards

New v5 endpoints should prefer explicit permission guards over broad role checks. Legacy role guards remain supported while route coverage is migrated.

Browser password sessions are local-owner only in v5 GA. The server accepts the session cookie only on loopback requests with loopback Host/Origin/Referer metadata. Remote, server, PWA, and multi-user clients must authenticate with a trusted device session or scoped API token so active workspace membership, role, revocation, and downgraded scopes are revalidated.

The v5 authority surface is tracked in docs/security/permission-coverage.json. Run node scripts/check-permission-coverage.mjs to fail when a REST route prefix, WebSocket event, CLI command, MCP tool, workflow step/action type, command palette action, or tracked background job is added without a permission classification.

The v5.0 hardening review is recorded in docs/security/v5-security-review.md, including fixed high/critical findings, accepted hardening risks, and the password-session local-owner boundary.

Release compatibility, stale-client behavior, update channels, and rollback limits are tracked in docs/V5-COMPATIBILITY-AND-RELEASE-POLICY.md. Compatibility errors and debug bundles must redact tokens, cookies, private keys, local private paths, raw chat content, and task body text.

Agent Sandbox Policies

Agent sandbox policy presets live in the shared app config and are managed from Settings -> Agents -> Sandbox Policies or /api/sandbox-policies.

Use them to constrain:

• Filesystem read/write paths, denied paths, dotfile masking, and local-only handles.
• Network egress defaults, allowlisted hosts and path prefixes, and private network or metadata endpoint blocks.
• Environment variable passthrough.
• Credential access mode: none, brokered references, or explicit environment passthrough.

Launch-time validation compares the preset with the selected provider's capabilities. Required unsupported controls block the agent or workflow step before execution. Advisory unsupported controls continue with warnings. Every dry-run and launch-time decision writes a governance trace with raw detail redacted; credential references and environment-style name=value strings are shown as [redacted].

Agent budget policies are enforced through the same governance path. Workspace, agent, workflow, workflow-agent, and per-run budgets can cap tokens, provider-reported cost, tool-call counts, runtime, retry count, and workflow fan-out. Soft thresholds write budget-policy warning traces. Hard thresholds pause or block for approval, downgrade to a configured model route, or cancel the run with recorded trace and completion-packet evidence.

For untrusted or externally sourced work, prefer a required preset with repository-scoped writes, default-deny network egress, metadata endpoint blocking, and brokered credentials. Keep the legacy permissive preset only for existing local Codex CLI workflows that still need broad compatibility.

Configuration Reference

Environment Variables

Variable	Default	Description
VERITAS_AUTH_ENABLED	true	Enable/disable authentication
VERITAS_AUTH_LOCALHOST_BYPASS	false	Allow unauthenticated localhost requests in development
VERITAS_ADMIN_KEY	(none)	Admin API key with full access
VERITAS_API_KEYS	(none)	Comma-separated API keys (format: name:key:role)

API Key Format

name:key:role,name2:key2:role2

Example:

veritas:vk_abc123xyz:agent,dashboard:vk_def456uvw:read-only

Generating API Keys

Using OpenSSL

# Generate a random 32-character key
openssl rand -base64 32

Using the Built-in Function

import { generateApiKey } from './middleware/auth.js';
const key = generateApiKey('vk'); // e.g., vk_AbCdEf123...

API Endpoints

Auth Status (Unauthenticated)

Check the current authentication configuration:

curl http://localhost:3001/api/auth/status

Response:

{
  "enabled": true,
  "localhostBypass": false,
  "configuredKeys": 2,
  "hasAdminKey": true
}

Health Check (Unauthenticated)

curl http://localhost:3001/health

WebSocket Authentication

WebSocket connections are authenticated on connect:

// With API key
const ws = new WebSocket('ws://localhost:3001/ws?api_key=your-key');

ws.onclose = (event) => {
  if (event.code === 4001) {
    console.error('Authentication failed:', event.reason);
  }
};

WebSocket Close Codes

Code	Meaning
1000	Normal close
4001	Authentication required/failed

Error Responses

401 Unauthorized

{
  "error": "Authentication required",
  "code": "AUTH_REQUIRED",
  "hint": "Provide API key via Authorization header (Bearer <key>), X-API-Key header, or api_key query parameter"
}

403 Forbidden

{
  "error": "Write access denied",
  "code": "WRITE_FORBIDDEN",
  "hint": "Your API key has read-only access"
}

Security Best Practices

1. Never commit API keys - Use environment variables or .env files (add to .gitignore)

2. Rotate keys regularly - Update API keys periodically, especially if compromised

3. Use HTTPS in production - API keys are transmitted in headers/URLs

4. Principle of least privilege - Use read-only for dashboards, agent for automation

5. Monitor access - The server logs connection attempts with role information

6. Constrain agent launches - Assign sandbox policy presets and run budgets before running untrusted or expensive work. Default-deny network egress, broker credentials, and cap token, spend, tool-call, runtime, retry, and fan-out exposure when a workflow does not need broad access.

7. Keep remote mode explicit - Binding outside loopback, reverse proxying, tunneling, or serving mobile/PWA clients requires auth enabled, localhost bypass disabled, exact CORS/WebSocket origins, and redacted diagnostics. See ADR 0002.

Migrating from No Auth

If you're upgrading from an earlier version without authentication:

1. Before upgrading: Document all clients that access the API

2. During upgrade:

   • Start with VERITAS_AUTH_LOCALHOST_BYPASS=true for smooth transition
   • Generate API keys for each client
   • Update clients to include authentication headers

3. After testing: Disable localhost bypass for production

Troubleshooting

"Authentication required" for localhost

Check that VERITAS_AUTH_LOCALHOST_BYPASS=true is set, or provide an API key.

"Invalid API key"

• Verify the key matches exactly (no extra spaces)
• Check that the key is in the VERITAS_API_KEYS or VERITAS_ADMIN_KEY variable
• Ensure the format is correct: name:key:role

WebSocket immediately closes

• Check browser console for the close reason
• Ensure the API key is passed as a query parameter: ?api_key=...

Architecture

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                       Request Flow                          │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                             │
│  Client Request                                             │
│       │                                                     │
│       ▼                                                     │
│  ┌──────────────┐                                          │
│  │ CORS/JSON    │ (express middleware)                     │
│  └──────────────┘                                          │
│       │                                                     │
│       ▼                                                     │
│  ┌──────────────┐   ┌───────────────────────┐              │
│  │ /health      │──▶│ Bypass auth           │              │
│  │ /api/auth/*  │   │ (unauthenticated)     │              │
│  └──────────────┘   └───────────────────────┘              │
│       │                                                     │
│       ▼                                                     │
│  ┌──────────────┐                                          │
│  │ authenticate │ (middleware/auth.ts)                     │
│  │              │                                          │
│  │ - Check auth │                                          │
│  │   enabled    │                                          │
│  │ - Localhost  │                                          │
│  │   bypass?    │                                          │
│  │ - Validate   │                                          │
│  │   API key    │                                          │
│  └──────────────┘                                          │
│       │                                                     │
│       ▼                                                     │
│  ┌──────────────┐                                          │
│  │ Route Handler│ (req.auth available)                     │
│  └──────────────┘                                          │
│                                                             │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Changelog

• v3.3.0 (2026-02-15): Task intelligence security hardening
  • Crash-recovery checkpointing with auto-sanitization of 20+ secret patterns plus regex value detection
  • XSS prevention in observational memory via sanitizeCommentText()
  • DFS cycle detection in task dependencies prevents infinite loop attacks
  • Input sanitization on agent filter (trim + 100 char cap)
  • Zod validation on all dependency and checkpoint routes
• v3.0.0 (2026-02-09): Workflow engine security
  • ReDoS protection on regex acceptance criteria
  • Expression injection prevention in template evaluator
  • Parallel DoS limits (max 50 concurrent sub-steps)
  • Gate approval authentication and permission checks
  • RBAC with ACL files for workflow access control
  • Audit logging of all workflow changes
• v2.0.0 (2026-02-06): Multi-agent security
  • Agent permission levels (Intern/Specialist/Lead) with enforcement
  • Agent registry with heartbeat-based liveness tracking
  • MCP SDK patched to ^1.26.0 (GHSA-345p-7cg4-v4c7)
  • Rate limiting documentation (reverse proxy recommended for public deployments)
• v1.0.0 (2026-01-29): Initial authentication implementation
  • API key authentication for HTTP and WebSocket
  • Role-based authorization (admin, agent, read-only)
  • Localhost bypass for development
  • Configuration via environment variables