Provider env vars are global, so installing the verification key via the
environment either clobbered or was clobbered by the primary key when both
used the same provider (setdefault only fills missing vars). Pass the
verification key as a per-call api_key in model_settings.extra_args instead,
in both the runtime path and startup warm-up, so a separate-provider verifier
authenticates correctly and warm-up no longer fails before the key exists.
Add an opt-in verification pass (STRIX_VERIFY_FINDINGS + STRIX_VERIFICATION_MODEL)
that sends every candidate finding to an independent model which tries to refute
it before the finding is persisted. Fail-closed: rejected findings and verifier
errors never reach customer-facing artifacts. The verifier can use its own model,
reasoning effort, and API key, and its usage counts toward --max-budget-usd.
* fix(report): prevent code-fence breakout in vulnerability markdown
render_vulnerability_md wrapped LLM-authored poc_script_code and code
snippet values in a fixed three-backtick fence, so a triple-backtick inside
the value closed the fence early and the rest rendered as live markdown
(headings, tracking-beacon images) in the shareable report deliverable.
Open each such block with a fence one backtick longer than the longest
backtick run in the payload (CommonMark: a block closes only on a fence at
least as long as the opener), so the content always renders verbatim. The
adjacent ```diff block is already safe (its lines are '- '/'+ ' prefixed and
so can never be a bare-backtick closing fence) and is left unchanged.
Fixes#815
* fix(report): indent multiline snippets
---------
Co-authored-by: thejesh23 <thejesh23@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alex Schapiro <bearsyankees@gmail.com>
build_raw_request kept the Content-Length inherited from the captured
request, so replaying a modified body (repeat_request) emitted a request
whose declared length did not match the body — truncating the payload or
stalling the target. Drop any inherited Content-Length (case-insensitively)
and recompute it from the body actually being sent.
Adds tests covering a lengthened body, an emptied body, and the
no-inherited-header path.
Fixes#814
Co-authored-by: thejesh23 <thejesh23@users.noreply.github.com>
An httpx.Timeout in ModelSettings.extra_args crashes
ModelSettings.to_json_dict() (PydanticSerializationError) on the Chat
Completions and LiteLLM model paths, which serialize settings for their
tracing generation span — failing every model turn on those paths. Pass
the timeout as a plain float, which httpx-based clients apply as the
read (inactivity) timeout.
The SDK's http_status retry policy only retries errors carrying a known
HTTP status code, but quota/billing (and other provider-side) failures
often surface inside a streamed response as a bare error with no status
code, so they were failing on the first attempt. Add a statusless retry
policy to DEFAULT_MODEL_RETRY (retry count and backoff unchanged) so they
are retried before a genuine exhaustion fails the run; user aborts are
never retried.
The SDK's http_status retry policy only retries errors carrying a known
HTTP status code, but quota/billing (and other provider-side) failures
often surface inside a streamed response as a bare error with no status
code, so they were failing on the first attempt. Add a statusless retry
policy to DEFAULT_MODEL_RETRY so they are retried (before any content is
streamed; user aborts are never retried), restoring the pre-SDK engine's
resilience. If the provider is genuinely exhausted, the error still
propagates and fails the scan after retries.
* fix(proxy,tooling): serialize+reconnect Caido client, actionable HTTPQL errors, sandbox tool guidance
Addresses the top recurring agent tool-call failures observed in telemetry:
- proxy: the shared Caido client had no locking or reconnect, so concurrent
agent calls raced ("Transport is already connected") and a dead transport
poisoned the rest of the run ("Connector is closed"/"Server disconnected").
Add an asyncio lock + bounded reconnect in caido_api.call_with_client (sandbox
path) and a scan-wide caido_lock in the run context that host-side proxy tools
hold around every call. Deterministic errors are not retried.
- proxy: list_requests now returns Caido's exact parser message, echoes the
offending query, and includes a corrected-syntax hint so agents self-correct
instead of retrying a broken HTTPQL filter.
- shell/prompt: document that write_stdin requires a process started with
tty=true; nudge toward writing Python to a file over deeply-nested one-liners;
note the venv pre-installs common libs.
- agent-browser: distinguish daemon/connection failures (run doctor, don't loop)
from malformed commands; invoke directly (no sh -c wrapper).
- containers: use POSIX '.' instead of the bashism 'source' in generated rc
files (fixes 'sh: source: not found'); add file + xxd and pre-install
requests/httpx/beautifulsoup4/lxml/pyjwt/cryptography in the sandbox venv.
- tests: cover proxy serialization/reconnect/no-retry and HTTPQL errors.
* fix(proxy): host-side reconnect, close stale clients, don't retry mutations
Addresses Greptile review on the reconnect logic:
- Host path had no reconnect: a dead shared context client (Caido restart /
network blip) previously disabled proxy tools for the rest of the scan. Add
SharedCaidoClient, a serialized reconnect-safe holder stored once per scan in
the run context and shared across agents. On a dead transport it rebuilds via
reconnect_caido, which re-selects the SAME Caido project (preserving captured
traffic) instead of creating a new empty one.
- Don't repeat completed mutations: call_with_client / SharedCaidoClient.call
take idempotent=. Reads retry once on reconnect; replay + scope
create/update/delete heal the client but re-raise instead of risking a
double-apply.
- Don't leak replaced clients: the stale client is aclose()d (best-effort) on
every reconnect.
- Extend tests to cover close-on-reconnect, non-idempotent re-raise, and the
SharedCaidoClient holder.
* fix(proxy): close replacement Caido client when project.select fails
Addresses Greptile P1: in reconnect_caido (and bootstrap_caido) a successful
connect() followed by a failing project.select()/create() discarded the
connected client without closing it, so a missing/unavailable project could
leak a transport on every retry. Close the client before re-raising.
---------
Co-authored-by: Alex Schapiro <bearsyankees@gmail.com>
* fix(prompt): treat demo/sample data and demo environments as low severity or skip
* Update system_prompt.jinja
* fix(prompt): use demo context as a skip signal, not a CVSS override
* fix(prompt): let demo context honestly inform CVSS impact metrics
* fix(prompt): focus on detecting demo environments to inform CVSS impact
* fix(prompt): keep demo-environment check concise
* fix(prompt): trim demo-environment check to a short addendum
---------
Co-authored-by: Alex Schapiro <bearsyankees@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: alex s <46074070+bearsyankees@users.noreply.github.com>
The sandbox never creates /workspace/scratch, so guidance pointing agents
there failed on first write. Make the Python/exec_command and recon
output-hygiene guidance path-agnostic (write to a file, relative to the
working dir) instead of naming a directory that may not exist.
Per projectdiscovery katana docs, add the flags that actually bound
crawl output size and a reduce-then-delete workflow:
- -mdp (max-domain-pages; default is unlimited), -fsu (filter-similar),
-fs scope, -f url (URL-only), -or/-ob (omit raw/body), -mrs.
- Baseline now includes -mdp 2000 -fsu; new 'Keeping output small'
section: bound scope/volume, shrink records, distil then delete raw
crawls.
Address Greptile review:
- system_prompt: only clean up your own task's files; don't delete
another agent's files in the shared workspace unless confirmed unused.
- katana.md: extract+dedupe URLs with jq before removing raw .jsonl
(sort -u on JSONL compares whole records, not URLs).
Add lightweight, always-on disk-hygiene guidance so agents keep recon
artifacts bounded on the shared /workspace instead of writing very large
uncapped crawl output.
- system_prompt.jinja: DISK & SCRATCH HYGIENE note in the shared-workspace
block; recon PHASE 1 crawl bullet asks to bound each crawl and tidy up.
- skills/tooling/katana.md: bound the baseline/deep examples with -ct,
add a Keeping-output-manageable note (bound by -ct/-d, reserve -jsl/-kf
all for narrowed targets, check du -sh, dedupe and remove raw .jsonl).
Apply cgroup caps (mem_limit, shm_size, nano_cpus, pids_limit) to the
sandbox container from STRIX_SANDBOX_* env vars. Unset values keep
docker's unbounded default, so behavior is unchanged unless opted in.
The sandbox SDK's LocalDir walker rejects any symlink outright
(LocalDirReadError, reason=symlink_not_supported), so uploading a cloned
repository that commits symlinks (common in JS/TS monorepos) aborts before
the agent starts. Stage such trees into a temp copy first: in-tree links
are dereferenced; out-of-tree, dangling, and cyclic links are dropped and
never followed, preserving the walker's path-escape safety. Symlink-free
trees are uploaded as-is.
* fix(deps): cap openai<2.45 and add litellm[proxy] so fresh installs can run
* chore(deps): sync uv.lock with openai cap and litellm[proxy]
Regenerate the lockfile so locked/frozen installs pick up the openai<2.45 cap and litellm[proxy] extras (fastapi, orjson, ...); remove inline dependency comments.
Co-Authored-By: Ahmed Allam <ahmed39652003@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Ahmed Allam <ahmed39652003@gmail.com>
