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220 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
220 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# Content Safety Policy
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Last updated: August 18, 2026
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## Purpose and scope
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SkillHub accepts, stores, reviews, and distributes agent skill packages. Packages
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can contain instructions, scripts, documentation, examples, images, and other files
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that influence an AI agent or execute on a user's computer. Profiles, namespace
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descriptions, reviews, reports, ratings, and release notes also contain user-supplied
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content.
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This document describes the project's content-safety expectations, available
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technical and governance controls, and the responsibilities of people who publish,
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review, operate, and install skills.
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The SkillHub maintainers do not operate or moderate every independently hosted
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instance. Each operator must assess its users, jurisdiction, deployment model, and
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risk; publish enforceable rules and a reporting channel; configure appropriate
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controls; and staff its own review, appeal, and emergency processes.
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## Baseline rules
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SkillHub instances should not knowingly publish or distribute content or packages
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that:
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- violate applicable law or another person's intellectual-property, privacy, or
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other rights;
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- sexually exploit or endanger children, including child sexual abuse material;
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- credibly threaten, harass, or promote violence or hateful abuse against people;
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- expose personal, confidential, or authentication data without authorization;
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- contain malware, credential theft, destructive payloads, unauthorized access,
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persistence, evasion, or instructions intended to defeat security controls;
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- impersonate people or organizations, facilitate fraud, or intentionally present
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deceptive or materially misleading claims;
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- secretly collect, transmit, or use data beyond the skill's documented purpose;
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- conceal important external services, downloads, commands, permissions, or side
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effects from reviewers and users; or
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- bypass an instance's review, scanning, namespace, visibility, or access-control
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rules.
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Context matters. Legitimate security research, education, documentation, and
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defensive automation can discuss or test risky behavior without promoting harm.
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Reviewers should consider purpose, provenance, permissions, likely impact, and
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applicable law instead of relying on keywords alone.
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## Content and package risks
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A skill may instruct an agent to read or modify files, run commands, call external
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services, install dependencies, browse websites, or handle sensitive inputs.
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Documentation and examples may be inaccurate or omit important consequences.
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Images and archives may contain hidden payloads. Ratings or social signals do not
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prove that a package is safe, lawful, accurate, or suitable for a particular use.
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Publishers must accurately describe required permissions, external recipients,
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dependencies, expected side effects, supported environments, and known limitations.
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Installers must review package contents and apply least privilege before execution.
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## Available technical and governance controls
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SkillHub includes controls that an operator can combine according to its risk:
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- package limits and file-type validation, including size, file-count, extension,
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and selected file-signature checks;
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- a configurable security scanner that can inspect uploaded packages and produce
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findings for reviewers;
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- namespace and platform review workflows with approve, reject, withdraw, and
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promotion decisions;
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- user reports and administrator actions such as hiding, archiving, rejecting, or
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yanking content and versions;
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- platform and namespace RBAC for publishing and governance actions;
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- public, namespace-only, and private visibility; and
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- audit records and notifications for relevant governance activity.
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The implementation and operating guidance are documented in the
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[scanner guide](security-scanning.md),
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[review guide](skillhub/en/guide/review.md), and
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[security architecture](../document/docs/04-developer/architecture/security.md).
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## Important limitations
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These controls reduce risk but do not certify a package as safe or compliant:
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- scanner operation is configurable, and an operator can run SkillHub without an
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enabled scanner;
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- optional LLM-backed analysis depends on the service selected by the operator and
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can create additional privacy and reliability risks;
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- static, behavioral, metadata, and model-based analysis can produce false
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positives and false negatives;
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- a successfully scanned package can still be misleading, vulnerable, or
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malicious in context, or unsuitable for a specific environment;
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- privileged publication paths require operator governance and periodic review;
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and
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- independently hosted instances can configure different review, visibility, and
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enforcement practices.
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Operators must disclose which controls are active. A package that fails scanning
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or review should remain unavailable for ordinary installation until the failure
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is resolved through a documented process. Scanner failure must not be treated as
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proof that a package is safe.
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## Publisher responsibilities
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Before submitting a skill, a publisher should:
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- inspect every included file and remove secrets, personal data, build artifacts,
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and unrelated binaries;
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- document commands, network destinations, external downloads, required
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permissions, and persistent changes;
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- pin or constrain dependencies where practical and preserve their license notices;
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- provide evidence for security, compliance, or standards claims instead of relying
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on labels alone;
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- test failure and rollback behavior in an isolated environment;
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- avoid manipulative instructions designed to override system, user, or operator
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safety controls; and
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- update or withdraw a package when a material risk is discovered.
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## Operator safeguards
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Before opening an instance to publishers or installers, an operator should:
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- define permitted and prohibited content, reviewers, escalation owners, and
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emergency contacts;
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- enable scanning and human review appropriate to the instance's exposure and
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package risk;
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- restrict direct-publish and governance roles, log their use, and review them
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regularly;
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- isolate scanning and package inspection from production secrets and sensitive
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networks;
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- rate-limit uploads, downloads, reports, and automated activity;
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- preserve only the evidence needed for review and protect reporter identities;
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- provide a visible reporting channel and an impartial appeal route; and
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- train reviewers to handle malware, privacy, child-safety, fraud, and
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intellectual-property reports safely.
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## Reporting
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For a skill or profile visible in a SkillHub instance, use that instance's report
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feature or contact the operator identified in its published policies. Include the
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package coordinate and version, the reason for concern, the time observed, and the
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minimum context needed to investigate. Do not execute a suspected malicious package
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or resend illegal, exploitative, personal, or confidential material through an
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unprotected channel.
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For abusive or harassing conduct on SkillHub project-managed community surfaces,
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report privately to
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[ifly_opensource@iflytek.com](mailto:ifly_opensource@iflytek.com) under the
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[Code of Conduct](../CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). Report upstream security vulnerabilities
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privately to [security@iflytek.com](mailto:security@iflytek.com) under the
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[iFLYTEK organization security policy](https://github.com/iflytek/.github/blob/main/SECURITY.md).
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Do not disclose vulnerabilities or personal data in a public issue.
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## Review, action, and notice
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An operator's documented process should:
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1. triage imminent danger, child-safety concerns, credible malware, exposed
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credentials, and active security incidents for urgent specialist handling;
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2. preserve only the evidence needed for a proportionate review;
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3. assess the package, context, applicable rule, law, provenance, permissions, and
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likely user impact;
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4. take proportionate action, such as rejecting a version, hiding or yanking a
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package, restricting an account, revoking a token, or escalating to an authorized
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specialist;
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5. record the rule, evidence, and rationale and notify affected people when lawful
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and safe; and
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6. provide an appeal route and use confirmed incidents to improve controls.
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SkillHub's review guide recommends completing routine package reviews within 24
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hours to avoid blocking publishers. That recommendation is not a historical average
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for safety reports and is not an emergency-response guarantee. The upstream project
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does not yet have enough comparable safety reports to publish a meaningful average
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assessment or action time. Each operator must publish targets appropriate to its
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risk, staffing, and legal obligations, with an urgent path for imminent harm and
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child safety.
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## Appeals
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A publisher, reporter, account holder, or other person materially affected by a
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governance decision should be able to request review through the instance
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operator's private channel. The request should identify the original decision and
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give a reason for review, such as significant new evidence, a material procedural
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error, a conflict of interest, or a clearly disproportionate action.
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Appeals should be handled by a person who did not make the original decision and
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has no conflict of interest. The reviewer may uphold, modify, or reverse the action,
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or require a new investigation. Temporary protective measures may remain in place
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while needed to protect people, systems, evidence, or legal obligations.
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For Code of Conduct decisions on project-managed community surfaces, send an appeal
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to [ifly_opensource@iflytek.com](mailto:ifly_opensource@iflytek.com) with the
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subject `SkillHub Code of Conduct appeal`. Include the original case reference,
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the outcome being challenged, and the reason for review. Appeal information must
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be limited to people who need it. Retaliation for a good-faith report or appeal
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is prohibited.
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## Children and young people
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SkillHub is a general-purpose developer and enterprise collaboration tool, not a
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child-directed service. An operator that permits use by children or processes their
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data must perform an age-appropriate risk assessment, use any legally required
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parental or guardian consent, minimize collection and profiling, restrict contact
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and high-risk package capabilities, provide child-accessible notices and reporting,
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and route serious concerns to trained personnel and appropriate authorities.
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If those protections cannot be provided, the instance should not be offered to
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children. The project Code of Conduct separately protects community participation
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from harassment regardless of age.
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## Privacy and policy review
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Package inspection, reports, audit logs, and investigations can expose sensitive
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information. They must follow the
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[Privacy and Data Governance Policy](PRIVACY_AND_DATA_GOVERNANCE.md) and the
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instance's own privacy notice and retention schedule.
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Material changes to this policy are made through the repository's public review
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process. Operators should periodically test their controls, review incident trends,
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and update their policy when the product, threat model, law, or operating context
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changes.
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