The dashboard lint-budgets step ran check-lint-budgets.mjs in --check mode,
which fails and tells you to run `npm run lint:metrics` and re-stage by hand.
Add a --write mode that rewrites eslint-metrics.json from the same eslint
report, and have pre-commit use it, then flag drift via git diff so you
re-stage; this mirrors how the block below regenerates schema.d.ts. CI keeps
using --check, so it still fails on a stale committed metrics file.
knip was producing garbage locally and was never wired into CI, so nobody
trusted it. Two structural problems: it silently degrades when deps are
missing (a partial worktree install flagged all 436 test files as unused),
and its config had blind spots that surfaced as false positives.
Fixes so a knip run means something:
- Register every playwright config (serverRootPath + migration variants), not
just the main one. serverRootPath.config.ts is invoked via --config in
test_server_root_path.yml, which knip can't see; it was falsely flagged as
an unused file
- Treat src/components/ui/** as entry points. These are shadcn design-system
primitives, intentionally part of the palette before every one is consumed;
knip was flagging not-yet-used ones (e.g. select.tsx) as dead files and
their sub-exports as unused. Marking the directory as the design-system
surface is the correct fix, not deleting components someone is about to use
- Declare @ant-design/icons as a direct dependency. It was imported in ~198
files but only resolved via antd hoisting, so every one showed up as an
"unlisted dependency"
- Add an explicit vitest plugin block so test-file classification no longer
rides on auto-detection
- Stage severities via rules: gate the now-clean categories (files,
dependencies, unlisted, unresolved) as errors and keep exports/types/
duplicates as warnings, so CI enforces what's at zero today while the
remaining findings ratchet down in follow-ups
- Run npm run knip in the frontend-lint CI job, which installs with npm ci so
it never sees a partial tree
knip now exits 0 with the gated categories clean
* fix(e2e): wire batch provider secrets for docker and k8s
Point batch deployments at the credential field names and os.environ refs
the gateway actually resolves from process env (compose .env or EKS secret
mounts). Missing secrets skip instead of failing red so a red run means a
product bug. Mirror S3 bucket env aliases in docker-compose for provider_fallback
* fix(e2e): drop batch provider_env unit tests
The batches suite is live e2e only; no monkeypatch or unit-level tests
* fix: batch credentials, provider list, and team db lookup
Keep object-storage fields through CredentialLiteLLMParams and resolve
os.environ/ refs when reading deployment credentials so Vertex/Bedrock
batch file uploads see bucket and AWS keys from K8s/docker env
Skip managed batch list when the request is provider-scoped so
/{provider}/v1/batches list works instead of 500
Force DB on check_db_only team lookups and stop masking non-404 errors
as "team doesn't exist"
Drop e2e runner-side skip helpers; hard-fail on missing gateway secrets
* fix: tag reseed, team window spend, and remaining e2e flakes
Reseed spend:tag counters from LiteLLM_TagTable so cold redis still
enforces after the spend writer flushes
When applying post-call cost to team multi-window counters, load the
team from the DB if it is missing from the management cache so window
spend is not dropped on cache misses
Harden cold-counter reseed e2e (namespace-aware keys, burst success,
poll). Give tag budget more headroom. Retry /key/update on redis DNS
blips. Ensure NLTK punkt_tab is present for pipecat realtime audio
* revert: drop product code changes; e2e-only scope
Reverts all litellm/ and unit-test product edits. This branch is limited
to tests/e2e per contributor instruction
* fix(e2e): harden batch list and team member setup races
provider_fallback list falls back when managed batches reject provider
filtering. Team create waits for /team/info and member_add retries on
transient team-not-found so split control-plane lag does not red the suite
* fix(e2e): remove .env.example
Leave local .env and docker-compose env wiring as the secret source
* fix(e2e): wire files_settings and faster budget rescheduler for compose
OpenAI/Azure batch file uploads need files_settings; budget reset e2e needs a
short rescheduler window. Drop unsupported bedrock-encoded create_batch cells,
tolerate bedrock file.bytes=0, and surface team-info wait failures instead of
hanging silently
* chore(e2e): strip verbose comments from batch capabilities
* fix(e2e): assert managed list fallback before provider_fallback skip
When provider-scoped list is rejected, still fetch the unfiltered list and
check the envelope. Only skip membership when the id is a raw
provider_fallback batch that managed list cannot index
* refactor(ui): colocate agents and guardrails views, keeping shared selectors and types
The last two group-1 colocation splits. Both are file-plus-folder combos: the
page view is a top-level file (agents.tsx / guardrails.tsx) sitting beside a
supporting folder of the same name, and part of that folder is shared.
agents: agents/types (imported by the agents hook) stays in @/components/agents;
agents.tsx and the rest of the agents/ folder move into agents/_components (the
view file becomes _components/index.tsx).
guardrails: GuardrailSelector (imported by the Playground, the key edit view,
and the agents add-guardrail form) and types stay in @/components/guardrails;
guardrails.tsx and the other 47 folder files (including the tool_permission,
custom_code, content_filter, and llm_judge subfolders) move into
guardrails/_components.
Moved files' imports of the retained shared files become @/components paths,
other escaping relative imports are absolutized against @/, and moved test
files have their from/vi.mock/vi.importActual paths rewritten to match. Lint
suppressions are re-keyed for moved files only (the staying selector/types keep
their src/components keys). The shared selectors did not move, so their external
consumers are untouched. No behavior change.
* fix(ui): move the orphaned agents/guardrails view tests and drop dead GuardrailItem
Greptile follow-ups on the agents/guardrails colocation:
- agents.tsx and guardrails.tsx moved to their _components/index.tsx, but their
sibling test files (src/components/agents.test.tsx, guardrails.test.tsx) were
left behind still importing ./agents and ./guardrails, which broke a full
vitest run. Move them to the matching _components/index.test.tsx and rewrite
their view import to ./index, folder mocks to local ./ siblings, and
networking to @/components/networking.
- Remove the unused GuardrailItem interface and its GuardrailDefinitionLocation
import from the guardrails view (dead code carried over from before the move;
state is typed as Guardrail[]).
* fix(spend-logs): honor store_prompts_in_spend_logs for guardrail_information (LIT-4314)
_get_spend_logs_metadata passed guardrail_information entries through
verbatim, so guardrail hooks that echo the LLM request into
guardrail_response leaked the raw prompt into LiteLLM_SpendLogs.metadata
regardless of store_prompts_in_spend_logs. This mirrored the pre-existing
gap for the other prompt-carrying fields (vector_store_request_metadata,
error_information, etc.), which already sanitize via
_should_store_prompts_and_responses_in_spend_logs.
Add _sanitize_guardrail_information_for_spend_logs alongside the other
per-field sanitizers and wire it into _get_spend_logs_metadata. When the
flag is False the sanitizer replaces guardrail_request and
guardrail_response with REDACTED_BY_LITELM_STRING while preserving every
other typed field on the entry (name, provider, mode, status, timings,
action, violation_categories, risk_score, masked_entity_count, ...) so
guardrail dashboards keep working. When the flag is True (or the field
is None) the entries pass through unchanged.
Widen StandardLoggingGuardrailInformation.guardrail_request from
Optional[dict] to Optional[Union[dict, str]] so the redacted sentinel
satisfies the TypedDict without needing a cast; guardrail_response
already accepted str.
Regression tests cover the three cases (flag=False redacts,
flag=True passes through, None passes through) plus an end-to-end
get_logging_payload path that fails if the wire-in at line 139 is
reverted.
* chore(spend-logs): review nits (one-shot dict build, scrub identifier in tests)
- _redact_prompt_fields_in_guardrail_entry now returns the redacted
dict in one expression instead of seed-then-mutate (TYPE-3)
- swap the illustrative guardrail_name in the new test fixtures for
a generic 'demo-echo-guard' identifier
* chore(spend-logs): only redact guardrail prompt fields when caller supplied them
Greptile P2: the sanitizer was unconditionally writing REDACTED_BY_LITELM
into both guardrail_request and guardrail_response on the copy, so entries
that never carried one of those fields (e.g. a guardrail that only emits
a guardrail_response) came out with a phantom guardrail_request key added.
Guard both assignments with an in-check so the output shape is stable.
Add a mutation-checked regression test that fails if either guard is
removed.
* fix(spend-logs): also redact match_details and classification in guardrail_information
The initial LIT-4314 fix redacted guardrail_request and guardrail_response,
but two other typed fields on StandardLoggingGuardrailInformation also
carry raw prompt content when a first-party guardrail populates them:
- litellm_content_filter/content_filter.py:1676 sets classification =
dict(CompetitorIntentDetection), whose evidence[*].match is a substring
taken directly from the user's normalized prompt (see
litellm_content_filter/competitor_intent/base.py:184-194).
- block_code_execution/block_code_execution.py:571 sets match_details =
guardrail_response = [dict(d) for d in detections], where detections
carry the fenced-code-block content extracted from the user's message.
Reproduced live against localhost:4000 with store_prompts_in_spend_logs
false and a custom guardrail passing tracing_detail with both fields:
before this commit the raw prompt shows up in metadata.guardrail_information[0]
under match_details and classification; after, both are the sentinel.
Widen the two TypedDict fields to Optional[Union[..., str]] so the
sentinel string satisfies the schema without a cast, and consolidate
the redaction set into a tuple so future prompt-carrying additions are
one-line changes.
* fix(spend-logs): normalize non-list guardrail_information shapes in sanitizer
xecguard's logging hook (xecguard.py:246) assigns a bare dict to
standard_logging_object['guardrail_information'] instead of a list,
violating the typed contract Optional[List[StandardLoggingGuardrailInformation]].
Without defensive normalization, _sanitize_guardrail_information_for_spend_logs
iterates the dict's string keys and _redact_prompt_fields_in_guardrail_entry
raises TypeError on {**'guardrail_name'}, which get_logging_payload's
downstream update_database catches with a broad except and silently drops
the entire spend-log write for that request.
Normalize a bare-dict input to a single-item list at the sanitizer's
entry point, and skip any non-dict entries defensively (matching OTEL's
existing isinstance filter at opentelemetry.py:1751-1753 for the same
field). Downstream readers already model this defensively; make the
spend-log write path match.
The root cause is xecguard's writer, not the sanitizer. That is being
tracked as a separate ticket; this PR keeps xecguard-enabled deploys
from silently losing spend logs when store_prompts_in_spend_logs=false.
* fix(types): declare guardrail Union members str-first to avoid poisoning typing cache
CPython's typing module caches Union[...] order-insensitively (first-
construction wins), and litellm/types/utils.py has no 'from __future__
import annotations', so its unions are constructed eagerly at import
time -- before any proxy model. Declaring guardrail_request,
classification, and match_details with dict-first ordering seeds the
typing cache with a dict-first tuple, and later proxy models that
declare custom_llm_provider / model_aliases / vertex_credentials as
Optional[Union[str, dict]] pick up the same dict-first object.
Downstream, Pydantic's get_args() then reports anyOf in dict-first
order, FastAPI emits the OpenAPI accordingly, and 'npm run gen:api'
produces a schema.d.ts diff on unrelated fields, tripping the schema-
sync CI check.
Behaviorally identical in Python and at the wire; the flip only reorders
the union members so the first construction matches how the codebase
had always declared these unions, and 'npm run gen:api' now produces a
zero diff against the committed schema.d.ts.
The multi-server list path already relays an upstream 401 from a client-forwarded
server (true_passthrough / oauth_delegate) as an MCPUpstreamAuthError so the caller
re-runs its own upstream OAuth. The single-server REST call path did not: an upstream
401 was masked as a graceful isError result, so an MCP client holding an expired
upstream token never learned it had to re-authenticate
Relay the upstream 401 on the call path too. For these modes the manager calls the
client with raise_on_error=True, extracts the WWW-Authenticate through the existing
upstream-auth exception walk, and raises MCPUpstreamAuthError; the REST endpoint turns
it into a real 401 + WWW-Authenticate. Only 401 is treated as a re-auth signal (a 403 is
a genuine authorization failure that re-auth will not fix, so it stays a masked isError
with a visible warning), matching the list path and MCPUpstreamAuthError's contract. The
legacy oauth2 + delegate_auth_to_upstream mode is deliberately left off the call-path
relay since it is being removed
To keep this expected caller-must-reauth signal from tripping error-rate alerts, the
client layer logs at debug when the caller opted into raise_on_error and therefore owns
the exception (both call_tool/list_tools and the run_with_session helper they share, so an
expected re-auth emits no warning per call either), the manager's non-auth branch logs the
exception type only (never str(e), which for an httpx error embeds the upstream URL a
credential can hide in), and the streamable and REST handlers log the relayed 401 at info
rather than as an error with a traceback
Tests cover the manager raising on a client-forwarded 401 while keeping a 403/503 as a
masked isError, the client-layer debug-vs-error logging split, the streamable handler's
informational isError, and the REST endpoint relaying both the direct and virtual
mcp_tool_call branches as a real 401 + WWW-Authenticate; each was mutation-checked to fail
when the corresponding behavior is broken
* refactor(ui): colocate the policies view, keeping PolicySelector shared
Group-1 colocation split. The policies folder lived in the shared src/components
dump but is only partly shared: PolicySelector (used by the Playground,
ComplianceUI, and key edit view) and its types stay in @/components/policies,
while the policy-management view (27 files: index, tables, forms, modals,
pipeline builder, and their tests) moves to policies/_components.
Moved files' imports of the retained shared files become @/components/policies
paths; other escaping relative imports are absolutized against the @/ alias
(including @/data/... and the repo test-utils via @/../tests/...), and moved
test files have both their `from` imports and `vi.mock` paths rewritten so the
mocks keep matching the source. Grandfathered lint suppressions for moved files
are re-keyed. PolicySelector did not move, so its external consumers are
untouched. No behavior change.
* fix(ui): keep PolicySelector.tsx eslint suppression at its original path
PolicySelector.tsx stays in src/components/policies (only the management view
moved to _components), but the suppression re-key wrongly moved its
no-nested-ternary entry to the phantom _components path, orphaning the real
file's suppression. Revert that one key. (Greptile P1 on #32720.)
Two of the group-1 colocation splits. Each of these folders lived in the shared
src/components dump but is only partly shared: the page's management view is
segment-owned, while a selector widget is reused by other features. So this
splits them rather than moving wholesale.
tag-management: TagSelector (used by playground) and its types stay in
@/components/tag_management; the management view (index, tag_info, TagTable,
CreateTagModal) moves to tag-management/_components.
vector-stores: VectorStoreSelector (used by organizations and playground) and
its types stay in @/components/vector_store_management; the rest of the
management UI moves to vector-stores/_components.
The moved files' imports of the retained shared files are rewritten to absolute
@/components paths, escaping relative imports are absolutized, and moved test
files have both their `from` imports and `vi.mock` paths rewritten to match.
Grandfathered lint suppressions for moved files are re-keyed. The external
consumers of the selectors are untouched (the selectors did not move). No
behavior change.
Renames each segment's local components/ folder to _components/ (private to the
route, matching Next's _ route-exclusion). Both folders are imported only by
their own page.tsx via the folder index (verified zero external importers
across src, tests, and e2e_tests), so each is a straight rename plus repointing
that one index import; a folder rename keeps every file at the same depth, so
all internal and relative imports are unaffected.
Grandfathered lint suppressions under the two folders (31 entries: cost-tracking
15, prompts 16) are re-keyed to the new paths with counts unchanged. No behavior
change.
Team-level callback_vars (e.g. langsmith_api_key) get spread into
data["metadata"] as four aliases (user_api_key_metadata,
user_api_key_team_metadata, user_api_key_auth_metadata,
user_api_key_auth). When a guardrail hook echoes that metadata into
its guardrail_response, the plaintext credential landed five times
inside LiteLLM_SpendLogs.metadata.standard_logging_guardrail_information[i].guardrail_response
and every downstream sink that reads it (OTel via emit_guardrail_span,
Langfuse, custom loggers).
Add a purpose-built payload walker (mask_credentials_in_payload) that
only masks strings under sensitive-named keys and preserves every
other value (None, ints, floats, bools, tuples, typed objects) verbatim.
The walker reuses SensitiveDataMasker.is_sensitive_key so the pattern
list stays in one place, and unwraps Pydantic models via model_dump()
so nested UserAPIKeyAuth values reached by the walk get scanned as
plain dicts (they are JSON-serialized downstream anyway).
Apply the walker at add_standard_logging_guardrail_information_to_request_data
after the existing secret_fields pop and match/regex redaction, so
every downstream sink sees masked values from a single seam.
At threshold 0.8 azure gpt-realtime fires speech-stop and creates a response, but the committed audio is clipped enough that the response comes back empty (0 transcript, 0 audio), failing the audio-input assertions deterministically. Dropping to 0.5 captures the full utterance so the model produces real content. Verified against a live proxy: 0.8 yields empty responses, 0.5 yields transcript and audio. openai tolerated 0.8; azure did not
azure batch used azure/gpt-4.1-mini-batch; gpt-4.1-mini is deprecating (2026-11-04)
and can no longer be deployed, so point it at gpt-5.4-mini (Global Batch) and bump
the api_version to 2025-04-01-preview. Requires an Azure Global Batch deployment
named gpt-5.4-mini-batch plus AZURE_API_BASE/AZURE_API_KEY on the proxy.
xai/grok-4-1-fast-non-reasoning is deprecated (2026-05-15); update the commented
xai realtime provider and the coverage-matrix doc to xai/grok-4-1-fast.
Colocation follow-up to the App Router migration: move each page's owned
components out of the shared src/components dump and into its route segment's
_components/ folder, draining the shared bucket. Convention: a component used
by exactly one segment goes in that segment's _components/ (private, matching
Next's _ route-exclusion); a component shared by 2+ segments stays in
@/components. No new _shared/ folder.
Rename-in-place (segment already had a local components/ folder):
- api-reference (also relocates the shared CodeBlock, used by playground and
cost-tracking, to @/components/CodeBlock)
- memory, budgets, access-groups
- caching, projects, guardrails-monitor
Extract from src/components (page view lived in the shared dump):
- AdminPanel -> admin-panel, organizations -> organizations,
general_settings -> router-settings, usage -> old-usage
Each folder/view was verified to have no importer other than its own page
(cross-checked across src, tests, and e2e_tests). Relative imports inside moved
single files are rewritten to absolute @/components/*; colocated tests move with
their subject and have their vi.mock paths rewritten to match. Grandfathered
lint suppressions (tremor, react-hooks, and similar, all pre-existing) are
re-keyed to the new paths with counts unchanged. No behavior change.
The preview endpoint infers client_credentials when the inherited client_id, client_secret, and
token_url are all present (common once DCR or discovery filled them) and then strips the forwarded
bearer to preview as M2M, so the staged interactive token was silently unused; sending
oauth2_flow=authorization_code bypasses the inference. spec_path now rides along so OpenAPI servers
take the spec-based preview path the create form gets. clearHeldOAuthToken also empties the tool
list, mirroring the create form's clearTools, so a preview fetched with the discarded token never
lingers while the refetch is in flight
The per-row delete_many loop becomes a single delete filtered to the enumerated OAuth users'
(user_id IN, server_id) pairs; same rows deleted, same BYOK-sparing precision, same count-mismatch
detection, one round-trip instead of N
The field doc still said scheme + host + path while the redactor now strips the path along with
userinfo, query, and fragment, since hosted MCP servers routinely embed the credential in the path
The create and edit submit paths for true_passthrough and oauth_delegate persist only the tool
configuration: the parametrized create test authorizes, disables the allowlist, and asserts nothing
is persisted before submit, then that the create payload carries allowed_tools but no credentials
and no occurrence of the token anywhere in the serialized payload, no per-user DB credential is
written, and the token is committed to sessionStorage only, keyed to the created server. The edit
save test gains the same serialized-payload assertion
For authorization_code the edit preview listed tools by server_id only, relying on the stored
per-user DB credential, so a token authorized in the edit session gave an empty preview until the
admin saved; the create form previews the identical state through the config-based preview
endpoint, which takes the token explicitly. The edit fetch now routes through that same endpoint
when a staged interactive token is held, built from the form values with the saved record as
fallback, and keeps the by-server_id listing for every other case
The identity used to pick the audience from spec_path only when
values.transport was OPENAPI, but the create form keeps transport in component
state rather than form values, so spec_path edits on OpenAPI servers never
invalidated a held token. Comparing url and spec_path independently mirrors
the backend's mcp_oauth_token_identity and fires regardless of whether
transport is present. Invalidation now also wipes only credentials; the
admin-typed endpoint fields are kept
LiteLLM_MCPUserCredentials stores BYOK API keys in the same column as per-user
OAuth tokens, so the purge on a mint-relevant config change now deletes only
rows whose payload decodes as an OAuth2 credential, each by its
(user_id, server_id) pair, instead of every row for the server. An api_key
server whose url changes purges nothing. delete_mcp_server now also
invalidates each enumerated user's cached token so a re-created server reusing
the id cannot serve tokens minted for the deleted one, and both cache drops
are best-effort
The staged access token never reaches formValues (it is not a registered form field), so the
assertion could not fail; the DCR client pair is the leak the test actually pins, proven by the
mutation run
The snapshot read only feeds the stale-token purge decision; leaving it unguarded meant a failed
read would 500 an edit whose update would have succeeded, and it broke
test_edit_mcp_server_redacts_credentials, whose mocked prisma is not awaitable on the un-patched
get_mcp_server path. A failure now logs and skips the purge, consistent with the purge half already
being best-effort. Adds the first endpoint-level coverage of the edit purge wiring: purge on a
mint-relevant change, no purge when the identity is unchanged, and edit success with purge skipped
when the snapshot read raises
The purge takes an injectable invalidate_token_cache callable defaulting to the manager's shared
invalidation, and MCPServerManager takes an injectable per_user_token_cache alongside the existing
per_user_oauth_token_store, so tests inject fakes instead of monkeypatching the global manager and
the module-level cache. The new identity helpers drop Any for object throughout
Review follow-ups on the stale-token invalidation. The backend identity now decrypts client_id and
client_secret before comparing: the stored values are NaCl-encrypted with a fresh nonce on every
write, so comparing ciphertext flagged every routine save as a mint-relevant change and purged
per-user tokens that were still valid. The identity also gains spec_path, the audience for OpenAPI
servers, and parses credentials stored as a JSON string
The purge now routes each (user, server) through the manager's invalidate_user_oauth_token_cache,
which becomes the single invalidation point covering both the legacy per-user token cache and the
v2 per-user OAuth token store; previously the purge evicted only the legacy cache while the revoke
path evicted only the v2 store, so each path left the other cache serving a replaced token until
its TTL. A credential row racing in between the find and the delete is now detected via the
delete_many count and logged; its cache entry expires by TTL
On the dashboard, CLEARED_ON_INVALIDATION and the staleness check move to types.tsx as the single
shared implementation for both forms. The edit form's transport handler now rechecks the identity
after its programmatic setFieldsValue calls, which antd does not report through onValuesChange, so
a token no longer survives a transport switch that clears the mint target. The create form rebuilds
formValues from the post-reset form state after an invalidation instead of publishing the pre-reset
snapshot, so the tool preview can no longer refetch with the discarded DCR client. Both transport
handlers now share the recheck, which also stops the create form from over-invalidating on an
http to sse swap that keeps the same url and therefore the same audience
An admin who ran Authorize & Fetch and then changed a field that determines which upstream OAuth
token gets minted kept using the stale token for tool preview, sessionStorage, and (on the backend)
the stored per-user credential and its cache. Grounded in RFC 8707/8693 and the MCP auth spec, a token
is bound to one tuple: resource/audience (url), OAuth mode/grant (auth_type, oauth_flow_type), the
authorization-server endpoints, and the OAuth client + scopes. A shared getOAuthAuthorizationIdentity
captures exactly those fields; transport (http/sse on the same url is the same audience) and
delegate_auth_to_upstream (a downstream-usage toggle never sent to the authorize request) are excluded.
UI: both the create and edit forms now discard the held token (React state / sessionStorage / hook,
plus the fetched token + DCR client in form.credentials) whenever the identity diverges from the one it
was authorized against, re-applying the admin's in-flight edit so it is never wiped. The check lives in
one shared helper so the two forms cannot drift.
Backend: editing an MCP server now compares the pre/post identity and, on a mint-relevant change, purges
every stored per-user OAuth credential for the server (DB row + per-user token cache) so no user
forwards a token minted for a resource/AS/client that no longer matches. Best-effort; a purge failure
never fails the update.
The gateway authorize/token/register gate and the preview header extraction each carried their own
inline copy of the oauth2 + client-forwarded mode set, which could drift from the discovery
constant the registry builders use; all three surfaces mean the same thing (modes that run the
upstream OAuth browser flow), so they now read the one constant
The redacted resource kept the path, but hosted MCP servers routinely embed the credential in the
path (for example /mcp/s/<token>/mcp), and mcp_tool_call_metadata is readable by a caller who can
invoke the tool, so the path leaked the upstream credential into spend logs. Only scheme, host, and
port are logged now
Authorization doubles as the admission fallback when x-litellm-api-key is absent, so a caller who
authenticated the preview request that way had their LiteLLM key forwarded to the upstream as the
oauth2/client-forwarded token. The preview now forwards Authorization only when the primary
admission header is present, which is how the dashboard has always sent it; with no primary header
there is no upstream token on the request at all. Applies to oauth2 and both client-forwarded
modes; parametrized regression test plus the admission header added to the existing extraction
tests to mirror the real UI request shape
* fix(bedrock-invoke): retain clear_tool_uses_20250919 context_management edits and emit context-management-2025-06-27 beta (LIT-3393)
Copy of #29206 by oss-agent-shin, rebased onto litellm_internal_staging so CircleCI can run.
Bedrock InvokeModel supports automatic tool-call clearing (clear_tool_uses_20250919) under the context-management-2025-06-27 beta, but LiteLLM stripped the edit and dropped the beta header, causing a Bedrock 400. This maps bedrock.context-management-2025-06-27 to itself in anthropic_beta_headers_config.json (bedrock_converse stays null) and rewrites _filter_context_management_for_bedrock_invoke around an allowlist of supported edit types that keeps each supported edit and adds its matching beta.
* test(bedrock-invoke): restore beta-headers config cache with a shared fixture in LIT-3393 tests
Greptile flagged that three of the four new tests reloaded the module-level
beta-headers config into local mode without restoring it on teardown, leaking
state into later tests in the same process. Move setup/teardown into a
local_beta_headers_config fixture used by all four tests.
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Co-authored-by: oss-agent-shin <ext-agent-shin@berri.ai>
* fix: rust ocr tests finally pass
* fix: move realtime dir
* fix(realtime): normalize azure realtime api_base to host for Foundry endpoints
The azure realtime handler appended the realtime path to api_base verbatim, so a
Foundry base carrying a project path (.../api/projects/<name>) produced an invalid
realtime URL and the websocket handshake hung. Normalize api_base to scheme and host
before building the realtime path so both Azure OpenAI and Foundry bases connect
Point the e2e realtime azure deployment at the GA gpt-realtime model and stop passing
the os.environ refs the realtime path never unwraps, resolving them from the gateway
env by name instead. Drop the local docker-compose scaffolding from the tree
* test(e2e): add Gateway.list_files and list_fine_tuning_jobs for the discovery suite
The discovery endpoints suite calls client.gateway.list_files and
list_fine_tuning_jobs, which did not exist on Gateway, so both tests errored with
AttributeError before reaching the proxy. Add the two GET wrappers using the
existing FileListResponse / FineTuningJobsResponse models
* revert(realtime): drop azure realtime api_base host-normalization
The azure realtime handshake failure was a config issue, not a litellm bug: the
realtime base was set to the Azure AI Foundry project endpoint (.../api/projects/<p>),
but the OpenAI-compatible realtime route lives at the resource root. litellm correctly
appends the realtime path to whatever base it is given, so pointing the realtime
deployment at the resource root is the fix and no core change is needed
* fix(ocr): route azure_ai doc-intelligence to its own endpoint at the source
get_llm_provider inherits AZURE_AI_API_BASE into api_base for every azure_ai/* OCR
model, but Azure Document Intelligence is a separate resource reached via
AZURE_DOCUMENT_INTELLIGENCE_ENDPOINT, so doc-intelligence requests went to the wrong
host. Stop inheriting the azure_ai base for doc-intelligence models so api_base stays
unset and both the rust bridge and the python get_complete_url fall back to the
document-intelligence endpoint. This drops the earlier _rust_bridge_api_base reorder,
which only covered the rust path and let the env silently override an explicit api_base
* refactor(ocr): consolidate azure doc-intelligence detection; keep explicit api_base
Extract is_azure_document_intelligence_model as the single source of truth for the azure_ai doc-intelligence sub-route so the check is no longer duplicated across _prepare_ocr_request and _rust_bridge_api_base, and gate the dynamic_api_base suppression on the caller not supplying an api_base so an explicit endpoint is always honoured. Restore xai to the realtime PROVIDERS as a documented disabled entry instead of dropping it silently, and add a regression test pinning doc-intelligence api_base resolution.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Co-authored-by: Mubashir Osmani <mubashir@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
