Comparing per variable rejected a credential written under its other spelling:
langfuse_secret and langfuse_secret_key are one key, so repeating the stored
secret under the other name read as a new value.
Ask instead whether the value is one the owning entries already carry. A
destination the caller controls is by definition not, so the redirect stays
closed, and no alias table has to stay complete for that to hold.
The family rule compared variable names only, so a team admin who registered
an integration for the success event could not register the same integration,
with the same values, for the failure event.
Compare the values as well: repeating what the owning entry already stores
flattens to the same dict, so there is nothing to redirect. The stored side is
decrypted first, because the credentials are encrypted at rest and ciphertext
never equals the plaintext coming in.
Every stored entry's callback_vars are flattened into one dict before a
request reads them, and that dict is what the exporter authenticates and
addresses with. So an entry naming only a destination is enough to
redirect a credential written somewhere else: a host on a second entry
pairs with the key pair from the first, and the request carries that key
pair to the new host. A team admin cannot read the team's masked Langfuse
secret, but could add such an entry and receive it.
Reject, for writers who are not proxy admins, an entry using a credential
family another entry already holds. Family rather than callback name,
because langfuse and langfuse_otel configure one Langfuse project and
would otherwise redirect each other, and because a destination like
dd_agent_host that no integration registry lists still pairs with the
Datadog credentials beside it.
A proxy admin already holds every credential the proxy has, so the rule
would buy nothing there and would break configs that predate it. A team
admin who does want to move a family deletes the entry holding it first,
which reveals nothing.
The grant is two templates ending in the callback suffix, and the
placeholder now takes slashes and colons. Every other route under
/team/{team_id} registers an ordinary single-segment placeholder, so no
URL the router sends to one of them can end in the callback suffix.
Pin that, so adding a path-converter route beside these fails here
rather than by handing a caller a handler the grant never covered.
A team id may carry a slash, a colon, or both. The gate expanded {x:path}
to "[^:]+", so an id with a colon in it matched no self_managed_routes
entry and its team admin got the proxy-admin-only denial on a route the
router had already resolved for them. Listing a second {x} spelling covered
a colon or a slash but never both.
Expand {x:path} to ".+" instead, except when the template puts a ":"
literal of its own after the placeholder, which is where the narrower form
was earning its keep: the Google routes end in ":generateContent" and
friends, and there the value has to stop before that suffix rather than
swallow it and match a different verb.
That lets self_managed_routes drop back to the two :path spellings the
router itself mounts.
The route gate expands {team_id:path} to "[^:]+" so a colon-suffixed provider
route is not swallowed, which means the two entries added here matched a team
id with a slash but not one with a colon, while the router accepts both.
team_id is a free-form string, so a team whose id contains a colon kept the
old proxy-admin-only denial and its admin could not manage its own callbacks.
List both spellings rather than relaxing the shared matcher, which every
":path" route depends on. The comment claimed the two matchers agree; they do
not, so it now says what each placeholder actually accepts.
The team callback endpoints already authorize correctly: POST, GET and DELETE
each call _verify_team_access, which admits a proxy admin, an org admin for the
team, or an admin of that team, and 403s everyone else. The route-permission
layer never let a team admin reach them, so it answered 401 naming proxy admin
and the handler's own check was dead code for the caller it was written for.
Adding the two paths to self_managed_routes is how every other team-admin route
works: /team/member_add, /team/member_delete, /team/member_update and
/team/permissions_update all sit in that list and scope per team inside the
handler. The entries use the :path converter the routes are registered with, so
a team id containing a slash resolves the same way at the gate as at the router.
Because any authenticated caller now reaches these handlers, an unknown team had
to stop being distinguishable from one the caller may not manage. All three
handlers looked the team up and raised a distinct 'does not exist' before the
access check, which would have let any valid key probe for team ids. That branch
now returns the same 403 body _verify_team_access raises, and keeps the
diagnosable error for a proxy admin.
disable_logging stays out of the grant. That is a scope decision rather than a
security boundary, since a team admin holding DELETE can clear callbacks one at
a time; it differs only in also clearing the deprecated callback_settings shape.
* test(e2e/ui): cover the Budgets page create, edit and delete flows
The Budgets page had no browser coverage at all, so an admin creating or
editing a spend cap through the UI was only exercised by hand at RC time.
Each test reads the budget back from /budget/list, a different route from
the one the table renders, so a row that only exists in the table's cache
does not pass. The edit test pins the rate limits an unrelated spend-cap
edit has no business touching.
* test(e2e/ui): trim comments that restate the test steps
Review flagged the explanatory comments as restating ordinary setup rather
than explaining anything. Keeps the two that carry the regression rationale
for an assertion and drops the rest.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The restored code seeded two mutable lists, which trips LIT002 now that
the type-discipline budget has ratcheted past what they cost
Build both in one shot as tuples and widen the parameter to Sequence so
the single caller still type checks. No behavior change, both are only
ever read
The pure revert restored `getattr(llm_router, "search_tools")`, whose
two-argument constant-attribute form ruff flags as B009, and the
strict-rule budget has since ratcheted below what that costs
Passing an explicit `None` default keeps behavior identical, the
preceding `hasattr` guard already proves the attribute is there, while
staying inside the budget
This reverts commit 65a46a5f32 (#38113)
That change made two edits that combine into a hard failure for SDK
users. It dropped the null-router guard in
_select_search_tool_from_router, so a missing router now yields an empty
search_tools list instead of returning early, and it turned the no-match
case in _select_search_tool_from_list from a debug-logged fallback into
a raised ValueError. It also added a call site in
async_pre_call_deployment_hook that invokes the selection purely for the
side effect of raising, discarding the return value
Used together, any SDK caller that sets search_tool_name and sends a web
search tool now raises "Configured search tool '<name>' was not found"
on every request. There is no way to satisfy the check off the proxy,
because search_tools is only ever populated from the proxy router, so
the SDK path cannot register one
tests/pass_through_unit_tests/test_websearch_interception_e2e.py caught
this, but #38113 only updated the handler unit tests, so the break
landed on staging
Reverting restores the previous behavior while we work out a fix that
keeps the stricter validation on the proxy path, where a silently
substituted search provider is the real problem worth rejecting, without
turning the SDK path into an unconditional error
Updates browserslist for GHSA-73wf-gq98-2v4g and GHSA-c83g-rgw3-j3cx, both CVSS 7.5. The vulnerabilities are fixed in 4.28.7; bump to 4.28.8, published 2026-08-08.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The invite-dialog test only read data-orientation, so a regression inside
the shared field variants could restore the full-width bar and still pass.
Assert the classes that carry the layout, cover the two SSO call sites the
fix also changed, and pin the vertical/horizontal contract on the primitive.
bg-none only clears background-image, so the buttons fell back to the
browser's default button background instead of the transparent one the
inline style had.
key_edit_view opened a select and then clicked the option it found by
title text or by raw text. Both queries match the moment the option
enters the DOM, which is one render before the popup finishes entering.
Until then the positioner still carries an inline pointer-events: none,
and user-event refuses to click through it.
That is a race, and a fast machine loses it. Five of the file's 84 tests
failed on every local run while CI stayed green, which is the worst shape
for a test to have: it is only ever red on the machine of whoever is
trying to change the code.
tests/test-utils.tsx already ships chooseSelectOption for exactly this.
It finds the option by role and waits for the positioner to release
pointer events before clicking. The five call sites now use it, and the
helper takes the direct user-event API as well as a setup() instance so
callers do not have to restructure to use it.
Five consecutive full-file runs pass where every previous run failed.
Also finishes this file's screen queries, which brings
prefer-screen-queries to its target of 18.
The page painted every surface, border and text color inline with a
fixed light palette (#202124, #5f6368, #dadce0, #f8f9fa, #fff), so in
dark mode it drew dark text on hardcoded white cards.
Move the whole component to the foreground/muted/border/card/info
tokens, which already resolve for both themes.
The pure helpers express the same regression: the save-side drop must
leave the alias in place, and two registries must expand it to their
own ids. The full validate path is already covered by the
persists-verbatim test and the live e2e test.
A single-instance run cannot reproduce the two-region setup, but the
regression is fully visible in one: the alias must survive to /key/info
unrewritten, and the alias-granted key must still list the server's
tools. The broken write path stored the resolved server id instead.
Since PR #29128, key create/update/regenerate resolved every
object_permission.mcp_servers entry against the saving instance's
DB + config registry and persisted the resolved server ids. For
config-loaded servers the id is derived from a hash of the regional
URL, so in a shared-database multi-region deployment the rewrite baked
one region's ids into the row and every other region denied the key.
Grants written before v1.88.0 kept the raw alias and kept working,
which is why only newly provisioned keys broke.
Keep the validation and the stale-entry drop (the LIT-3278 fix), but
persist the caller's original identifiers for everything that resolves.
Read-time expand_permission_list already maps a name to each region's
local server id.
