The stamp in the keychain entry is what decides that secret against one still
sitting in the token file, and it came straight off the wall clock. A clock
that stepped backwards between two logins therefore handed the win to the
older of them: a login the keychain took but the token file could not be
pointed at was resolved back to the credential it replaced, and the fresh one
was erased from the keychain on the way past.
save_cli_token now reads the stamp already on disk and pins the new sign-in
just above it, so the ordering never depends on the clock having moved
forwards. On a clock that did, this changes nothing.
The two stores hold different credentials on that path, so the rollback a
migration does would hand the superseded one back out. The login that could not
replace the file already named the state, and logout reports it too.
A login the keychain accepted whose token file could not be replaced left the
superseded secret on disk, and the next load preferred the file unconditionally,
so it served the old credential and erased the new one from the keychain on the
way past. The keychain entry now carries the timestamp of the sign-in that minted
it, and the two stores are compared on that instead.
A pre-flight that times out leaves its write parked inside the keychain, holding
it against every later call, so the next read blocks on the main thread with no
timeout of its own. Anything that resolves the credential more than once in a
process hits it: an SDK Client built a second time never returns.
The vault now remembers the silence and reports the keychain unreachable for the
rest of the process rather than queueing behind the parked call.
`lite up` treats a token record whose key the keychain would not hand over as no
login at all, and that clause had no test: every existing freshness test passed a
record carrying a real key, so deleting the clause left the whole suite green
The base install smoke check now also asserts keyring is absent, which is what
makes the lazy import in cli_keyring meaningful. keyring ships in the cli extra
only, so a plain `pip install litellm` must not be able to reach it
When a full disk refuses the replacement file and a read-only token file
refuses the rewrite in place, the only way left to get the secret off disk
is to remove the file carrying it. That file was also the note saying the
keychain went unchecked, so its absence made the next logout read a
keychain that was never confirmed as one already known to be clean.
Removing it is what frees the room the replacement was refused for, so the
note is written again on the way out and the logout after this one still
warns.
`lite whoami` led with "Authenticated" whenever a token file was on disk, even when the
keychain holding the credential would not give it up. The notice about that sat below the
account lines, so the session read as a working one and sent the user looking for the
problem anywhere but the keychain
Taking the secret out of ~/.litellm/token.json stages a replacement and moves it into
place, which needs room for a second file and a directory that will accept a new entry.
A full disk refuses the first and a read-only ~/.litellm the second, and logout gave up
there: it removed the file when it could, dropping the record that the keychain had never
been confirmed clear, so the logout after it reported a clean keychain it never checked
Shortening the file already in place needs neither, so the logout scrub and the legacy
migration now fall back to overwriting it where it lies. On a read-only ~/.litellm the
logout the user asked for now happens, instead of coming back with instructions to delete
the file by hand
A ~/.litellm that has gone read-only, or one left root-owned by a sudo login,
refuses both the scrubbed rewrite and the removal. The removal was unguarded,
so 'lite logout' ended in a PermissionError traceback with the credential still
readable in the file. It now comes back as an outcome the command reports,
naming the file and what to do about it, and a file that holds no secret is
still not worth alarming anyone over.
A logout run from an install without the keyring package treated a token file
holding its own secret as proof that no keychain entry could exist. That only
holds for the login which wrote the file. A login before it may have had the
package and put its credential in the keychain, where it outlives both the
uninstall and the file that replaced it, so logout reported a clean sweep over
a live credential. Every keychain that cannot be reached is now treated the
same way, and the message says the keychain went unchecked rather than
asserting what is in it.
A logout that could not reach the keychain deleted the token file whenever it
still held its own secret, and the next logout read that missing file as proof
the keychain was clean. It answered the warning the first run had just issued
with "Logged out successfully" while the entry an earlier login left behind was
still live. The file is the only record that something may still be in there,
which is what `_nothing_left_behind` already says it relies on, so keep it and
take only the secret out.
A keychain that did answer is a different case. `SecretStranded` means the entry
is confirmed there and would not delete, and that needs no note in the file,
while keeping one lets every later command read the credential straight back out
of the keychain, which makes "Logged out locally" untrue. That one drops the
file, as it did before.
The secret still goes first either way: a copy that cannot be replaced with a
secret-free one is removed rather than kept.
Staging the token file can succeed and the replacement still fail afterwards,
and that is the one save path where the keychain has already taken the new
secret. It was reported as a save that kept nothing, which sends the user
looking for a credential that is sitting in their keychain, and it claimed the
previous login was untouched when the one keychain slot had just been written
over.
Give that path its own outcome and its own notice. The new secret stays where
it is: the entry it replaced went the moment it landed, so no rollback brings
that back, and removing the new one too would turn a login this machine may
still be able to use into no login at all.
The remaining `CredentialNotSaved` paths all leave both stores untouched, so
the reassurance they carry is now true wherever it is printed.
Three ways the credential commands could mislead or hang.
`lite logout` on a machine that never logged in warned that a credential may
be stranded in a keychain it could not check, and told the user to install
keyring to go clear it. There was nothing there. A missing token file is now
read as the evidence it is, because logout keeps a secret-free file behind
whenever the keychain is left unconfirmed, so a later run can tell a machine
with a credential it cannot reach apart from one that never had a login. That
holds on the LITELLM_CLI_DISABLE_KEYRING path too.
`KeyringDiscardsWrites` was handled on the read and erase paths, which cannot
produce it: the null backend returns None from `get_password` rather than
raising, so only a write ever detects it. It now lives on `SecretWrite` alone
and the unreachable arms are gone.
`keyring.set_password` blocks forever under a HOME with no usable login
keychain, which is what containers, CI images, `sudo -H`, and service accounts
run with, and reads answer normally there so nothing cheaper tells them apart.
`lite login` never touched a keychain before this, so a sign-in that simply
never returns would be a new way for it to fail. Writes are pre-flighted with
a throwaway value on a bounded wait, and a keychain that stays silent falls
back to the token file. The real credential is never the thing handed to a
call that might land long after we stopped waiting.
Saving also stages the token file before the keychain is given anything, since
the file is the half a read-only or full directory refuses. A save that cannot
land now leaves both stores as it found them, which matters most when the
login it failed to replace still works.
`make lint` hands every path in the diff against the base branch to `ruff
format --check`, including the ones the branch deleted, so any branch that
moves or removes a file under `litellm/` fails the gate with "No such file or
directory" instead of a formatting complaint.
test-linting.yml already filters those out with `--diff-filter=ACMR`, so the
Makefile was the half that drifted. Match it.
A keyring backend can accept a write and keep nothing. That is exactly what
`keyring --disable` and PYTHON_KEYRING_BACKEND=keyring.backends.null.Keyring
select, and it raises nothing to distinguish itself, so `lite login` was
handing the credential to a black hole, scrubbing its own copy from
token.json, and printing a success message over a login that no longer
worked. Reading the value back is the only way to tell that backend apart
from a keychain that really stored the secret.
The same rule closes the rest of the gaps. A credential the token file will
not record is taken back out of the keychain instead of being left live on a
machine with no record of it, and is reported rather than raised. The
migration stages its scrubbed file before the keychain is handed anything,
so a directory that will not accept the rewrite stops the move rather than
leaving the secret in two places. Logout no longer reads a key in the file
as proof that the keychain is clear, which was never sound across two
separate runs, and only draws that conclusion when the `keyring` package is
missing outright, where nothing could have reached a keychain at all.
Removing the file when it could not be rewritten covered a full disk, but not a
~/.litellm that permits neither the rewrite nor the delete, which is what a
`sudo lite login` leaves behind. There the secret was copied into the keychain and
kept in cleartext on disk, so migration widened exposure instead of narrowing it
Migration now only keeps the vault copy if the file's copy is gone. When it is not,
the write is rolled back and the user is left exactly as they were, logged in with
one copy of the credential
Migration moved the secret into the keychain and then suppressed any OSError from
rewriting token.json, so a file that could not be rewritten kept the credential in
cleartext while every command reported success. That file is now removed instead:
signing in again costs one command, a stranded live credential costs the credential
`lite logout` also reported a clean logout whenever the keyring package was missing,
on the reasoning that an install without it could never have stored anything. The
entry belongs to the OS, so a keychain-backed login survives a logout run from a venv
without the cli extra. erase() now reports which keychain state applies, and logout
warns with the advice that fixes each one, staying quiet for file-backed logins whose
token file still carries its own secret
Also pins the migration path's tightening of a world-readable legacy token.json, and
moves the logout tests off patch() onto the injected vault
lite ships with every install of litellm, but the keyring package it needs
for keychain storage only ships with the cli extra. Such a user on a Mac was
told 'No OS keychain available' about a machine that plainly has one, with
nothing pointing at the missing package.
The vault now reports which of the three unusable states it is in, so login
can point at the install, name the kill switch, or report a genuinely absent
keychain.
Drop the inline notes on keychain erasure and disk-vs-vault precedence in favour
of docstrings on the two functions that own those rules, and remove a stale
section header and a field note that the code already says plainly.
* feat(ptu): accrue flat cost for PTU deployments declared in config.yaml
The flat-cost rollup reads deployments from LiteLLM_ProxyModelTable, and config.yaml
models never reach that table by design, so a PTU deployment declared there accrued no
flat cost at all while still billing its traffic per token. The provider bills the
reservation whichever file declared it.
The rollup now also reads the deployments the router holds that no database row owns,
identified by db_model, skipping the per-request credential clones that carry
original_model_id and reuse their source's PTU config under a fresh id. Registering such
a deployment zeroes its pricing, since reserved capacity already pays for the traffic it
serves, and leaving a rate unset falls back to the public cost map, which makes the double
charge the default rather than an opt-in.
The rules both halves apply now live in one module. The rollup's test for what it will
charge and the router's test for what to zero have to agree, or a deployment one accepts
and the other declines serves its traffic for free. That module also owns the fields the
write endpoints already zero, so the two paths cannot drift: tiered_pricing is emptied
rather than zeroed because its tiers outrank the rates beside them, the search context
table is written zeroed because an absent one means the provider default, and any further
rate the deployment itself declares is zeroed alongside the standing set.
The prune is bounded to the deployments a run scanned, but only for a run that priced a
config-declared deployment. Deciding a row is garbage on staleness alone stays correct
while every run derives its charges from the same table, so a database-only run sweeps
exactly as it did before; once one host's charges come from a file the others cannot read,
a row it never considered is not evidence of anything.
Behaviour change worth calling out: a zeroed deployment sorts ahead of an unpriced sibling
in QualityRouter's cost tiebreak, where an unset rate previously sorted last. Reserved
capacity really is the cheaper choice, but the ordering moves.
* refactor(ptu): drop a Final rebind and two redundant isinstance guards
The basedpyright budget rejected reassigning a Final in the datetime coercion and
two isinstance calls the router entry's own type already guarantees. Filtering the
built records rather than the raw entries removes both guards and leaves
_router_deployment as the single validator.
lite login used to write the minted cli-session key in cleartext to
~/.litellm/token.json. The secret material (key plus any JWT) now goes
to the OS keychain through the optional keyring package, with the 0600
file kept for non-secret metadata and as the fallback on headless boxes.
Legacy plaintext files keep authenticating and are migrated into the
keychain, then scrubbed, on first read. A secret still on disk always
outranks the keychain entry, so a failed keychain write can never
resurrect a stale key. LITELLM_PROXY_API_KEY and --api-key precedence
is unchanged, lite logout clears both stores and warns when the
keychain will not release the entry, and ~/.litellm is created 0700
(tightened from 0755 where an older CLI left it broader).
LITELLM_CLI_DISABLE_KEYRING=1 forces the file fallback.
* fix(ui): render optional array and object MCP tool parameters as JSON inputs
A Python signature like `tags: list[str] | None = None` serialises to
`{"anyOf": [{"type": "array"}, {"type": "null"}]}` with no top-level
`type`, so the tool test panel's control dispatch fell through to the
generic text input. Whatever the user typed was sent verbatim, and the
server rejected it as the wrong type.
Resolve a property to its single non-null union member before choosing a
control, validating, seeding defaults, and coercing the submitted value,
so all four agree and an optional array or object gets the same JSON
textarea a required one already got.
* fix(ui): keep a null-defaulted optional MCP parameter out of the call
A parameter declared `list[str] | None = None` carries `default: null`,
which means the caller should send nothing. Seeding its editor with an
empty container made the field non-blank, so an untouched parameter was
submitted as `[]` or `{}` instead of being omitted.
Treat an explicit null default as "no value" everywhere it is read: the
editor starts blank and shows its placeholder, and the submitted
arguments leave the key out entirely.
Teams.tsx and Teams.test.tsx both conflicted with staging's antd -> shadcn
migration of the team create form.
Teams.tsx: took staging's rewritten import block and dropped `theme` from the
antd import, since this branch replaced `<Content style={{ padding: token... }}>`
with the Tailwind inset. Dropped both `const { Text } = Typography` (staging
removed its last use) and `const { token } = theme.useToken()` (this branch
removed its last use).
Teams.test.tsx: took this branch's PageHeader-shaped assertions over staging's
older tab-bar lookup, and restored the `within` import that staging had dropped.
Removed the `toHaveClass` snapshot of the antd tab-bar Tailwind classes and the
`.closest(".ant-tabs")` lookup: staging added local/no-antd-class-selectors as a
zero-violation error rule, and those assertions are inert in jsdom anyway. Every
behavioural assertion in that test is unchanged.
KeyValueInput and QueryParamInput each seeded a private copy of their rows
from the value prop with a one-time useState initializer. The antd form they
were written for hid that: rc-field-form bumps an internal resetCount key on
resetFields, which remounts a Field's children, so the private copy was thrown
away on every reset. react-hook-form's reset does not remount, and the modal is
hidden rather than unmounted, so after Cancel the rows stayed on screen holding
the old values while the form value went back to empty.
The visible cost was a blocked create flow. A leaked header row made the modal
look configured, but the form value behind it was gone, so submitting a fresh
path and target was refused with "Please configure the headers" and no request
was sent. Typing one character into the leaked row put a value back and the
submit went through, which is not something a user can guess.
Both inputs are now controlled off the value prop, which is an array of pairs
rather than a record. A record cannot represent a row whose name is still empty,
which is the reason the private copy existed: two blank rows collapse into one
and a half-typed row disappears as it is typed. With pairs the field value is
the editable shape, the second source of truth is gone, and a form reset clears
the rows like every other field. add_pass_through converts to a record at submit,
so the request payload is unchanged.
Headers now require at least one row with a non-empty name. Previously that was
enforced by accident, because adding a row did not notify the form at all.
PR #37550 taught the backend unit-test shards to read the pull request's own
file list, but four required jobs were never wired to that gate and ran in full
on every pull request regardless of what it touched. A UI-only pull request
still paid roughly 17 runner-minutes of Python work it could not have affected,
and a backend-only one still installed and built the dashboard.
Lint and the MCP suite now take the existing backend decision. The dashboard
build and unit tests take a new ui decision, which tracks ui/ rather than
reusing client: client deliberately runs whenever the backend changes, because
it gates CircleCI's end-to-end jobs that drive a real proxy, while the build and
the unit tests cannot see the backend at all. CI config counts as ui-relevant
too, so a pull request that rewrites the dashboard workflows still exercises
them instead of shipping unvalidated.
The gate stays inside the job rather than moving to on.paths or to a job-level
condition on the shard callers. A workflow filtered out by on.paths never starts
and never reports, so a required check waits forever, and a skipped caller job
publishes its own name instead of the nested "<shard> / Run tests" the ruleset
requires. Both were measured before settling on this shape.
Three setup steps in the shard base and in the documentation job also leaked
past the gate, so a skipped shard still spent about twelve seconds installing uv
and restoring its cache. They now carry the same condition, and the documentation
job stops cloning litellm-docs when it has nothing to validate.
* refactor(ui): migrate the model and router settings pages off antd
Converts the add model flow, credential panels, model settings and router
settings onto the shadcn primitives, moves the mapping table onto the
shared DataTable, and drops the dead uploadProps prop chain that only
existed to carry antd's UploadProps type.
* fix(ui): split comma-separated custom technical keywords into one term each
* refactor(ui): migrate the MCP servers pages off antd
Converts the MCP server create, edit, connect and permission screens plus
the MCP tools and selector components onto the shadcn primitives, and
rewrites the test helpers that drove antd's select and collapse DOM.
* fix(ui): finish the MCP servers antd migration so the shared field rules have one contract
mcpFieldRules and MCPPermissionManagement were already flipped to the shadcn
prop shape, but CreateMCPServer and UserEnvVarsModal were still rendering antd,
so the create modal spread onValueChange onto an antd Select that ignores it and
passed searchValue props that no longer exist. Convert both off antd, drop the
searchValue plumbing the MultiSelect now owns, and normalise tag values before
the tag list renders so a delimited or empty string cannot crash it.
Rewrite testUtils.selectOption to drive the shadcn listbox instead of
.ant-select, expand the collapsed permission panel before querying its switches,
and assert the dismiss case after a reopen now that Dialog unmounts closed
content.
* fix(ui): split multi-tag entries the MCP tag inputs commit as one value
The tag input hands back whatever the admin typed as a single custom value, so
"read,write" was stored verbatim and reached the backend as one malformed scope.
tagsControl already split delimited values on the way in; run the same
normalisation on the way out and dedupe, so both directions agree.
* fix(ui): stop splitting tag entries that are not scope lists
The previous commit split every tag field on whitespace and commas, but only a
scope list is delimited. A stdio arg or an access description item may contain
both characters as part of the value, so splitting them changed the argv the
process receives. Keep those entries verbatim and move the splitting behind
scopesControl, which the OAuth, token exchange and ID-JAG scope fields use.
* fix(ui): split tag entries on comma only, matching the antd token separator
Every tag field here was an antd Select carrying a comma token separator, so a
comma committed a tag and nothing else did. Splitting on whitespace as well
broke stdio args, and splitting neither left comma-separated extra headers and
access groups stored as one malformed value. Apply the comma rule in both
directions, trim each entry, and drop the scope-specific helper the previous
commit added, since the backend types scopes as a list rather than the
space-delimited string that helper assumed.
* fix(ui): stop rewriting stored tag values that an admin never edited
Stdio args are process argv, so a comma inside one argument and a
deliberately repeated flag both have to survive a round trip through the
edit modal. Two places were rewriting them. tagsControl split and deduped
the value it read back from the server, and MultiSelect re-split every
already-committed chip on each change rather than only the entry just
typed. Both now leave settled values alone, which keeps the antd token
separator applying to typing and nothing else.
* refactor(ui): migrate shared primitives and common components off antd
Adds the success variant to the shared Alert plus success, warning and
info variants to Badge, introduces UtcDateTimeInput to replace antd's
DatePicker, and converts the common components and key/team helpers onto
the shadcn primitives.
* fix(ui): keep MultiSelect and budget input faithful to their antd behaviour
Restore the clear-all control MultiSelect lost, split comma-separated
custom entries into one value per token, and stop rounding the budget
input on every keystroke so a fractional amount survives typing.
* test(ui): drive the access group picker through the migrated MultiSelect
AccessGroupSelector no longer renders an antd Select, so the placeholder
is an input label rather than a text node and the popup inerts the page
until it closes.
The dashboard drew its icons from two libraries at once: lucide-react,
which shadcn/ui ships with, and @ant-design/icons, left over from antd.
This moves the last 39 files onto lucide and drops the dependency, so
the icon set matches the component library everywhere.
antd icons sized themselves from the inherited font-size and rendered as
role="img" with an aria-label, neither of which a lucide svg does, so the
swap carries explicit size classes and gives the two icon-only plugin
buttons real accessible names.
`ProxyConfig.get_config()` walked the parsed config and replaced every
`os.environ/<KEY>` string with `get_secret(value)` before anything initialized
the secret manager, so a key held only by the manager resolved to `None` and
that `None` was written back into the config. The later fallback in
`load_config` could not recover it, because the key now existed with a `None`
value.
Hoist the initialization into `get_config()`, ahead of the resolution pass, so
every entrypoint gets it: the CLI already did this itself, but the microservice
entrypoints (`gateway/main.py`, `backend/main.py`) uvicorn the app directly and
bypass the CLI. `load_config`'s own call is now redundant and is dropped, so
startup builds the manager once instead of building one and discarding it.
`get_config()` also runs on management-endpoint request paths, so this returns
early once a manager exists rather than rebuilding the client per request.
Also warn when a reference the manager would have been asked for resolves to
`None`. The reporter had no log line at all to work from. `get_secret` only
reaches the manager when reads are enabled and the name is in `hosted_keys`, so
`secret_manager_would_be_consulted` mirrors that gate and keeps the warning off
env-only references, which are expected rather than an error.
detect-backend-changes diffed the event payload's base.sha against the
checked-out ref. Those are two different points in time: actions/checkout
resolves refs/pull/N/merge, and GitHub recomputes that ref whenever the base
branch advances, so the diff picked up whatever landed on staging between the
event firing and the job starting. On a recent UI-only pull request three
backend commits from staging were attributed to the branch, and every backend
shard ran in full
Ask the API which files the pull request touches instead. That is the same set
the Files changed tab shows, and it is immune to either endpoint moving. The
shell body moves into .github/scripts/detect_backend_changes.sh so it can be
exercised directly, and the fail-open paths now also cover an API failure, a
file list past the API's 3000-entry listing ceiling, and a classifier that
prints something unexpected
Every dynamic tracer-provider build called Resource.create, which scans the entry
points of every installed distribution, roughly 3ms and 200 file opens. The dynamic
providers reach it from the async logging path, which runs on the event loop serving
requests, so past the provider cache bound every request paid it and delayed the
requests in flight alongside it
The value derives only from the logger's config and process environment, so it is
built once per logger and reused. This logger's own init-time providers share it,
which also removes redundant startup builds. ArizeLogger overrides _init_tracing and
still builds its own, so it keeps one extra build
Refs LIT-5437
The proxy pre-creates the logging object before the router picks a deployment,
and the native /v1/messages handler never copied the deployment's
vertex_location into the logging params it updates, so cost resolution fell
back to the environment or the default region and priced every call on this
surface with the regional endpoint uplift. Copy the explicitly configured
location from the request's litellm params, the same source dispatch builds
the request URL from, and register the new regional_endpoint_uplift_multiplier
field in the cost map schema test.
The checkbox and its visible text both sat inside the max_budget
FormField label, which renders a single <label htmlFor> pointing at the
number input, so clicking the text focused Max Budget instead of ticking
the box. The checkbox only carried an aria-label, so it had no label of
its own to catch the click.
Wrap the checkbox and its text in their own <label>, the association the
antd checkbox wrapper used to provide. The accessible name now comes
from that label, so the aria-label is dropped rather than duplicated,
and the outer field label still points at the number input.
Auth and pass-through failures reach post_call_failure_hook with the raw request body unstripped, so a client-supplied standard_logging_object could feed the new attribution fallback when the logging object carries none. Pop the key before the lift so only the logging object may supply it. Also coalesce a None recovered cost to 0.0 so the lift always overwrites any client-supplied response_cost, matching the merge base's clobber semantics.
