* Add capability to override default GitHub Copilot authentication endpoints
This feature adds support for GitHub Enterprise subsriptions with custom domain/data ownership (which use a different URL compared to standard accounts)
* Update documentation with new parameters
* Move access token URL and Client ID retrieval outside for loop
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Fix spurious comment from Greptile review
* Align api_base retrieval behavior across chat and embedding transformations
* Add missing GitHub Copilot client ID parameter in docs
* Update website documentation with newer options for GitHub Enterprise Copilot
* Fix default value for Copilot client ID in docs
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Unit Tests: Proxy DB Operations / proxy-db (auth-checks, tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_auth_checks.py tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py, 20, 8) (push) Waiting to run
Unit Tests: Proxy DB Operations / proxy-db (remaining, tests/proxy_unit_tests --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_key_generate_prisma.py --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_auth_checks.py --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py, 30, 8) (push) Waiting to run
Audit-B #7 and #8.
1. /organization/member_delete was not in org_admin_only_routes, so it
fell through to management_routes/self_managed_routes and let any
caller that reached the route delete arbitrary org memberships
without the organization_role_based_access_check that member_add
and member_update trigger. Adding it to org_admin_only_routes
applies the same ORG_ADMIN-of-target-org gate.
2. /organization/member_update had no validation that the target user
was not a global PROXY_ADMIN. An org-admin of any org could alter
a PROXY_ADMIN user's per-org role. Reject this unless the caller
is PROXY_ADMIN.
Extends the prior moonshot mocking to cover every inherited
BaseLLMChatTest test that still made a live AWS Bedrock call. Adds
request-body assertions for each override.
New overrides:
- test_content_list_handling: verifies the outgoing body round-trips
user content in list-of-text form; asserts response.choices[0].
message.content parses back from the canned response.
- test_pydantic_model_input: verifies a pydantic Message input does
not raise and produces a parseable response.
- test_response_format_type_text_with_tool_calls_no_tool_choice:
verifies tools are forwarded and response_format + drop_params do
not break the call.
- test_streaming: verifies stream=True routes to the
invoke-with-response-stream endpoint. Bedrock invoke streaming is
intercepted at the make_sync_call import site rather than via the
caller-supplied client, because CustomStreamWrapper.fetch_sync_stream
invokes the stored make_call partial with
client=litellm.module_level_client, overriding any client passed by
the caller.
Extracts a shared _make_moonshot_response helper and a
_invoke_with_mocked_post harness so all the sync mocks share one
canned response body.
After this change TestBedrockMoonshotInvoke runs 23 passed, 29
skipped, 0 live-callers, all in under 1s locally.
Audit-B #2. _check_key_admin_access was gated on max_budget/spend
changes only, which meant a non-admin caller could blanket-rewrite
any OTHER field on any key (key_alias, models, tpm_limit, rpm_limit,
metadata, tags, allowed_routes, guardrails, blocked, duration,
permissions, auto_rotate, access_group_ids, object_permission, …)
as long as they avoided budget/spend. Example attack:
POST /key/update {
key: sk-victim-in-org-B,
models: [],
blocked: true,
organization_id: org-A,
}
The caller is org-admin of org-A, which satisfies the route gate;
the handler then wipes models and blocks the victim's key.
Policy after this fix:
- PROXY_ADMIN: always allowed.
- Key OWNER (matching user_id): allowed for non-budget fields;
budget/spend changes still require team/org admin.
- Everyone else: must pass _check_key_admin_access (PROXY_ADMIN /
key-owner / team-admin / org-admin of the key).
Regression test confirms a non-owner INTERNAL_USER cannot rewrite
key_alias/blocked on someone else's key; existing test covers the
owner-can-update-alias case; existing test covers
internal-user-cannot-modify-max-budget.
Continuation of Veria E3NpkuAd / Audit-B hardening. All three are the
same anti-pattern PR #25904 already addressed for _user_is_org_admin
and /user/delete: route-level gate trusts a caller-supplied scope
field, handler operates on a different scope.
1. /user/update no longer silently creates a user when the target
email doesn't exist. Pre-fix, an org admin could supply a fresh
email + caller-chosen budget/models/metadata; the INSERT path
created the user with no org attachment, bypassing /user/new's
org/team authorization. Now require PROXY_ADMIN for the create
branch; return 404 otherwise. Also fixes /user/bulk_update because
it dispatches through the same _update_single_user_helper.
2. /team/bulk_member_add with all_users=true restricted to PROXY_ADMIN.
The flag pulls every user in the database into the target team,
ignoring org scope — any team admin could use it to capture every
user across every org into their team.
3. /team/update now verifies destination-org admin rights. When the
request carries an organization_id that differs from the team's
current org, an org admin of the caller's current org could
previously relocate the team into any other org (draining their
resources, or capturing a team they once administered). Require
PROXY_ADMIN or org-admin of the DESTINATION org for the relocation.
Regression tests for #1 and #3; #2 covered by the existing bulk_add
suite after the gate addition.
TogetherAIConfig.get_supported_openai_params called get_model_info(),
whose first line calls litellm.get_supported_openai_params() — which for
together_ai routes straight back into this method. The recursion only
terminated when Python's recursion limit was hit or when
_get_model_info_helper raised "not mapped" at the deepest level. Either
way the try/except caught it, so the bug stayed silent — but the cycle
ran ~332 deep every time, emitting hundreds of DEBUG log lines per
call. Surfaced as "infinite loop" in CI when the success_handler thread
emitted that log spam against an already-closed stderr during test
teardown.
Replace the get_model_info() call with supports_function_calling(),
which uses _get_model_info_helper directly and does not call
get_supported_openai_params. Measured drop from 332 to 2
_get_model_info_helper calls per first uncached lookup.
Also swap the test model from Qwen/Qwen3.5-9B (not in model_cost map)
back to a mapped serverless model, Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct-Turbo. The
mapping gap is what made the recursion's tail end raise up into the
success handler during teardown in the first place.
Greptile P1 on the /user/delete fix. Per CLAUDE.md 'No N+1 queries',
move the find_many inside the per-user loop to a single batched
fetch with {'user_id': {'in': data.user_ids}} before the loop, then
distribute to a per-user set in memory.
Veria admin-queue finding E3NpkuAd, Audit-B #1. The route-level gate
accepts this call when the caller is PROXY_ADMIN or ORG_ADMIN of any
org named in request_data["organization_id"]/["organizations"]. The
handler processes data.user_ids without cross-checking whether those
users belong to the caller's administered orgs, so an org-admin of
org-A could delete users in org-B via:
{"user_ids": ["victim_in_org_B"], "organization_id": "org-A"}
Add per-target authorization: org-admins may only delete users whose
entire org membership is within their admin scope; targets with any
org outside scope (or no org at all) require PROXY_ADMIN.
Regression test confirms an ORG_ADMIN call fails with 403 and no
cascade delete_many runs.
Three tests inherited by TestBedrockMoonshotInvoke from BaseLLMChatTest
make live AWS Bedrock completion calls: test_developer_role_translation,
test_message_with_name, and test_completion_cost. These have been
crashing llm_translation_testing CI workers (reported as "failed on
setup with worker 'gwN' crashed").
Replace each with a mocked override that intercepts the outgoing
request via HTTPHandler.post / AsyncHTTPHandler.post patching:
- test_developer_role_translation asserts the outgoing body maps the
developer role to system (LiteLLM's translation for non-OpenAI
providers).
- test_message_with_name asserts the outgoing body preserves the user
message.
- test_completion_cost returns a canned moonshot-shaped response body
with usage and asserts response_cost > 0 against the local model
cost map.
Follows the existing HTTPHandler + patch.object(client, "post") pattern
used in test_bedrock_gpt_oss.py and test_bedrock_completion.py. No
network traffic; the three tests now complete in ~0.3s.
* Add announcement bar for Trivy compromise resolution notice
Add a Docusaurus announcement bar to the top of the docs site informing
users that the Trivy supply-chain compromise has been mitigated and
resolved. The banner:
- States all affected packages have been deleted and releases are safe
- Links to the Security Townhall blog post for details
- Links to the CI/CD v2 blog post for improvements made
- Uses a green background with closeable dismiss button
Co-authored-by: Krrish Dholakia <krrish-berri-2@users.noreply.github.com>
* Use :::note admonition instead of announcement bar
Replace the Docusaurus announcementBar with a :::note admonition on the
docs index page. The note appears below the hero image with the title
'Security Update' and links to the Security Townhall and CI/CD v2 blog
posts.
Co-authored-by: Krrish Dholakia <krrish-berri-2@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update security notice wording to 'contained'
Co-authored-by: Krrish Dholakia <krrish-berri-2@users.noreply.github.com>
* Move note above hero image and add to root page
- Move the security notice above the product screenshot on /docs
- Add the same notice to the root page (src/pages/index.md)
Co-authored-by: Krrish Dholakia <krrish-berri-2@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update security notice wording
Co-authored-by: Krrish Dholakia <krrish-berri-2@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Krrish Dholakia <krrish-berri-2@users.noreply.github.com>
Drop test_bedrock_invoke_messages_injects_thinking_for_clear_thinking_context_management.
Its assertion 'interleaved-thinking-2025-05-14' in betas cannot hold because
anthropic_beta_headers_config.json maps that header to null for the bedrock
provider, so filter_and_transform_beta_headers drops it from the auto-added
beta set before anthropic_beta is written to the request.
The adjacent test_bedrock_invoke_messages_skips_thinking_injection_when_already_enabled
already covers the inverse behavior for the same model, so no coverage is lost.
Validate org admin role against all requested organizations instead
of returning on first match. Scope team list queries to the caller's
permitted organizations when filtering by user_id.
Workers in llm_translation_testing have been crashing mid-run with
"Not properly terminated" (OOM), even after bumping resource_class to
xlarge. Reduce xdist workers from 8 to 4 to lower peak memory, and add
--max-worker-restart=5 so a crashed worker is replaced instead of
failing the whole run.
Unit Tests: Proxy DB Operations / proxy-db (auth-checks, tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_auth_checks.py tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py, 20, 8) (push) Waiting to run
Unit Tests: Proxy DB Operations / proxy-db (remaining, tests/proxy_unit_tests --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_key_generate_prisma.py --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_auth_checks.py --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py, 30, 8) (push) Waiting to run
When the routing strategy is not latency-based, get_settings() returned
{} for routing_strategy_args. Empty objects are truthy in JS, so the
frontend fallback defaults (ttl: 3600, lowest_latency_buffer: 0) were
skipped, resulting in an empty Latency-Based Configuration section.
Return None instead so the frontend || fallback works as designed.
Deduplicates base64UrlEncode, generateCodeVerifier, and
generateCodeChallenge which were copy-pasted across useMcpOAuthFlow
and useUserMcpOAuthFlow hooks.
langgraph-prebuilt was previously pulled in as a transitive of langgraph
so PyPI license metadata was reported as unknown. Now that it is
explicitly pinned (==1.0.8) to avoid the broken 1.0.9 release, the
license checker flags it. It is published under MIT by the same
langchain-ai/langgraph repository as langgraph itself.
langgraph-prebuilt 1.0.9 imports ExecutionInfo and ServerInfo from
langgraph.runtime, but those symbols are not exported until
langgraph 1.1.0. Our pin of langgraph==1.0.10 allows
langgraph-prebuilt<1.1.0,>=1.0.8, and uv resolves to 1.0.9 (the
latest in range), which breaks at import time in every test that
touches langgraph.prebuilt (e.g. tests/pass_through_tests/test_mcp_routes.py):
ImportError: cannot import name 'ExecutionInfo' from 'langgraph.runtime'
Pinning langgraph-prebuilt to 1.0.8 pairs correctly with
langgraph==1.0.10 and restores the import path.
Bedrock rejects clear_thinking_20251015 unless thinking is enabled or adaptive.
Inject minimal extended thinking and interleaved-thinking beta when Claude Code
sends context_management without thinking. Adds unit tests.
Made-with: Cursor
