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265 commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
mateo-berri
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0511b76ada
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Gate MCP OAuth pass-through on delegate_auth_to_upstream flag
Sameer's review on #28356/#28008 flagged that the new pass-through behaviors (preemptive 401 challenges, /.well-known/oauth-protected- resource proxying, upstream 401/403 propagation as MCPUpstreamAuthError, and Authorization-stripping when no x-litellm-api-key is supplied) were implicitly enabled for every server with auth_type=none plus Authorization in extra_headers. Existing users doing static bearer pass-through for non-OAuth reasons would have silently regressed. Make the detection rule explicit: extend the existing delegate_auth_to_upstream flag (previously oauth2-only) to also gate is_oauth_passthrough. Now requires flag + auth_type=None + Authorization in extra_headers, per Sameer's suggested detection rule. The UI toggle now appears for both modes (oauth2 PKCE passthrough and auth_type=none OAuth pass-through) with mode-appropriate copy. Update test fixtures to set the flag where the test intent is to exercise OAuth pass-through behavior, and add negative tests covering the new default-false case. |
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Cursor Agent
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e2e4f703b7
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Merge latest litellm_feat/v1.84.0-mcp-gateway-jwt-auth into local merge branch
# Conflicts: # tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/auth/test_user_api_key_auth_mcp.py # tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_handle_jwt.py Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Cursor Agent
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418e266968
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fix(tests): align merged JWT and MCP cold-start assertions
Update the tests carried over from PR #28008 to match the assertions on the staging branch: - tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_handle_jwt.py: unknown issuers now fall back to the legacy JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL path (per litellm_feat/v1.84.0-mcp-gateway-jwt-auth's '\''fall back to global JWKS on unknown issuer'\''), and mapped issuer claims that are absent no longer fail closed — they simply leave the normalised LiteLLM internal claim absent. - tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/auth/test_user_api_key_auth_mcp.py: the aggregate '\''/mcp'\'' route still triggers the delegate-auth-to-upstream lookup once for the header-supplied server name; cold-start admission must NOT fire on top of that. Tighten the assertion to assert_called_once_with so a future regression that re-enters cold-start is caught. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Cursor Agent
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86cf3efd16
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_feat/v1.84.0-mcp-gateway-jwt-auth
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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mateo-berri
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7905e996bd
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fix(mcp,jwt): drop unneeded async helper + suppress misleading unscoped JWT warning
- _build_oauth_authorization_server_response: revert to sync (no awaits in body). The function only does dict construction and synchronous registry lookups; async added coroutine creation overhead per discovery call without need. - _build_decode_kwargs: accept has_issuer_config so the global path's 'JWT auth is unscoped' warning is suppressed when LiteLLM_JWTAuth.issuers provides per-issuer scoping. Previously the warning fired spuriously for admins who intentionally use only the new issuers config. |
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Cursor Agent
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6697fdb03d
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Merge PR #28008 (gym-cmd/litellm:feat/v1.84.0-mcp-gateway-jwt-auth) into litellm_feat/v1.84.0-mcp-gateway-jwt-auth
# Conflicts: # litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py # litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/server.py # litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/mcp_management_endpoints.py # litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py # litellm/types/mcp_server/mcp_server_manager.py # tests/test_litellm/interactions/test_openapi_compliance.py # tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/auth/test_user_api_key_auth_mcp.py # tests/test_litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/test_mcp_management_endpoints.py Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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mateo-berri
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31f8c56cb7
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fix(mcp,tests): assert cold-start helper directly for aggregate /mcp
Threading client_ip into _target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream made get_mcp_server_by_name(name, client_ip=...) also fire from the delegate-auth check, so the call_args_list assertion on client_ip-in-kwargs no longer uniquely signals a cold-start lookup. Patch _is_mcp_passthrough_cold_start and assert it is not invoked, which is the actual contract the test is pinning. |
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Sameer Kankute
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718c4637a8
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feat(mcp): allow native MCP OAuth support for cursor (#28327)
* feat(mcp): allow native MCP OAuth redirect URIs (cursor://) Discoverable OAuth /authorize rejected cursor:// callbacks because validate_trusted_redirect_uri only accepted http/https. Add an allowlisted native path with a built-in Cursor default and optional MCP_TRUSTED_NATIVE_REDIRECT_URIS env for other clients. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): address Greptile native redirect URI review Lowercase paths in normalizer so env allowlist entries match case- insensitively. Tighten wildcard prefix matching to reject sibling paths (e.g. callback-2) unless the prefix ends with /. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): reject query params on native OAuth redirect URIs Greptile: normalization stripped query strings before allowlist compare, so cursor://.../callback?injected=... could pass validation. Reject any native redirect_uri with a query component (same as fragments). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(model_cost_map): add mistral/ministral-8b-2512 entry Mistral rotated the 'mistral/mistral-tiny' alias to return 'ministral-8b-2512' as the response model, which is not in the cost map. This caused test_completion_mistral_api and test_completion_mistral_api_modified_input to fail in completion_cost lookup. Add the entry mirroring the existing openrouter/mistralai/ministral-8b-2512 pricing. * fix(mcp): lowercase default native redirect URIs Make _parse_trusted_native_redirect_uris apply the same lowercasing to built-in defaults as it does to env-var entries. * fix(tests): backfill local model_cost into remote-fetched map litellm.model_cost is loaded at import time from the URL pinned to main, so pricing entries that exist only in this branch (e.g. mistral/ministral-8b-2512, freshly added because Mistral now returns this id from mistral-tiny) are absent at test time and completion_cost lookups raise. Backfill the in-tree backup so cassette-driven cost calculations resolve against the entries that ship with the branch under test. Fixes the local_testing_part1 failures on test_completion_mistral_api and test_completion_mistral_api_modified_input. --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com> |
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Sameer Kankute
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68efe6970c
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fix(mcp): JWT on tools/list and REST tools/call server resolution (#28227)
* fix(mcp): JWT on tools/list, REST server_id resolution, tool_server_mismatch
Sign outbound MCP JWTs for list_mcp_tools and inject headers on the tools/list
path. Resolve server_id on /mcp-rest/tools/call and return 403 tool_server_mismatch
when the tool does not belong to the requested server. Default missing arguments to {}.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(mcp): restrict list JWTs to mcp:tools/list and default REST arguments to {}
- List-only JWTs (call_type=list_mcp_tools) no longer carry the broad
mcp:tools/call scope. _build_scope() now emits only mcp:tools/list
when no tool name is provided, mirroring the existing least-privilege
rule that tool-call JWTs omit mcp:tools/list.
- REST /tools/call now defaults a missing 'arguments' field to {} so
execute_mcp_tool() and downstream **arguments / .keys() calls don't
receive None and crash with TypeError/AttributeError.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(mcp): validate tool/server in call_tool; skip JWT signer when not configured or static auth present
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(mcp): align tests and mypy with user_api_key_auth on tools/list
Update mocks for the new _get_tools_from_server parameter, mock server
registry in REST access-denied test, and narrow static_headers for mypy.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(test): accept user_api_key_auth in get_tools_from_mcp_servers mock
The side_effect for the all-servers case did not accept the new kwarg,
so tools/list returned an empty list.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(mcp): fail fast for unknown tools when server mapping exists
Server-name fallback in call_tool must not open an upstream session when
the tool is absent from a populated mapping. Update the HTTP transport test
to register a known tool before asserting not-found behavior.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix mypy
* Fix mypy
* fix(mcp): preserve tools/call scope on missing tool name; pass user_api_key_auth in list_tools
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(mcp): match alias/server_name in _resolve_mcp_server_for_tool_call
The registry lookup in _resolve_mcp_server_for_tool_call previously only
compared candidate.name against the provided server_name, but tool name
prefixes can be derived from a server's alias or server_name (see
get_server_prefix). When the tool→server mapping is empty/stale (cold
start, dynamic tools), the lookup would fail for alias-configured
servers even though get_mcp_server_by_name (used by the REST path)
matches alias, server_name, and name.
Match the same priority of identifiers in both the registry pass and
the unprefixed fallback so the MCP protocol call_tool path is
consistent with the REST path.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(mcp): reuse proxy_logging DualCache in inject_mcp_jwt_headers_for_upstream
Instead of allocating a fresh DualCache() on every tools/list invocation,
prefer the shared proxy_logging_obj.internal_usage_cache.dual_cache when
available. The cache argument is currently unused by MCPJWTSigner, but
sharing the proxy's cache avoids per-call allocation overhead and matches
the cache identity used elsewhere in the proxy hook plumbing — so any
future per-request state stored in cache will survive across list calls.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): return 403 ip_filtering for IP-restricted servers in tools/call name lookup
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(test): accept user_api_key_auth kwarg in list_tools mocks
The proxy-infra job was failing on four TestMCPServerManager tests because
the mock_get_tools_from_server stubs did not accept the new
user_api_key_auth keyword argument that list_tools now forwards to
_get_tools_from_server. Add the kwarg to each stub so list_tools can call
through cleanly.
Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): skip JWT injection when per-user mcp_auth_header is set
MCPClient._get_auth_headers() applies extra_headers AFTER writing
Authorization from auth_value, so an injected JWT silently overwrites
the user's per-server OAuth token. Guard the JWT signer with
'not mcp_auth_header' so per-user OAuth (and any dict-form per-user
auth) takes precedence, mirroring the existing static_headers guard.
Adds a regression test that the signer's inject helper is not called
when mcp_auth_header is supplied.
* fix(mcp): skip JWT injection when extra_headers already has Authorization
When a server uses per-user OAuth tokens, the resolved token is passed
into _get_tools_from_server via extra_headers. The JWT injection guard
only checked mcp_auth_header and the server's static headers, so the
signer would silently overwrite the user's OAuth Authorization header.
Add a check for an existing Authorization entry in extra_headers so
caller-supplied per-user OAuth tokens take precedence over JWT signing.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* test(mcp): cover JWT signer + tool-call resolution branches
Adds unit tests for the new MCPServerManager helpers (_resolve_mcp_server_for_tool_call,
_resolve_oauth2_headers_for_tool_call) and the new MCPJWTSigner paths
(_build_scope call_type branches and inject_mcp_jwt_headers_for_upstream).
Brings patch coverage above the auto target without changing behavior.
Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): retry tool-server lookup with prefixed name in REST mismatch check
When the REST /mcp-rest/tools/call path sends a raw tool name plus
requested_server_id, _get_mcp_server_from_tool_name(name) can return
None if the mapping only stores the prefixed form. That bypassed the
tool_server_mismatch 403 guard and let the call fall through to
trusting requested_server.
Retry the lookup with every known prefix of the requested server so
the mismatch check fires whenever the tool is actually registered.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(mcp): always reject unknown tools in server-name fallback
Defense-in-depth: _resolve_mcp_server_for_tool_call previously skipped
the unknown-tool check whenever the per-server mapping had no entries
yet (cold start, OAuth2 lazy listing, or upstream listing failure),
allowing arbitrary tool names to reach upstream servers.
Tighten the check so the server-name fallback always rejects tool
names not present in the mapping. Callers must call list_tools first
(standard MCP flow) before tools/call can resolve. Removes the
now-unused _mapping_has_tools_for_server helper and adds an
explicit empty-mapping rejection test alongside the existing
populated-mapping rejection test.
Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <sameer@berri.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude (greptile subagent) <claude-greptile-bot@anthropic.com>
|
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Cursor Agent
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f0eb54ea9f
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fix(mcp): correct passthrough probe 401 + slashed-name cold start parser
- _check_passthrough_upstream_auth now emits 'Bearer resource_metadata="..."' pointing at the gateway's oauth-protected-resource well-known URL, mirroring the pre-emptive 401 path. Pass-through servers don't use the gateway as an authorization server, so the previous 'authorization_uri=' challenge sent clients to the wrong metadata endpoint. - _parse_mcp_server_names_from_path now accepts server names that contain a single slash (e.g. custom_solutions/user_123), mirroring MCPRequestHandler._extract_target_server_names_from_path. Without this, the cold-start bypass missed slashed-name servers and the generic admission error propagated instead of the spec-compliant 401 challenge. - _is_mcp_passthrough_cold_start drops the unused scope parameter from its signature. Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> |
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Claude
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ee38ba16e3
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fix(mcp,tests): sync stubs and cold-start assertions with delegate-check
The merge of base-branch _target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream into process_mcp_request inserts an additional get_mcp_server_by_name(name) lookup ahead of the cold-start path, which breaks two test patterns: 1. lookup_by_name(name) side-effect stubs in TestMCPDelegateAuthToUpstream are called positionally by the delegate check, then again by the cold-start path with client_ip=... — raising TypeError: unexpected keyword argument 'client_ip'. Accept **_kwargs to match the real signature. 2. TestMCPPassthroughColdStartAdmission assertions count the lookup exactly once with client_ip=..., but the delegate check now adds a positional-only call ahead of it. Switch assert_called_once_with to assert_any_call for the cold-start invocation, and assert client_ip was *not* passed for the aggregate /mcp test where cold-start must not fire. Both updates align with CLAUDE.md guidance to keep monkeypatch stubs in sync with the real signature when an optional parameter is added. Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com> |
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gym-cmd
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eae390b16d | fix(mcp): respect client ip for delegated auth | ||
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Claude
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488fcc25e1
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fix(jwt,mcp): fall back to global JWKS on unknown issuer; prune fetch locks
- handle_jwt._get_configured_issuer now returns None for tokens whose 'iss' is not in the configured issuers list, letting auth_jwt fall through to the legacy JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL path instead of hard-raising. This keeps existing tokens from non-configured IdPs working when an operator adds the new 'issuers' list to a live deployment. - discoverable_endpoints._prune_oauth_metadata_cache now also prunes entries in _OAUTH_METADATA_FETCH_LOCKS whose cache entry has been evicted and whose lock isn't currently held, bounding the locks dict to match the cache it guards. Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com> |
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gym-cmd
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b4df1a9bde |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/litellm_internal_staging' into feat/v1.84.0-mcp-gateway-jwt-auth-public
# Conflicts: # .github/workflows/test-unit-proxy-db.yml # litellm-proxy-extras/pyproject.toml # litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py # litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/oauth_utils.py # litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/server.py # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/404.html # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/__next.__PAGE__.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/__next._full.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/__next._head.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/__next._index.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/__next._tree.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/_next/static/8TZ2JbOi7SZ6BCj9ScTHW/_buildManifest.js # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/_next/static/8TZ2JbOi7SZ6BCj9ScTHW/_clientMiddlewareManifest.json # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/_next/static/8TZ2JbOi7SZ6BCj9ScTHW/_ssgManifest.js # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/_next/static/L07LLek3NGtynjTxlCdLS/_buildManifest.js # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/_next/static/L07LLek3NGtynjTxlCdLS/_clientMiddlewareManifest.json # 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litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/test-key/__next._tree.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/mcp-servers.html # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/mcp-servers.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/mcp-servers/__next.!KGRhc2hib2FyZCk.tools.mcp-servers.__PAGE__.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/mcp-servers/__next.!KGRhc2hib2FyZCk.tools.mcp-servers.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/mcp-servers/__next.!KGRhc2hib2FyZCk.tools.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/mcp-servers/__next.!KGRhc2hib2FyZCk.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/mcp-servers/__next._full.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/mcp-servers/__next._head.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/mcp-servers/__next._index.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/mcp-servers/__next._tree.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/vector-stores.html # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/vector-stores.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/tools/vector-stores/__next.!KGRhc2hib2FyZCk.tools.txt # 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litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/usage/__next._index.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/usage/__next._tree.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/users.html # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/users.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/users/__next.!KGRhc2hib2FyZCk.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/users/__next.!KGRhc2hib2FyZCk.users.__PAGE__.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/users/__next.!KGRhc2hib2FyZCk.users.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/users/__next._full.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/users/__next._head.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/users/__next._index.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/users/__next._tree.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/virtual-keys.html # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/virtual-keys.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/virtual-keys/__next.!KGRhc2hib2FyZCk.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/virtual-keys/__next.!KGRhc2hib2FyZCk.virtual-keys.__PAGE__.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/virtual-keys/__next.!KGRhc2hib2FyZCk.virtual-keys.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/virtual-keys/__next._full.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/virtual-keys/__next._head.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/virtual-keys/__next._index.txt # litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/virtual-keys/__next._tree.txt # litellm/proxy/auth/auth_utils.py # litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/internal_user_endpoints.py # litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/mcp_management_endpoints.py # litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py # litellm/types/mcp_server/mcp_server_manager.py # pyproject.toml # tests/test_litellm/interactions/test_openapi_compliance.py # tests/test_litellm/litellm_core_utils/prompt_templates/test_litellm_core_utils_prompt_templates_common_utils.py # tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_discoverable_endpoints.py # tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_mcp_server.py # tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_openapi_to_mcp_generator.py # tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_auth_utils.py # tests/test_litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/test_key_management_endpoints.py # tests/test_litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/test_mcp_management_endpoints.py # tests/test_litellm/proxy/rag_endpoints/test_rag_endpoints.py # tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_server.py # uv.lock |
||
|
Claude
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d42a66adb6
|
Merge branch 'litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_feat/v1.84.0-mcp-gateway-jwt-auth
Resolved unrelated-history merge using
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||
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Artem Dudarev
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f6359cbf04 |
fix(mcp): forward Authorization in pass-through when x-litellm-api-key is admission
Commit
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||
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Mateo Wang
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1b0ae3af83
|
fix(mcp-oauth): PROXY_BASE_URL escape hatch + diagnostic logging for {"detail":"invalid_request"} (#28086)
* fix(mcp-oauth): add PROXY_BASE_URL escape hatch + diagnostic logging for invalid_request
Customers hitting "{"detail":"invalid_request"}" on the MCP /authorize
endpoint had no way to recover when their ingress mangles X-Forwarded-*
headers (the same-origin check in validate_trusted_redirect_uri compares
the browser-supplied redirect_uri against get_request_base_url, which is
reconstructed from those headers).
Two contained changes:
1. get_request_base_url now honours PROXY_BASE_URL as the canonical
public origin when set, bypassing the X-Forwarded-* trust gate
entirely. Operators who know their public URL can set it once
instead of debugging ingress header rewrites.
2. The rejection path in validate_trusted_redirect_uri emits a WARN
log carrying the redirect_uri, computed proxy base, and the
X-Forwarded-* / Host headers seen. A bare 400 was undiagnosable;
this turns it into a one-line root-cause.
* test(mcp-oauth): capture warnings from correct logger ("LiteLLM")
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(mcp-oauth): reject malformed PROXY_BASE_URL with one-shot diagnostic
A scheme-less PROXY_BASE_URL (e.g. "litellm.example.com" instead of
"https://litellm.example.com") would sail through urlparse with empty
scheme + netloc, silently breaking every same-origin compare in
validate_trusted_redirect_uri and leaving the operator staring at the
same opaque 400 the env var was meant to fix.
Validate it once at read time: only honour values that parse as
http(s) URLs with a non-empty netloc; otherwise log a one-shot WARN
naming the bad value and fall through to the request-derived origin
so the proxy still serves traffic.
* fix(mcp/oauth): normalize PROXY_BASE_URL to strip query/fragment
Match the X-Forwarded-* path's normalization so a configured
PROXY_BASE_URL containing a query string or fragment does not break
downstream f-string concatenation like f"{base_url}/callback".
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* refactor(mcp-oauth): drop non-essential comments from PROXY_BASE_URL changes
Strip narrative comments and verbose docstrings added in this PR; the
code is intuitive enough on its own and the log messages already carry
their own diagnostic context. Pre-existing comments are left untouched.
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
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gym-cmd
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3753970cc9 |
security: prevent forwarding litellm api keys to upstream mcp servers
- Strip Authorization header from extra_headers for pass-through servers - Pass-through servers (auth_type=None with extra_headers: [Authorization]) must not receive the user's LiteLLM API key - Only OAuth2 M2M and pass-through servers skip Authorization header - Other headers (x-request-id, x-trace-id) are still forwarded normally - Fixes credential leakage / authentication bypass in MCP pass-through mode |
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gym-cmd
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6079a5f55b | test(mcp): split oauth passthrough regressions | ||
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gym-cmd
|
8ca2f14f81 | fix(mcp): address oauth passthrough review findings | ||
|
Sameer Kankute
|
106b2f2da8
|
Merge pull request #27977 from BerriAI/litellm_mcp_internal_delegate_pkce
fix(mcp): delegate PKCE bypass for internal MCP servers |
||
|
gym-cmd
|
dee5d55a0b | test(mcp): align trusted proxy fixtures | ||
|
gym-cmd
|
c279f4e3ef | fix(mcp): validate oauth callback redirect sink | ||
|
gym-cmd
|
8e864f33ee | fix(mcp): refine upstream OAuth metadata fallback | ||
|
gym-cmd
|
d0cc1a49f5 | feat(mcp): support OAuth passthrough discovery | ||
|
Sameer Kankute
|
4e2b2d9d1f
|
fix(mcp): expose delegate_auth_to_upstream in MCP server list rows (#27936)
_build_mcp_server_table omitted delegate_auth_to_upstream, so GET /v1/mcp/server always returned the default false while the registry kept the DB value. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
||
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Sameer Kankute
|
d855e56333
|
chore(mcp): warn on internal + upstream PKCE delegate
Log verbose_logger.warning when loading oauth2 interactive servers with available_on_public_internet=false and delegate_auth_to_upstream=true (config + DB). Dashboard Alert for the same combo. CLAUDE note for operators. Tests for log and M2M skip. |
||
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Sameer Kankute
|
5aabfccf57
|
fix(mcp): allow delegate PKCE bypass for internal MCP servers
Remove available_on_public_internet gating from delegate-auth-to-upstream paths so oauth2 + delegate_auth_to_upstream interactive servers behave the same when marked internal. Keeps M2M exclusion. Updates tests. |
||
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Dennis Henry
|
9b6ab55c5f
|
fix: allow for allowlisted redirect URIs (#27761)
* fix: allow for allowlisted redirect URIs * github comment addressing * Update litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/oauth_utils.py Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * harden oauth wildcard further * test: cover wildcard entry with dot-leading suffix rejection --------- Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
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Sameer Kankute
|
18f77ff7bc
|
feat(mcp): add delegate_auth_to_upstream flag for PKCE passthrough (#27834)
* feat(mcp): add delegate_auth_to_upstream flag for PKCE passthrough Adds an opt-in per-server flag that lets clients (e.g. VS Code) complete PKCE directly with an upstream OAuth2 MCP server, instead of LiteLLM double-gating with its own API-key/SSO check. Only honored when auth_type=oauth2 and the operator explicitly sets the flag; mixed-target or non-oauth2 requests fail closed. - Adds the field to Pydantic models, Prisma schema, and a migration - New MCPRequestHandler._target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream gate that runs only when no x-litellm-api-key is present, so authenticated users still get user_id resolution + stored-credential lookup - Anonymous callers now see delegate servers in get_allowed_mcp_servers (scoped to delegate servers only; the upstream still enforces auth) - mcp_management_endpoints: allow anonymous /authorize and /token for delegate servers so VS Code can complete PKCE without a LiteLLM session - UI toggle (shown only for oauth2) + payload/view wiring - Tests covering: oauth2 on/off, non-oauth2 with flag, mixed targets, no resolvable target, explicit key precedence, and 401 emission Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Enforce oauth2 for delegated MCP auth bypass Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): close secondary Authorization bypass for delegate servers The delegate-auth bypass gated only on the primary `x-litellm-api-key` header, so a LiteLLM key sent via `Authorization: Bearer sk-...` (the secondary header) was silently dropped — skipping spend tracking and rate limiting. Gate on the resolved litellm_api_key (which considers both headers) so the bypass fires only when neither is present. Also update the existing "Authorization header present" test to reflect that an upstream OAuth token now flows through the existing oauth2 fallback (LiteLLM auth attempt → fail → anonymous), not via the delegate branch. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Avoid duplicate MCP OAuth credential lookup Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): block delegate bypass for M2M and internal-only servers Two security issues flagged in code review: 1. High – client_credentials (M2M) servers must not be delegatable: LiteLLM auto-fetches the upstream token using stored credentials, so allowing anonymous bypass would let any external caller invoke tools authenticated as LiteLLM's service account. Fix: check `server.has_client_credentials` in `_target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream`, the anonymous allow-list in `get_allowed_mcp_servers`, and `_mcp_oauth_user_api_key_auth`. 2. Medium – internal-only servers exposed to public internet: The anonymous delegate allow-list was not filtering by `available_on_public_internet`, so external callers with an upstream OAuth token could invoke tools on servers marked internal-only. Fix: add `available_on_public_internet` guard to the anonymous delegate server list in `get_allowed_mcp_servers`. Tests added for both cases. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Require public MCP delegate auth servers Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): align delegate auth path parsing with downstream routing `_extract_target_server_names_from_path` used a naive segments-based split while `server.py::_get_mcp_servers_in_path` uses a regex that allows server names with one embedded slash and comma-separated lists. With the old parser, a request to `/mcp/<delegated>/<garbage>` was parsed as targeting `<delegated>` by the auth gate (bypassing LiteLLM auth) while the routing layer parsed it as `<delegated>/<garbage>` — when that name did not resolve, the request fell back to the anonymous allow-list, which can include `allow_all_keys` servers that normally require a LiteLLM key. Replace the parser with the same regex logic as `_get_mcp_servers_in_path` so auth gating sees the exact target name(s) downstream routing sees. Add regression tests covering parser parity and the specific extra-path-segment bypass attempt. https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9 * fix(mcp): close header/path TOCTOU in MCP delegate auth gate `_target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream` and `_target_servers_use_oauth2` trusted the `x-mcp-servers` header when present, but `server.py::extract_mcp_auth_context` overrides that header with the path-derived list for `/mcp/...` routes. An attacker could set `x-mcp-servers: <delegated>` while pointing the URL path at a non-delegate server, flipping the auth gate without changing the target downstream routing actually uses. Extract a shared `_resolve_target_server_names` helper that mirrors the downstream override (path-derived names for `/mcp/...` routes, header value otherwise). Add regression tests covering the TOCTOU attempt and the helper's path-vs-header precedence. https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9 * Fix delegated MCP OAuth test mock Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): drop unreachable /{server}/mcp branch in auth path parser `_extract_target_server_names_from_path` also matched the ``/{server_name}/mcp`` form, but the downstream parser ``_get_mcp_servers_in_path`` only handles ``/mcp/...`` — and ``dynamic_mcp_route`` in ``proxy_server`` rewrites ``/{name}/mcp`` to ``/mcp/{name}`` on the scope before the MCP handler runs. Parsing the un-rewritten form on the auth side was therefore unreachable in production, and contradicted the docstring's claim of mirroring the downstream parser — exactly the kind of mismatch that risks a future header/path TOCTOU if any new entry point skips the rewrite. Drop the branch; the canonical ``/mcp/...`` path matches both parsers. Update the regression test to assert the new behavior. https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9 * Fix MCP path auth target resolution Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): require auth for refresh_token grants on delegate-auth servers `_mcp_oauth_user_api_key_auth` gates the unauthenticated PKCE flow for ``delegate_auth_to_upstream`` servers, but the bypass applied to BOTH ``/authorize`` and ``/token`` regardless of grant type. ``mcp_token`` accepts ``grant_type=refresh_token`` as well as ``authorization_code``, and ``exchange_token_with_server`` attaches the server's stored ``client_secret`` to whatever is forwarded upstream. An unauthenticated caller holding a refresh token issued to that OAuth client could mint fresh upstream access tokens through LiteLLM. Limit the anonymous bypass on ``/token`` to ``grant_type=authorization_code`` (the only grant PKCE actually protects via ``code_verifier``); fall through to normal LiteLLM auth for ``refresh_token`` and any other grant. ``/authorize`` continues to allow anonymous PKCE redirects. https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9 * fix(ui): clear delegate_auth_to_upstream when switching off oauth2 The ``delegate_auth_to_upstream`` form field is rendered inside an ``isOAuth2 && (...)`` conditional, so the Form.Item unmounts when the user changes ``auth_type`` away from ``oauth2``. The follow-up ``form.setFieldValue("delegate_auth_to_upstream", false)`` runs after the field has already deregistered, so ``onFinish`` receives ``undefined`` and the fallback ``?? mcpServer.delegate_auth_to_upstream`` preserved the old ``true``. The flag then persisted in the database for a non-oauth2 server and silently re-activated if ``auth_type`` was later switched back to ``oauth2``. In the edit payload, force the flag to ``false`` whenever ``auth_type !== oauth2``; only trust the form value (and the existing DB fallback) when the server is actually oauth2. Backend defense-in-depth already ignores the flag for non-oauth2 servers, but the DB state should stay clean too. https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9 * Fix MCP delegate auth reset on edit Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Sameer Kankute
|
466f06df6d
|
fix(mcp): surface upstream 401 for token-forwarding MCP servers (#27847)
* fix(mcp): surface upstream 401 for token-forwarding MCP servers For MCP servers configured with extra_headers: [Authorization], the gateway forwards the client token directly to the upstream. When that token is rejected (expired or invalid) the upstream returns 401, but the MCP SDK starts the SSE stream with 200 OK before calling handlers, so the 401 can't be returned mid-stream. Fix: add a pre-flight httpx probe in handle_streamable_http_mcp — before the SDK opens the session — so the gateway can still return HTTP 401 with WWW-Authenticate: Bearer authorization_uri=<gateway-discovery-url> when the upstream rejects the token. The probe fails-open (returns 200) on network errors so a transient hiccup does not block valid requests. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): parallelize pre-flight auth probes and use HEAD to avoid side effects - Extract forwarded_auth outside the pass-through server loop (was called N times for the same scope value) - Gather all upstream auth probes concurrently with asyncio.gather instead of sequentially; eliminates N×5 s worst-case latency - Switch probe from POST+initialize JSON-RPC body to HEAD request; HEAD carries the Authorization header so the upstream rejects invalid tokens with 401 but never allocates a session or writes an audit entry Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): use get_async_httpx_client in _probe_upstream_auth Replaces bare httpx.AsyncClient with the project-standard get_async_httpx_client(httpxSpecialProvider.MCP) to satisfy the ensure_async_clients_test code coverage check and avoid the +500 ms per-request overhead of creating a new client on every probe call. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * refactor(mcp): extract pre-flight probe into _check_passthrough_upstream_auth Moves the parallel upstream auth probe logic out of handle_streamable_http_mcp into a dedicated helper to satisfy Ruff PLR0915 (Too many statements > 50). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): gate pre-flight probes on authorized server set to prevent bypass _check_passthrough_upstream_auth was resolving user-supplied server names directly before authorization ran, letting any permitted LiteLLM key trigger an upstream HEAD probe to a server it was not allowed to use. Changes: - Call _get_allowed_mcp_servers inside the helper so only servers the caller's key is authorized for are probed. - Move the call site to after toolset scoping so the auth context is fully resolved before the probe list is built. - Thread user_api_key_auth into the helper signature (replaces the raw mcp_servers name list). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Add async HTTP HEAD support Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): use Scope type annotation in _get_forwarded_auth_from_scope Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Fix MCP upstream auth probe method Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * Remove unused AsyncHTTPHandler head method Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): exclude has_client_credentials servers from pre-flight auth probe _prepare_mcp_server_headers skips caller Authorization when the server uses OAuth client-credentials (M2M), but the pre-flight probe was still selecting those servers and forwarding the caller's raw token in the HEAD request. Exclude servers with has_client_credentials from the probe list to match the actual downstream header-preparation logic. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): propagate upstream 403 as 403, not 401 with WWW-Authenticate Per RFC 9110, 401 means "go get new credentials." Mapping an upstream 403 to a gateway 401 causes OAuth clients to restart the authorization flow, obtain a fresh token with identical scopes, hit 403 again, and loop indefinitely. 401 from upstream → gateway 401 + WWW-Authenticate (re-authorize) 403 from upstream → gateway 403 (no WWW-Authenticate hint) Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): skip auth probe when Authorization may be the LiteLLM proxy key The pre-flight upstream probe must not forward the caller's Authorization header when it could itself be the LiteLLM proxy API key. Restrict the probe to requests that supply x-litellm-api-key explicitly — only then is the Authorization header unambiguously the upstream OAuth token the caller wants forwarded. * Fix MCP ASGI HTTPException propagation Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): use public AsyncHTTPHandler.post() in auth probe Use AsyncHTTPHandler.post() and catch httpx.HTTPStatusError explicitly so the 401/403 we want to surface is not silently swallowed by the broad fail-open except Exception block. Avoids reaching into the handler's private client attribute, which would silently regress to fail-open if AsyncHTTPHandler is ever refactored. * Fix MCP auth probe tests Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * test(mcp): add coverage for httpx.HTTPStatusError path in auth probe AsyncHTTPHandler.post() calls raise_for_status() internally, so a real upstream 401/403 lands as httpx.HTTPStatusError. Add a test that exercises that specific exception path so a regression that swallows the error in the broad fail-open except Exception would be caught. --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: claude-bot <claude-bot@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Cursor Agent
|
a1d1906025
|
fix(mcp): static headers win over forwarded headers in OpenAPI MCP
Match the existing MCP invariant in merge_mcp_headers and the managed MCP path: operator-configured static headers always override caller-forwarded headers on name conflict, with case-insensitive comparison so different casing cannot bypass the precedence. _request_auth_header (BYOK) still overrides Authorization last. Addresses Veria review on PR #27383. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
Milan
|
38bc921dd2
|
fix(mcp): forward extra_headers for OpenAPI MCP tools
OpenAPI-generated tools only applied static closure headers and BYOK Authorization via ContextVar. Copy MCPServer.extra_headers from the incoming MCP request into _request_extra_headers (set in server.py before local tool dispatch), merge in openapi_to_mcp_generator via a small helper. OAuth2 M2M: do not forward caller Authorization from raw_headers (same rule as _prepare_mcp_server_headers for managed MCP). Adds TestRequestExtraHeaders and clarifies mcp_server_manager registration comment. Fixes #26794 Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
||
|
Sameer Kankute
|
aa9e7b9808
|
feat: litellm shin agent oss staging 05 10 2026 (#27631)
* fix: invalidate cached tag object on tag budget reset (#27481) (#27572) Squash-merged by litellm-agent from oss-agent-shin's PR. * chore(mcp): tighten stdio server registration paths (#27570) Squash-merged by litellm-agent from stuxf's PR. * fix(proxy): clear MCP OpenAPI mappings on server eviction; widen budget cache invalidation Evict OpenAPI tools from global_mcp_tool_registry and strip tool_name_to_mcp_server_name_mapping entries when a server leaves the runtime registry (remove_server and approval-status eviction). Invalidate user_api_key_cache for keys, orgs, and team members on budget-tier spend resets alongside tags. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): align update_server eviction with remove_server name fallback Document budget-reset test assertion flip (cross-pod cache staleness). Greptile: eviction now pops by server_id then server_name like remove_server; test docstring explains assert_not_awaited -> assert_any_await change. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Fix org budget cache invalidation --------- Co-authored-by: oss-agent-shin <ext-agent-shin@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: stuxf <70670632+stuxf@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
||
|
Sameer Kankute
|
9ed99037d2
|
Merge pull request #27422 from BerriAI/shin_agent_oss_staging_05_07_2026
[litellm-agent] Staging → litellm_internal_staging (5/7/2026) |
||
|
milan-berri
|
9380940ced
|
fix(mcp): forward extra_headers for OpenAPI MCP tools (#27383)
* fix(mcp): forward extra_headers for OpenAPI MCP tools OpenAPI-generated tools only applied static closure headers and BYOK Authorization via ContextVar. Copy MCPServer.extra_headers from the incoming MCP request into _request_extra_headers (set in server.py before local tool dispatch), merge in openapi_to_mcp_generator via a small helper. OAuth2 M2M: do not forward caller Authorization from raw_headers (same rule as _prepare_mcp_server_headers for managed MCP). Adds TestRequestExtraHeaders and clarifies mcp_server_manager registration comment. Fixes #26794 Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * refactor(mcp): access has_client_credentials on MCPServer directly Greptile: getattr default was redundant; property exists on MCPServer and mcp_server is non-None inside the extra_headers forwarding block. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
ishaan-berri
|
e4c14862fc
|
feat(mcp): add OBO MCP Auth (#27421)
* feat(mcp): add oauth2 token exchange auth Co-authored-by: ishaan-berri <ishaan-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(mcp): cache token exchange fallback Co-authored-by: ishaan-berri <ishaan-berri@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: oss-agent-shin <279349115+oss-agent-shin@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: ishaan-berri <ishaan-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
oss-pr-review-agent-shin[bot]
|
158b0c28c0
|
[litellm-agent] Staging → litellm_internal_staging (5/7/2026) (#27375)
Squash-merged by litellm-agent from oss-pr-review-agent-shin[bot]'s PR. |
||
|
ishaan-berri
|
bd1a05aed9
|
Fix MCP DB reload partial failures (#27314)
* Fix MCP database reload partial failures Co-authored-by: ishaan-berri <ishaan-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Avoid staged MCP registry exposure Co-authored-by: ishaan-berri <ishaan-berri@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: oss-agent-shin <279349115+oss-agent-shin@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: ishaan-berri <ishaan-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
Krrish Dholakia
|
454ce5073f
|
fix(anthropic, mcp): sanitize tool names to match Anthropic's [a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,128} pattern (#26788)
* fix(anthropic, mcp): sanitize tool names to match Anthropic's `^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,128}$`
Tool names with characters like `/` or `.` (commonly produced by the
OpenAPI -> MCP generator from `operationId`s such as
`actions/download-job-logs-for-workflow-run`) caused Anthropic to reject
requests with `tools.N.custom.name: String should match pattern
'^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,128}$'`.
Two layers of fix:
1. Anthropic transformation: build a per-request forward map (original ->
sanitized, disambiguated by suffix on collisions) and a reverse map
(only for names actually rewritten). Forward map is applied to tool
defs, `tool_choice`, and historical assistant tool_calls in messages.
Reverse map is threaded through both the non-streaming and streaming
response paths so callers continue to see their original tool names
in `tool_use` blocks.
2. OpenAPI -> MCP generator: sanitize `operationId` (and the
method+path fallback) at registration time so generated MCP tools are
valid for any strict-name provider, not just Anthropic. The dashboard
preview endpoint applies the same sanitization for parity.
Includes unit tests covering: collision disambiguation between
`foo_bar` and `foo/bar` in the same request, reverse-map only firing
for actually-rewritten names, message rewrite for historical tool_calls,
streaming chunk_parser reverse-mapping, and sanitization of OpenAPI
operationIds plus the preview endpoint output.
Made-with: Cursor
* fix(anthropic): build tool-name maps in transform_request, not optional_params
The previous patch stashed the per-request forward and reverse tool-name
maps under ``optional_params["_anthropic_tool_name_forward_map"]`` and
``optional_params["_anthropic_tool_name_map"]``. ``optional_params`` is
the dict that becomes the JSON body via ``data = {**optional_params}``,
so those internal keys leaked over the wire and Anthropic 400'd with:
_anthropic_tool_name_forward_map: Extra inputs are not permitted
Worse, this meant *every* request whose tool list contained any name with
an invalid character (the exact case the patch was meant to fix) regressed
into a confusing meta-error pointing at LiteLLM's internal map instead of
the offending tool.
Fix: move all tool-name sanitization into ``transform_request``, which is
the single chokepoint already shared by ``AnthropicConfig``,
``AmazonAnthropicConfig`` (Bedrock invoke), ``VertexAIAnthropicConfig``,
and ``AzureAnthropicConfig`` (all call ``super().transform_request`` /
``AnthropicConfig.transform_request(self, ...)``). New static helper
``_sanitize_tool_names_in_request`` walks the already-Anthropic-shaped
``optional_params["tools"]`` (only ``type=="custom"`` entries -- hosted
tool names are reserved by Anthropic and must not be touched), builds
the per-request forward/reverse maps, and applies the forward map in
place to ``tools[*].name`` and ``tool_choice.name``. The reverse map is
stashed exclusively on ``litellm_params`` (which is never serialized to
a provider) under ``_anthropic_tool_name_map`` for the response paths
to consume.
Side effect of this restructure: ``map_openai_params`` is now a pure
OpenAI->Anthropic param translator with no side-channel state, which
matches its contract everywhere else in the codebase.
Tests: replaced the now-incorrect "stashes maps in optional_params"
tests with regressions that assert no underscore-prefixed keys appear
in either ``optional_params`` after ``map_openai_params`` or in the
final ``transform_request`` body. Added end-to-end coverage for:
sanitization in ``transform_request``, ``tool_choice`` rewriting,
historical ``tool_calls`` rewriting in messages, and hosted-tool
passthrough.
Made-with: Cursor
* fix(anthropic): always sanitize empty text content blocks
Anthropic 400s on `{"role": "user", "content": ""}` with:
"messages: text content blocks must be non-empty"
LiteLLM already had `_sanitize_empty_text_content` to rewrite empty text
to a placeholder, but it was gated behind `litellm.modify_params=True`.
With that flag off (default), empty content from upstream agent
frameworks (e.g. pydantic-ai) flowed straight through and tripped the
Anthropic validator.
Fix:
- Always run `_sanitize_empty_text_content` at the top of
`anthropic_messages_pt`, independent of `modify_params`. There is no
way to "pass through" an empty text block, so this is non-optional.
The richer tool-call sanitizations (Cases A/B/D, which actually
mutate conversation structure) remain gated on `modify_params`.
- Extend `_sanitize_empty_text_content` to also handle list-of-blocks
content (`[{"type": "text", "text": ""}]`), not just string content.
Adds 3 regression tests covering string content, list-of-blocks
content, and the no-op case (non-empty messages with modify_params off).
Made-with: Cursor
* fix(anthropic): drop dead tool-name forward-map params, fix mypy + caller-mutation
- remove unused `name_forward_map` param from `_map_tool_choice`,
`_map_tool_helper`, `_map_tools` and the `_apply_anthropic_tool_name_forward`
helper. Production sanitization runs in `_sanitize_tool_names_in_request`
at `transform_request`; these params were never threaded through.
- handler.py: use `ANTHROPIC_TOOL_NAME_REVERSE_MAP_KEY` constant instead of
the hardcoded `"_anthropic_tool_name_map"` string.
- fix mypy `"object" has no attribute "__iter__"` in
`_rewrite_tool_names_in_messages` by guarding `tool_calls` with
`isinstance(..., list)`.
- `_sanitize_tool_names_in_request`: build a new tools list with copy-on-
change entries (and copy `tool_choice` on rewrite) so a caller reusing
the same tool list/dicts across requests doesn't see its inputs
permanently rewritten.
- doc-comment `_build_request_tool_name_maps` clarifying it operates on
OpenAI-format tools (vs `_sanitize_tool_names_in_request` which runs
on Anthropic-format tools post-`_map_tools`).
- tests: drop 3 tests pinning the now-removed param paths; add coverage
for tool_calls + None function_call rewrite and caller-dict immutability.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): inherit stored credentials in test/tools/list for edit flow
When editing an existing MCP server, the Tool Configuration preview
calls POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list with server_id but no credentials
(management API redacts them). The endpoint now calls
_inherit_credentials_from_existing_server() so stored bearer tokens
and OAuth2 M2M credentials are loaded from global_mcp_server_manager
automatically — tools load without re-entering credentials.
New servers (no server_id) and requests with explicit credentials are
unaffected (function is a no-op in both cases).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): show all tools in edit panel, not just allowed tools
Edit flow was passing externalTools (from GET /tools/list, filtered by
allowed_tools) to MCPToolConfiguration, disabling the internal hook.
Remove the external props so the internal hook fires via
POST /test/tools/list, which returns all tools unfiltered. Combined
with the credential inheritance fix, tools load automatically without
re-entering credentials and all tools are visible for re-configuration.
existingAllowedTools still pre-checks previously allowed tools.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix order-dependent collision in _build_anthropic_tool_name_maps
Use a two-pass approach: first pre-register all already-valid tool names
in the 'used' set, then sanitize/disambiguate names that need rewriting.
This ensures valid names always have priority regardless of input order,
preventing duplicate tool names on the wire when e.g. 'foo/bar' appears
before 'foo_bar' in the tool list.
Add regression test for the reversed ordering case.
* Fix OpenAPI tool name collision: disambiguate sanitized names with numeric suffixes
sanitize_openapi_tool_name replaces all invalid chars with '_', but when
two operationIds differ only by sanitized characters (e.g. 'foo/list' and
'foo.list' both become 'foo_list'), the second registration silently
overwrites the first in the tool registry.
Add collision disambiguation in register_tools_from_openapi that appends
_2, _3, ... suffixes when a sanitized name is already taken, mirroring
the existing logic in _build_anthropic_tool_name_maps.
* Fix preview endpoint missing collision disambiguation for tool names
Add used_names tracking and _2/_3 suffix disambiguation to
_preview_openapi_tools, matching the logic in register_tools_from_openapi.
Without this, two operationIds that sanitize to the same string (e.g.
'foo/list' and 'foo.list' both becoming 'foo_list') would show duplicate
names in the preview while registration would disambiguate them.
* Align preview HTTP method order with register_tools_from_openapi
The preview endpoint and register_tools_from_openapi both use
order-dependent collision disambiguation (_2, _3 suffixes). When the
iteration order differs, two operations on the same path with sanitized
names that collide get different suffixes in preview vs registration,
so the dashboard shows names that don't match what actually got
registered.
Also adds a regression test that fails on the swapped order.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
* Skip duplicate originals in _build_anthropic_tool_name_maps
If the same invalid tool name appeared twice in original_names (e.g.
['foo/bar', 'foo/bar']), the second occurrence overwrote the forward
map entry with a freshly-suffixed name (foo_bar_2), leaving foo_bar
orphaned in 'used' with no reverse mapping. _sanitize_tool_names_in_request
then rewrote both tool entries to foo_bar_2, and Anthropic 400'd on
duplicate tool names.
Skip the rewrite if forward already has the original mapped.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
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yuneng-jiang
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6ff668c7aa
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[Infra] Promote internal staging to main (#27245)
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* default requested_model to empty string on litellm-side rejects * Update litellm/router.py Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: scope key access_group_ids override by team's assigned groups A team member could set any access_group_ids on their key (e.g. a group assigned only to a different team) and override the team's model restriction. Intersect the key's access_group_ids with team_object.access_group_ids in _key_access_group_grants_model so foreign groups are dropped before model expansion. Adds a regression test that asserts expansion is never called for foreign groups. * [Fix] Proxy: Skip Personal Budget Hook When Reservation Covers Counter The reservation path (PR #26845) atomically pre-fills `spend:user:{user_id}` and admits at the strict-`<` boundary. The legacy `_PROXY_MaxBudgetLimiter` pre-call hook re-reads the same counter with `>=`, so a reservation that fills the counter to exactly `max_budget` (e.g. a request without a `max_tokens` cap that falls back to reserving the smallest remaining headroom) is rejected by the hook even though the reservation already admitted it. Skip the hook when the request's active `budget_reservation` covers `spend:user:{user_id}`. The reservation is the source of truth for that counter cross-pod; the legacy `>=` path remains in place for requests without a reservation (e.g. paths that bypass the reservation entirely). Reproduces as `tests/otel_tests/test_prometheus.py::test_user_budget_metrics` on a fresh user with `max_budget=10` calling `fake-openai-endpoint` without `max_tokens`. Adds focused unit coverage in `tests/test_litellm/proxy/hooks/test_max_budget_limiter.py`. * harden bedrock file bucket validation * Fix syntax errors from botched merge in router.py * Fix Vertex batch output edge cases * [Fix] RBAC: Drop management_routes Write Fallback for Admin Viewer Greptile P1: the unsafe-method branch of `_check_proxy_admin_viewer_access` ended with a blanket `if route in management_routes: return`. That set is a mix of reads (info/list — handled via the safe-method GET branch above) and writes. The fallback let Admin Viewer POST to write endpoints not enumerated in `_ADMIN_VIEWER_BLOCKED_WRITE_ROUTES`, including: - /team/block, /team/unblock, /team/permissions_update - /jwt/key/mapping/{new,update,delete} - /key/bulk_update - /key/{key_id}/reset_spend Remove the fallback. The two remaining allow sets (admin_viewer_routes and global_spend_tracking_routes) are both read-only, so removal does not affect the legitimate POST-as-read cases (e.g. /spend/calculate, which is in spend_tracking_routes ⊂ admin_viewer_routes). Tests: - 8 new parametrized cases pinning each previously-leaking management write endpoint to 403 on POST for PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY. * fix(tests): anchor VCR redis cassette key to repo root `os.path.relpath` with no `start` arg uses the current working directory, so running pytest from a subdirectory produced a different Redis key than running from the repo root. CI-recorded cassettes and locally-replayed runs would silently miss each other's cache. Anchor the path to the repo root (derived from `__file__`) so the key is stable regardless of CWD. https://claude.ai/code/session_018uCx7pcrkdUJZrCVMaTdPx * fix: gate key access_group override on group's own assignment Replaces the previous intersect-with-team.access_group_ids check, which made the override unreachable in practice (the team-gate fallback already covered every case the intersection allowed). The override now resolves each of the key's access_group_ids via get_access_object and accepts the group only if its assigned_team_ids includes the key's team_id, or its assigned_key_ids includes the key's token. This fulfills the original ask (a key can extend a team's allow-list via a group the admin granted to that team or that specific key) while still rejecting foreign groups referenced by team members of other teams. * [Fix] Proxy/Key Management: Honor team_member_permissions /key/list In /key/list Endpoint When a team grants /key/list via team_member_permissions, non-admin members should see all keys for that team — same as a team admin. Previously the classification in list_keys() only checked admin status, so permitted members fell into the service-account-only path and could not see other members' personal keys. Routes those members into the full-visibility set. * Fix access-group bypass via litellm-model fallback path When _get_all_deployments returns 0 candidates and the litellm-model fallback branch (_get_deployment_by_litellm_model) finds deployments that the access-group filter then empties, _access_group_filter_emptied_candidates remained False (it was captured before that branch ran). The router would then proceed to default fallbacks; the fallback model could have no access_groups and short-circuit the filter, silently serving a caller blocked by access-group restrictions. Update the flag inside the litellm-model branch when filtering empties a non-empty candidate set so the default-fallback guard still triggers. * fix(proxy): redact MCP server URL and headers for non-admin viewers (VERIA-8) Many MCP integrations (Zapier, etc.) embed an upstream API key directly in the server URL, e.g. ``https://actions.zapier.com/mcp/<api-key>/sse``. The list and single-server endpoints were returning the full URL to any authenticated user — `_redact_mcp_credentials` only stripped the explicit ``credentials`` field, and `_sanitize_mcp_server_for_virtual_key` only ran for restricted virtual keys. Non-admin internal users could read the dashboard, click the unmask toggle, and exfiltrate the raw token. Add `_sanitize_mcp_server_for_non_admin` that runs on top of the existing credential redaction and clears the credential-bearing fields: - ``url`` (the primary leak vector) - ``spec_path`` (OpenAPI spec URLs that may carry tokens) - ``static_headers`` / ``extra_headers`` (Authorization) - ``env`` (arbitrary secrets) - ``authorization_url`` / ``token_url`` / ``registration_url`` Identity fields (``server_id``, ``alias``, ``mcp_info``, etc.) are preserved so the UI can still list servers a non-admin's team has access to. Apply the new sanitizer in `fetch_all_mcp_servers` and the per-server fetch path right after the existing virtual-key branch. Update the existing `test_list_mcp_servers_non_admin_user_filtered` assertions that previously checked URL visibility. Frontend defense-in-depth: hide the URL unmask toggle on `mcp_server_view.tsx` unless the viewer is a proxy admin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix runtime policy attachment initialization Mark runtime-created policies and attachments initialized so global policy attachments created from the policy builder apply immediately without requiring a restart. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * test(router): cover _try_early_resolve_deployments_for_model_not_in_names The router_code_coverage CI check requires every function in router.py to be referenced by at least one test under tests/{local_testing, router_unit_tests,test_litellm} in a file with "router" in its name. The recently-extracted helper had no direct test, so the check failed with "0.45% of functions in router.py are not tested". Add a focused test that exercises the four return paths: model already in self.model_names, no fallback applies, pattern-router match, and default_deployment substitution (also asserting the stored default isn't mutated). https://claude.ai/code/session_019AVp1XL7RT9RxRe4qRLkay * Fix policy registry teardown in tests Reset the policy ID index during policy engine test cleanup so stale policy versions cannot leak between tests. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(batches): count non-chat tokens, validate batch-file model access (VERIA-39) (#27015) * fix(batches): count non-chat tokens and validate every model in batch file Two security control bypasses on POST /v1/batches: 1. `_get_batch_job_input_file_usage` only summed tokens for `body.messages` (chat completions). Embedding (`input`) and text completion (`prompt`) batches reported zero, letting massive non-chat workloads slip past TPM rate limits. Extend the counter to handle string and list shapes for both fields. 2. The batch input file was forwarded to the upstream provider without inspecting the models named inside the JSONL — only the outer `model` query parameter was checked against the caller's allowlist. A caller restricted to gpt-3.5 could submit a batch targeting gpt-4o and the upstream would execute it under the proxy's shared API key. Add `_get_models_from_batch_input_file_content` (returns the distinct `body.model` values) and call it from `_enforce_batch_file_model_access` in the pre-call hook, which runs each model through `can_key_call_model` so the same allowlist semantics (wildcards, access groups, all-proxy-models, team aliases) the proxy enforces on `/chat/completions` apply here too. Any unauthorized model raises a 403 before the file is forwarded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(batches): count pre-tokenized prompt/input shapes, classify 403 logs Two follow-ups from the Greptile review on the batch validation PR: 1. P1 TPM bypass via integer token arrays. The OpenAI batch schema accepts ``prompt`` and ``input`` as ``list[int]`` (a single pre-tokenized prompt) or ``list[list[int]]`` (multiple) in addition to the string and ``list[str]`` shapes. Pre-fix only the string shapes were counted, so a caller could submit a batch with hundreds of millions of pre-tokenized tokens and the rate limiter would record zero. Extract the per-field logic into ``_count_prompt_or_input_tokens`` and count each int as one token. 2. P2 access-denial logs were indistinguishable from I/O failures. ``count_input_file_usage`` caught every exception under a generic "Error counting input file usage" message, so an intentional 403 from ``_enforce_batch_file_model_access`` looked the same in the logs as a missing file or a Prisma timeout. Catch ``HTTPException`` separately and log 403s at WARNING level with a security-relevant message before re-raising. Tests cover the new shapes: single ``list[int]``, ``list[list[int]]`` (the worst-case bypass vector), and embeddings ``input`` with pre-tokenized arrays. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(proxy): re-validate user_id after /user/info re-parses query (#27009) * fix(proxy): re-validate user_id ownership after /user/info re-parses query The route-level access check in `RouteChecks.non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check` reads `request.query_params.get("user_id")`, which decodes literal `+` to spaces. The endpoint then re-parses the raw query string with `urllib.unquote` in `get_user_id_from_request` to preserve `+` characters (so plus-addressed emails work as user_ids). Those two paths produce different ids: a caller who registered a user_id containing a literal space could pass the route check and then read another user's row by sending the encoded `+` form. Add `_enforce_user_info_access` and call it after `_normalize_user_info_user_id` returns the final id. Proxy admin / view-only admin still bypass; everyone else must match the resolved user_id (or have no user_id, which falls back to the caller's own id later in the handler). Tests cover the admin bypass, owner-match path, and the cross-user lookup that this change blocks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(proxy): apply user_info ownership check to PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY `_enforce_user_info_access` was bypassing both PROXY_ADMIN and PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY, but the upstream route check in `RouteChecks.non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check` only treats PROXY_ADMIN as a true admin for the `/user/info` route — view-only admins go through the `user_id == valid_token.user_id` enforcement along with regular users. Mirroring that asymmetry left the same encoded-`+` bypass open for view-only admins whose user_id contains a literal space. Drop the PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY exemption so the post-decode re-check matches the upstream rule. Update tests: a view-only admin must now be blocked from cross-user lookups but still allowed to read their own row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(spend-logs): opt-in suppression of stack traces in spend-tracking error logs Adds LITELLM_SUPPRESS_SPEND_LOG_TRACEBACKS env var. When set to true and the proxy log level is INFO or above, spend-tracking error paths emit a single ERROR line without the full traceback. Stack traces are preserved at DEBUG and the Sentry / proxy_logging_obj.failure_handler path is unchanged. The new spend_log_error helper is wired through the spend write hot path: - DBSpendUpdateWriter (update_database, _update_*_db, batch upsert, redis-commit fallbacks) - _ProxyDBLogger._PROXY_track_cost_callback - get_logging_payload exception path - update_spend / update_daily_tag_spend / spend logs queue monitor Resolves LIT-2704. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(spend-logs): preserve no-traceback behavior for update_daily_tag_spend This call site previously logged a single-line error via verbose_proxy_logger.error() with no traceback. Switching it to spend_log_error(..., exc=e) caused a full stack trace to render by default (when LITELLM_SUPPRESS_SPEND_LOG_TRACEBACKS is unset), which contradicts the PR goal of leaving default behavior unchanged. Revert this specific site to the original error log call. * fix(spend-logs): preserve no-traceback behavior for update_daily_tag_spend Bugbot caught a regression: the previous error log here was a single-line verbose_proxy_logger.error(...) with no traceback. spend_log_error attaches the active exception's traceback by default (when the suppression env var is unset), so swapping it in changed default behavior. Revert this one site to its original .error() call to keep the PR strictly opt-in. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(spend-logs): suppress traceback in SpendLogs error_information row Extend LITELLM_SUPPRESS_SPEND_LOG_TRACEBACKS to the failure callback so the per-row Metadata pane in the UI no longer shows the stack trace when the opt-in env var is set, matching the existing console-side suppression. https://claude.ai/code/session_014dztoRbRnRvq54HL9EyHx6 * [Fix] Proxy: Repair Merge Fallout In Router-Override Fallback Auth Conflict resolution for #26968 dropped the `Iterator` typing import (NameError at module load), left a dead `fallback_models = cast(...)` block, and the new tests called `_enforce_key_and_fallback_model_access` without the now-required `request` kwarg. * isolate dual OTEL handlers * harden cloud file compatibility path * harden cloud file compatibility path * [Fix] Proxy/Key Management: Align Key-Org Membership Checks On Generate And Regenerate Mirrors the membership rule on /key/update so that /key/generate and /key/{key}/regenerate apply the same `_validate_caller_can_assign_key_org` gate when the caller specifies an `organization_id`. Proxy admins bypass. The check no-ops when `organization_id` is not being set. * thread trusted params through vertex file content * trust only server legacy file flag * chore(proxy): keep public AI hub unauthenticated * fix(proxy): preserve low-detail readiness status * [Test] Anthropic: Replace Legacy Claude-4-Sonnet Alias With Haiku 4.5 Three live-API tests pinned to claude-4-sonnet-20250514, which is a non-canonical alias of claude-sonnet-4-20250514. Anthropic's main API no longer resolves the legacy form under freshly issued keys, so the tests fail with not_found_error. The token counter test pinned to claude-sonnet-4-20250514 itself (deprecation_date 2026-05-14, two weeks out) was on borrowed time too. Bump all four to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 — capability superset for what these tests exercise (streaming, parallel tool calling, extended thinking, token counting), no upcoming deprecation, cheaper per-token. * chore(proxy): move URL-valued model/file_id guard from SDK to proxy The previous per-provider guards in HuggingFace, Oobabooga, and Gemini files lived in the SDK layer, breaking SDK callers who legitimately pass URL-valued model identifiers. Move the check to the proxy boundary in add_litellm_data_to_request so SDK users keep working while proxy users default-deny URL-valued model and file_id, with admin opt-in via litellm.provider_url_destination_allowed_hosts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * [Chore] Proxy/UI: Drop stray _experimental/out/chat/index.html This file is a regenerable UI build artifact that should not be tracked in source. Removing so the merge into litellm_internal_staging stays clean. * [Test] Anthropic Passthrough: Bump Streaming Cost-Injection Test To Haiku 4.5 test_anthropic_messages_streaming_cost_injection hits the proxy's /v1/messages route, which routes via the anthropic/* wildcard to api.anthropic.com. The 404 surfaced in the test was Anthropic's own not_found_error propagated back through the proxy (visible from the x-litellm-model-id hash on the response — the proxy did route). Same root cause as the prior commit: the legacy claude-4-sonnet-20250514 alias is no longer recognized by Anthropic's main API under the new key. Swap to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 — same routing path, canonical model. * fix(proxy): handle ownership-recording failures after upstream create If record_container_owner raises after the upstream container is created, the user previously got a 500 with no usable container — they were billed for an unreachable resource. Move ownership recording into the create path's exception handling and split the two failure modes: - HTTPException from the recorder (auth conflicts) propagates verbatim so the client sees the real status code, not a generic LLM error. - Unexpected exceptions are logged and swallowed; the response is returned to the caller so they aren't billed for a container they can't address. The DB row stays untracked until an operator reconciles. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(guardrails): close post-call coverage gaps * fix(types): add /team/permissions_bulk_update to management_routes The blocklist check in _check_proxy_admin_viewer_access only fires for routes that match LiteLLMRoutes.management_routes — the bulk-update endpoint was missing from that list, so the test for view-only admins on /team/permissions_bulk_update fell through to "allow." Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * [Test] Anthropic Passthrough: Bump Thinking Tests Off Legacy Sonnet 4 Alias base_anthropic_messages_test.test_anthropic_messages_with_thinking and test_anthropic_streaming_with_thinking still pinned to claude-4-sonnet-20250514 — the same legacy alias Anthropic no longer recognizes under freshly issued keys. The other four tests in this base class already use claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929; these two were missed. Bump to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 (supports_reasoning=true, no upcoming deprecation). Subclasses including TestAnthropicPassthroughBasic inherit these methods. * fix(guardrails): cover multi-choice output variants * fix(proxy): preserve public ai hub ui setting * fix(scim): cascade FK cleanup on user delete and surface block status in UI SCIM DELETE /Users/{id} previously called litellm_usertable.delete without clearing rows that FK back to the user, so Postgres rejected the delete with LiteLLM_InvitationLink_user_id_fkey and the SCIM caller saw a 500. Add a helper to drop invitation_link, organization_membership, and team_membership rows before the user delete (mirrors /user/delete in internal_user_endpoints). Also add a Status column to the Virtual Keys and Internal Users tables so admins can see at a glance which keys are blocked and which users SCIM has deactivated. SCIM-blocked keys carry a tooltip explaining the origin. Pin the dashboard's Node version to 20 via .nvmrc to match CI. * chore: update Next.js build artifacts (2026-05-02 03:21 UTC, node v20.20.2) * perf(proxy): cache container/skill ownership reads on the hot path Container ownership and skill rows are looked up on every retrieve / delete / list / file-content / chat-completion-with-skill call. The new stores wrapped raw Prisma queries with no cache, putting one DB round-trip on each request. Add an in-process TTL'd cache mirroring the _byok_cred_cache pattern in mcp_server/server.py: per-key (value, monotonic_timestamp), 60s TTL, 10000-entry cap with full-clear on overflow, invalidated by every write. Negative results (`None`) are cached too so untracked-resource checks also skip the DB. Tests cover: cache-after-first-hit, negative caching, write invalidation, no-caching-on-DB-error, TTL expiry, capacity eviction. 56 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update Next.js build artifacts (2026-05-02 03:39 UTC, node v20.20.2) * fix: remove traceback key instead of it being "" * fix: linting error * fix(scim): preserve scim_active on PUT when client omits the field A SCIM PUT may legally omit `active` (full-replace with the field absent). Pydantic fills the SCIMUser.active default of True, so the PUT handler was overwriting metadata.scim_active with True even when the client never sent it — silently reactivating a previously SCIM-blocked user and unblocking their keys. Use model_fields_set to detect whether the client actually sent `active`. If omitted, preserve the prior scim_active value and skip the cascade to virtual keys. Also drop comments added in this PR that just narrate what the code does; keep only the docstrings and the SQL-NULL pitfall note that explain non-obvious behaviour. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): use set lookup for permitted agent filters * fix(mcp): redact command fields for non-admin server views * fix(proxy): forward decoded container ids after ownership checks * fix(caching): handle stale isolated Redis semantic index * fix(cloudflare): support response_text in streaming chunk parser Newer Cloudflare Workers AI models (e.g. Nemotron) emit 'response_text' instead of 'response' on streamed chunks. The non-streaming path was already updated to fall back to 'response_text' (#26385), but the streaming chunk parser still only read 'response', which caused streaming requests against those models to silently produce empty content. Mirror the non-streaming fallback in CloudflareChatResponseIterator.chunk_parser and add a streaming test for the response_text shape. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Fix code qa * Address bugbot: drop dead encode/decode helpers; preserve empty custom_id - Remove unused _encode_gcp_label_value / _decode_gcp_label_value singular helpers; only the _chunks variants are actually called. - Use 'is not None' check for custom_id so empty-string custom_ids are still labeled and round-trip through batch outputs. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Forward Vertex file content logging context * test vertex file content logging forwarding Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> * Fix Vertex batch output logging mutation * fix: don't mutate caller's logging_obj in _try_transform_vertex_batch_output_to_openai The method was overwriting logging_obj.optional_params, logging_obj.model, and logging_obj.start_time on the caller's Logging instance. When invoked from llm_http_handler.py's generic framework path, the framework's own logging_obj (which already went through pre_call) had its properties clobbered, causing model and start_time to reflect the last batch line's values rather than the original call context. Fix: create a fresh local Logging instance for the per-line transformation instead of mutating the incoming logging_obj. The caller's object is now left entirely untouched regardless of whether a logging_obj was passed in or not. Regression tests added to verify model, start_time, and optional_params are not mutated on the caller's logging_obj. Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> * feat: add opt-out flag for Vertex batch output transformation Adds litellm.disable_vertex_batch_output_transformation (default False). When True, afile_content returns raw Vertex predictions.jsonl untouched so users that parse candidates/modelVersion directly are not broken. * fix(anthropic,bedrock): omit thinking/output_config when reasoning_effort="none" Setting reasoning_effort="none" on Anthropic chat models (direct, Bedrock Invoke, Bedrock Converse, Vertex AI Anthropic, Azure AI Anthropic) crashed LiteLLM with: litellm.APIConnectionError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'get' Both the Anthropic chat transformation and Bedrock Converse called ``AnthropicConfig._map_reasoning_effort`` and assigned the ``None`` it returns for ``"none"`` directly to ``optional_params["thinking"]``. Downstream ``is_thinking_enabled`` then did ``optional_params["thinking"].get("type")`` and crashed. Pop ``thinking`` (and on Claude 4.6/4.7, ``output_config``) instead of assigning ``None``, restoring the documented contract that ``reasoning_effort="none"`` means "do not enable thinking". This also prevents downstream Anthropic 400s ("thinking: Input should be an object", "output_config.effort: Input should be ...") if the bug were ever masked. Verified end-to-end against the live Anthropic API and Bedrock Converse on claude-opus-4-{5,6,7} and claude-sonnet-4-6, plus Bedrock Invoke for Claude 4.5/4.6. Vertex AI Anthropic and Azure AI Anthropic inherit the fixed ``map_openai_params`` from ``AnthropicConfig`` and need no further changes. * fix(vertex-ai): set response=null on batch error entries per OpenAI spec The Vertex batch output transformer was emitting both a populated 'response' and 'error' for failed batch entries. The OpenAI Batch output spec defines them as mutually exclusive: on error 'response' MUST be null. This broke any consumer using 'result["response"] is None' to detect failures. * test(vertex-ai): cover transformation_error path emits response=null * fix(security): sandbox jinja2 in gitlab/arize/bitbucket prompt managers DotpromptManager was hardened to render through ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment. The three sibling managers (gitlab, arize, bitbucket) were missed and still instantiate plain jinja2.Environment(), leaving the same attribute-traversal SSTI primitive open: a template fetched from a GitLab/BitBucket repo or Arize Phoenix workspace can reach __class__.__init__.__globals__ and execute arbitrary Python on the proxy host. Match the dotprompt pattern by switching all three to ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment. The sandbox blocks the dunder-traversal chain while leaving normal {{ var }} substitution intact, so the template surface is unchanged for legitimate use. Adds tests/test_litellm/integrations/test_prompt_manager_ssti.py (18 cases) verifying each manager's jinja_env is a sandbox, that classic SSTI payloads raise SecurityError, and that ordinary variable rendering still works. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(proxy): drop client-supplied pricing fields from request bodies The proxy currently forwards request-body pricing parameters (the fields on `CustomPricingLiteLLMParams`, plus `metadata.model_info`) into the core call path. Those fields belong to deployment configuration, not to per-request input — sending them from a client mutates the request's recorded cost and, via `litellm.completion` → `register_model`, the process-wide `litellm.model_cost` map for every later caller in the worker. Strip them at the boundary. The strip set is built from `CustomPricingLiteLLMParams.model_fields` so pricing fields added later are covered automatically. Operators who do want clients to supply per-request pricing can opt back in per key or team via `metadata.allow_client_pricing_override = true`, mirroring the existing `allow_client_mock_response` and `allow_client_message_redaction_opt_out` flags. Tests cover the strip set's coverage, root and metadata strips, the opt-in skip on both key and team metadata, and a regression check that the global `litellm.model_cost` map is unmutated after a stripped request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(proxy): log stripped pricing fields at debug for operator visibility Operators upgrading would otherwise see client-supplied pricing overrides silently stop applying with no diagnostic. Emit a debug-level line listing the dropped fields and pointing at the opt-in flag when any are stripped; stay silent on the no-op path so the log isn't filled with noise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(proxy): move pricing strip below the litellm_metadata JSON-string parse The strip ran before the proxy parses ``litellm_metadata`` from a JSON string into a dict (a path used by multipart/form-data and ``extra_body`` callers), so ``isinstance(metadata, dict)`` was False and ``model_info`` survived the strip. Move the call to the same post-parse position the ``user_api_key_*`` strip already uses for the same reason. Adds a regression test exercising the JSON-string ``litellm_metadata`` path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(responses): replace legacy claude-4-sonnet alias in multiturn tool-call test Anthropic's main API no longer resolves the non-canonical 'claude-4-sonnet-20250514' alias for freshly issued keys, returning 404 not_found_error. PR #27031 already swept three other live tests pinned to this alias to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 but missed test_multiturn_tool_calls in the responses API suite, which is now failing reliably on PR CI runs (e.g. PR #27074, job 1603363). Bump the two model references in test_multiturn_tool_calls to the same claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 snapshot used by PR #27031 -- it covers everything this test exercises (tool calling, multi-turn) and isn't on a deprecation schedule. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(proxy): close callback-config and observability-credential side channels Two related gaps in the proxy's request bouncer: 1. ``is_request_body_safe`` (auth_utils.py) walked the request-body root and the ``litellm_embedding_config`` nested dict, but not ``metadata`` or ``litellm_metadata``. The same fields it bans at root — Langfuse / Langsmith / Arize / PostHog / Braintrust / Phoenix / W&B Weave / GCS / Humanloop / Lunary credentials and routing — were silently accepted when the caller put them inside metadata, retargeting observability callbacks to a caller-controlled host with caller-supplied creds. Walk both metadata containers (and parse the JSON-string form sent via multipart / ``extra_body``) through the same banned-params helper, so the existing ``allow_client_side_credentials`` opt-in covers both paths consistently. 2. The banned-params list was hand-maintained and lagged the canonical ``_supported_callback_params`` allow-list in ``initialize_dynamic_callback_params``. Derive the observability bans from that allow-list (minus a small ``_SAFE_CLIENT_CALLBACK_PARAMS`` set for informational fields like ``langfuse_prompt_version`` and ``langsmith_sampling_rate``) so future integrations are covered automatically; ``_EXTRA_BANNED_OBSERVABILITY_PARAMS`` carries the handful of fields integrations read but the allow-list hasn't caught up to. A guard test fails CI if a new entry is added to ``_supported_callback_params`` without an explicit safe-list decision. Separately in ``litellm_pre_call_utils.py``: add ``callbacks``, ``service_callback``, ``logger_fn``, and ``litellm_disabled_callbacks`` to ``_UNTRUSTED_ROOT_CONTROL_FIELDS``. The first three are appended to worker-wide ``litellm.{input,success,failure,_async_*,service}_callback`` lists / ``litellm.user_logger_fn`` from inside ``function_setup`` — one request poisons every subsequent caller in that worker. The last is the inverse primitive: the legitimate path reads it from key/team metadata, the request-body version silently disables admin-configured audit / observability for the call. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): per-param allow must continue, not return early A pre-existing logic bug in ``_check_banned_params``: when the deployment-level ``configurable_clientside_auth_params`` permitted one banned field, the loop ``return``-ed on the first match instead of ``continue``-ing, so any other banned param later in the same body or metadata dict was never checked. This PR's metadata walk multiplies the surface where that bypass matters — a body pairing an allowed ``api_base`` with an observability credential like ``langfuse_host`` would silently pass. Proxy-wide ``allow_client_side_credentials`` keeps ``return`` (it's a global opt-in for every banned param). The per-param branch becomes ``continue`` so only the one explicitly-permitted field is skipped. Adds a regression test that exercises the api_base + langfuse_host pair. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(vector_store): resolve embedding config at request time, never persist creds The vector store create/update path previously called ``_resolve_embedding_config`` against the admin-configured router/DB model and persisted the resolved ``litellm_embedding_config`` dict (``api_key`` / ``api_base`` / ``api_version``) into the ``litellm_managedvectorstorestable.litellm_params`` column. Because the resolver expanded ``os.environ/...`` references via ``get_secret``, the DB row carried cleartext provider credentials, and the ``/vector_store/{new,info,update,list}`` responses returned them to any authenticated caller who could supply a known admin model name. Move the auto-resolve out of ``create_vector_store_in_db`` and out of the update path. Persist only the user-supplied ``litellm_embedding_model`` reference. Resolve at request-handling time inside ``_update_request_data_with_litellm_managed_vector_store_registry`` so the resolved config lives in the per-request ``data`` dict and is garbage-collected after the response. Legacy rows that were created by an earlier proxy version and already carry a resolved ``litellm_embedding_config`` skip the re-resolution and pass through unchanged so embedding calls keep working. The ``new_vector_store`` response now also runs the existing ``_redact_sensitive_litellm_params`` masker (already used by ``info``, ``update``, and ``list``), defending against caller-supplied cleartext on the create path and against legacy rows whose persisted credentials are still in the database. Existing tests that asserted the old write-time-resolve behaviour are updated to assert the new persistence shape (no embedding config stored, just the model reference). Two new tests cover the use-time path: one asserting fresh resolution happens when a row carries only the model reference, the other asserting legacy rows with persisted config skip re-resolution and continue to work. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(vector_store): tighten registry-mutation comment and dedupe test helpers * fix(vector_store): cache use-time embedding-config resolution Hold the resolved config in a process-memory TTL cache so the request-handling path doesn't run litellm_proxymodeltable.find_first on every vector-store call. * fix(anthropic,bedrock,vertex): forward output_config.effort + 400 on garbage reasoning_effort Follow-up bugs surfaced by the QA sweep on PR #27039 (https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/27039#issuecomment-4363363610). 1. Stop stripping output_config.effort on Bedrock + Vertex adaptive routes. - Vertex AI Claude 4.6/4.7 accepts output_config.effort on rawPredict (verified end-to-end against us-east5 / global). The strip helper now no-ops for effort. - Bedrock Converse routes output_config into additionalModelRequestFields for anthropic base models so the requested adaptive tier (low/medium/ high/xhigh/max) actually reaches the wire instead of all collapsing to identical thinking. - Bedrock Invoke chat transformation (AmazonAnthropicClaudeConfig) stops popping output_config from the post-AnthropicConfig request body. - Bedrock Invoke /v1/messages allowlist (BedrockInvokeAnthropicMessagesRequest) now lists output_config so the runtime allowlist filter forwards it. 2. Validate effort across Bedrock Converse so 'disabled' / 'invalid' / '' / unsupported tiers (xhigh/max on Sonnet 4.6 or budget-mode 4.5 models) surface as a clean 400 BadRequestError instead of 500. 3. ValueError -> BadRequestError throughout (AnthropicConfig.map_openai_params, _apply_output_config, AmazonConverseConfig._handle_reasoning_effort_parameter). Empty-string effort is now rejected (was silently passing the 'if effort and ...' short-circuit). 4. Floor reasoning_effort='minimal' at the Anthropic provider minimum (1024 budget_tokens) via new ANTHROPIC_MIN_THINKING_BUDGET_TOKENS so it's a usable tier on direct Anthropic / Azure AI Anthropic / Vertex AI Anthropic / Bedrock Invoke (all of which 400 below 1024). 5. model_prices: dedupe duplicate supports_max_reasoning_effort key on claude-opus-4-7 / claude-opus-4-7-20260416. Adds regression tests across all five affected paths; existing tests asserting the silent-strip behavior were updated to reflect the new pass-through and clean 400 surfaces. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(constants): make ANTHROPIC_MIN_THINKING_BUDGET_TOKENS a plain constant The documentation CI test (tests/documentation_tests/test_env_keys.py) asserts every os.getenv() key in the source has a matching entry in the litellm-docs config_settings.md table. ANTHROPIC_MIN_THINKING_BUDGET_TOKENS tracks Anthropic's published wire-protocol minimum (1024) — it's not a user-tunable, so making it env-overridable was wrong anyway. Drop the os.getenv() wrapper; the value is now a plain literal. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(anthropic,bedrock): correct effort error message and dedupe effort_map - Remove 'none' from the Bedrock _validate_anthropic_adaptive_effort error message; it was listed as a valid value but rejected by the membership check, leaving users in a feedback loop if they tried 'none'. - Hoist the duplicated reasoning_effort -> output_config.effort mapping out of AnthropicConfig.map_openai_params and AmazonConverseConfig._handle_reasoning_effort_parameter into a single AnthropicConfig.REASONING_EFFORT_TO_OUTPUT_CONFIG_EFFORT class constant so the two routes cannot drift. * fix(anthropic): translate reasoning_effort on /v1/messages route Closes the remaining QA-sweep gap on PR #27074: Bedrock Invoke /v1/messages was silently ignoring ``reasoning_effort`` because the shared param filter only kept native Anthropic keys, so every effort tier collapsed to the same behavior on the wire (27/231 cells failing across opus-4-5 / opus-4-6 / sonnet-4-6). Map ``reasoning_effort`` to native Anthropic ``thinking`` / ``output_config.effort`` at the ``AnthropicMessagesConfig`` layer so all four /v1/messages routes (direct Anthropic, Azure AI, Vertex AI, Bedrock Invoke) inherit the same translation: - Add ``reasoning_effort`` to ``AnthropicMessagesRequestOptionalParams`` so the param filter in ``AnthropicMessagesRequestUtils.get_requested_anthropic_messages_optional_param`` no longer drops it before the transformation runs. - Add ``_translate_reasoning_effort_to_anthropic`` and call it from ``transform_anthropic_messages_request``. Mirrors ``AnthropicConfig.map_openai_params`` on the chat completion path (re-uses ``_map_reasoning_effort`` and ``REASONING_EFFORT_TO_OUTPUT_CONFIG_EFFORT``) so the two routes cannot drift. Pops ``reasoning_effort`` so it never reaches the wire. - Caller-supplied native ``thinking`` / ``output_config.effort`` always win — same precedence as ``_translate_legacy_thinking_for_adaptive_model``. - Garbage values (``""``, ``"disabled"``, ``"invalid"``) raise ``AnthropicError(status_code=400)`` instead of falling through and surfacing as 500s from the provider. - ``"none"`` clears thinking + output_config so callers can opt out per request. Also restores the non-adaptive-model test coverage on Bedrock Invoke /v1/messages that the previous commit lost when ``test_bedrock_messages_strips_output_config`` was renamed to the ``forwards`` variant on Opus 4.7. Adds a new test file ``test_reasoning_effort_translation.py`` covering the translation at the shared config level (adaptive + non-adaptive models, none, garbage, caller precedence) so all four /v1/messages routes are exercised by a single suite. Adds parametrized + behavioral tests on the Bedrock Invoke /v1/messages suite covering: minimal/low/medium/high/xhigh/max mapping for adaptive models, thinking-budget mapping for non-adaptive Opus 4.5, ``none`` clears both, garbage raises 400, explicit ``output_config`` wins. Refs: https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/27074 * fix(anthropic,bedrock): reject unmapped reasoning_effort at mapping site Both the chat completion path (AnthropicConfig.map_openai_params) and the Bedrock Converse path (_handle_reasoning_effort_parameter) used REASONING_EFFORT_TO_OUTPUT_CONFIG_EFFORT.get(value, value) which falls back to the raw input on unmapped keys. Combined with _map_reasoning_effort returning type='adaptive' for any string on Claude 4.6/4.7, garbage values (e.g. 'disabled') could leak into optional_params['output_config']['effort'] unvalidated if map_openai_params ran without the downstream transform_request or _validate_anthropic_adaptive_effort check. Mirror the /v1/messages pattern: use .get(value) (no fallback) and raise BadRequestError immediately when the value is unmapped, co-locating validation with the mapping for defense in depth. * style: black formatting Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(anthropic): stop class-attr leak; gate xhigh/max on every route The reasoning-effort mapping dict was a public class attribute on AnthropicConfig, so BaseConfig.get_config returned it as a request parameter and every Anthropic-backed call (Anthropic / Azure / Vertex / Bedrock Invoke) hit a 400 'REASONING_EFFORT_TO_OUTPUT_CONFIG_EFFORT: Extra inputs are not permitted' from the provider. Move the mapping to a module-level constant. _supports_effort_level only looked the model up under custom_llm_provider='anthropic', so bedrock-prefixed model ids (e.g. bedrock/invoke/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-7) returned False for both 'max' and 'xhigh' even when the underlying model entry has the flag set. Strip known provider prefixes and retry the lookup against litellm.model_cost directly so per-model gating works on every route. Mirror the per-model xhigh/max gate from AnthropicConfig._apply_output_config in AnthropicMessagesConfig._translate_reasoning_effort_to_anthropic so the /v1/messages route also raises a clean 400 instead of forwarding the unsupported tier. * feat(anthropic,bedrock): strip output_config under drop_params for non-effort models When a proxy fronts Claude Code (which always sends `output_config.effort`) at a pre-4.5 Anthropic model — haiku-3, sonnet-3.5, opus-3, sonnet-4 — the forwarded knob causes a forced 400 the client can't fix. Gating a strip behind the existing `drop_params` flag lets operators opt into silent fixup once and stop worrying about per-model param hygiene. Default (`drop_params=False`) still forwards and surfaces the provider's error, preserving the strict, debuggable contract from #27074. Per https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/build-with-claude/effort the supporting set is Opus 4.5+, Sonnet 4.6+, and Mythos Preview; everything else is dropped (with a verbose_logger warning so the strip is visible). Recognition uses model-name patterns plus a fallback to any `supports_*_reasoning_effort` flag in the model map for forward compatibility with new entries. https://claude.ai/code/session_01WjHq31rvXT6xYNdVmSJvRp (cherry picked from commit |
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Sameer Kankute
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f576eb3228
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Merge pull request #26960 from BerriAI/litellm_org_mcp_permissions
feat(mcp): enforce org-level MCP server and toolset permissions |
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yuneng-jiang
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c154b0df24
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Merge pull request #27016 from stuxf/fix/mcp-openapi-tool-auth-bypass
fix(mcp): run pre_call_tool_check on OpenAPI/local-registry path (VERIA-7) |
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user
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8ee599aa7d
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fix(mcp): use canonical proxy_logging_obj, deny when MCP server is unresolvable
Greptile flagged two follow-ups on the OpenAPI/local-registry pre-call
check:
1. **P1 runtime crash via None proxy_logging_obj.**
`kwargs.get("proxy_logging_obj")` is `None` on the MCP entry path,
and `pre_call_tool_check` calls `proxy_logging_obj._create_mcp_request_object_from_kwargs`
unconditionally after the security checks, which would have crashed
every legitimate call with `AttributeError`. Source the logging
object from `litellm.proxy.proxy_server` the same way
`_handle_managed_mcp_tool` already does.
2. **P2 authorization-bypass window when mcp_server is None.**
Previously the new check was guarded by `if mcp_server is not None`,
so any local tool whose registry entry had no resolvable server (a
startup-race window before `_initialize_tool_name_to_mcp_server_name_mapping`
completes, or an orphaned registry entry) ran without the security
check. Tools registered via openapi_to_mcp_generator are always tied
to a server, so a missing one is a configuration/timing fault — fail
the call with 503 instead of dispatching unguarded.
Tests: existing two pass with an added assertion that
`proxy_logging_obj` is non-None at the call site, plus a new test that
covers the 503 deny branch when the tool→server mapping is missing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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yuneng-jiang
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8363fe00e1
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Merge pull request #26841 from stuxf/fix/mcp-xff-trust-gate
chore(mcp): require trusted-proxy gate before honouring X-Forwarded-* on OAuth discovery |
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user
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5daf0168a8
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fix(mcp): run pre_call_tool_check on OpenAPI/local-registry path (VERIA-7)
`execute_mcp_tool` dispatches in two ways: managed MCP servers go through `_handle_managed_mcp_tool`, which calls `MCPServerManager.pre_call_tool_check` to enforce allowed/banned tool lists, key/team `object_permission` tool grants, and parameter validation. OpenAPI-backed tools, however, were resolved via `global_mcp_tool_registry` and dispatched directly to `_handle_local_mcp_tool` — entirely skipping `pre_call_tool_check`. A caller could invoke any registered OpenAPI tool regardless of their key/team permissions, including administrative or destructive operations on the upstream API. Run `pre_call_tool_check` before the local-registry dispatch whenever the resolved server is set (the same condition used to surface server context to the managed path). Honor any guardrail-modified arguments the hook returns. Errors raised by the hook propagate up before `_handle_local_mcp_tool` runs. Tests cover both directions: the pre-call hook fires when the local tool resolves alongside a server, and a hook-raised HTTPException prevents the local handler from being invoked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Sameer Kankute
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8300657af9
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fix(mcp): preserve oauth2 m2m auth for tools routes (#26871)
* Fix tool/list M2M creds issue * Fix tool call creds issue * Fix greptile review * Fix lint * Fix lint * Fix lint * Fix lint |
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Cursor Agent
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fca21a979c
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Fix org MCP permission ceiling escalation | ||
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Sameer Kankute
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b540a71e47
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feat(mcp): enforce org-level MCP server and toolset permissions
Apply organization object_permission as a ceiling on allowed MCP servers and tool permissions, consistent with vector store org checks. Includes unit tests for org ceiling, intersection, and tool filtering. Made-with: Cursor |
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yuneng-jiang
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256e05e474
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Merge pull request #26849 from stuxf/fix/mcp-oauth-discovery-ssrf
chore(mcp): SSRF guard on OAuth metadata discovery follow-up fetches |