* fix(proxy): attribute spend to org for team-linked keys minted without org_id
Keys attached to an org-linked team but minted without an organization_id
produced spend that was never credited to the org: the spend writer reads
user_api_key_dict.org_id with no team fallback, while the org budget check
resolves the org from the team. The check therefore ran against a counter
fed by almost none of the org's traffic and never tripped.
Backfill org_id from the freshly fetched team object in
_run_centralized_common_checks, per request only, so the spend writer and
the budget check read the same org. A key with an explicitly pinned org_id
always wins, and the cached key row is never mutated, so moving a team to
a different org takes effect on the next auth once the team cache
refreshes.
* test(proxy): cover CLI session-token org backfill from team
CLI session tokens from /sso/cli/poll are minted with a real team_id but
no org_id, and their auth path decrypts the blob without the combined_view
team join that fills org for DB keys. Spend from these tokens reached the
team but never the org, so org budgets never tripped. The regression test
mints a real CLI token, runs it through the centralized checks, and
asserts the credential leaves auth with the team's org.
(cherry picked from commit 579f41d57f)
* fix(proxy): share CLI SSO login sessions across workers without enable_redis_auth_cache
* fix(proxy): make CLI SSO flow state redis-authoritative across workers
The CLI SSO flow is stored in a DualCache whose get_cache is memory-first, so
the worker that served /sso/cli/start keeps serving its stale in-memory flow and
never observes the sso_complete/session_data update another worker writes during
the OAuth callback. Attaching Redis alone is not enough; poll on the original
worker returns pending forever.
Read and write the flow directly through the attached Redis backend when present
so every worker sees the same authoritative state, falling back to the in-memory
DualCache only when no Redis is configured.
* fix(proxy): serialize CLI SSO flow as JSON for the redis round trip
RedisCache stores values via str(value) and parses reads with
json.loads then ast.literal_eval. The completed flow contains a
LitellmUserRoles enum in session_data.user_role, whose repr is not a
parseable literal, so any worker reading the completed flow from redis
raised SyntaxError and returned 400 "CLI login session not found".
Writing the flow as json.dumps makes the round trip lossless (the enum
is a str subclass) and fails loudly at write time if a non-serializable
value is ever added to the flow.
* fix(proxy): point CLI SSO session-not-found hint at configuring Redis
The error message and warning still told users to set enable_redis_auth_cache,
but the CLI SSO session cache now gets Redis unconditionally whenever one is
configured, so that flag no longer affects CLI login
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>
(cherry picked from commit 17a83aa896)
* refactor(auth): derive temp budget bump without mutation, tz-aware auth datetimes
_update_key_budget_with_temp_budget_increase mutated max_budget in place, so correctness depended on every resolution path handing it a fresh copy of the cached token; one future re-cache of a live token would compound the bump per request. Return a model_copy instead so no caller can leak an increased budget into shared state.
Also fixes the three remaining DTZ005 naive datetime.now() calls in user_api_key_auth.py (auth span start, builder start_time, service-log end_time; all consumers convert to epoch or subtract same-pair datetimes) and ratchets the DTZ005 strict budget 244 -> 241.
* test: pin non-mutation of the temp budget helper input
Adversarial mutation-testing showed reverting the helper to in-place mutation still passed every test: the cache's copy-on-read layer masks the mutation in the integration test and the direct unit test only inspected the return value. Assert the input object is left untouched and the result is a distinct object so the purity guarantee itself is load-bearing.
(cherry picked from commit 76c9eca25d)
temp_budget_increase was only applied on the DB-fetch path of _user_api_key_auth_builder, so a key served from the auth cache reverted to its original max_budget and was wrongly blocked with BudgetExceededError once spend crossed the original budget while staying under the effective budget.
Move _update_key_budget_with_temp_budget_increase out of the DB-only branch so it runs for every resolved token regardless of source. The cache stores the original budget and each cache hit returns a fresh model_copy(), so this never double-applies.
Fixes#25760
Co-authored-by: shivam <shivam@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 089de50d20)
With enable_redis_auth_cache and multiple replicas, /key/update and
/key/delete delete the Redis auth blob and the handling pod's in-memory
entry, but two read-path writers re-published the stale blob from any other
replica's per-pod memory back to Redis with a fresh 60s TTL on every
request: the post-auth re-cache in user_api_key_auth and the spend writeback
in update_cache. Replicas whose in-memory entries expired then re-primed
themselves from the poisoned Redis entry, so key limit and access changes
never took effect fleet-wide while traffic continued, and a deleted key kept
authenticating.
The auth object is now written only by the DB-load paths
(IdentityStore._resolve_key, get_key_object): the post-auth re-cache is
removed outright (even a local-only write could race an invalidation and
resurrect a revoked key on this worker) and spend tracking no longer writes
the auth object back at all; spend is tracked through the spend🔑*
counters. The remaining spend writebacks for user, team, end-user, and tag
objects become local-only so they cannot republish stale management objects
either, with one deliberate exception: the proxy-wide
{litellm_proxy_admin_name}:spend scalar keeps its shared Redis write because
the global max_budget check reads it between authoritative DB reloads, and
it carries no limits or permissions so sharing it cannot resurrect an
invalidated auth blob.
DualCache's redis-to-memory read backfill also ignored default_in_memory_ttl,
pinning backfilled entries for InMemoryCache's 600s default instead of the
configured 60s auth TTL; the backfill now injects the configured default like
every write path already does, so a replica primed from Redis converges
within the auth cache TTL as well.
Consolidates the sibling stale-auth-recache branch; the delete-propagation
case is the duplicate ticket LIT-4350.
Resolves LIT-4219
(cherry picked from commit ae8dc1f39f)
create_model_info_response cast cost-map max_input_tokens / max_output_tokens
with unguarded int(). The surrounding try/except covers only the get_model_info
lookup, so a deployment whose model_info carries a non-numeric limit (e.g.
"128,000" or an empty string) raised inside the per-model listing loop and
failed the entire GET /v1/models and /models response with a 500, taking healthy
deployments down with it. A deployment's model_info is registered into
litellm.model_cost verbatim, so the malformed value reaches the cost map and not
just the router index.
Router.get_configured_token_limits already coerced this safely for the
deployment path; the cost-map path was missed, so the two together still
regressed. Both now share coerce_token_limit in litellm_core_utils, which
returns None for a malformed value so the listing omits that one limit instead
of failing, matching the graceful degradation the endpoint had before the
cost-map switch.
(cherry picked from commit ab02127b50)
* fix(docker): bake prisma CLI and engines at a fixed path so fresh-DB migrations work for any uid offline (#33853)
* fix(docker): bake prisma CLI and engines at a fixed path so fresh-DB migrations work for any uid offline
The runtime image shipped the prisma CLI and engines under /root/.cache, the
default HOME-derived prisma-python cache location. Any deployment whose
runtime HOME is not /root (kubernetes runAsUser, docker --user, HOME
overrides) missed that cache on a fresh database, fell back to a nodeenv
Node download that crashes on Wolfi (libatomic.so.1), and started the proxy
with zero tables while every DB-backed endpoint returned 500
The bake now lives at /opt/prisma, a path no HOME resolution or cache
volume mount can shadow. The builder records the engine paths there at
generate time, and the runtime stage pins PRISMA_BINARY_CACHE_DIR,
PRISMA_CLI_PATH, PRISMA_CLI_QUERY_ENGINE_TYPE=binary and
PRISMA_OFFLINE_MODE so both litellm-proxy-extras and prisma-python resolve
the baked CLI and engines directly. prisma migrate deploy on a fresh
database now needs no npm and no network access for any runtime uid,
including readOnlyRootFilesystem deployments
Verified against live containers: fresh and existing databases as root,
uid 12345, HOME overridden, on an internal-only docker network, and with
a read-only root filesystem all migrate and serve /team/new successfully
Fixes#33650, #24554
* chore(docker): fail the image build if the baked prisma CLI layout drifts
Asserts the baked CLI shim is executable and its entrypoint exists in the
runtime stage after the COPY and chmod, so a layout change in a future
prisma-python release breaks the image build loudly instead of silently
degrading the migration path at container startup
(cherry picked from commit 567ebcb3e9)
* fix(router): treat malformed configured token limits as absent on /v1/models (#33864)
A deployment whose model_info carried a non-numeric max_input_tokens or
max_output_tokens (for example "128,000" or an empty string) made the
bare int() in get_configured_token_limits raise inside the per-model
/v1/models loop, so one misconfigured deployment turned the entire
listing into a 500. Coerce each configured limit safely and treat
malformed values as absent, matching the graceful degradation the
listing had before the cost-map switch
(cherry picked from commit ef7007c3dd)
* fix(ci): bump pillow to 12.3.0 to resolve osv-scan CVEs (#33093)
(cherry picked from commit 20e646c49a)
* chore(deps): pin httplib2 and setuptools transitive floors (#33233)
Raise the constraint floors for two transitive dependencies so resolution moves them to their latest maintenance releases: httplib2 0.31.2 -> 0.32.0 and setuptools 82.0.1 -> 83.0.0. Both are pulled in only by optional integrations (Google API client, grpc tooling, lunary observability, the nvidia-riva extra), all lower-bound only, so the floors stay inside every requirer's allowed range and a default install is unaffected
(cherry picked from commit 8b323202ec)
* fix(anthropic/passthrough): drop incompatible temperature when downgrading adaptive thinking for pre-4.6 models (#33244)
* fix(anthropic/passthrough): drop temperature and cap thinking budget when downgrading adaptive thinking for pre-4.6 models
* test(anthropic/passthrough): use sufficient max_tokens for reasoning_effort thinking mapping
* fix(anthropic/passthrough): drop incompatible temperature when downgrading adaptive thinking for pre-4.6 models
Narrow the fix to the temperature reconciliation; the reasoning_effort
budget cap is reverted because the live translation grid relies on
budget_tokens >= max_tokens to reject unsupported effort tiers
(xhigh/max) on budget-mode models, so capping turned those 400s into
200s.
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 71dffc1e9a)
* build: raise requires-python cap to <3.15 so Python 3.14 installs current releases (#33438)
* build: drop requires-python upper cap so Python 3.14 resolves to current releases
The <3.14 cap made pip on Python 3.14 fall back to litellm 1.83.7, a
pre-April release whose old auth flow fails with 400s. The cap was added
in d9a460277a because deps lacked 3.14 wheels and uv could not resolve
the 3.14 split; both are fixed now via the existing python_version
markers plus a ddtrace version split (2.x has no cp314 wheels, 3.16+
does). Verified on 3.14.5: uv sync --all-extras installs, litellm and
proxy_server import (rust bridge falls back to pure python), real
provider calls succeed sync/async/streaming, and the core-utils test
suite passes.
* build: cap requires-python at <3.15 and keep ddtrace on one major per python band
Reviewer preference to bound the supported window at the newest tested
minor rather than leaving it open-ended, and Greptile flagged the
ddtrace 3.14+ range spanning two majors; every ddtrace 4.x ships cp314
wheels so the band is now >=4.0,<5.0, matching the single-major
convention of the 2.x band.
(cherry picked from commit c6d49a85b2)
* build(deps): update ddtrace to the 4.x line
A single ddtrace constraint now covers every supported Python version, so this collapses the version split introduced in #33438. Also aligns the build_from_pip image pin and updates the type-only Tracer import to its current module path
(cherry picked from commit edc38eab34)
* fix(docker): restore litellm-proxy-extras source dir in runtime images (#33592)
* fix(docker): restore litellm-proxy-extras source dir in runtime images
#30243 narrowed the runtime stage to an allowlist COPY, which dropped
/app/litellm-proxy-extras from the published images. Downstream
migration jobs point prisma migrate deploy at that path; with the
schema gone (or a schema with no adjacent migrations dir, where prisma
exits 0 without applying anything) those jobs went green while never
migrating the database. Restore the folder in all three runtime stages
and assert in image-scan that the schema and a non-empty migrations dir
ship at the source path
* chore(ci): drop image-scan migration-assets assertion
(cherry picked from commit 111d447e1b)
* fix(model_armor): restore reference attachments via skip_unscannable_attachments and remove the attachment count cap (#33554)
* fix(model_armor): add skip_unscannable_attachments to allow reference-only attachments through
* fix(model_armor): wire skip_unscannable_attachments through guardrail config
* fix(model_armor): make max_file_attachments configurable and scan overflow instead of dropping
* fix(model_armor): remove the per-request attachment count cap and scan all attachments
---------
Co-authored-by: yucheng <yucheng@berri.ai>
(cherry picked from commit 0d7b0f708b)
* build(rust): raise pyo3 to 0.29 so the native bridge compiles on Python 3.14 (#33798)
pyo3 0.23.5 hard-caps the interpreter at Python 3.13, so building the
native bridge against a 3.14 interpreter aborts inside pyo3-ffi's build
script before anything links. This raises pyo3 and pyo3-async-runtimes
to 0.29 (currently the newest line, and the range starting at 0.26 that
supports 3.14) and migrates the three call sites whose APIs were renamed
across that range: Python::with_gil is now Python::attach and
Python::allow_threads is now Python::detach. On a GIL-enabled interpreter
those are pure renames with identical semantics, so behavior on 3.10
through 3.13 is unchanged
Verified by compiling the native module for cp313 and cp314 and driving
it directly on both interpreters: gil_stats reports exactly one GIL
release per sync OCR call and the async path completes, matching the
0.23.5 baseline. cargo fmt, clippy, and the workspace tests pass on both
3.13 and 3.14 with the lockfile locked, and the lock churn is confined to
the pyo3 crates
Part of #26343; addresses the pyo3 build failure reported in #33116
(cherry picked from commit f3d20153b3)
* build(deps): allow redisvl, pypdf, and openapi-core on Python 3.14 (#33801)
Remove the python_version < '3.14' environment markers from redisvl,
pypdf, and openapi-core now that all three install and import cleanly
on 3.14. The relock is marker-only: no package version changed for any
Python branch, and the locked versions (redisvl 0.4.1, pypdf 6.13.3,
openapi-core 0.22.0) now serve 3.14 as well. semantic-router and
aurelio-sdk stay gated because every published release caps
python_requires below 3.14
(cherry picked from commit 967d934484)
* build(deps): bump mcp lock to 1.28.1 to clear image-scan findings (#33803)
* build(deps): bump mcp lock to 1.28.1 to clear image-scan findings
* build(deps): require mcp>=1.28.1
(cherry picked from commit 40e914cfa7)
* fix(proxy): source /v1/models token limits from the cost map instead of Router.get_model_group_info (#33721)
* fix(proxy): source /v1/models token limits from cost map instead of Router.get_model_group_info
Resolves the per-model get_model_group_info fan-out on GET /v1/models
(and /models) that pegged the event loop on wildcard listings (#33636).
create_model_info_response now reads max_input_tokens/max_output_tokens
from litellm.get_model_info (the static cost map) rather than the router,
which aggregated and deepcopied every deployment in a group per listed
model.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): inject model-info lookup into create_model_info_response for deterministic coverage
Inject the cost-map lookup (defaulting to litellm.get_model_info) so the
except and max_output_tokens branches are exercised deterministically and
the token-limit tests no longer hardcode mutable cost-map values.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(proxy): surface custom deployment token limits on /v1/models via cheap index lookup
Add Router.get_configured_token_limits, an O(1) model-name index lookup that
reads a concrete deployment's configured max_input_tokens/max_output_tokens
without triggering pattern matching or deep copies. create_model_info_response
layers this over the cost map so custom deployments absent from the cost map
still surface their limits, and admin-configured limits override cost-map
defaults, while wildcard-expanded names stay on the fast path.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: ryan <ryan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8536e3b80e)
---------
Co-authored-by: yucheng-berri <yucheng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: devin-ai-integration[bot] <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>
* feat(proxy): add expires filter to GET /key/list
Add an opt-in expires query param to GET /key/list so callers can fetch
only expired or only active keys without paginating every page and
filtering client-side. 'expired' matches keys whose expires is in the
past (NULL expires excluded); 'active' matches keys that never expire or
expire in the future. Omitting the param preserves existing behavior for
every caller. An unrecognized value returns HTTP 400 rather than silently
returning all keys.
The filter is pushed to the database via the existing Prisma where
builder so callers avoid pulling the full key table into application
memory.
Resolves LIT-3387
* refactor(proxy): declare VALID_EXPIRES_FILTER_VALUES before its first use
* feat(guardrails): add pre_mcp_call support to Content Filter
* test(guardrails): cover canonical MCP key gate under pre_mcp_call mode
* fix(guardrails): scan MCP arguments per value and gate mixed-mode scans by call type
* fix(guardrails): cap MCP argument scan depth and register the walker with the recursion detector
* test(guardrails): update LIT-4226 UI settings tests for content filter pre_mcp_call support
* fix(guardrails): use builtin generics in MCP scan annotations to satisfy strict-rule budget
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Some tiered Dashscope models price reasoning output above standard output
(output_cost_per_reasoning_token > output_cost_per_token). The reservation charged
all output at the standard rate, so a reasoning-heavy request reserved too little
and concurrent calls could exceed the budget before reconciliation. The reasoning
share is unknown before the request runs, so reserve every output token at the
higher of the two configured rates, for both tiered and flat pricing.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(guardrails): filter Add-Guardrail mode dropdown per provider
The GET /guardrails/ui/add_guardrail_settings endpoint returned every
GuardrailEventHooks value in one flat supported_modes list, so the Admin
UI rendered pre_mcp_call as a selectable Mode for every guardrail. Saving
Content Filter or Tool Permission with pre_mcp_call then failed with a
400 because those guardrails' server-side supported_event_hooks list
excludes it.
Expose each guardrail's supported hooks as a get_supported_event_hooks
classmethod on CustomGuardrail (mirrors the existing get_config_model
pattern) and have the endpoint iterate guardrail_class_registry to build
a supported_modes_by_provider map. The UI Mode dropdown filters by that
map when the selected provider is known and falls back to the global
list otherwise. __init__ now sources its own supported_event_hooks list
from the classmethod so the two sides can't drift.
Also register BedrockGuardrail, ToolPermissionGuardrail, lakera,
lakera_v2, and presidio in guardrail_class_registry so they participate
in the map (they were previously only in guardrail_initializer_registry
and had no class-registry entry).
Behavior change: guardrails that previously had no supported_event_hooks
declared (aim, javelin, azure/text_moderation, cato_networks,
crowdstrike_aidr, headroom, hiddenlayer, lasso, noma, onyx,
prompt_security, qualifire, repelloai, zscaler_ai_guard, aporia_ai,
lakera_ai, lakera_ai_v2, mcp_jwt_signer, model_armor, presidio) now
validate the configured mode at instantiation. Existing configs where
the mode was silently a no-op will fail at proxy startup with a clear
validation error rather than running as a broken guardrail.
Resolves LIT-4226
* fix(guardrails): add LITELLM_STRICT_GUARDRAIL_MODES escape hatch, preserve current mode in edit form
Address Greptile P1 (startup break) and P2 (edit form UX):
LITELLM_STRICT_GUARDRAIL_MODES defaults to true (raise on unsupported
event_hook, unchanged behavior for the guardrails validated pre-PR).
Setting it to false logs a warning and continues, giving deployments an
opt-out while they fix configs that now surface as errors instead of
silently no-op'ing. Regression test covers both modes.
Edit form now surfaces the currently-saved mode even when it is not in
the filtered per-provider list, so a legacy row (e.g. content_filter
saved with pre_mcp_call before this fix) no longer disappears from the
dropdown; the option renders with a 'not supported by <provider>' note
so the user knows to pick another.
* fix(guardrails): correct audited hook lists, prune stale modes on provider switch, clean form lint
Audited every get_supported_event_hooks classmethod against the hooks
each guardrail's own tests exercise and its handler methods. Five were
too narrow and their tests caught it in CI: rubrik gains pre_call,
presidio gains during_call and pre_mcp_call, prompt_security, onyx and
qualifire gain during_call. The remaining classes match either their
original __init__ declarations or their exercised modes exactly.
Cursor review fixes: the Add form now drops selected modes the new
provider does not support when the user switches providers, so a
pre_mcp_call selection cannot ride along into a provider that rejects
it at save; the edit form handles list-shaped stored modes instead of
treating mode as always a string.
Extracted shared toModeArray and getSupportedModesForProvider helpers
into guardrail_info_helpers so both forms use one implementation, typed
the remaining any usages in both forms, removed nested ternaries, and
committed the ratcheted-down eslint metrics and pruned suppressions
The envelope arm bypasses user_api_key_auth, so it never ran
pre_db_read_auth_checks (request-size and body-safety limits, the IP allowlist,
and the general_settings route allowlist) that the normal MCP admission path
runs before any key lookup. A caller blocked by IP or a disallowed proxy route
could be admitted through an envelope where the same principal on the normal
path is rejected. Run those gates before the envelope crypto, mirroring the
pipeline's pre-DB ordering; a blocked IP or route surfaces its own 403.
Alibaba Model Studio (Dashscope) tiered pricing is all-or-nothing: the tier is
selected by a request's total input tokens and every token, input and output, is
billed at that one tier's rate. The reservation path used graduated slicing and,
worse, picked the output tier from the output-token count, so a long-context
request with a large output allowance reserved far less than the provider charges
and could slip past a depleted budget. Select the tier from input tokens and apply
its rates to all input and output tokens.
Reservation also read tiered pricing from only the first deployment in a model
group. A caller could hit an alias whose cheaper deployment was listed first and
exceed the budget once routed to a costlier sibling. Estimate against every
eligible deployment's pricing and reserve the maximum.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The envelope arm reloaded the identity and ran _run_centralized_common_checks
but skipped RouteChecks.should_call_route, which the standard pipeline runs
between the builder and common_checks. Because the centralized checks treat MCP
as an inference route and never re-check allowed_routes, a key barred from MCP
routes could mint an envelope at the token endpoint (not itself an MCP route)
and replay it against MCP. Run the route gate before admitting, and clear the
request-scoped budget_reservation, matching the wrapper's sequence; a disallowed
route now surfaces the gate's own 403.
* feat: add silent CLI token refresh for apiKeyHelper support
lite auth print-token prints a valid proxy credential for use as Claude
Code's apiKeyHelper, transparently refreshing it first if the cached JWT
is stale. This unblocks MDM-managed apiKeyHelper deployments (managed
via `lite auth print-token`) that need silent mid-session credential
rotation without restarting the client.
Refresh capability is backed by a virtual key minted with an empty model
list and cli_refresh metadata, kept strictly separate from the actual
(short-lived, real-model-scoped) call credential -- so a leak of the
credential that flows through every LLM request and subprocess env var
can't also self-renew. The refresh flow is single-use: /sso/cli/refresh
mints a fresh JWT + refresh token pair and blocks the presented refresh
token immediately, so a replay can't mint a second pair from it.
Server: /sso/cli/refresh (rotate) and /sso/cli/logout (revoke) endpoints.
lite login now also stores a refresh token; lite logout revokes it
server-side instead of only clearing the local file.
* fix: allow non-admin users to hit CLI refresh routes; resolve apiKeyHelper base_url from token.json
Found via a live end-to-end test against a real proxy + real Claude Code
session: /sso/cli/refresh and /sso/cli/logout were unreachable for any
non-proxy-admin caller, since Depends(user_api_key_auth) pulls in a
route-RBAC gate that 403s any route not on an explicit allowlist. That
made the feature unusable for actual end users, who authenticate as
internal_user. Add both routes to internal_user_routes; the handlers
already do their own fine-grained check (metadata.cli_refresh) same as
/key/block does today.
Also: `lite auth print-token` required an explicit --base-url/
LITELLM_PROXY_URL matching the stored token's origin, defaulting to
localhost:4000 otherwise. But apiKeyHelper is configured bare (no
flags), so this always mismatched a real deployment. Track whether
--base-url was explicitly passed (via click's ParameterSource) and, if
not, resolve the server from token.json directly instead of the CLI
default.
* test: mock refresh-token minting in test_cli_poll_key_tolerates_missing_user_row
Landed on litellm_internal_staging after this branch's refresh-key minting
change; needs the same mock as the other cli_poll_key tests since minting
now runs unconditionally whenever a JWT is generated.
* fix(ci): update test_cli_auth.py for refresh_token contract, regenerate schema.d.ts
_poll_for_authentication now always includes "refresh_token" in its
returned dict, and _handle_team_selection_during_polling returns a dict
instead of a bare JWT string -- test_cli_auth.py predates this branch's
refresh-token work and still asserted the old shapes.
schema.d.ts regenerated via `npm run gen:api` to pick up the new
/sso/cli/refresh and /sso/cli/logout routes (plus unrelated drift from
other PRs merged since it was last generated).
* fix(ci): apply CI's own schema.d.ts diff (enterprise routes I can't generate locally)
Local `npm run gen:api` only sees OSS routes -- this machine's
litellm_enterprise editable install points at a now-deleted temp
directory, so it silently drops enterprise-only routes from the spec.
Applied the exact diff CI's own generation produced instead of
re-running the generator locally.
* fix: close refresh-token race, fail closed on DB down, fix logout base_url
Addresses Greptile review findings on the CLI refresh-token PR:
- cli_refresh_token minted a new JWT + refresh token BEFORE blocking the
presented one. Two concurrent requests bearing the same refresh token
could both pass auth and both mint fresh pairs, yielding four live
credentials from one consumed token. Now the presented token is
consumed atomically first via update_many (only succeeding if it flips
blocked from False/None to True); the loser gets count=0 and is
rejected before anything is minted.
- When prisma_client is None, refresh silently returned a new JWT
without ever being able to mark the presented token consumed, leaving
it valid indefinitely. Now fails closed with a 500 instead.
- `lite logout` sent its revocation POST to ctx.obj["base_url"], which
defaults to localhost:4000 when --base-url isn't passed -- the same
bug print_token had before the base_url_explicit fix, just missed
here. Now resolves the same way: trust the stored token's origin
unless the caller explicitly overrode --base-url.
* fix(ci): satisfy ruff format and narrow token_data type in logout
* fix(security): never trust refresh-token metadata for authorization
Addresses a real privilege-escalation path Veria flagged: cli_refresh_token
read team_id, team_alias, and max_budget straight off the presented
token's own metadata and used them to authorize the new JWT. Since any
authenticated user can self-mint a virtual key with arbitrary metadata
via the ordinary /key/generate endpoint, a self-forged key with
{"cli_refresh": true, "team_id": "<any-team>", "max_budget": 999999999}
would sail through _require_cli_refresh_token's only check
(metadata.cli_refresh == True) and get a JWT scoped to a team the
caller never belonged to, with a budget it never had -- full
cross-team / budget bypass, and a removed team member could keep
refreshing team-scoped sessions indefinitely.
Metadata's team_id is now treated as an untrusted UX hint only: honored
solely if the CALLER (identified by the authenticated key's own
user_id, not client input) is a current member per a fresh
get_user_object lookup. team_alias and max_budget are never read back
from metadata at all -- team_alias comes from a live get_team_object
lookup and max_budget is recomputed with the exact same capping logic
the initial SSO login poll uses. _mint_cli_refresh_token no longer
accepts or stores team_alias/max_budget, only the team_id hint.
Added regression tests proving: a forged/stale team_id is dropped
(falls back to no team, not silently honored), and a forged max_budget
in metadata never reaches the issued JWT.
* fix(ci): catch HTTPException specifically instead of bare Exception (BLE001)
* fix: un-consume refresh token if minting the replacement fails
Greptile flagged a real reliability gap: cli_refresh_token blocks the
presented token atomically, then does several more DB calls before
returning a replacement (user lookup, team lookup, JWT mint, new
refresh-key mint). Since this endpoint exists specifically for fully
unattended apiKeyHelper operation, a single transient failure in that
window (DB hiccup, etc.) permanently stranded the user: their old
token was already dead and no new one was issued, with no recovery
path short of a full interactive browser re-login.
Wrap that window in try/except; on any failure, best-effort revert the
consumed token back to usable (blocked=False) before re-raising, so a
retry can succeed. Standard compensating-action pattern since
generate_key_helper_fn doesn't take an injectable transaction, so
wrapping the whole thing in a real DB transaction isn't practical here.
* fix(security): refresh key had unrestricted model access, not none
Critical bug: _mint_cli_refresh_token used models=[] intending "no LLM
access", but that's backwards in this codebase. Per
_check_model_access_helper: `len(filtered_models) == 0 and len(models)
== 0` -> all_model_access = True. An empty models list on a key with no
team_id means UNRESTRICTED access to every model, not zero access. The
CLI refresh token -- meant to be usable for nothing but silently
exchanging itself for a new JWT -- was actually a fully unrestricted
API key for its entire 90-day lifetime, completely undermining the
whole point of keeping it separate from the short-lived call
credential.
Fixed with two independent layers: allowed_routes hard-restricts the
key to exactly /sso/cli/refresh and /sso/cli/logout (the real enforced
boundary, checked in the shared user_api_key_auth dependency for every
route); models is set to an unmatchable sentinel string as
defense-in-depth in case any code path only consults the models field.
Added an end-to-end regression test that exercises the actual
model-access-control function against a key shaped like the minted
refresh token, rather than only asserting on what arguments were passed
to the key-generation call -- the latter kind of test is exactly what
let the original bug ship, since asserting `models == []` is equally
consistent with "no access" and "unrestricted access" without checking
what the access-control code actually does with that shape.
Also: the compensating-rollback added for reliability un-blocked a
consumed refresh token even when the underlying user no longer exists.
That's a permanent, intentional rejection, not a transient failure --
un-blocking it would let a stale refresh token become valid again for a
different account if the user_id is ever reused/re-registered. Moved
the user-existence check outside the rollback-on-failure block so it
stays permanently blocked.
* refactor: rotate CLI refresh tokens via regenerate_key_fn instead of hand-rolled consume/rollback
The refresh token is already a plain litellm virtual key, so rotation can
delegate to the same atomic DB update /key/regenerate uses instead of a
bespoke update_many + compensating-rollback dance. This makes silent CLI
refresh an Enterprise feature, same as regular key regeneration.
* refactor: replace CLI stateless JWT + refresh-key pair with one self-rotating virtual key
The CLI previously minted two credentials on login: a stateless self-signed
JWT for LLM calls, and a separate DB-backed refresh-only key (scoped away
from ever calling an LLM) just to authorize minting a new JWT. Collapse
this into a single real virtual key, used directly as the LLM bearer token
and re-presented to /sso/cli/refresh to rotate its own secret in place.
This also means the CLI session key now shows up in the Admin UI's Keys
page and can be revoked/regenerated like any other key, rather than being
an invisible, unmanageable stateless token.
* refactor: drop silent CLI refresh, key just expires and requires re-login
/sso/cli/refresh only ever benefited Enterprise deployments (regenerate_key_fn's
gate), while everyone else already fell through to "re-run lite login" on
failure. Cut the endpoint, the rotation logic, and the client-side refresh
path entirely; print-token now just prints the cached key until it hits its
LITELLM_CLI_JWT_EXPIRATION_HOURS duration, then fails fast telling the user
to log in again. Session key itself is unaffected: still a real, revocable
virtual key visible in the Keys UI, `lite logout` still revokes it directly.
* fix(ci): regenerate schema.d.ts after removing /sso/cli/refresh route
* revert: go back to stateless JWT, keep only lite auth print-token
The virtual-key redesign (revocable, Keys-UI-visible credential) wasn't
needed just to support print-token, and cost real server-side surface
(a mint path, a logout-revoke endpoint, migrated tests/docs) for a property
this repo doesn't need yet. Reverting cli_poll_key/_types.py/schema.d.ts
back to the original stateless-JWT design; the only durable addition from
this whole effort is `lite auth print-token` (reads the cached credential,
prints it while fresh, fails with a clear message once it's past
LITELLM_CLI_JWT_EXPIRATION_HOURS) plus the base_url_explicit plumbing it
needs. `lite logout` goes back to clearing the local file only, since a
stateless JWT can't be revoked server-side.
* refactor: move CLI token freshness check to cli_token_utils, drop unnecessary renames
Addresses review: the freshness check is a pure token-shape/timestamp
util, not command logic, so it belongs alongside the other SDK-level
CLI token helpers (load_cli_token, get_litellm_gateway_api_key) rather
than in commands/auth.py. Also reverted a few incidental jwt_token/
session_key variable and string renames that weren't load-bearing.
get_key_object's raw transport error propagated uncaught out of
_reload_admitted_key as an opaque 500; classify it via the shared
_raise_503_if_db_unavailable helper (also used by the live-policy gate) so a
database outage is a retryable 503, while a key-not-found ProxyException stays
the fail-closed 401.
Streaming requests return from common_request_processing before
async_post_call_success_hook runs, so response._hidden_params.additional_headers
never gets the v3 x-ratelimit-{descriptor_key}-{remaining|limit}-{rate_limit_type}
entries. Prometheus / logging callbacks that read those values from
standard_logging_object.hidden_params.additional_headers then see nothing;
combined with the pre-existing gap that Prometheus reads from that same slot
(LIT-2577 / PR #28816), per-key remaining RPM/TPM cannot be monitored for
streaming traffic at all.
Fix in three parts:
- Stash the pre-call RateLimitResponse in the metadata channels the async
success-logging callback inherits, alongside the existing top-level entry
the non-streaming path reads.
- Add async_logging_hook to the v3 handler. It fires in a distinct earlier
loop inside async_success_handler (all callbacks' async_logging_hook
complete before any async_log_success_event starts), so mirroring the
pre-call snapshot into standard_logging_object.hidden_params.additional_headers
and response._hidden_params.additional_headers here guarantees every
downstream success callback sees the values regardless of registration
order. Non-streaming keeps the existing async_post_call_success_hook write
and this hook re-populates the same values idempotently.
- Extract the shared `_merge_ratelimit_statuses_into_additional_headers`
helper the non-streaming path already had inlined so both callsites emit
the identical key shape.
Over-budget rendered 401 (should be 429), model-access and other typed
failures collapsed to 401, and a transient DB outage was masked as an auth
error. Mirror UserAPIKeyAuthExceptionHandler: budget maps to 429, a sub-check's
own HTTPException/ProxyException keeps its status, a DB outage is a retryable
503, and only a genuinely unresolvable failure stays the fail-closed 401.
Two follow-ups on the envelope admission arm flagged in review.
Team revocation bypass: _reload_admitted_key checked only the key's own
blocked/expires, so blocking a key's team left every envelope minted under it
live until expiry. Reload the team and reject a blocked team, mirroring
common_checks, so a team block revokes its envelopes immediately.
Caller-overridable upstream token: egress resolves the per-server auth header
alias-first, but injection keyed under server_name, so for a server with a
distinct alias a caller-forwarded x-mcp-{alias}-authorization sat at the
higher-priority slot and paired the admitted identity with an attacker's
upstream credential. Inject under alias-first so the sealed token owns the slot
egress resolves.
The bridge envelope sealed only user_id/server_id, and admission fabricated a
UserAPIKeyAuth(user_id=...) with no object_permission, team_id, org_id, or key
identity. Downstream MCP permission checks read the missing restrictions as
unrestricted, so a caller holding a valid envelope for a restricted key could
reach tools and servers that key was never granted, and a revoked key kept
working until the envelope expired.
Bind the hashed authorizing key into the envelope identity and reload the live
UserAPIKeyAuth by it at admission via get_key_object, failing closed with a 401
when the key is missing, blocked, or expired. Authorization is resolved fresh
per request instead of frozen at mint time, so current key/team/org and tool
restrictions plus revocation are enforced.
- config: KeywordTierRule now strips and drops blank/whitespace keywords (a stray
"" makes _keyword_matches match every prompt, silently forcing that tier for all
traffic); still requires at least one real keyword to remain
- frontend build_complexity_router_config: trim keywords and drop rules left empty so
an unfilled "Add keyword rule" row no longer ships a rule the backend rejects with a
400 in the heuristic (non-semantic) flow, where the client-side semantic guard doesn't run
- proxy clear_cache / delete_model: the auto_router/ prefix also covers quality_router/
and adaptive_router/, so pop the model_name from all four router registries (no-op
where absent) instead of only auto/complexity; otherwise a DB quality_router's stale
entry made reload raise "already exists" and abort, and adaptive left a leak
- frontend ComplexityRouterConfig: only render the Keyword Tier Overrides and Semantic
keyword matching sections when their change handlers are provided, so the edit-auto-
router modal (which omits them) no longer shows interactive-but-dead controls
Replace the request.path_params read (and its defensive getattr guard) with
the route template. A real Starlette request always exposes path_params, but
common_checks runs on lightweight request doubles that don't, so reading it
directly forced a getattr workaround that only existed to tolerate those
doubles.
Instead, match the route template (/team/{team_id}) to identify the RESTful
update route and take the team id from the last path segment. This drops the
path_params dependency entirely, and because the template distinguishes the
PATCH route from its single-segment siblings (/team/new, /team/list, ...), it
also avoids a spurious team lookup those routes would otherwise trigger if we
matched the resolved path shape alone.
A dynamically registered (RFC 7591) OAuth client persisted onto the MCP server row is bound to the redirect_uri it was first registered with, but that binding was never recorded. After the proxy's public origin changed, every authorize paired the reused client with the new callback and the IdP rejected it permanently.
The DCR persist now records redirect_uris alongside the client identity. The admin register path treats a positive mismatch between the recording and the current callback as stale and re-registers a replacement client; rows without a recording (pre-existing installs and admin-configured clients) are grandfathered so upgrades never re-mint client_ids or orphan refresh tokens. The persist also writes client_secret and token_endpoint_auth_method explicitly as None when absent so the credential blob merge cannot pair a re-registered public client with the previous client's secret. Public register routes and non-admin callers keep existing behavior.
Closes#32473
apply_json_merge_patch recurses into nested objects, which the repo's recursive_detector code-quality check flags because unbounded recursion over caller-supplied JSON has caused CPU/stack issues before. Cap the recursion at a depth far above any realistic team-metadata shape and reject deeper patches with a ValueError so a pathologically nested body fails closed instead of overflowing the stack, then register the function in the detector's ignore list alongside the other depth-bounded JSON walkers
delete_model popped the auto_routers/complexity_routers registries by the deleted
deployment's model_name without checking it was actually an auto_router/* deployment.
Deleting a regular DB model that merely shares a name with a config-defined router
therefore evicted that router, which add_deployment never restores, leaving it
unroutable until a proxy restart. This is the same cross-tenant DoS clear_cache was
hardened against; mirror its auto_router/ prefix guard here.
Extracts _deployment_name_and_model to read model_name and litellm_params.model from
the deployment (delete_deployment returns the raw model_list dict at runtime despite
its Deployment annotation), and adds a regression test asserting a same-named config
router survives deletion of an unrelated regular model.
Wire the coarse route gate so PATCH /team/{team_id} is reachable by exactly the roles that can call POST /team/update: proxy admins, org admins of the team's own organization, and JWT admins. Regular internal users and view-only proxy admins stay blocked, matching the existing endpoint
Because the team id lives in the path rather than the body, the org-context resolver now also reads it from path_team_id for the bare /team/{team_id} route, so an org admin's organization is resolved and injected the same way it already is for POST /team/update. /team/{team_id} is added to management_routes rather than the role-agnostic self_managed_routes; the latter would have opened POST /team/new to any authenticated user through the shared /team/{team_id} path pattern
Add deterministic keyword-to-tier overrides and optional embedding-based
(semantic) keyword matching to the complexity router, and surface both in the
Add Auto Router UI behind a Router Type selector: "Auto-Router v2 [Recommended]"
(complexity tiers + keyword overrides + semantic matching, the default) and
"Semantic Router [to be deprecated]" (the existing utterance-based router,
unchanged). Keyword-to-tier overrides resolve to the highest tier matched
rather than the first keyword matched, so match order no longer affects the
routing decision.
Backend:
- config: KeywordTierRule model plus keyword_tier_rules, semantic_keyword_matching,
embedding_model, and match_threshold on ComplexityRouterConfig, with a validator
requiring an embedding model and rules when semantic matching is on
- complexity_router: evaluate keyword rules before scoring; lexical matches escalate
to the most-severe matched tier (order-independent), and semantic mode reuses
LiteLLMRouterEncoder + SemanticRouter to match paraphrases by cosine similarity,
falling back to the scorer when nothing matches
- model management: clear complexity_routers on cache reload so config edits take effect
Frontend:
- Add Auto Router tab restores the Router Type radio (Auto-Router v2 recommended
by default, Semantic Router still available) and sends keyword_tier_rules plus
the semantic settings on the recommended path, instead of flattening keywords
into custom_technical_keywords
- client-side guard blocks submit when semantic matching is enabled without an
embedding model or without any keyword tier rules, mirroring the backend validator
- moved the "How Classification Works" explainer below Custom Technical Keywords
and above Keyword Tier Overrides
- remove the Test Connection action from the recommended flow, which can't build a
valid pre-save payload for a router (leaves a TODO for a JSON preview / config
test follow-up)
Tests cover lexical escalation, semantic matching via the real library with injected
embeddings, the semantic config guard, config validation, the reload-clear
regression, and the frontend payload builder
Add a RESTful PATCH /team/{team_id} that partially updates a team using RFC 7386 JSON Merge Patch. team_id comes from the path, and metadata is merged with the team's stored metadata instead of being replaced wholesale the way POST /team/update does: an omitted key is preserved, key: null deletes it, and any other value overwrites, recursing into nested objects. Every other field behaves the same as POST /team/update
The handler delegates to the existing update path, so authorization, budget checks, system-managed-key stripping, metadata encryption, cache refresh, and audit logging are shared rather than reimplemented. POST /team/update is untouched, so the change is purely additive
A trailing slash on --base-url (or LITELLM_PROXY_URL) produced
double-slash URLs like https://host//sso/cli/start, which 404s. Normalize
once in the CLI's top-level group callback so every subcommand benefits.
* fix(proxy): match list/dict guardrail_mode in compliance mode checks
* test(compliance): cover ComplianceChecker guardrail_mode shapes (str/list/dict/None)
* fix(proxy): trust only Mode.default in compliance mode matching (ignore tag overrides)
* fix(proxy): match dict guardrail_mode only when every branch runs in mode (no false-compliant)
* fix(proxy): treat multi-mode guardrail_mode as unresolved (no false-compliant)
The list branch previously counted a guardrail configured with mode:
[pre_call, post_call] under every listed mode. But when the writer cannot
infer the concrete hook that fired (apply_guardrail invocations), the raw
list is logged, and an image-only request that only reaches the post-call
path still records both modes. That let a pre_call compliance check pass on
a request that only ran post_call.
Match the tightened dict semantics: a list now counts for mode only when
every listed mode equals mode. Same trade-off (under-report instead of
false-COMPLIANT). Speculative set support is dropped (spend logs are
JSON-serialized, sets do not cross the wire).
Tests updated to reflect the tightened list semantics, deduplicated (single
TestModeMatching class), and shortened. The invariant is now expressed as
a computed check: True implies every branch runs in the matched mode.
---------
Co-authored-by: Marton Schneider <marton@schneider.co.nl>
* fix(proxy): build redis usage cache from REDIS_* env when cache backend is not Redis
Selecting a semantic (or any non-Redis-KV) response cache left
redis_usage_cache unset, silently downgrading cross-pod rate limits,
parallel-request limits, spend coordination, and the pod lock manager
to per-pod in-memory state. Fall back to a standalone RedisCache built
from REDIS_* environment variables, mirroring the existing
use_redis_transaction_buffer escape hatch, which now shares the same
helper.
Resolves LIT-3861
* feat(proxy): configure the coordination redis independently of the response cache
Adds general_settings.coordination_redis, an explicit block for the Redis
the proxy uses for cross-pod rate limits, parallel-request limits, spend
tracking, the pod lock manager, and shared health checks. Resolution order
is the explicit block, then a plain-Redis response-cache backend, then the
REDIS_* environment. Cluster and sentinel targets are supported, and a
cluster target now builds a RedisClusterCache so cluster-aware consumers
take the cluster path.
Admins can configure it from the Caching page of the dashboard via
/coordination_redis/settings, which reports which source is in effect,
redacts credentials on read, and offers a connection test. Settings saved
there are read back at startup so they take effect on restart.
Also fixes redis client construction so an explicitly configured host
outranks REDIS_URL in the environment. Previously the url branch stripped
the caller's host and port, so an explicit block, or a connection test
typed into the dashboard, silently targeted whatever REDIS_URL named
* fix(ui): move coordination_redis_settings into renamed _components directory
---------
Co-authored-by: Yucheng Zhu <yucheng@berri.ai>
Selecting a semantic (or any non-Redis-KV) response cache left
redis_usage_cache unset, silently downgrading cross-pod rate limits,
parallel-request limits, spend coordination, and the pod lock manager
to per-pod in-memory state. Fall back to a standalone RedisCache built
from REDIS_* environment variables, mirroring the existing
use_redis_transaction_buffer escape hatch, which now shares the same
helper.
Resolves LIT-3861
