* fix(ui): keep litellm_credential_name from LiteLLM Params JSON when no credential is selected
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(ui): drop null litellm_credential_name from AddModelPanel payload fixture
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ui): validate JSON litellm_credential_name against accessible credentials
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): enforce proxy-admin-only credential attachment on model create/update
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): raise ProxyException for unauthorized credential attach and gate /model/update
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): fold credential-change detection into can_user_attach_credential to satisfy complexity budget
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): decrypt stored credential name before unchanged-credential comparison
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): cover credential attach rejection on add_new_model and patch_model
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): annotate proxy-global patches with test-quality suppressions
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(s3): bound object keys and download filenames to s3 limits
Long OpenAI-compatible Responses API ids pushed the s3 object key past s3's
1024 UTF-8 byte cap, so the PUT failed with a 400 and the log record was
dropped. Keys that still fit are unchanged, byte for byte. An oversized one
now keeps a readable head of the file name and appends the sha256 of the full
name. A configured path/alias prefix that is long enough to overflow on its
own keeps whole leading path segments, so a prefix-scoped IAM policy or
lifecycle rule still matches, and ends in a short digest of the full
configured value so two operators do not land in the same folder.
The Content-Disposition filename carried the same unbounded id and hit s3's
2048 byte metadata-header cap, so the upload still failed with
MetadataTooLarge once the key was bounded. It is bounded the same way, head
plus digest, so two records downloaded from the console stay distinct files.
The full response id stays in the uploaded JSON payload.
* fix(s3): keep the configured prefix whole and spend the whole key budget
Shorten the response id first and only trim the operator's configured prefix
when the prefix itself is what does not fit, so prefix scoped IAM policies and
lifecycle rules keep matching. Trim by bytes rather than whole segments so the
longest possible string prefix survives, and route the audit log key through
the same shared builder.
* chore(s3): trim the comments and docstrings the review flagged
Keep the two external facts that are not visible from the code, the 1024 byte
object key cap and the 2048 byte metadata header cap, and drop the rest.
Filtering copied fields by name dropped companion billing rules like
web_search_billing_unit and the regional uplift multipliers, so grounding
and uplifts billed differently through the deployment entry. Copy the
backend's raw litellm.model_cost entry wholesale instead, which also
removes the synthesized-zero special case since the raw entry only holds
real values.
This reverts merge commit 2b1bd20834 (#31125)
Two CircleCI jobs on the staging-to-main promotion went red the moment
that PR landed. proxy_multi_instance_tests boots two proxies against one
database, and both now race the same migration:
Error: P3018 A migration failed to apply
Database error code: 40P01, deadlock detected
Process 73 waits for ShareLock on virtual transaction 4/11;
blocked by process 75. Process 75 waits for ExclusiveLock on
advisory lock [16384,0,72707369,1]; blocked by process 73
Neither proxy comes up, so the job times out after 300s waiting on
localhost:4000. The same wait took 36.5s on the last green run
Timeline: #31125 merged at 18:46:14Z and the failing run started at
18:49:59Z. The merge commit is not an ancestor of the last green
revision (194a3cc) and is an ancestor of the first failing one
(01de2837)
The v2 resolver was meant to avoid exactly this class of contention, so
the deadlock looks like a bug in it rather than a reason to abandon it.
Putting the default back to v1 buys time to fix it without holding up
the release
Copying only the flat token rates dropped threshold, tiered, service-tier,
cache, character, and per-second rates from peak-hour billing once cost
lookup switched to the deployment entry, and get_model_info synthesizes
zero flat rates for backends without one, which would have marked
tiered-only backends explicitly priced free. Copy every price-bearing
field instead, deep-copied, rejecting the synthesized zeros the way
_inherit_builtin_tiered_output_rate already does.
Clicking a Base UI select entry found by text or by a title attribute is a
race. The text node exists one render before the popup finishes entering,
and until then the positioner still carries pointer-events: none, so
user-event refuses the click and the test throws. Querying by role only
matches once the popup is exposed to the accessibility tree, which is after
that window closes.
Route the 37 remaining select interactions through chooseSelectOption, which
does the role query. Instrumenting the converted files shows the text query
resolving while the popup was still pointer-blocked on 6 of 41 samples; the
role query was never blocked.
Seven files kept their text queries because their popup entries carry no
accessible role, so there is nothing to query by.
The page set its headings, table borders, sidebar labels and tag pills
inline with a fixed light palette (#202124, #5f6368, #dadce0, #f8f9fa,
#fff), so in dark mode it drew dark text on hardcoded white surfaces.
Move those to the foreground/muted/border/card/info tokens, matching
the back link and Create Guardrail button that already used them.
* test(e2e/ui): cover the Usage page activity tabs
Usage had one test, on Top Virtual Keys. The Key, Model and Endpoint Activity
tabs are the ones an admin reads to answer where the spend went, and none of
them was covered.
Also fixes waitForKeyInDailyActivity, which only read the first page of
/user/daily/activity. The route paginates, so once a run generates more keys
than one page holds, the helper spins for its full 120 seconds and then blames
the rollup for a key the rollup wrote correctly. The Usage page itself already
walks every page; the helper now matches it.
* test(e2e/ui): route the user-creation call through SERVER_ROOT_PATH
Review caught /user/new posting to the server root, which misses the proxy
when it is mounted under a prefix. traffic.ts already had the helper for
this; it is now exported so specs making their own management calls can use
it too.
Also drops the mutable accumulators from the daily-activity paging, which
the repo conventions ask for.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Teams tests covered creating, deleting and membership, but nothing on the
Settings tab, which is the form that posts the whole team back. That is the
shape behind the reports of a team losing its metadata or its model aliases
after an unrelated edit.
Each test creates its own team rather than editing a seeded one. The limits
test pins the models and members the edit had no business touching, and the
alias test calls the new alias with a team key instead of trusting the
readback, since an alias the router never resolves reads the same either way.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(e2e/ui): stop the suite failing on things that are not regressions
Five tests in the UI suite fail for reasons that have nothing to do with the
product being broken, which is enough to keep the whole leg red.
Two need a premium proxy and fail hard without one: Regenerate Key renders
disabled when the proxy is unlicensed, and /model/new refuses a team-scoped
deployment. Both now skip without LITELLM_LICENSE, the way three other tests
in this suite already do.
Three consumed a seeded fixture: Delete key, Delete a team and remove a member
each destroyed the row they needed, so the retries CI runs with were guaranteed
to fail and the suite could not run twice against one database. They now create
what they destroy.
Top Virtual Keys ranks by spend and every mock deployment costs $0, so which
keys make the list came down to how ties happened to sort. It now sends its
traffic through a priced deployment and earns its place.
* test(e2e/ui): clean up the fixtures these tests create
Review caught two leaks: the priced deployment the usage test registers and
the user the team-admin test adds both outlived the run, so repeated runs
grew shared state that later routing and rosters can see.
Also brings in the paginated daily-activity read. /user/daily/activity pages
its per-key breakdown and the helper only read the first page, so the usage
test spent its full timeout blaming the rollup for a key the rollup wrote.
* test(e2e/ui): read the licence from the proxy, not the runner
Review pointed out that checking LITELLM_LICENSE in the runner's environment
describes the wrong machine: Playwright can be pointed at a proxy configured
somewhere else, and then the skip either hides coverage or runs a premium
test against an unlicensed target.
The admin session JWT already carries the premium_user claim the dashboard
itself reads to enable these controls, so both skips now use that.
* test(e2e/ui): clean up fixtures on the failure path too
Review caught both cleanups sitting at the end of the test body, where a
failing assertion skips them, and both discarding the response so a refused
delete passed quietly. They move to afterEach and assert the delete landed.
The priced deployment matters most: left behind it keeps its custom pricing
and goes on changing what later runs route and what they cost.
* test(e2e/ui): wait for the priced deployment to become routable
The Top Virtual Keys test registered a priced deployment and sent the key's
traffic through it on the next line, so on the deployed stack it failed with
"no healthy deployments for e2e-usage-priced-...": /model/new had written
the row but the router had not picked it up yet.
Polls a ping until the deployment answers before the test sends the request
it measures, matching what the addModel spec already does for a model added
through the UI. A ping that fails writes no spend log, so the retries cannot
move the ranking this test asserts.
* test(e2e/ui): register fixtures for cleanup before the step that can fail
Review found both helpers handing their id back to the caller to record, with
a failure-prone call in between: the priced deployment was registered after
the routability wait, and the added user after /team/member_add. Either
failing left the resource in the shared database with nothing tracking it.
Both now take the teardown list and add themselves as soon as the resource
exists, so the afterEach removes it however the rest of setup goes.
* test(e2e/ui): resolve the priced deployment for teardown by name
Review pointed out the remaining gap: /model/new can persist the deployment
and still answer non-2xx, and the id was only recorded after the response was
asserted, so that path left it behind with its custom pricing.
The name is now claimed before the request and teardown looks it up in
/model/info, so a create that saved without answering 2xx is still removed and
one that never saved is simply not there.
* test(e2e/ui): claim the member id before creating the user
/user/new can persist the user and still answer non-2xx, and the id is chosen
by the test rather than returned by the proxy, so registering it before the
call is what closes the last create-failure path.
Teardown now skips an id whose user is not there, so claiming it up front
cannot fail a run where the create never landed.
* test(e2e/ui): wait out the router reload when resolving a deployment to delete
/model/info answers from the router, not from the database, and /model/new
catches and logs a failed in-request reload while still answering 2xx. A
deployment can therefore be persisted and absent from the listing until the
next reload, which is where teardown was giving up and leaking it.
Teardown now retries the lookup for a little over one
PROXY_CONFIG_RELOAD_INTERVAL_SECONDS before treating the name as never
persisted, so the only names it skips are the ones that really are not there.
* test(e2e/ui): prove a stored credential survives a config reload before using it
The Test Connect assertion has been failing intermittently on the full-suite
runs. Artifacts from litellm-e2e-ui build 165 show the UI sending
litellm_credential_name and the proxy answering with the credential unapplied:
raw_request_api_base was https://api.openai.com/v1/ rather than the mock base
the credential carries, and the call died on an upstream 404 for the model. The
same credential had resolved on three probes eight seconds earlier.
The proxy's periodic credential refresh takes a database snapshot, prunes any
in-memory credential missing from it, then re-adds the snapshot. A credential
created while that is in flight gets pruned and stays gone until the next tick,
and load_credentials_from_list fails open onto the ambient key, so nothing in
the error names the credential.
The existing pre-check asked for three consecutive probe successes, but they
completed in under a second, so they could not span a refresh. Space them so
the run covers a whole interval, which is what proves the credential survived a
refresh and is therefore stable.
* test(e2e/ui): find a database-only deployment through the search listing
/model/info answers from the router, so a deployment that reached the database
while /model/new's in-request reload failed is invisible there, and waiting on
the next reload only helps if reconciliation eventually picks it up.
/v2/model/info?search= runs a bounded query against the model table and
deliberately returns rows the router does not hold, so it resolves those
deployments to the id /model/delete needs. Falling back to it removes the wait
as well: absent from both listings now means the deployment never persisted.
* test(e2e/ui): delete the temporary member without a lookup that can skip it
Teardown asked /user/info first and treated any non-2xx as absence, so a
transient failure on the lookup silently skipped the delete and left the user
behind, which is the leak the claimed id was meant to close.
/user/delete answers 404 for an id that is not there, so it can carry both
cases on its own: 404 means the create never persisted, and anything else that
is not 2xx now fails the teardown instead of passing quietly.
* test(e2e/ui): reach the database fallback when the router listing fails
Asserting on /model/info threw before the fallback could run, so a failure on
the router-backed listing aborted teardown and left the deployment persisted,
which is the leak the fallback was added to close.
The router listing is best-effort now: an unreadable response just falls
through to the search-backed one. That listing is the authoritative answer to
whether the deployment exists, so it is the one that has to be readable, and a
name missing from it is a create that never persisted.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Logs page had coverage for opening a request and for the End User filter,
but nothing for the filters an on-call engineer actually reaches for: whose
key made the request, and which requests failed.
Each test mints its own keys and asserts on request ids it generated itself,
so a filter that quietly does nothing fails on the other key's row still being
on screen rather than passing because our own row happens to be there.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(guardrails): add Alice by ActiveFence guardrail
Adds `guardrail: alice` — policy-based guardrails for prompts and model
responses, evaluated against ActiveFence's Alice.
What makes this different from the other providers: Alice evaluates against
policies configured per *application*, and a proxy typically fronts several of
them, so the application cannot be a static config value. It is named on the
LiteLLM virtual key instead:
curl $PROXY/key/generate -H "Authorization: Bearer $LITELLM_MASTER_KEY" \
-d '{"key_alias": "payments-bot",
"metadata": {"alice_app_id": "payments-bot"}}'
read via `CustomGuardrail._get_admin_metadata`, with `key_alias` as the
fallback. That helper is what makes it trustworthy: it reads whichever metadata
holder the proxy wrote the authenticated key's values into — which differs by
route — and the proxy strips caller-supplied `user_api_key_*` from both, so a
caller cannot point its own traffic at an application with laxer policies than
the one its key was issued for. A request whose key names no application is
refused rather than evaluated against a guess.
Implements `apply_guardrail` only, so pre_call, during_call, post_call and
streaming all come from UnifiedLLMGuardrails. Blocks with
GuardrailRaisedException; masks by substituting Alice's redacted text; a MASK
carrying no replacement blocks rather than passing the original through. A
verdict reporting `errors[]` is treated as a failure, not a pass — otherwise a
half-evaluated message would be allowed. `unreachable_fallback` (already on
LitellmParams) chooses fail-closed or fail-open on transport failure.
Config:
guardrails:
- guardrail_name: alice
litellm_params:
guardrail: alice
mode: [pre_call, post_call]
api_key: os.environ/ALICE_API_KEY
21 tests in tests/test_litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/test_alice.py
cover registration, credential resolution, the app-id ladder including the
forged-metadata case, every verdict, and both unreachable policies.
No new LitellmParams field, so no schema.d.ts regeneration is needed.
* refactor(guardrails): post to Alice's LiteLLM endpoint and forward verbatim
Switches from `/v2/evaluate/message` — Alice's single-text endpoint — to
`/v2/evaluate/litellm`, which takes the hook's arguments as they arrive and
answers with a verdict.
That inverts where the work happens, and shrinks this plugin accordingly. It
now selects nothing and renames nothing: it posts `{input_type, inputs,
request_data}` and enforces `{verdict, categories, correlation_id, message,
replacements}`. Which parts of a conversation are worth evaluating, and how a
verdict is reached, are decided by Alice — so changing either is a change on
their side rather than a LiteLLM upgrade for every user.
The app-id resolution this plugin carried is gone with it. Alice reads the
application off the authenticated key's metadata itself, from the payload it is
handed, so the ladder here was duplicating a decision the far side already
makes. The security property is unchanged and still comes from the proxy
stripping caller-supplied `user_api_key_*` before a guardrail sees the request.
Masking is now positional — the far side chose which texts it was answering
for, so it says which by index. Only `texts` is written; a new
`structured_messages` object would make the chat translation layer skip the
`texts` write-back and silently drop the edits. A mask that lands nowhere
blocks rather than passing the original through.
`request_data` carries live Python objects (an OpenTelemetry span among them),
so `_json_safe` copies it into something serialisable by a mechanical rule
rather than a field list — a list drifts from what the far side needs, a rule
cannot. Serialising naively raises, and that error would read as "guardrail
unavailable" on every request.
26 tests, covering verbatim forwarding, each verdict, positional masking, the
`structured_messages` identity trap, both unreachable policies, and the
serialiser's handling of unserialisable values and cycles.
* fix(alice guardrail): satisfy lint and code-quality CI gates
- Bound _json_safe's recursion and register it in recursive_detector's
ignore list (it already caps depth and dedupes cycles by id, matching
the repo's established pattern for legitimate bounded recursion).
- Clear ruff-strict budget breaches: annotate __init__'s return type,
raise TypeError (not ValueError) for a bad response body, type
_json_safe's payload as object instead of Any, and file-scope-ignore
ANN401 for **kwargs (forwarding it as object broke the call into
CustomGuardrail.__init__, confirmed via basedpyright).
- Clear type-discipline budget breaches: suppress the construction/
annotation checks on one-shot HTTP payloads, the module-level
guardrail registries, and _json_safe's bounded accumulator; narrow
AliceVerdict's list fields to tuples and _evaluate's request_data to
Mapping[str, object] where nothing downstream mutates them.
* test(alice guardrail): assert the guardrail actually registers
The registration test called init_guardrails_v2 and asserted nothing, so it
passed whether or not the guardrail was ever registered — TQ001 in the
test-quality gate, and a fair catch: a test that cannot fail is not covering
the thing it names.
Now asserts exactly one AliceGuardrail lands in litellm.callbacks under the
configured name.
This surfaced only after the ruff-strict and type-discipline gates stopped
failing ahead of it; the lint job runs its gates in sequence, so an earlier
failure masks every later one.
* fix(alice guardrail): reach 100% patch coverage, drop the ActiveFence naming
Codecov flagged 10 uncovered lines, all of them error paths — which is where a
guardrail most needs covering, since each one decides whether traffic flows
unscreened.
Two of the ten turned out to be dead rather than untested, and are removed:
- `except GuardrailRaisedException: raise` in apply_guardrail. `_evaluate`
raises httpx errors, Timeout and TypeError, never that — so the clause could
never fire.
- the trailing `json.dumps` probe in `_json_safe`. Everything json.dumps
handles natively is caught by the isinstance branches above (a dict or list
subclass included), so anything reaching the bottom — bytes, datetime, an
OpenTelemetry span — cannot cross the wire regardless. It now says so and
returns None.
The rest are now tested: a timeout, 502/503/504 as unreachable, a 4xx as NOT
unreachable (a rejected credential is our misconfiguration, not an outage, and
must not fail open), a non-object response body, and a model whose model_dump
raises.
Also drops "by ActiveFence" throughout — the product is Alice — and points the
header at alice.io. `ui_friendly_name` is now "Alice", which is the key
guardrailLogoMap and the garden card look up, so all three moved together.
* fix(alice guardrail): strip caller credentials, widen unreachable detection, block partial MASK
Addresses PR review: request_data no longer forwards secret_fields.raw_headers or
the root api_key to Alice (the caller's Authorization token in the clear otherwise);
HTTP 500, malformed JSON, and a non-object body now route through the configured
unreachable_fallback instead of raising raw, so fail_open still fails open on those;
a MASK verdict with even one out-of-range replacement now blocks entirely instead of
silently letting the rest through unmasked. Also tightens request_data's type and
documents the known streaming-mask limitation on the class.
* fix(alice guardrail): strip credentials at any depth, stop filtering on texts
secret_fields/api_key/headers/provider_specific_header can appear nested
under proxy_server_request, metadata, litellm_metadata, and their
requester_metadata/body sub-paths in a real captured payload — a
top-level-only strip missed all of those. _json_safe now drops these keys
by name wherever they occur during serialization, so a new nesting path
can't reintroduce the leak.
apply_guardrail also stopped skipping the call whenever texts was empty,
even when tool_calls/images/structured_messages carried content — that
was the plugin making a selection decision Alice's design says belongs on
the far side. It now only skips when none of the selectable fields have
anything in them.
* fix(alice guardrail): route an undecodable response body through the fallback
`response.json()` raises UnicodeDecodeError when the body carries bytes that
are not valid UTF-8, and that escaped the except clause: UnicodeDecodeError is
a *sibling* of json.JSONDecodeError under ValueError, not a subclass of it, so
naming only JSONDecodeError left it uncaught. Both fallback modes surfaced a
raw decoding error instead of applying unreachable_fallback — which for a
fail_open deployment meant a hard failure where it had asked for an allow.
Named explicitly rather than widening to ValueError, so the clause still says
which three conditions it means. Tested under both policies.
A bare string or list under off_peak_pricing in YAML passed the truthy
guard and crashed _is_off_peak with AttributeError, breaking cost
calculation for that deployment. Malformed pieces of the block are
documented to not match rather than error, so guard the block itself the
same way and bill standard rates.
* test(e2e/ui): cover creating, testing and deleting a guardrail
The Guardrails page had no browser coverage. The RC checklist covers it by
hand against a live Presidio, which is why it has always been skipped in CI.
These drive the LiteLLM content filter instead, which runs inside the proxy,
so the whole flow is exercised without a third-party moderation service. The
create test does not stop at the table row: it sends a prompt carrying the
keyword it just banned and asserts the gateway refuses it, then sends a clean
prompt through the same guardrail and asserts it is served.
* test(e2e/ui): delete the guardrails these tests create
Review caught the fixtures being left behind. Guardrails are database rows
that show up in the table and in the playground's list, so a run that leaves
them changes what the next run sees.
Also trims the comments that restated what the helpers already say.
* test(e2e/ui): fail the run when guardrail teardown does not delete
Review caught the afterEach discarding the DELETE response, so a failed
cleanup finished quietly and left the guardrail for the next run to trip on.
* test(e2e/ui): wait for a new guardrail to reach the request path
The wizard test drove one chat completion immediately after creating the
guardrail and required a 400. A trace from the deployed stack shows the
record is stored correctly (blocked_words, action BLOCK, block_on_violation)
and the call six seconds later is still served unguarded, so the first
request can land before the proxy picks the guardrail up.
Polls the same call to the same 400 instead, which keeps the assertion and
lets the refresh land. If it never blocks, this stays red, which is what we
want it to say.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The router_code_coverage gate only counts calls made from test files with
router in the filename, so the helper needs direct unit tests beside the
other inheritance helpers in test_router_model_cost_isolation.py: fills
missing base rates from the builtin entry, leaves explicit rates alone,
and no-ops without a block or for an unmapped backend model.
* test(e2e/ui): cover the Budgets page create, edit and delete flows
The Budgets page had no browser coverage at all, so an admin creating or
editing a spend cap through the UI was only exercised by hand at RC time.
Each test reads the budget back from /budget/list, a different route from
the one the table renders, so a row that only exists in the table's cache
does not pass. The edit test pins the rate limits an unrelated spend-cap
edit has no business touching.
* test(e2e/ui): trim comments that restate the test steps
Review flagged the explanatory comments as restating ordinary setup rather
than explaining anything. Keeps the two that carry the regression rationale
for an assertion and drops the rest.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cost lookup selects the deployment-scoped cost map entry only when custom
pricing is detected and the entry carries a base pricing field. A deployment
whose model_info held nothing but off_peak_pricing failed both conditions, so
its schedule was silently ignored and every request billed at the shared
backend rate.
use_custom_pricing_for_model now also treats deployment-scoped pricing fields
in the metadata model_info as custom pricing, and the router inherits the
backend model's built-in base token rates onto such an entry at registration,
which also lets cache pricing inheritance apply. Regression tests cover the
registration, the detection, and the costed request end to end.
Ports the Model Hub search to the AI Hub Agent Hub tab and the admin
/agents toolbar as a client-side filter over agent name and description.
Extracts the hub search matching into utils/searchUtils and fixes the
public Model Hub rendering the whole catalog when a search matches
nothing (LIT-5230)
