Container ownership and skill rows are looked up on every retrieve /
delete / list / file-content / chat-completion-with-skill call. The new
stores wrapped raw Prisma queries with no cache, putting one DB
round-trip on each request. Add an in-process TTL'd cache mirroring the
_byok_cred_cache pattern in mcp_server/server.py: per-key (value,
monotonic_timestamp), 60s TTL, 10000-entry cap with full-clear on
overflow, invalidated by every write. Negative results (`None`) are
cached too so untracked-resource checks also skip the DB.
Tests cover: cache-after-first-hit, negative caching, write
invalidation, no-caching-on-DB-error, TTL expiry, capacity eviction.
56 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SCIM DELETE /Users/{id} previously called litellm_usertable.delete without
clearing rows that FK back to the user, so Postgres rejected the delete with
LiteLLM_InvitationLink_user_id_fkey and the SCIM caller saw a 500. Add a
helper to drop invitation_link, organization_membership, and team_membership
rows before the user delete (mirrors /user/delete in internal_user_endpoints).
Also add a Status column to the Virtual Keys and Internal Users tables so
admins can see at a glance which keys are blocked and which users SCIM has
deactivated. SCIM-blocked keys carry a tooltip explaining the origin.
Pin the dashboard's Node version to 20 via .nvmrc to match CI.
base_anthropic_messages_test.test_anthropic_messages_with_thinking and
test_anthropic_streaming_with_thinking still pinned to
claude-4-sonnet-20250514 — the same legacy alias Anthropic no longer
recognizes under freshly issued keys. The other four tests in this base
class already use claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929; these two were missed.
Bump to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 (supports_reasoning=true, no upcoming
deprecation). Subclasses including TestAnthropicPassthroughBasic
inherit these methods.
If record_container_owner raises after the upstream container is created,
the user previously got a 500 with no usable container — they were billed
for an unreachable resource. Move ownership recording into the create
path's exception handling and split the two failure modes:
- HTTPException from the recorder (auth conflicts) propagates verbatim
so the client sees the real status code, not a generic LLM error.
- Unexpected exceptions are logged and swallowed; the response is
returned to the caller so they aren't billed for a container they
can't address. The DB row stays untracked until an operator reconciles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_anthropic_messages_streaming_cost_injection hits the proxy's
/v1/messages route, which routes via the anthropic/* wildcard to
api.anthropic.com. The 404 surfaced in the test was Anthropic's own
not_found_error propagated back through the proxy (visible from the
x-litellm-model-id hash on the response — the proxy did route).
Same root cause as the prior commit: the legacy claude-4-sonnet-20250514
alias is no longer recognized by Anthropic's main API under the new key.
Swap to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 — same routing path, canonical model.
The previous per-provider guards in HuggingFace, Oobabooga, and Gemini
files lived in the SDK layer, breaking SDK callers who legitimately pass
URL-valued model identifiers. Move the check to the proxy boundary in
add_litellm_data_to_request so SDK users keep working while proxy users
default-deny URL-valued model and file_id, with admin opt-in via
litellm.provider_url_destination_allowed_hosts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three live-API tests pinned to claude-4-sonnet-20250514, which is a
non-canonical alias of claude-sonnet-4-20250514. Anthropic's main API
no longer resolves the legacy form under freshly issued keys, so the
tests fail with not_found_error. The token counter test pinned to
claude-sonnet-4-20250514 itself (deprecation_date 2026-05-14, two weeks
out) was on borrowed time too.
Bump all four to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 — capability superset for what
these tests exercise (streaming, parallel tool calling, extended thinking,
token counting), no upcoming deprecation, cheaper per-token.
Conflict resolution for #26968 dropped the `Iterator` typing import
(NameError at module load), left a dead `fallback_models = cast(...)`
block, and the new tests called `_enforce_key_and_fallback_model_access`
without the now-required `request` kwarg.
Extend LITELLM_SUPPRESS_SPEND_LOG_TRACEBACKS to the failure callback so the
per-row Metadata pane in the UI no longer shows the stack trace when the
opt-in env var is set, matching the existing console-side suppression.
https://claude.ai/code/session_014dztoRbRnRvq54HL9EyHx6
Adds LITELLM_SUPPRESS_SPEND_LOG_TRACEBACKS env var. When set to true and the
proxy log level is INFO or above, spend-tracking error paths emit a single
ERROR line without the full traceback. Stack traces are preserved at DEBUG
and the Sentry / proxy_logging_obj.failure_handler path is unchanged.
The new spend_log_error helper is wired through the spend write hot path:
- DBSpendUpdateWriter (update_database, _update_*_db, batch upsert,
redis-commit fallbacks)
- _ProxyDBLogger._PROXY_track_cost_callback
- get_logging_payload exception path
- update_spend / update_daily_tag_spend / spend logs queue monitor
Resolves LIT-2704.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): re-validate user_id ownership after /user/info re-parses query
The route-level access check in `RouteChecks.non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check`
reads `request.query_params.get("user_id")`, which decodes literal `+` to
spaces. The endpoint then re-parses the raw query string with `urllib.unquote`
in `get_user_id_from_request` to preserve `+` characters (so plus-addressed
emails work as user_ids). Those two paths produce different ids: a caller
who registered a user_id containing a literal space could pass the route
check and then read another user's row by sending the encoded `+` form.
Add `_enforce_user_info_access` and call it after `_normalize_user_info_user_id`
returns the final id. Proxy admin / view-only admin still bypass; everyone
else must match the resolved user_id (or have no user_id, which falls back
to the caller's own id later in the handler).
Tests cover the admin bypass, owner-match path, and the cross-user lookup
that this change blocks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(proxy): apply user_info ownership check to PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY
`_enforce_user_info_access` was bypassing both PROXY_ADMIN and
PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY, but the upstream route check in
`RouteChecks.non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check` only treats
PROXY_ADMIN as a true admin for the `/user/info` route — view-only
admins go through the `user_id == valid_token.user_id` enforcement
along with regular users. Mirroring that asymmetry left the same
encoded-`+` bypass open for view-only admins whose user_id contains a
literal space.
Drop the PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY exemption so the post-decode re-check
matches the upstream rule. Update tests: a view-only admin must now
be blocked from cross-user lookups but still allowed to read their
own row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(batches): count non-chat tokens and validate every model in batch file
Two security control bypasses on POST /v1/batches:
1. `_get_batch_job_input_file_usage` only summed tokens for
`body.messages` (chat completions). Embedding (`input`) and text
completion (`prompt`) batches reported zero, letting massive
non-chat workloads slip past TPM rate limits. Extend the counter
to handle string and list shapes for both fields.
2. The batch input file was forwarded to the upstream provider
without inspecting the models named inside the JSONL — only the
outer `model` query parameter was checked against the caller's
allowlist. A caller restricted to gpt-3.5 could submit a batch
targeting gpt-4o and the upstream would execute it under the
proxy's shared API key.
Add `_get_models_from_batch_input_file_content` (returns the
distinct `body.model` values) and call it from
`_enforce_batch_file_model_access` in the pre-call hook, which runs
each model through `can_key_call_model` so the same allowlist
semantics (wildcards, access groups, all-proxy-models, team aliases)
the proxy enforces on `/chat/completions` apply here too. Any
unauthorized model raises a 403 before the file is forwarded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(batches): count pre-tokenized prompt/input shapes, classify 403 logs
Two follow-ups from the Greptile review on the batch validation PR:
1. P1 TPM bypass via integer token arrays. The OpenAI batch schema
accepts ``prompt`` and ``input`` as ``list[int]`` (a single
pre-tokenized prompt) or ``list[list[int]]`` (multiple) in addition
to the string and ``list[str]`` shapes. Pre-fix only the string
shapes were counted, so a caller could submit a batch with hundreds
of millions of pre-tokenized tokens and the rate limiter would
record zero. Extract the per-field logic into
``_count_prompt_or_input_tokens`` and count each int as one token.
2. P2 access-denial logs were indistinguishable from I/O failures.
``count_input_file_usage`` caught every exception under a generic
"Error counting input file usage" message, so an intentional 403
from ``_enforce_batch_file_model_access`` looked the same in the
logs as a missing file or a Prisma timeout. Catch ``HTTPException``
separately and log 403s at WARNING level with a security-relevant
message before re-raising.
Tests cover the new shapes: single ``list[int]``, ``list[list[int]]``
(the worst-case bypass vector), and embeddings ``input`` with
pre-tokenized arrays.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reset the policy ID index during policy engine test cleanup so stale policy versions cannot leak between tests.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The router_code_coverage CI check requires every function in router.py to
be referenced by at least one test under tests/{local_testing,
router_unit_tests,test_litellm} in a file with "router" in its name.
The recently-extracted helper had no direct test, so the check failed
with "0.45% of functions in router.py are not tested".
Add a focused test that exercises the four return paths: model already
in self.model_names, no fallback applies, pattern-router match, and
default_deployment substitution (also asserting the stored default
isn't mutated).
https://claude.ai/code/session_019AVp1XL7RT9RxRe4qRLkay
Mark runtime-created policies and attachments initialized so global policy attachments created from the policy builder apply immediately without requiring a restart.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Many MCP integrations (Zapier, etc.) embed an upstream API key
directly in the server URL, e.g.
``https://actions.zapier.com/mcp/<api-key>/sse``. The list and
single-server endpoints were returning the full URL to any
authenticated user — `_redact_mcp_credentials` only stripped the
explicit ``credentials`` field, and `_sanitize_mcp_server_for_virtual_key`
only ran for restricted virtual keys. Non-admin internal users could
read the dashboard, click the unmask toggle, and exfiltrate the raw
token.
Add `_sanitize_mcp_server_for_non_admin` that runs on top of the
existing credential redaction and clears the credential-bearing
fields:
- ``url`` (the primary leak vector)
- ``spec_path`` (OpenAPI spec URLs that may carry tokens)
- ``static_headers`` / ``extra_headers`` (Authorization)
- ``env`` (arbitrary secrets)
- ``authorization_url`` / ``token_url`` / ``registration_url``
Identity fields (``server_id``, ``alias``, ``mcp_info``, etc.) are
preserved so the UI can still list servers a non-admin's team has
access to.
Apply the new sanitizer in `fetch_all_mcp_servers` and the per-server
fetch path right after the existing virtual-key branch. Update the
existing `test_list_mcp_servers_non_admin_user_filtered` assertions
that previously checked URL visibility.
Frontend defense-in-depth: hide the URL unmask toggle on
`mcp_server_view.tsx` unless the viewer is a proxy admin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When _get_all_deployments returns 0 candidates and the litellm-model
fallback branch (_get_deployment_by_litellm_model) finds deployments that
the access-group filter then empties, _access_group_filter_emptied_candidates
remained False (it was captured before that branch ran). The router would
then proceed to default fallbacks; the fallback model could have no
access_groups and short-circuit the filter, silently serving a caller
blocked by access-group restrictions.
Update the flag inside the litellm-model branch when filtering empties a
non-empty candidate set so the default-fallback guard still triggers.
When a team grants /key/list via team_member_permissions, non-admin members
should see all keys for that team — same as a team admin. Previously the
classification in list_keys() only checked admin status, so permitted
members fell into the service-account-only path and could not see other
members' personal keys. Routes those members into the full-visibility set.
