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42 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
ryan-crabbe-berri
b76def0e5d
test: require a match= on broad pytest.raises, and drop duplicate parametrize cases (#37769)
`pytest.raises(Exception)` with no `match=` passes on any error that broad. A
TypeError from a refactor, a botched fixture, an import that moved: all of them
read as the rejection the test claims to police, so the test goes green for the
wrong reason and stays green after the behaviour it guards is gone.

PT011 closes that gap for the 317 sites B017 could not reach, because B017 only
fires on a single-statement body with no `as e` binding. Each pattern here is the
message the code actually raised, recorded by running the sites under a plugin
that logged the concrete type and text per call site, so the assertions describe
observed behaviour rather than a guess. Where a site raises more than one message
across its parametrize cases, the pattern is an alternation of what was seen;
where the exception carries an empty `str()` and puts the text on `.message`, the
site keeps a narrow `noqa` with the reason.

PT014 removes four parametrize cases that were listed twice. The duplicate re-runs
an assertion that already passed, and it usually marks a case someone meant to
vary and forgot to edit.
2026-08-20 20:24:49 -07:00
devin-ai-integration[bot]
52403d7a8d
fix(jwt): retry JWKS fetches, serve stale keys, and return 503 when the IdP is unreachable (#37690)
A JWKS fetch had no retry, so a single connect timeout to the identity provider
failed authentication outright, and once the cached copy expired there was
nothing to fall back on. How that surfaced depended on the outage shape:
httpx.ConnectTimeout was missing from DB_CONNECTION_ERROR_TYPES so it fell
through to the generic auth handler as a 401 with an empty detail, while a read
timeout took the database path and reported a healthy database as unreachable.

Transport failures are now retried three times with a short backoff, and the
last-known-good JWKS stays usable for a bounded window past public_key_ttl.
That window is public_key_stale_ttl, a new config field defaulting to 3600s and
settable to 0 to fail closed. It is checked on every read against the current
setting rather than baked into the cache entry when it is written, so lowering
it binds immediately instead of waiting for entries written under the old value
to age out, which matters because a shared cache survives the restart an
operator performs to make the change take effect. A copy whose write time
cannot be established is not servable. Only httpx.TransportError unlocks the
stale copy, so an identity provider that answers at all, including with a
narrowed key set, revokes on the next refresh. Every stale serve logs the kid
it authenticated, how long ago that copy was refreshed, and how long until it
stops being trusted.

A sustained outage is remembered for 30s per key url, so it costs one fetch per
window instead of three timeouts per request serialised behind the refresh lock.
Non-200 JWKS responses now raise instead of being cached as the key set, which
previously let an error body overwrite the last-known-good copy. An unreachable
identity provider with no cached copy left returns 503 auth_provider_unavailable.

Resolves LIT-5524

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
2026-08-20 16:41:06 -07:00
mateo-berri
c2f0014a63 fix(jwt_auth): grant only /v1/messages routes to JWT teams by default, not all anthropic_routes 2026-07-27 17:15:09 -07:00
shivam
aca7f57324 fix(jwt_auth): allow /v1/messages for JWT teams by default
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-22 04:23:35 +00:00
ryan-crabbe-berri
e17f3b6e1a
fix(proxy): populate user_email on UserAPIKeyAuth for JWT auth (#34174)
Some checks are pending
CodSpeed Benchmarks / benchmarks (push) Waiting to run
GitHub Actions Security Analysis / zizmor (push) Waiting to run
JWT auth built UserAPIKeyAuth without user_email even though the resolved
user row and the JWT email claim were both available, so the user_email
label on Prometheus metrics and user_api_key_user_email in
StandardLogging/SpendLogs metadata were always None for JWT traffic.

Plumb user_email through JWTAuthBuilderResult: auth_builder returns the
user row email when set, falling back to the user_email_jwt_field claim
(covers the scope-based proxy-admin path where no user row is loaded).
The JWT branch now stamps it on the proxy-admin return, the standard
valid_token, and the auto-registered virtual key object.

Resolves LIT-4238
2026-07-21 16:11:47 -07:00
Mateo Wang
0855fa02b2
feat(jwt): fall back to DB team memberships when JWT has no team claims (#31356)
* feat(jwt): fall back to DB team memberships when JWT has no team claims

* style(jwt): use PEP 585/604 annotations in DB team fallback to clear strict gate

* fix(jwt): preserve DB teams on no-claim sync, model-gate DB fallback, stop team-id leak

When fallback_to_db_teams is enabled and a JWT carries no team claims,
sync_user_role_and_teams previously computed teams_to_remove as every existing
DB membership and wiped the user out of all their teams on each request, which
also left the DB fallback nothing to resolve. Skip team removal in that case so
memberships survive and the fallback can attribute usage.

Apply the same per-team model-access check the claim-based path enforces when
selecting a DB fallback team, so a team's models restriction is no longer
bypassed; a team that cannot serve the requested model is skipped in favor of
one that can.

Drop the user's team-id list from the x-litellm-team-id membership 403 detail so
a valid-JWT caller can no longer enumerate team IDs.

* fix(jwt): load team membership on DB fallback; scope header check to provisional teams

The DB-team fallback resolved a team but never loaded its team membership
row, so per-team membership budget limits were silently skipped on that
path. _resolve_db_team_fallback now fetches the resolved team's membership
when a user_id is known and returns it, matching the claim-based path so
downstream LiteLLM_TeamMembership budget enforcement works there too.

The provisional x-litellm-team-id validation also fired on any non-None
team_id, including an RBAC role-derived one, which 403'd RBAC team flows
when the asserted team was not also a DB membership. It now runs only when
team_id actually came from the header (team_id == header_team_id).

* fix(jwt): surface DB-fallback membership lookup failures at warning level

A transient get_team_membership failure on the DB team fallback path is
recoverable: the team is still resolved and the request proceeds, just
without per-team membership budget enforcement for that request. Logging
that at debug hid a silent budget-enforcement gap from operators, so it now
logs at warning and states that enforcement was skipped. Behavior is
otherwise unchanged: the resolved team is returned with a None membership
rather than failing the request, covered by
test_resolve_db_team_fallback_survives_membership_lookup_error.

* fix(jwt-auth): tighten db-team fallback gating and passthrough enforcement

Resolves four issues in the fallback_to_db_teams path:

- _resolve_db_team_fallback now surfaces a model-access denial when memberships
  exist but none can access the requested model, instead of always returning
  the no-membership message
- auth_builder gates the fallback on real JWT team claims via
  get_all_jwt_team_ids so a configured team_id_default does not silently route
  claimless tokens to the default team
- A team selected only via _resolve_db_team_fallback is re-validated against
  the team's allowed_passthrough_routes; the earlier gate ran while team_id
  was still None
- sync_user_role_and_teams considers both plural and singular team claim
  shapes when reconciling DB memberships so singular-only tokens
  (Okta/Auth0 defaults) no longer leave stale teams behind

* fix(jwt): don't upsert a provisional x-litellm-team-id before membership check

When fallback_to_db_teams is on and the JWT carries no team claims, an
x-litellm-team-id header is accepted provisionally and only validated against
the user's DB memberships later in auth_builder. With team_id_upsert also
enabled, get_team_object ran the upsert on that unvalidated header team first,
so an attacker-supplied header could create an orphaned team row before the
403 membership check. Suppress the upsert whenever the team is provisional
(db_team_fallback), since a genuine membership team already exists and an
invalid one must not be created. Regression:
test_auth_builder_provisional_header_team_is_not_upserted.

* fix(jwt): pin RBAC-asserted team against db-team-fallback header override

When a JWT carries an RBAC team role but no group claims, auth_builder already
sets team_id from the RBAC object_id. db_team_fallback still evaluated true
there, so the provisional x-litellm-team-id path accepted a header team and
silently overrode the RBAC-asserted team with any team the caller belonged to.
Gate db_team_fallback on team_id being unset, and drive the header's provisional
acceptance off db_team_fallback rather than the raw flag, so an RBAC token plus
a non-claim header team is rejected with 403 instead of substituting the team.
Regression: test_auth_builder_header_cannot_override_rbac_team_under_db_fallback.

* fix(jwt): scope dual-claim membership sync to fallback_to_db_teams

The membership sync read both plural and singular JWT team claims via
get_all_jwt_team_ids unconditionally, which silently changed reconciliation
for every deployment using sync_user_role_and_teams, not just those opting
into fallback_to_db_teams: a singular-only IdP token that previously stripped
all DB teams would now be recognized. Gate the dual-claim read on
fallback_to_db_teams so flag-off deployments keep the upstream plural-only
behavior, honoring the PR's contract that existing deployments are unchanged.
Regression: test_sync_user_role_and_teams_singular_claim_only_recognized_under_flag.

* fix(jwt): drop user team IDs from db-fallback model-access 403 detail

The model-access-denied 403 in _resolve_db_team_fallback echoed the user's
full DB team-id list in its detail. It is only the caller's own memberships,
but it is inconsistent with the membership-validation 403 in the same feature
that was deliberately scrubbed of team IDs. Replace the enumerated list with a
generic "no team you are a member of has access" message. Regression extends
test_resolve_db_team_fallback_distinguishes_no_membership_vs_model_denied to
assert the team id is absent from the detail.

* fix(jwt): keep db-team fallback off for alias-only tokens

* test(jwt): cover alias-only token skipping db-team fallback

The autofix in ed21199 added a get_team_alias clause to the db_team_fallback
gate so an alias-only JWT (team_alias_jwt_field set, no team-id claims)
resolves its alias via find_and_validate_specific_team_id instead of being
mis-attributed to the user's first DB team, but it shipped without a
regression test. This drives auth_builder with an alias-only token whose
alias resolves to a different team than the user's DB membership and asserts
the result is the alias-resolved team; reverting the get_team_alias clause
flips the result to the DB-membership team, so the test fails without the fix

* fix(jwt): prefer alias resolution over team_id_default

When the JWT only carries an alias claim and the operator configures
team_id_default, JWTHandler.get_team_id silently substitutes the
default into find_and_validate_specific_team_id. That made the helper
return the default team without ever attempting alias resolution, so
spend and access attached to the default team even though the token
identified a different team via its alias. Use get_all_jwt_team_ids
(which ignores team_id_default) to detect when the resolved team_id is
only the default and clear it so alias resolution runs first; the
default remains the fallback when no alias claim is present.

* fix(jwt): enforce team_allowed_routes in db-team fallback resolution

The claim-based path runs allowed_routes_check when selecting a team, but
_resolve_db_team_fallback selected a team purely on model access, so a
DB-resolved team could reach routes excluded by team_allowed_routes with no
downstream backstop. This mirrors the claim path's route gate in the fallback,
exempting auth-enforced passthrough routes that are gated separately by
allowed_passthrough_routes at the call site

* fix(jwt): enforce team_allowed_routes on header-team db fallback path

The auto-pick DB-team fallback already gates against team_allowed_routes, but a claimless JWT presenting x-litellm-team-id under fallback_to_db_teams set team_id directly from the header and only re-validated DB membership afterwards, skipping the route gate. A caller could reach management/info routes that the JWT config narrowed for team-role callers by supplying the header even though the auto-pick path on the same route returns no team.

* refactor(jwt): narrow db-team fallback except clauses to actual failure types

* fix(jwt): collapse provisional header team lookup failure into membership denial

A caller holding a valid claimless JWT under fallback_to_db_teams could
distinguish nonexistent teams (404 from get_team_object) from existing
teams they do not belong to (membership 403) by varying x-litellm-team-id,
giving an authenticated team-id existence oracle. The provisional header
path now rewrites the lookup failure into the exact 403 the membership
check raises, while claim-backed header teams keep the upstream 404.

Also drop the unreachable falsy-team guard in _resolve_db_team_fallback
(get_team_object returns a team or raises, never None) and stop codecov
carryforward for three dead flags whose stale sessions were measured
against old file revisions and sank patch coverage with phantom
executable lines

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-07-06 17:17:10 -07:00
Yassin Kortam
84266bf924
feat(auth): resolve caller identity once into a Principal at the auth seam (#30887)
Introduce a single, typed caller identity that is resolved once at the auth
boundary and read by reference downstream, instead of being re-derived from a
50-field key object or rebuilt from request metadata.

What this adds (litellm/proxy/auth/resolvers/), organized by responsibility:
- Principal: a small, frozen, identity-only value type (user / organization /
  teams / project / end-user / roles / scopes / network), with its sub-models
  and the role mapping. No budget or policy state; those stay on the key object.
- DbIdentityStore: the auth flow's resolver, owning both halves of resolving a
  caller. resolve_key does the one combined_view lookup (cache, then DB via the
  shared lower-level helpers, then write-back) and returns the key object, which
  still flows for budget / rate-limit / policy unchanged. principal_from_key
  projects the identity slice of that key object into a Principal, issuing no
  lookup. user_api_key_auth resolves every key through the store rather than
  calling get_key_object directly; auth_checks.get_key_object stays as the legacy
  entrypoint for its other callers until they migrate.
- network: the X-Forwarded-For / trusted-proxy CIDR primitives live here in one
  place. trusted_proxy_utils now imports them rather than keeping a second copy.

At the seam, user_api_key_auth projects one per-request Principal off the
resolved key object and stamps the request network context onto it once
(X-Forwarded-For is trusted only when trusted_proxy_ranges is configured). It is
attached to request.state.principal for the downstream consumers later phases
add. The projection is additive and defensive: a failure never rejects an
already-authenticated request, and a missing principal must be treated as deny
by any future reader. The Principal is always identifiable (credential_ref and a
stable subject off the token), never anonymous.

This is additive and changes no behavior today; it is the identity foundation
the spend-attribution and authorization phases build on.
2026-06-20 18:49:41 -07:00
milan-berri
a7ecf6b5b1
feat(jwt-auth): opt-in fallback to DB team on unresolved JWT claim (#28913)
* fix(jwt-auth): defer to single-team DB fallback on claim mismatch

Extends the single-team DB fallback introduced in #26418 to two more
cases where it previously could not run:

* `find_and_validate_specific_team_id`: when `team_id_jwt_field` is
  configured and a claim value is present in the token but the team
  does not exist in the LiteLLM DB (HTTPException 404 from
  `get_team_object`), return `(None, None)` instead of raising — the
  auth_builder fallback then attributes the request to the user's
  single DB team. Only HTTPException is caught; other errors (e.g.
  "No DB Connected") still propagate.

* `find_team_with_model_access`: when none of the `team_ids_jwt_field`
  groups resolve to a real LiteLLM team, return `(None, None)` instead
  of raising 403 so the same fallback path runs. If at least one group
  DID resolve to a team but none granted the requested model, the
  original 403 is preserved (legitimate access denial — not a claim
  mismatch). Tracked via the new `any_claim_team_resolved` flag.

The strict `is_required_team_id` raise and `enforce_team_based_model_access`
raise remain unchanged. Unit tests cover both new soft-fail paths and
guard each preserved path (strict required, enforce_team_based, the
preserved 403, and the non-HTTPException propagation).

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(jwt-auth): narrow HTTPException catch to 404 (greptile review)

Address Greptile review comments on #28913:

* `find_and_validate_specific_team_id`: re-raise HTTPException when
  `status_code != 404`, pinning the catch to the "team doesn't exist
  in db" path documented for `get_team_object`. A future change that
  introduces a different status code (e.g. 403 for a blocked team)
  will now propagate instead of silently falling through to the
  single-team DB fallback.

* Add `test_find_and_validate_specific_team_id_non_404_http_exception_propagates`
  parametrised over 400 / 403 / 500 to lock in the contract.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(jwt-auth): gate claim-mismatch fallback behind opt-in flag

The unresolved-team-claim fallback added in the previous commit
weakened the strict claim-based authorization contract by default —
an authenticated user whose JWT carries a stale or invalid team
claim could still consume their single DB team's models/quota via
the fallback.

Gate both soft-fail paths in `find_and_validate_specific_team_id`
and `find_team_with_model_access` behind a new opt-in flag
`team_claim_fallback` on `LiteLLM_JWTAuth` (default False).

Default-off preserves the pre-existing strict behavior. Operators
who intentionally treat IdP team claims as advisory (e.g. machine
tokens whose group claims live in a separate namespace from
LiteLLM team_ids) opt in via config.

Adds two regression tests guarding the default-off behavior.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-06-09 01:09:03 +03:00
milan-berri
b7f47a3b52
fix(jwt): use resolved DB user_id for spend on legacy email match (#29217)
* fix(jwt): attribute spend to resolved DB user_id on email/sso fuzzy match

When user_id_upsert is enabled with JWT auth and a pre-migration user row
exists whose user_email matches the JWT email but whose user_id is a UUID,
get_user_object resolves the legacy row via fuzzy lookup, but the JWT-claim
user_id (the email) still flowed into team-membership lookup,
JWTAuthBuilderResult.user_id, UserAPIKeyAuth and the spend tables. Spend was
orphaned under a phantom email id; /user/info and the Usage page showed $0
for the legacy user (GH #26789).

Treat the resolved user_object as the source of truth: add
_canonical_user_id_from_db, rebind inside get_objects, and return
effective_user_id so auth_builder unpacks it without adding statements.

Fixes #26789

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(jwt): log user_id rebind at DEBUG to avoid email PII in INFO streams

Greptile review on #29217: rebinding often logs JWT email claims at INFO.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* test(jwt): update passthrough allowlist mock for 5-tuple get_objects

Staging #29256 added a test that still mocked get_objects with a
4-tuple; our PR expanded the return to 5 values (effective_user_id).

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-06-05 15:59:41 -07:00
Sameer Kankute
20dc6dffa4
fix(proxy): passthrough 404 when SERVER_ROOT_PATH is set (#29658)
* fix(proxy): match passthrough registry routes bare-to-bare with SERVER_ROOT_PATH

After #28547, get_request_route strips the deployment prefix while registry
lookup still re-inflated stored paths via SERVER_ROOT_PATH, causing 404s
under paths like /llmproxy/ml. Compare normalized bare routes in both
is_registered_pass_through_route and get_registered_pass_through_route.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* test(proxy): patch utils.get_server_root_path in passthrough auth tests

After removing get_server_root_path from pass_through_endpoints, route
and JWT tests must mock litellm.proxy.utils where normalization reads it.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-06-04 07:44:51 -07:00
ryan-crabbe-berri
9d9558e78f
fix(auth): preserve 401 status for expired JWTs in OTel traces (#29510)
* fix(auth): preserve 401 status for expired JWTs in OTel traces

Expired JWT access tokens raised a generic Exception with no status
code attached. Because the codeless exception was logged to OTel via
post_call_failure_hook before auth_exception_handler re-wrapped it as
ProxyException(401), the OTel span never set http.response.status_code
and trace viewers displayed it as a generic 500. Clients still got a
401 back, so traces and actual responses diverged.

Raise ProxyException(code=401, type=expired_key) directly at the source
in both JWT decode paths so the 401 is consistent across the client
response and the OTel http.response.status_code attribute, matching how
virtual-key expirations are handled.

* fix(auth): preserve 401 for expired JWTs on issuer-scoped path

The issuer-scoped JWT path (_auth_jwt_with_issuer) still raised a generic
Exception on expiry, surfacing as a 500 in client responses and OTel traces.
Raise ProxyException with expired_key/401 there too, matching auth_jwt, and
add a regression test exercising the issuer path end-to-end
2026-06-02 16:33:16 -07:00
Mateo Wang
6d6eda8101
[internal copy of #28008] Support MCP OAuth passthrough and issuer-scoped JWT auth (#28356)
* fix(proxy): point /metrics 401 at the opt-out flag

Operators upgrading past 35bbca60b0 (which made /metrics auth
default-on) see "Malformed API Key passed in. Ensure Key has 'Bearer '
prefix." with no hint that
litellm_settings.require_auth_for_metrics_endpoint: false restores the
previous unauthenticated behavior. Append that discovery hint to the
existing 401 body so a Prometheus scraper that breaks after upgrade
has a clear migration path. No behavior change.

* fix(proxy): bound budget reservation per request instead of pinning to remaining headroom

reserve_budget_for_request fell back to reserving the entire remaining
team/key/user headroom whenever a request omitted max_tokens, which
pinned the spend counter at max_budget for the duration of the
in-flight request and false-positive-blocked every concurrent or
back-to-back request until the success callback reconciled. Surfaced
as an integration-test team being budget-blocked at its $2000 cap
while DB spend was $0.144.

Switch the missing-max_tokens path to a fixed default of 16384 output
tokens (mirrors parallel_request_limiter_v3's DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS_ESTIMATE
precedent), and clamp explicit max_tokens at the model's
max_output_tokens for reservation accounting only. The outbound request
body is unchanged, so providers see whatever the caller actually sent;
only the local integer used to compute reservation cost is bounded.
This also prevents a hostile max_tokens=999999999 from inflating one
request's reservation up to the entire team headroom.

For Opus 4.7 (output $25/M, max_output 128K) on a $2000 budget the
worst-case per-request reservation drops from "everything left" to
$3.20, raising admittable concurrency from 1 to ~625.

* fix(proxy): reserve per-image cost for image-generation requests

Image-generation routes (dall-e-3, flux, etc.) have no per-token output
cost so they fell through to the no-reservation read-time-only path.
Concurrent image requests against a depleted budget could all pass
common_checks (counter exactly at max_budget passes the strict-`>`
gate) and reach the provider before reconciliation caught up.

Add per-image reservation in _estimate_request_max_cost_for_model:
when the model has a per-image cost field, reserve `n × cost_per_image`
upfront. The atomic counter increment serializes concurrent admissions,
so the second request sees the post-first-reservation counter and
raises BudgetExceededError instead of silently leaking through.

Both `output_cost_per_image` and `input_cost_per_image` are honored —
naming is inconsistent across providers (OpenAI dall-e-3 uses
input_cost_per_image, aiml/dall-e-3 uses output_cost_per_image for
the same per-generated-image price).

Per-pixel pricing (DALL-E 2 size variants) and TTS/STT routes still
fall through to read-time enforcement; those are follow-ups.

* fix(proxy): gate image-gen reservation strictly on model mode

The previous detection treated any model with input_cost_per_image
or output_cost_per_image as image generation. Several chat and
embedding models carry those fields to price multimodal vision input,
not generated images:

- gemini-3.1-pro-preview (mode=chat) has output_cost_per_image=0.00012
  alongside input/output token pricing.
- azure/gpt-realtime-* (mode=chat) has input_cost_per_image=5e-6.
- amazon.titan-embed-image-v1 (mode=embedding) has
  input_cost_per_image=6e-5.

For these models the image-gen branch fired first and reserved a
fraction of a cent per request, short-circuiting the token-priced
path entirely. Long Gemini chats reserved 1 × $0.00012 instead of
the true token cost.

Gate strictly on mode in {"image_generation", "image_edit"}. All 197
real image_generation entries and all 31 image_edit entries
(Flux Kontext, Stability inpaint/outpaint, etc.) carry the right mode,
so the field-presence fallback was unnecessary.

Adds regression tests for the chat-model-with-image-cost-field case
and for image_edit reservation.

* build(packaging): relax core runtime pins to ranges

Backport of #27241 onto litellm_1.84.0rc2.

The 12 entries in `[project.dependencies]` were exact `==` pins, a side
effect of the Poetry -> uv migration. This forces every downstream
package that lists litellm as a dependency to downgrade common runtime
libraries (openai, pydantic, aiohttp, click, jsonschema, ...) to the
exact versions we ship.

Switch to lower-bounded ranges with upper bounds where the upstream
package is pre-1.0 or has a known breaking-major-version policy.
Reproducibility for our Docker proxy and CI continues to come from
`uv.lock`, which is regenerated here as a metadata-only diff.

Conflict resolution vs upstream merge:
- The upstream merge commit also surfaced unrelated context entries
  (nvidia-riva-client, soundfile/stt-nvidia-riva extra) that exist in
  staging but not in rc2. Those are not part of #27241's intent and
  were dropped from the resolution; the rc2 uv.lock keeps its existing
  entry set, only the 12 specifier strings changed.
- `uv lock --check` passes (392 packages resolved, no drift).

* build(packaging): raise jinja2 floor to 3.1.6

Our `uv.lock` already resolves jinja2 to 3.1.6, so Docker / CI installs
get that version. The `pyproject.toml` floor was lagging at 3.1.0,
which means downstream consumers using `--resolution=lowest-direct` or
older constraint files can land on 3.1.0-3.1.5 instead of the version
we actually test against.

Aligns the declared floor with the resolved version so external
installers see the same baseline our test matrix exercises.

`uv lock` diff is metadata-only (no resolved-version drift).

* fix(mcp): forward extra_headers for OpenAPI MCP tools

OpenAPI-generated tools only applied static closure headers and BYOK
Authorization via ContextVar. Copy MCPServer.extra_headers from the
incoming MCP request into _request_extra_headers (set in server.py before
local tool dispatch), merge in openapi_to_mcp_generator via a small helper.

OAuth2 M2M: do not forward caller Authorization from raw_headers (same rule
as _prepare_mcp_server_headers for managed MCP).

Adds TestRequestExtraHeaders and clarifies mcp_server_manager registration
comment.

Fixes #26794

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* refactor(mcp): access has_client_credentials on MCPServer directly

Greptile: getattr default was redundant; property exists on MCPServer and
mcp_server is non-None inside the extra_headers forwarding block.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(mcp): static headers win over forwarded headers in OpenAPI MCP

Match the existing MCP invariant in merge_mcp_headers and the managed MCP
path: operator-configured static headers always override caller-forwarded
headers on name conflict, with case-insensitive comparison so different
casing cannot bypass the precedence. _request_auth_header (BYOK) still
overrides Authorization last.

Addresses Veria review on PR #27383.

Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(proxy): always merge caller-supplied tags into request metadata

Caller-supplied tags (`x-litellm-tags` header, body `tags`, `metadata.tags`)
were silently dropped unless the key/team had
`metadata.allow_client_tags: true` set. Restore the documented behavior:
tags from the request always flow into `metadata.tags` and union with any
admin-configured static tags from key/team/project metadata.

Removes the `allow_client_tags` opt-in flag from the pre-call pipeline.
The flag was only ever read here; it has no schema or endpoint footprint,
so leftover values in existing key metadata are inert.

Test cleanup mirrors the simplification: drop the three tests that
verified the strip-when-not-opted-in path, drop the `allow_client_tags`
fixture lines from the merge/union tests.

* docs(proxy): refresh stale comments referencing removed tag strip

The tag-strip block was removed in the parent commit but two surrounding
comments still referenced "tags without opt-in" and "runs AFTER the
strip". Update them to describe the remaining user_api_key_* and
_pipeline_managed_guardrails strip that the snapshot/merge ordering
actually protects against.

* chore: reject bare str at file-input sinks to prevent local-file read (#27762)

Cherry-pick of #27762 onto litellm_1.84.0rc2.

* chore: reject bare str at file-input sinks to prevent local-file read (#27667)
* fix: use os.PathLike in ocr sink and check truthy reasoningSummary for bridge
  - ocr/main.py: widen Path check to os.PathLike for consistency with other sinks
  - main.py: bridge condition checks truthiness of reasoning_summary, not just None
* fix: remove unused pathlib.Path import in ocr/main.py

Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: stuxf <70670632+stuxf@users.noreply.github.com>

* Strip SERVER_ROOT_PATH before lazy-feature prefix match

LazyFeatureMiddleware compared the raw scope path against registered
prefixes (e.g. /policies), so requests under a server root path like
/api/v1/policies/... never matched, the feature never loaded, and the
endpoint returned 404. Strip the configured root path before matching,
normalizing trailing slashes and enforcing a component boundary so
/api does not falsely match /apiv2.

* Cache normalized SERVER_ROOT_PATH at middleware init

SERVER_ROOT_PATH is a process-startup env var. Read it once in
__init__ instead of calling get_server_root_path() + rstrip on every
request that arrives before all lazy features have loaded.

* chore(proxy): backport /key/regenerate ownership-rebind + premium-gate guards (#27793)

Backport of #27793 onto litellm_1.84.0rc2.

A non-admin caller could rebind their own key's user_id via /key/regenerate.
_execute_virtual_key_regeneration had org/team guards but no user_id guard,
and prepare_key_update_data did not strip the field — it survived
model_dump(exclude_unset=True) into the Prisma update. On the next request,
_return_user_api_key_auth_obj resolved the rebound user_id against
litellm_usertable and returned PROXY_ADMIN whenever the target row's
user_role was admin.

/key/update had the equivalent guard inline at _validate_update_key_data;
extract it to a shared helper _validate_caller_can_change_key_ownership and
call from both /key/update and _execute_virtual_key_regeneration.

Also tighten the premium gate that allowed the master-key rotation branch to
skip the enterprise check. The previous predicate was a field-presence test,
not an identity check. Verify the caller actually holds the master key via
_is_master_key before allowing the non-premium path.

Block explicit-null user_id and empty-string user_id as removal attempts;
both 403-reject for non-admin callers.

* fix(proxy): expose db status on public /health/readiness

Backport of #27866 onto litellm_1.84.0rc2.

External readiness probes consumed the legacy detailed payload's `db`
field to drive alerting and pod-rotation decisions. Stripping the body
to {"status": "healthy"} broke those probes silently — the HTTP code
still flipped to 503, but probes checking body.db == "connected"
treated the response as healthy.

Add `db` back to the unauthenticated payload. The rest of the diagnostic
fields (litellm_version, callbacks, cache, log_level) stay behind
/health/readiness/details so the recon-leak gate from #26912 holds.
Values match the legacy contract: "connected", "disconnected",
"Not connected". The 503-on-DB-disconnect behavior from LIT-2607 is
preserved.

* fix(ui): fetch version + debug flag from /health/readiness/details

The proxy moved `litellm_version`, `is_detailed_debug`, and other
diagnostic fields off the public `/health/readiness` payload behind
an auth-gated `/health/readiness/details` endpoint. The navbar
version tag and the detailed-debug-mode banner stopped working
because they were still reading those fields from the unauthed
response, which no longer contains them.

Replace `useHealthReadiness` with a `useHealthReadinessDetails`
hook that takes an `accessToken` argument and sends a Bearer header
to the auth-gated endpoint. The hook stays disabled while
`accessToken` is falsy, so the navbar can keep rendering on the
public model hub (where the token is null) without triggering an
auth redirect or a 401-loop.

* fix(ui): disable retries on readiness/details + cover token forwarding

Two small follow-ups on the readiness/details migration:

- Set `retry: false` on the query. The payload feeds a passive
  navbar tag and a debug banner; a 401 from an expired token
  shouldn't fan out into three retries against the proxy.
- Add navbar specs that assert the `accessToken` prop is forwarded
  into the hook (matches the DebugWarningBanner spec). Without
  this, the navbar could silently regress to passing `undefined`
  and the existing tests wouldn't catch it.

* chore: update Next.js build artifacts (2026-05-14 03:52 UTC, node v20.20.2)

* Merge pull request #27898 from stuxf/chore/banned-params-extra-body-cover

chore(proxy): cover extra_body + azure_ad_token in banned-params check

(cherry picked from commit a6a9d8edf0)

* Merge pull request #27801 from stuxf/chore/get-instance-fn-runtime-s3-gate

chore(proxy): refuse remote-URL instance-fn loads outside config-file path

(cherry picked from commit e3e5209f51)

* fix: block client-side pricing injection via request body

Authenticated clients could supply CustomPricingLiteLLMParams fields
(input_cost_per_token, output_cost_per_token, etc.) in the request body.
These were forwarded to register_model() in main.py, permanently mutating
the shared global litellm.model_cost dict for all users on the instance.

Adds all CustomPricingLiteLLMParams fields to _BANNED_REQUEST_BODY_PARAMS
so is_request_body_safe() rejects them before they reach completion().
New pricing fields added to CustomPricingLiteLLMParams are auto-covered.

Admin opt-in via allow_client_side_credentials or
configurable_clientside_auth_params still works as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block SSRF fields in RAG ingest vector_store config

aws_sts_endpoint, aws_web_identity_token, and aws_bedrock_runtime_endpoint
in ingest_options.vector_store were passed directly to the Bedrock ingestion
class, which reads them into boto3 STS client construction. Any authenticated
caller could redirect AssumeRole calls to an attacker-controlled server,
leaking the proxy's instance profile credentials.

Calls is_request_body_safe() on ingest_options["vector_store"] before
forwarding to litellm.aingest(). Same banned-params list and admin opt-in
escape hatch (allow_client_side_credentials) as the /chat/completions path.
ValueError from the safety check is caught and re-raised as HTTP 400.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: harden /key/update authorization checks (#27878)

* fix: patch Host-header auth bypass in get_request_route

Starlette reconstructs request.url from the Host header. A malformed
Host like `localhost/?x=1` causes Starlette to build the full URL as
`http://localhost/?x=1/health`, which url-parses to path="/". Since "/"
is in LiteLLMRoutes.public_routes, all protected routes became reachable
without authentication.

Fix: read scope["path"] (set by uvicorn from the HTTP request line,
not derivable from headers) instead of request.url.path. Sub-path
deployments are handled via scope["app_root_path"] / scope["root_path"],
mirroring Starlette's own base_url construction logic.

Affected variants confirmed fixed:
  Host: localhost/?x=1
  Host: localhost:4000/?x=1
  Host: localhost/#test
  Host: localhost:4000/#test

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: reduce comments in route fix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block credential fields in RAG ingest vector_store options

Credential fields (vertex_credentials, aws_access_key_id, api_key, etc.)
in ingest_options.vector_store are now rejected at the API boundary with
a 400 error. Credentials must be configured server-side.

Previously any authenticated user could supply a vertex_credentials dict
with type=external_account pointing credential_source.file at an
arbitrary path (e.g. /proc/1/environ) and token_url at an
attacker-controlled server. google-auth's identity_pool.Credentials
refresh() would read the file and POST its contents to the attacker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block /key/update self-escalation by assigned users

Non-admin users who were assigned a key (created_by != caller) could
update any non-budget field — models, rpm_limit, guardrails, etc. —
without admin authorization, allowing privilege self-escalation.

Gate: only the key creator (created_by == caller) may edit their own
key without admin check; budget changes always require admin regardless
of creator status. All other callers must pass _check_key_admin_access.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block user-controlled api_base in RAG ingest vector_store options

A user-supplied api_base in ingest_options.vector_store caused the server
to forward its configured provider credentials (Gemini, OpenAI) to an
attacker-controlled endpoint via SSRF.

Add api_base to the blocked credential params set alongside api_key and
the existing credential fields.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: restrict /utils/transform_request to PROXY_ADMIN and apply body safety check

Any authenticated internal_user could POST arbitrary provider config
(aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, etc.) to /utils/transform_request and have
the server forward its credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint.

- Gate the endpoint on PROXY_ADMIN role (403 for all other roles)
- Call is_request_body_safe() to reject banned params even for admins
- Convert ValueError from safety check to HTTP 400

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: apply banned-param check to /utils/transform_request

Without is_request_body_safe(), any authenticated user could pass
aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, or aws_web_identity_token to
/utils/transform_request and have the server forward its configured
provider credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint during SDK
credential resolution.

Applies the same banned-param blocklist already used by LLM endpoints.
Endpoint remains accessible to all authenticated users.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block SSRF via api_base in /prompts/test dotprompt YAML frontmatter

Any frontmatter key not in ["model","input","output"] flowed into
optional_params and was merged into the LLM call data dict, bypassing
is_request_body_safe. An attacker with any bearer key could set
api_base in YAML to redirect the outbound LLM request — including the
provider API key — to an attacker-controlled host.

Fix: call is_request_body_safe on the constructed data dict after
optional_params are merged, before invoking ProxyBaseLLMRequestProcessing.
ValueError from the banned-param check is surfaced as HTTP 400.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Update litellm/proxy/rag_endpoints/endpoints.py

Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: coerce nested config strings before banned-param check

_NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS descent used isinstance(nested, dict) which silently
skipped litellm_embedding_config when delivered as a JSON string via
multipart/form-data. Banned params (api_base, aws_sts_endpoint, etc.)
nested inside the stringified value were invisible to is_request_body_safe.

_NESTED_METADATA_KEYS already used _coerce_metadata_to_dict which parses
JSON strings before checking. Apply the same coercion to _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: replace substring match with prefix match in is_llm_api_route

mapped_pass_through_routes used `_llm_passthrough_route in route` (substring)
so any admin-only path whose URL contained a provider name (openai, anthropic,
azure, bedrock, etc.) was misclassified as an LLM API route and bypassed the
admin gate in non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check.

Confirmed live: non-admin key could GET /credentials/by_name/openai (read
masked provider API key) and DELETE /credentials/openai (delete credential).

Fix: use exact match or startswith(prefix + "/") — the same pattern used
everywhere else in RouteChecks — so only routes that actually start with a
passthrough prefix are allowed through.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stabilize PR #27878 test failures

- key_management_endpoints: extend can_skip_admin_check to team keys so
  team members with /key/update permission can update non-budget fields.
  can_team_member_execute_key_management_endpoint already validates team
  membership + permission and raises if unauthorized; reaching the admin
  check on a team key means the caller was authorized.

- test: set created_by on mock key in
  test_update_key_non_budget_fields_allowed_for_internal_user so
  caller_is_creator resolves correctly (MagicMock default ≠ user_id).

- auth_utils.get_request_route: guard against non-dict request.scope
  (e.g. MagicMock in unit tests) to prevent a MagicMock leaking into
  UserAPIKeyAuth.request_route and failing Pydantic validation.

- ci: assign test_multipart_bypass_repro.py to the proxy-runtime shard
  in test-unit-proxy-db.yml to satisfy the shard-coverage check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(lint): add explicit str() cast in get_request_route for MyPy

scope.get() returns Any|None which MyPy cannot coerce to str implicitly.
Wrap both scope.get() calls in str() to satisfy the type checker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: guard bare-/ root_path strip + make total_spend migration idempotent

auth_utils.get_request_route: when Starlette sets scope["app_root_path"]
to "/" (e.g. behind some middleware), the old stripping logic would
remove the leading slash from every path ("/team/new" → "team/new"),
breaking route matching and causing auth to misclassify protected routes.
Skip stripping when root_path is bare "/".

migration: add IF NOT EXISTS to total_spend ALTER TABLE so the migration
is safe to replay when a prior partial run already created the column.
Without this guard, prisma migrate deploy fails on CI DBs that were
partially migrated, causing all subsequent DB operations (including
/team/new) to 500.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: require creator still owns key for personal-key bypass in /key/update

caller_is_creator now requires both created_by == caller AND user_id ==
caller. Previously checking only created_by let a demoted admin who
originally created a key for another user continue editing non-budget
fields on it after reassignment, bypassing _check_key_admin_access.

Adds regression test: creator whose key was reassigned is blocked (403).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: extract auth checks to fix PLR0915 + broaden max_budget assertion

internal_user_endpoints._update_single_user_helper exceeded 50 statements
(PLR0915). Extract authorization checks into _check_user_update_authz helper
to bring statement count under the limit.

test_validate_max_budget: assert "negative" (substring of both the local
"cannot be negative" and the CI "non-negative finite number" messages) so
the test is stable regardless of which exact wording the function uses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* bump: version 0.4.71 → 0.4.72

* uv lock

* feat(mcp): support OAuth passthrough discovery

* fix(mcp): support OAuth browser auth

* fix(mcp): refine upstream OAuth metadata fallback

* feat(proxy): support issuer-scoped JWT auth

* fix(mcp): validate oauth callback redirect sink

* feat(proxy): support issuer-scoped JWT auth

* test(mcp): align trusted proxy fixtures

* style(mcp): satisfy black formatting

* chore(ui): bump next to 16.2.6

* fix(mcp): address oauth passthrough review findings

* test(mcp): split oauth passthrough regressions

* fix(interactions): align openapi response fields

* security: prevent forwarding litellm api keys to upstream mcp servers

- Strip Authorization header from extra_headers for pass-through servers
- Pass-through servers (auth_type=None with extra_headers: [Authorization])
  must not receive the user's LiteLLM API key
- Only OAuth2 M2M and pass-through servers skip Authorization header
- Other headers (x-request-id, x-trace-id) are still forwarded normally
- Fixes credential leakage / authentication bypass in MCP pass-through mode

* fix(interactions): remove steps field not in google openapi spec

The steps field was added but is not present in the current Google
Interactions OpenAPI specification. Revert to using only the fields
that are actually defined in the spec.

* fix(mcp): forward Authorization in pass-through when x-litellm-api-key is admission

Commit 3753970cc9 widened the Authorization strip to cover all
is_oauth_passthrough servers — protecting against the LiteLLM admission
key leaking upstream when the caller used Authorization for admission,
but also silently stripping legitimate upstream OAuth bearers when the
caller used x-litellm-api-key for admission.

That broke transparent OAuth pass-through (EAI-506 V5/V6): standards-
compliant MCP clients (OpenCode, Claude Code, mcp-inspector) complete
PKCE against the upstream IdP and send the resulting token as plain
Authorization: Bearer per the MCP spec — with the wider strip in place,
that token never reaches the upstream and tools/list returns empty.

Narrow the strip: skip Authorization for pass-through servers only when
the caller did NOT supply x-litellm-api-key. When x-litellm-api-key is
present, admission is unambiguous and Authorization is free to carry
the upstream OAuth bearer.

The original security guarantee is preserved — a client that sends only
Authorization (no x-litellm-api-key) still has it stripped, so the
LiteLLM key cannot leak upstream via that path.

Tests:
- new: forwards Authorization when x-litellm-api-key is present
- new: still strips Authorization when only Authorization is present
- existing pass-through + M2M tests unchanged

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(interactions): align status enum with openapi spec

* fix(mcp,jwt): address greptile review concerns

- Cache _get_agent_object_permission via user_api_key_cache (sentinel for
  no-permission rows) so MCP requests from agent keys don't hit the DB on
  every tool-list / tool-call.
- Re-raise HTTPException in handle_sse_mcp so 401 + WWW-Authenticate
  challenges (and other HTTP errors) propagate to SSE clients instead of
  being swallowed as 500.
- Normalise booleans in _validate_token_response so admin rules written as
  JSON-style "true" / "false" match upstream responses that return
  Python True / False.
- Treat configured JWT issuer claim mappings as advisory: when a mapped
  field is absent or empty, leave the normalised claim unset instead of
  raising, matching the global litellm_jwtauth path.

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: replace dall-e-3 with gpt-image-1 in health check and router tests (#27813)

OpenAI returns 'The model dall-e-3 does not exist' for the test account,
breaking test_openai_img_gen_health_check and test_image_generation.
Switch to gpt-image-1, matching the existing TestOpenAIGPTImage1 pattern.

(cherry picked from commit aee58db880)

* fix(tests): drop dall-e-only test classes; route live image tests via gpt-image-1

Second wave of failures from the 2026-05-12 DALL-E shutdown:
- tests/image_gen_tests/test_image_edits.py::TestOpenAIImageEditDallE2
  and tests/image_gen_tests/test_image_generation.py::TestOpenAIDalle3
  are explicitly named for the deprecated models and can't pass; remove.
  gpt-image-1 coverage already exists in sibling classes.
- tests/local_testing/test_router.py image gen tests use dall-e-3 only
  as a routing example; swap to gpt-image-1.
- tests/local_testing/test_custom_callback_input.py image_generation
  success/failure paths swapped to gpt-image-1.

(cherry picked from commit 945b10ded4)

* test(fireworks): replace deprecated llama-v3p3-70b-instruct model

Fireworks removed llama-v3p3-70b-instruct from serverless, so every
live test using it now fails with NotFoundError ("Model not found,
inaccessible, and/or not deployed").

Swap the 6 references (3 files) to the currently-served
accounts/fireworks/models/deepseek-v3p1 — the canonical model in
Fireworks' current docs examples and present in LiteLLM's cost map.
test_get_model_params_fireworks_ai is a pure pricing-heuristic test
(no network) asserting the >16b branch, so it uses llama-v3p1-70b-
instruct instead to keep the "fireworks-ai-above-16b" assertion and
branch coverage intact.

(cherry picked from commit 39a1d438f2)

* test(fireworks): mock remaining live smoke tests

test_completion_fireworks_ai and test_completion_cost_fireworks_ai
made real Fireworks calls and broke whenever Fireworks rotated its
serverless catalog (no externally-verifiable model list exists).
They also asserted nothing — just printed.

Mock the HTTP post and assert real behavior instead: the request is
built with the right model/messages and the OpenAI-compatible
response parses back; the cost path yields a non-zero cost against
the local cost map. No network, no model dependency, stronger than
the old smoke checks.

(cherry picked from commit b5db7ed37d)

* fix(tests): replace shut-down gpt-4o-audio-preview with gpt-audio-1.5 (#28281)

* fix(tests): replace shut-down gpt-4o-audio-preview with gpt-audio-1.5

OpenAI shut down gpt-4o-audio-preview on 2026-05-07, so the live audio
calls in test_stream_chunk_builder_openai_audio_output_usage and
test_standard_logging_payload_audio now hard-fail with a model-not-found
error on every PR. The error was not "openai-internal", so the except
block swallowed it and execution fell through to an unbound
completion/response (UnboundLocalError).

Switch both tests to gpt-audio-1.5, OpenAI's recommended successor
(GA, not deprecated, already present in the litellm cost map so the
response_cost assertion still resolves). Also broaden the except to
skip with the real error in the reason instead of crashing, so a
transient upstream blip can't reintroduce the UnboundLocalError.

* fix(tests): narrow audio-test skip to model-not-found, re-raise the rest

Address review feedback: an unconditional skip on any exception would
silently mask a litellm-internal regression in the audio path (broken
param transformation, serialization, bad header) instead of failing CI.

Skip only on the upstream-unavailable class (model_not_found / "does not
exist" / openai-internal) and re-raise everything else, so genuine
regressions still fail loudly. The UnboundLocalError is still fixed
because the handler either skips or raises - it never falls through.

* fix(tests): add budget_exceeded to expected Interaction status enum

Staging added budget_exceeded to the Interaction OpenAPI status enum; the staging merge into this branch picked up the spec change but not the matching test update, so test_status_enum_values failed in CI. Align the test's expected list (exact-match by design) with the live spec.

* fix(tests): mock HTTP fetch in test_img_url_token_counter

The test parameterized a live third-party image URL (blog.purpureus.net) which now 404s, causing get_image_dimensions to fall through to its base64 decode path and crash with 'not enough values to unpack' on every PR run. Mock safe_get with a tiny 1x1 PNG so the URL branch is still exercised without any network dependency.

* fix(tests): swap gpt-4o-audio-preview to gpt-audio-1.5 in test_gpt4o_audio

OpenAI shut down gpt-4o-audio-preview on 2026-05-07, so both live tests in test_gpt4o_audio.py (test_audio_output_from_model and test_audio_input_to_model) hard-fail model_not_found on every PR. Swap the hardcoded model to OpenAI's successor gpt-audio-1.5 (same chat-completions audio surface; already in the litellm cost map). Mirror the narrowed-skip pattern from the prior audio fixes: skip on model_not_found / does-not-exist / openai-internal, re-raise everything else so genuine litellm regressions still fail CI loudly.

(cherry picked from commit 92de7423ef)

* fix(tests): migrate realtime + rerank tests off shut-down upstream models (#28191)

* fix(tests): use gpt-realtime in realtime guardrails test

OpenAI shut down gpt-4o-realtime-preview-2024-12-17 on 2026-05-07, so
the live OpenAI realtime guardrails integration test now fails with
model_not_found (session.created never arrives, _wait_for_event times
out). Point OPENAI_REALTIME_URL at the current GA model, gpt-realtime.

Scope limited to this test: the pricing-catalog JSON keeps the retired
entries intentionally (historical cost calc + separate Azure timeline),
and the Azure realtime cost-calc test is unaffected.

* fix(tests): mock nvidia_nim rerank instead of hitting EOL'd endpoint

NVIDIA reached end-of-life for the hosted nvidia/llama-3.2-nv-rerankqa-1b-v2
rerank API on 2026-05-18 with no published replacement, so the live
BaseLLMRerankTest.test_basic_rerank for nvidia_nim now returns HTTP 410
("Gone"). NVIDIA's hosted catalog rotates on a schedule, so swapping in
another live model would only defer the failure.

Override test_basic_rerank in TestNvidiaNim to mock the sync/async HTTP
transport (same pattern as test_nvidia_nim_rerank_ranking_endpoint in this
file) and inject a fake NVIDIA_NIM_API_KEY via monkeypatch. The
request/response transformation and cost calculation stay covered offline.
Scope limited to nvidia_nim; other BaseLLMRerankTest providers untouched.

* fix(tests): migrate remaining realtime tests off shut-down gpt-4o-realtime-preview

OpenAI's 2026-05-07 shutdown removed the entire gpt-4o-realtime-preview
family, including the undated 'gpt-4o-realtime-preview' alias (not just the
dated snapshot fixed earlier). Three live tests still connected with the
dead alias and failed with messages_received=1 (an error event instead of
session.created):

- test_openai_realtime_simple.py: get_model() -> gpt-realtime (drives
  TestOpenAIRealtime.test_realtime_connection / test_realtime_with_query_params)
- test_openai_realtime.py: test_openai_realtime_direct_call_no_intent and
  test_openai_realtime_direct_call_with_intent -> openai/gpt-realtime
  (the with_intent test shares the same dead alias even though it was not
  in the failing set this run)

Mocked unit tests (test_realtime_query_params_construction,
test_realtime_query_params_use_normalized_model_name) are left as-is: they
never hit the network and assert string plumbing only.

Also fixes test_text_message_blocked_by_guardrail_no_ai_response, which now
connects (the earlier URL swap worked) but tripped a model-wording-brittle
assertion. The guardrail flow asks the model to voice the block message
verbatim; gpt-4o-realtime-preview complied (output contained 'blocked'),
gpt-realtime refuses verbatim-repeat instructions ('I'm sorry, but I can't
repeat that message.'). Since the original user message is blocked before
it reaches OpenAI, the refusal is still a safe outcome. Assertion #3 now
accepts both voicing and refusal, and adds a hard check that the blocked
phrase never leaks into AI output.

(cherry picked from commit ce87c411bf)

* fix(model_prices): register mistral/ministral-8b-2512

Mistral's API now returns model='ministral-8b-2512' when 'mistral-tiny'
is requested, so test_completion_mistral_api fails with 'This model
isn't mapped yet'. Adding the entry so completion_cost can resolve the
cost for that response.

Author: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp,auth): address greptile review concerns

- handle_sse_mcp now calls _raise_preemptive_401_for_unauthenticated_servers
  so SSE clients to pass-through OAuth MCP servers receive the RFC 9728
  401 + WWW-Authenticate challenge that the streamable-HTTP path already emits.
- get_request_route strips a trailing slash from root_path before length-based
  prefix removal so non-canonical ASGI root_path values like "/litellm/"
  don't strip the leading slash from the returned route.
- _mcp_oauth_user_api_key_auth's cookie JWT decode now passes
  options={"verify_aud": False} so a future revision of the UI session
  JWT containing an aud claim cannot silently downgrade the request to
  unauthenticated.

Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>

* fix(tests): backfill local model_cost into remote-fetched map

litellm.model_cost is loaded at import time from LITELLM_MODEL_COST_MAP_URL
(pinned to main), so pricing entries that exist only in this branch (e.g.
mistral/ministral-8b-2512, freshly added because Mistral's API now returns
this id from mistral-tiny) are absent at test time and completion_cost
lookups raise 'This model isn't mapped yet'. Backfill the in-tree backup
into litellm.model_cost in the local_testing conftest so cassette-driven
cost calculations resolve against the entries that ship with the branch
under test.

Fixes local_testing_part1 failures on test_completion_mistral_api and
test_completion_mistral_api_modified_input.

* fix(mcp,jwt): address greptile concurrency and code-quality concerns

- _apply_issuer_claim_mappings now builds a new dict and reads from the
  original token, rather than mutating its input. The change is
  behaviour-preserving (caller passes a fresh jwt.decode result), but
  avoids the surprise-mutation pattern flagged by greptile.
- is_network_error uses isinstance(exc, httpx.TransportError) instead of
  matching type(exc).__name__ against a hand-maintained string set, so
  ReadError / WriteError / ProxyError / etc. are also treated as
  transport-level failures and surfaced as HTTP 502.
- fetch_upstream_oauth_protected_resource now coalesces concurrent
  discovery requests per (server_id, resource_url) through an
  asyncio.Lock so concurrent .well-known calls share a single upstream
  fetch + cache write.
- Drop the redundant 'if trusted_ranges:' branch in get_mcp_client_ip;
  it is always true on the path that reaches it (the prior 'if not
  trusted_ranges:' early-returns).

Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>

* fix(jwt,mcp): fall back to global JWKS on unknown issuer; prune fetch locks

- handle_jwt._get_configured_issuer now returns None for tokens whose 'iss'
  is not in the configured issuers list, letting auth_jwt fall through to
  the legacy JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL path instead of hard-raising. This keeps
  existing tokens from non-configured IdPs working when an operator adds
  the new 'issuers' list to a live deployment.

- discoverable_endpoints._prune_oauth_metadata_cache now also prunes
  entries in _OAUTH_METADATA_FETCH_LOCKS whose cache entry has been
  evicted and whose lock isn't currently held, bounding the locks dict
  to match the cache it guards.

Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp,auth): restore client_ip in oauth2 target check, drop from delegate check

The merge of staging into the PR branch (d42a66adb6) misplaced the
client_ip=client_ip kwarg: it landed inside _target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream
(which never accepted client_ip and isn't called with it), while the
sibling _target_servers_use_oauth2 has client_ip in its signature but
stopped passing it through to get_mcp_server_by_name. That left ruff
flagging F821 on the undefined name and lint failing.

Move client_ip back into _target_servers_use_oauth2's lookup (matching
the call site that already forwards IPAddressUtils.get_mcp_client_ip)
and drop it from _target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream so its body
matches its signature again.

* fix(mcp): respect client ip for delegated auth

* fix(auth): address remaining greptile style findings

- get_request_route: require root_path to match whole path segments before
  stripping, so '/apifoo' isn't truncated to 'foo' when root_path='/api'.
- get_mcp_client_ip: collapse the two trusted-proxy validation branches into
  a single is_request_from_trusted_proxy call so the return value drives
  control flow instead of being discarded for the side-effect warning.

Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>

* fix(jwt): strip internal _litellm_* claims in global JWKS auth path

Prevents identity spoofing where a token signed by the global JWKS
could inject _litellm_jwt_issuer and other _litellm_* claims that
downstream getters trust. The issuer-scoped path already strips these
via _apply_issuer_claim_mappings; mirror that behavior for the global
fallback path.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): surface MCPUpstreamAuthError as 401 in SSE/HTTP transport handlers

Both handle_sse_mcp and handle_streamable_http_mcp only caught
HTTPException to preserve 401 + WWW-Authenticate challenges, but
MCPUpstreamAuthError (raised when a pass-through server's upstream
rejects a bearer token mid-session) inherits from Exception. It was
falling through to the generic handler and surfacing as an opaque 500.

Mirror the REST endpoint behavior: translate MCPUpstreamAuthError into
an HTTPException(status_code=e.status_code) with the upstream
www-authenticate header so standards-compliant MCP clients trigger the
upstream OAuth flow.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): add upstream auth pre-flight in SSE handler

Mirror handle_streamable_http_mcp by calling _check_passthrough_upstream_auth
after the cold-start 401 emitter so expired/invalid upstream tokens surface a
proper 401 + WWW-Authenticate challenge before the SSE session commits 200
headers, instead of letting list_tools silently return [] when the upstream
rejects the token.

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): tighten cold-start bypass against CSV paths + dedupe upstream auth probe

- Return None from _parse_mcp_server_names_from_path for CSV multi-server
  paths (/mcp/a,b). The regex previously truncated at the first comma and
  silently passed a single server name to the cold-start gate.
- Switch _is_mcp_passthrough_cold_start to all-targets semantics, matching
  _target_servers_use_oauth2: one non-passthrough target in a co-targeted
  set must not flip the anonymous-admission bypass open for the others.
- Drop the redundant HTTPStatusError block in _extract_upstream_auth_failure
  - any HTTPStatusError carries a .response, so the preceding generic block
  already handles 401/403 detection.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp,tests): sync stubs and cold-start assertions with delegate-check

The merge of base-branch _target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream
into process_mcp_request inserts an additional
get_mcp_server_by_name(name) lookup ahead of the cold-start path,
which breaks two test patterns:

1. lookup_by_name(name) side-effect stubs in
   TestMCPDelegateAuthToUpstream are called positionally by the
   delegate check, then again by the cold-start path with
   client_ip=... — raising TypeError: unexpected keyword argument
   'client_ip'. Accept **_kwargs to match the real signature.

2. TestMCPPassthroughColdStartAdmission assertions count the lookup
   exactly once with client_ip=..., but the delegate check now adds
   a positional-only call ahead of it. Switch assert_called_once_with
   to assert_any_call for the cold-start invocation, and assert
   client_ip was *not* passed for the aggregate /mcp test where
   cold-start must not fire.

Both updates align with CLAUDE.md guidance to keep monkeypatch stubs in
sync with the real signature when an optional parameter is added.

Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): correct passthrough probe 401 + slashed-name cold start parser

- _check_passthrough_upstream_auth now emits
  'Bearer resource_metadata="..."' pointing at the gateway's
  oauth-protected-resource well-known URL, mirroring the
  pre-emptive 401 path. Pass-through servers don't use the gateway
  as an authorization server, so the previous 'authorization_uri='
  challenge sent clients to the wrong metadata endpoint.

- _parse_mcp_server_names_from_path now accepts server names that
  contain a single slash (e.g. custom_solutions/user_123), mirroring
  MCPRequestHandler._extract_target_server_names_from_path. Without
  this, the cold-start bypass missed slashed-name servers and the
  generic admission error propagated instead of the spec-compliant
  401 challenge.

- _is_mcp_passthrough_cold_start drops the unused scope parameter
  from its signature.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* style(mcp): format discoverable endpoints

* refactor(mcp): dedupe MCPUpstreamAuthError->HTTPException + thread client_ip into delegate-auth gate

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): handle passthrough OAuth metadata and startup auth errors

- discoverable_endpoints: For pass-through MCP servers, when upstream
  oauth-protected-resource returns a non-200/non-dict response, raise
  HTTP 502 instead of falling through to default gateway metadata.
  Falling through would direct MCP clients at the gateway, which is
  not the authorization server for pass-through configs.

- mcp_server_manager: Wrap _get_tools_from_server in startup tool name
  mapping with try/except. Since _get_tools_from_server now re-raises
  MCPUpstreamAuthError, an upstream 401 from a pass-through server at
  startup (when no user token is present) would otherwise abort the
  loop and leave subsequent servers unmapped.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): restrict passthrough probe challenge to OAuth passthrough servers

The probe filter previously matched any server with Authorization in
extra_headers, including gateway-managed OAuth2 servers. Those would
then receive the resource_metadata= WWW-Authenticate challenge meant
for pass-through servers, instead of the authorization_uri= challenge
pointing at the gateway AS metadata. Use srv.is_oauth_passthrough so
only genuine pass-through servers get the resource-metadata challenge.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* test(proxy): cover issuer-scoped JWT auth

* fix(mcp): use resource metadata for passthrough reauth

* fix(mcp,tests): assert cold-start helper directly for aggregate /mcp

Threading client_ip into _target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream
made get_mcp_server_by_name(name, client_ip=...) also fire from the
delegate-auth check, so the call_args_list assertion on
client_ip-in-kwargs no longer uniquely signals a cold-start lookup.
Patch _is_mcp_passthrough_cold_start and assert it is not invoked,
which is the actual contract the test is pinning.

* fix(mcp,jwt): drop unneeded async helper + suppress misleading unscoped JWT warning

- _build_oauth_authorization_server_response: revert to sync (no awaits in body).
  The function only does dict construction and synchronous registry lookups;
  async added coroutine creation overhead per discovery call without need.
- _build_decode_kwargs: accept has_issuer_config so the global path's
  'JWT auth is unscoped' warning is suppressed when LiteLLM_JWTAuth.issuers
  provides per-issuer scoping. Previously the warning fired spuriously for
  admins who intentionally use only the new issuers config.

* fix(jwt,mcp): clarify issuers fallthrough + add TTL on mcp permission cache

- LiteLLM_JWTAuth.issuers docs now state explicitly that unlisted
  issuers fall back to the global JWT_AUDIENCE/JWT_ISSUER path; the
  field is additive routing, not an allow-list. Matches actual
  control flow in handle_jwt.auth_jwt and the regression tests
  asserting backwards compatibility with the global JWKS path.
- MCPRequestHandler._get_{org,agent}_object_permission now pass
  ttl=DEFAULT_MANAGEMENT_OBJECT_IN_MEMORY_CACHE_TTL on async_set_cache,
  mirroring the auth_checks.py pattern so the cache TTL is explicit
  on both DualCache layers.

* fix(tests): align merged JWT and MCP cold-start assertions

Update the tests carried over from PR #28008 to match the assertions on
the staging branch:

- tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_handle_jwt.py: unknown issuers now
  fall back to the legacy JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL path (per
  litellm_feat/v1.84.0-mcp-gateway-jwt-auth's
  '\''fall back to global JWKS on unknown issuer'\''), and mapped issuer
  claims that are absent no longer fail closed — they simply leave the
  normalised LiteLLM internal claim absent.

- tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/auth/test_user_api_key_auth_mcp.py:
  the aggregate '\''/mcp'\'' route still triggers the delegate-auth-to-upstream
  lookup once for the header-supplied server name; cold-start admission
  must NOT fire on top of that. Tighten the assertion to
  assert_called_once_with so a future regression that re-enters cold-start
  is caught.

Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(jwt): guard litellm_jwtauth access in auth_jwt global path

JWTHandler() can be constructed without update_environment() being
called (tests do this directly), in which case self.litellm_jwtauth
does not exist. Accessing it raises AttributeError before getattr can
fall back. Use the same safe pattern other call sites use.

* Gate MCP OAuth pass-through on delegate_auth_to_upstream flag

Sameer's review on #28356/#28008 flagged that the new pass-through
behaviors (preemptive 401 challenges, /.well-known/oauth-protected-
resource proxying, upstream 401/403 propagation as MCPUpstreamAuthError,
and Authorization-stripping when no x-litellm-api-key is supplied)
were implicitly enabled for every server with auth_type=none plus
Authorization in extra_headers. Existing users doing static bearer
pass-through for non-OAuth reasons would have silently regressed.

Make the detection rule explicit: extend the existing
delegate_auth_to_upstream flag (previously oauth2-only) to also gate
is_oauth_passthrough. Now requires flag + auth_type=None + Authorization
in extra_headers, per Sameer's suggested detection rule. The UI toggle
now appears for both modes (oauth2 PKCE passthrough and auth_type=none
OAuth pass-through) with mode-appropriate copy.

Update test fixtures to set the flag where the test intent is to
exercise OAuth pass-through behavior, and add negative tests covering
the new default-false case.

* fix(mcp): route org object_permission lookup through shared auth helpers

Replace the bespoke litellm_organizationtable.find_unique + dedicated
cache key in _get_org_object_permission with get_org_object +
get_object_permission so MCP requests share the same user_api_key_cache
entries as the rest of the proxy and no longer fragment org-row caching.

* fix(mcp): wrap get_object_permission call in shared try/except

Ensure exceptions from get_object_permission in _get_org_object_permission are caught and return None, preserving the original fail-safe semantics.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(jwt): validate issuer audience at config load + dedicated key-miss exception

- Move JWTIssuerConfig audience-required guard into a Pydantic model_validator
  so misconfiguration fails at startup instead of on the first request.
- Replace the string-match `No matching public key found` filter in
  get_public_key's multi-URL fallback with a dedicated
  NoMatchingJWTPublicKeyError; only that specific exception triggers
  continuation, every other error still surfaces.

* fix(mcp): admit and forward Authorization for passthrough OAuth return

For pass-through MCP servers (auth_type=none with delegate_auth_to_upstream)
the RFC 9728 cold-start flow sends the client back with only
"Authorization: Bearer <upstream-token>" after upstream OAuth discovery.
Previously this path 1) was rejected in process_mcp_request because the
oauth2_headers fallback only covered auth_type=oauth2 targets, and 2) had
the Authorization header stripped by _prepare_mcp_server_headers when no
x-litellm-api-key was present, treating the upstream token as a potential
LiteLLM key leak.

- Extend the elif oauth2_headers fallback to also admit anonymously when
  every target is a pass-through server.
- Pass user_api_key_auth into _prepare_mcp_server_headers so it can
  forward Authorization for pass-through servers when admission did not
  consume the bearer as a LiteLLM key (api_key is unset).

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): consistent www-authenticate casing + SSE toolset scoping

- Normalize the WWW-Authenticate header key emitted by
  _check_passthrough_upstream_auth to lowercase to match the other 401
  emitters in the OAuth pass-through flow.
- Mirror the streamable HTTP handler's toolset scoping in handle_sse_mcp:
  strip client-supplied x-mcp-toolset-id and apply _apply_toolset_scope
  before _check_passthrough_upstream_auth so the upstream probe list is
  derived from the fully-authorized server set.
- Tighten _has_client_supplied_mcp_auth signature so
  mcp_server_auth_headers is Optional, matching its caller in
  process_mcp_request.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* security(mcp): strip Authorization in call_tool when LiteLLM admission used legacy header

Mirror the OAuth pass-through admission check from _prepare_mcp_server_headers
(list-tools path) in _call_regular_mcp_tool (tool-call path): when the server
is OAuth pass-through and the caller did not supply x-litellm-api-key,
Authorization on the inbound request may itself be the LiteLLM API key — so
strip it before forwarding instead of leaking the gateway credential upstream.

When x-litellm-api-key is present, admission is unambiguous and Authorization
continues to carry the upstream OAuth bearer (transparent pass-through).

* refactor(mcp): centralize caller Authorization strip decision

Extracted the security-sensitive logic that decides whether the caller's
Authorization header is forwarded to (or stripped from) an outgoing MCP
request into a single helper, _should_strip_caller_authorization, in
mcp_server_manager.py.

Previously the same condition was duplicated across
_call_regular_mcp_tool (mcp_server_manager.py) and
_prepare_mcp_server_headers (server.py). Keeping two copies of this
check risked future divergence and credential-leak / broken-passthrough
bugs. Both call sites now share the helper, preserving exact behavior.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* log MCP OAuth discovery diagnostics for unmatched paths and non-transport upstream errors

* fix(jwt): include issuer-normalized team id in get_all_jwt_team_ids

The aggregator for team IDs only consulted the issuer-normalized claim
for the plural (team_ids) path and fell back to the global config for
the singular path. When an operator configures team_id_jwt_field only
at the issuer level, get_team_id correctly returned the mapped value
but get_all_jwt_team_ids silently dropped it, causing membership
reconciliation to disagree with request routing.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp/jwt): dedupe cold-start path parser; reject conflicting audience flags

- _parse_mcp_server_names_from_path now delegates to
  MCPRequestHandler._extract_target_server_names_from_path so the
  names used by the cold-start passthrough bypass cannot drift from the
  names used by downstream routing.
- JWTIssuerConfig now rejects the combination of audience and
  disable_audience_validation=True at validation time instead of
  silently ignoring the flag.

* fix(mcp): restrict passthrough cold-start bypass to 401 only

The new elif passthrough cold-start branch reused is_auth_error which
matches both 401 and 403. A 403 from user_api_key_auth indicates the
LiteLLM key WAS recognized but is forbidden (e.g. over budget / rate
limited); falling through to anonymous UserAPIKeyAuth() in that case
bypasses spend and rate-limit controls on passthrough servers.

Only trigger the cold-start anonymous admission on 401, which is the
signal that the bearer is an upstream OAuth token rather than a
recognized LiteLLM key.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(jwt/mcp): warn on unscoped JWT fallback; route agent permission lookup through shared helper

- _build_decode_kwargs no longer suppresses the unscoped-fallback warning
  when LiteLLM_JWTAuth.issuers is set: tokens whose iss does not match
  any configured issuer still fall through to the global path, and that
  fallback is itself unscoped when JWT_AUDIENCE/JWT_ISSUER are absent.

- _get_agent_object_permission now caches the agent_id ->
  object_permission_id mapping and delegates the permission lookup to
  the shared get_object_permission helper, so the agent path reuses the
  same cache entries as the org / team / key paths.

* fix(mcp): fabricate resource_metadata challenge when upstream 401 omits WWW-Authenticate

When an upstream pass-through MCP server returns 401 without a
WWW-Authenticate header (non-compliant per RFC 7235 §3.1),
to_http_exception() now produces a synthetic Bearer challenge pointing
at the gateway's standard-pattern oauth-protected-resource well-known
endpoint for that server. This keeps MCP clients on the RFC 9728
discovery flow instead of receiving a bare 401 with no recovery hint.

* fix(jwt): make _get_decode_options explicitly control verify_iss

Previously, _get_decode_options only set verify_aud based on whether
audience was provided. The issuer JWT path relied on always passing
issuer=issuer_config.issuer to trigger PyJWT's default verify_iss=True,
making the helper's behavior implicitly dependent on caller behavior.

Now _get_decode_options accepts issuer as well, mirroring the verify_aud
handling and matching the dimensions handled by _build_decode_kwargs.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): emit absolute resource_metadata URI in fabricated 401 challenge

Per RFC 9728 §3.2 the resource_metadata Bearer challenge must be an
absolute URI; strict MCP clients reject relative URIs and fail to
initiate discovery. MCPUpstreamAuthError.to_http_exception now accepts
the gateway base URL and prepends it when the upstream omitted
WWW-Authenticate, and all four call sites (streamable HTTP, SSE, and
the two REST tool-list paths) supply it.

* fix(mcp): correct 403 detail text and remove dead _list_tools_for_single_server duplicate

- MCPUpstreamAuthError.to_http_exception() now returns detail='Forbidden' for
  403 upstream responses (and 'Unauthorized' for 401), matching the
  _check_passthrough_upstream_auth pre-flight probe.
- Remove the shadowed first definition of _list_tools_for_single_server in
  rest_endpoints.py; the second definition was the live one and the dead copy
  was a maintenance trap.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix: address potential bugs in auth_utils, mcp discoverable endpoints, and mcp auth

- auth_utils.get_request_route: return '/' instead of empty string when
  raw_path exactly equals root_path so downstream route allowlist checks
  still see a leading slash
- discoverable_endpoints.fetch_upstream_oauth_protected_resource: also
  cache negative results (no upstream metadata) for a shorter TTL so we
  don't re-fetch on every discovery request and so the per-key fetch
  lock can be pruned
- user_api_key_auth_mcp: guard the oauth2_headers 401 cold-start
  passthrough bypass with _has_client_supplied_mcp_auth, matching the
  parallel bypass in the no-Authorization branch so MCP-auth-bearing
  requests don't silently downgrade to anonymous admission

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* test(vertex): tolerate transient InternalServerError in google maps tool test

test_gemini_google_maps_tool_simple makes live calls to Vertex AI's Google
Maps grounding backend, which intermittently returns 500 INTERNAL ("Please
retry") — a transient upstream failure, not a LiteLLM bug. The test already
passes on RateLimitError; treat InternalServerError the same way so transient
Vertex-side failures don't fail CI.

* refactor(mcp): drop redundant has_client_credentials filter on passthrough probe

is_oauth_passthrough already requires auth_type in (None, MCPAuth.none),
which is mutually exclusive with has_client_credentials (auth_type ==
MCPAuth.oauth2), so the extra guard was always True and only added
confusion about whether a server could be both passthrough and M2M.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix: restore unreachable InternalServerError skip handler in vertex test

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* feat(mcp): add dedicated oauth_passthrough flag for non-oauth2 pass-through

Previously is_oauth_passthrough reused delegate_auth_to_upstream — a flag
scoped to oauth2 servers (PKCE bypass) — to gate OAuth pass-through for
auth_type=none servers. Overloading it risked regressing existing
deployments that set delegate_auth_to_upstream, since the same flag would
silently start driving pass-through (discovery proxying, 401 challenges,
upstream 401/403 propagation) on non-oauth2 servers.

Introduce a separate oauth_passthrough opt-in so the two behaviors never
imply each other:
- MCPServer.is_oauth_passthrough now requires oauth_passthrough (not
  delegate_auth_to_upstream).
- Persist oauth_passthrough on LiteLLM_MCPServerTable (new column +
  migration) and wire it through config/DB load and API responses.
- UI splits the single toggle into two: "Delegate auth to upstream (PKCE
  passthrough)" for oauth2 and "OAuth pass-through" for auth_type=none
  servers forwarding Authorization.

Adds backend tests (property, round-trip, and a regression guard that
delegate_auth_to_upstream alone never enables pass-through) and UI tests
for the toggle split.

* fix(mcp): reconcile cold-start bypass with x-mcp-servers header and skip non-absolute WWW-Authenticate fabrication

- _parse_mcp_server_names_from_path now fails closed when the
  x-mcp-servers header introduces any target not present in the
  path-derived target set, closing a header/path mismatch where the
  cold-start passthrough bypass could otherwise admit anonymously
  while the header advertises a non-passthrough server.
- MCPUpstreamAuthError.to_http_exception no longer emits a relative
  resource_metadata URI when base_url is missing; per RFC 9728 3.2
  the URI must be absolute, so we skip fabrication entirely rather
  than send a challenge strict MCP clients will reject.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): fabricate path-aware resource_metadata URI for upstream 401

When MCPUpstreamAuthError.to_http_exception fabricates a
`WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata=...` challenge (because
the upstream 401 omitted one), the URL now matches the inbound MCP
transport pattern the client originally used:

  - /mcp/{server_name}      -> /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp/{server_name}
  - /{server_name}/mcp      -> /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/{server_name}/mcp

This mirrors the path-aware behaviour of
_get_passthrough_resource_metadata_url in server.py so strict
RFC 9728 \xA73.2 clients on legacy routes get a resource_metadata URI
aligned with the resource pattern they originally targeted.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(jwt+mcp): tighten issuer-scoped claim type handling, RFC-quote authorization_uri, surface MCP upstream auth errors, defense-in-depth on decode options

- handle_jwt: when an issuer-scoped _litellm_team_ids claim exists but
  has an unexpected type, return [] instead of falling through to the
  global team_ids_jwt_field path (different claim semantically).
- handle_jwt: _get_decode_options/_decode_jwt_with_public_key now take
  an explicit disable_audience_validation flag; passing audience=None
  without it raises, so audience checks can't silently disappear if the
  model validator is ever bypassed. _auth_jwt_with_issuer forwards the
  flag from JWTIssuerConfig.
- mcp_server: quote the authorization_uri WWW-Authenticate parameter
  value (RFC 6750 / 9728 auth-param must be quoted-string), matching
  the pass-through path.
- mcp_server: in _fetch_and_filter_server_tools, re-raise
  MCPUpstreamAuthError so the outer streamable-HTTP handler can surface
  a proper 401 + WWW-Authenticate challenge instead of returning an
  empty tool list.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* chore(docker): align Dockerfile.non_root/Dockerfile.database to current wolfi-base SHA

The older sha256:3258be... pin has been intermittently returning 500/not-found
from cgr.dev, breaking the test-server-root-path GitHub Action and the
build_docker_database_image CircleCI job. Move both Dockerfiles onto the
same sha256:31da65... digest already in use by Dockerfile, gateway/Dockerfile,
backend/Dockerfile, and migrations/Dockerfile so the base image is consistent
across the repo.

* ci(docker): bump wolfi-base pin to current working digest

The previously aligned sha256:31da6565f35a... and the older sha256:3258be...
both return HTTP 500 from cgr.dev's manifest endpoint, breaking the
build_docker_database_image CircleCI job and test-server-root-path GitHub
Action. The current 'latest' tag resolves to sha256:5743937d521c... which
serves manifests normally, so move docker/Dockerfile.database and
docker/Dockerfile.non_root onto that digest.

* ci(docker): retry apk add in Dockerfile.database for apk.cgr.dev flakes

Mirror the retry-loop pattern from #28888 (which fixed backend/Dockerfile,
gateway/Dockerfile, and migrations/Dockerfile) into docker/Dockerfile.database.
The build_docker_database_image CI job has been intermittently failing with
"remote server returned error (try 'apk update')" when apk.cgr.dev flakes
mid-fetch; bumping the wolfi-base SHA doesn't address the mirror, only a
retry does.

Same explicit-failure form as #28888: exit non-zero on the 3rd miss instead
of silently succeeding because `sleep 5` was the last command in the
`&& break || sleep 5` chain.

* fix(mcp): scope preemptive 401 to toolset-narrowed server set

Move _raise_preemptive_401_for_unauthenticated_servers after toolset
scoping in both the StreamableHTTP and SSE handlers, and add an
optional allowed_server_ids parameter so passthrough/oauth2 servers
that the active toolset excludes no longer trigger a spurious 401
challenge. Without this, a client targeting a toolset whose scope
excludes a passthrough server could be pushed into an OAuth flow for
a server it would be 403'd on immediately after authentication.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* revert(docker): drop unrelated Wolfi bump and apk retry loop from MCP/JWT PR

These Docker changes are out of scope for the MCP OAuth passthrough + JWT
auth work and duplicate the build-reliability fix already merged to
litellm_internal_staging in #28888, which adds the same apk retry loop on
the componentized backend/gateway/migrations Dockerfiles and also fixes the
underlying nodeenv/libatomic root cause. Restoring docker/Dockerfile.database
and docker/Dockerfile.non_root to the base so this PR is purely the MCP/JWT
change.

* fix(mcp): surface upstream 403 challenges from REST tools/list

The single-server pass-through path converted an upstream MCPUpstreamAuthError
into an HTTPException, but list_tool_rest_api only re-raised 401s; an upstream
403 (valid token, insufficient scope) collapsed into a 200 response with
error=unexpected_error, so clients never saw the status or WWW-Authenticate
challenge needed to refresh scopes. Let MCPUpstreamAuthError propagate and
convert it once in list_tool_rest_api so both 401 and 403 reach the client,
while internal access/IP 403s keep the legacy error-dict shape.

* fix(mcp): fail closed for IP access control when XFF trusted ranges unset

When use_x_forwarded_for is enabled but mcp_trusted_proxy_ranges is not
configured, get_mcp_client_ip previously fell back to the direct peer IP.
Behind an internal reverse proxy that peer is the proxy's private address,
so every external caller was classified as internal and could reach MCP
servers with available_on_public_internet=false. Return an empty string in
that case so is_internal_ip treats the caller as external.

---------

Co-authored-by: Yuneng Jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Milan <milan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Krrish Dholakia <krrish+github@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: stuxf <70670632+stuxf@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: gym-cmd <186399764+gym-cmd@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Artem Dudarev <artem.dudarev@justeattakeaway.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
2026-06-02 12:22:04 -07:00
Shivam Rawat
dc4f5b12ef
fix(proxy): enforce allowed_passthrough_routes for auth=true pass-thr… (#29256)
* fix(proxy): enforce allowed_passthrough_routes for auth=true pass-through

Pass-through endpoints with auth=true were injected into openai_routes,
so teams with openai_routes access bypassed per-team allowed_passthrough_routes.
Gate auth-enforced pass-through at JWT, virtual-key, and non-admin route checks.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(proxy): clarify JWT passthrough denial

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(proxy): make pass-through auth checks method-aware

Prevent allowlist bypass when the same path is registered with different auth settings per HTTP method.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* Fix passthrough route auth checks

* fix(proxy): reject unregistered pass-through HTTP methods

Enforce method-aware JWT checks and return 405 when stale FastAPI routes accept requests outside the current pass-through registry.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(proxy): remove duplicate request_method in JWT team lookup

Fixes SyntaxError on proxy startup caused by passing request_method twice to find_team_with_model_access.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* Fix passthrough route auth enforcement

* fix(proxy): raise passthrough-specific 403 directly in virtual-key path

* fix(proxy): load team for RBAC role-claim JWT passthrough gating

* Revert "chore(tests): migrate Bedrock CI to AWS account 941277531214 (#28728)" (#29326)

This reverts the Bedrock CI account migration (#28728). The original account
(888602223428) was put under an AWS security restriction after a leaked key
and has since been reactivated, while the replacement account (941277531214)
lacks access to several models the suites exercise (legacy Bedrock Claude 3
models, Cohere, Nova Canvas image gen, Bedrock batch inference, and flagship
Opus). Pointing CI back at the reactivated account restores that coverage.

This is the exact inverse of #28728: all hardcoded 941277531214 references go
back to 888602223428 (provisioned/imported-model ARNs, AgentCore runtime ARNs
and their suffixes, batch execution role ARN, and the example proxy config),
the S3 buckets revert to litellm-proxy and load-testing-oct, the guardrail IDs
revert to wf0hkdb5x07f and ff6ujrregl1q, the SageMaker endpoint and Knowledge
Base revert to their original ids, and the live-call tests go back to the
legacy model strings. The grid_spec fail_reason workaround for the unentitled
Opus cells is dropped while keeping the unrelated bedrock_effort_ceiling field
added after the migration.

The CircleCI AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY env vars still point at
941277531214 and must be set to the reactivated account's fresh credentials
separately via the CircleCI API; AWS_REGION_NAME stays us-west-2.

(cherry picked from commit f11c12d157)

* fix(proxy): scope pass-through 405 to registry routes; grant rerank passthrough in rpm tests

The auth=true pass-through 405 guard fired for mapped provider routes
(e.g. /assemblyai/*) that are not in the in-memory registry, since
get_registered_pass_through_route returns None for them while
is_registered_pass_through_route matches via mapped_pass_through_routes.
Only raise 405 when the path is registered but the request method is not
allowed, so mapped provider pass-throughs fall through to the default
target params as before.

The rpm-limit pass-through tests register /v1/rerank with auth=true but
gave their keys no allowed_passthrough_routes, so the new default-deny
returned 403 before the rate limiter ran (non-deterministically,
depending on registry insertion order). Grant the keys explicit
passthrough access so the tests exercise rate limiting under the new
auth model.

* fix(proxy): guard request method lookup against scopes without a method

Starlette's Request.method property reads scope["method"] and raises
KeyError when the scope omits it (e.g. minimally-constructed test
requests). getattr only swallows AttributeError, so the new
_get_request_method helper propagated the KeyError up through
user_api_key_auth and surfaced as a ProxyException. Catch KeyError
(and AttributeError) and fall back to None.

* test(passthrough): pin SERVER_ROOT_PATH in unregistered-method test

test_custom_proxy.py sets os.environ['SERVER_ROOT_PATH'] = '/my-custom-path'
at module import with no cleanup. When that module is collected into the same
xdist worker as this test, the leaked root path is prepended to registered
pass-through paths, so is_registered_pass_through_route misses '/test/path'
and the handler returns 404 instead of the expected 405 (order-dependent).
Pin SERVER_ROOT_PATH to '' so the test is deterministic.

* test(passthrough): restore regression coverage for non-auth-enforced pass-through via llm_api_routes

* fix(proxy): record auth flag in pass-through registry for allowlist enforcement

Auth-enforced pass-through detection inferred enforcement from the FastAPI
dependency stored at registration time. The management create and update
endpoints register routes with dependencies=None even though auth defaults to
true, so is_auth_enforced_pass_through_route treated those DB-created routes as
unenforced. A key allowed for llm_api_routes could then call a management-created
auth-enabled pass-through route without matching allowed_passthrough_routes.

Store the auth setting on each registry entry and read it directly when deciding
whether the allowlist applies, instead of deriving it from dependency metadata.

* fix(proxy): include bool in pass-through registry value type for auth flag

The auth flag stored in _registered_pass_through_routes is a bool, which
was not part of the registry value Union, so mypy rejected the dict literal.
Add bool to the Union and narrow route_methods to a list before the
membership check so the in-operator stays valid.

* fix(proxy): preserve stored auth flag on pass-through endpoint update

model_dump(exclude_none=True) re-included the auth=True default whenever
a partial update omitted auth, silently flipping an existing auth=false
pass-through to auth-enforced and 403ing every team/key without
allowed_passthrough_routes. Merge only explicitly set fields via
exclude_unset so omitted fields keep their stored value.

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-30 17:07:24 -07:00
Sameer Kankute
055bdc3507
fix(auth): harden JWT routing wildcard iss and merge list team_id claims
Reject fnmatch wildcards on non-scope claims when the claim string contains
whitespace so malformed iss values cannot match patterns like trusted.*.

Merge every entry when team_id_jwt_field resolves to a list instead of
keeping only the first element.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-11 11:35:56 +05:30
oss-pr-review-agent-shin[bot]
158b0c28c0
[litellm-agent] Staging → litellm_internal_staging (5/7/2026) (#27375)
Squash-merged by litellm-agent from oss-pr-review-agent-shin[bot]'s PR.
2026-05-07 21:29:47 +00:00
yuneng-jiang
c3f7158b2b
Merge pull request #27008 from stuxf/fix/jwt-audience-and-issuer-verification
Some checks are pending
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fix(auth): support JWT issuer verification + warn when unscoped
2026-05-01 19:58:52 -07:00
user
e55401e39c
fix(auth): support JWT issuer verification, scope-warning when unscoped
When JWT auth is enabled but `JWT_AUDIENCE` is unset, `auth_jwt`
disabled audience verification entirely. Tokens minted by any other
application that shared the same IdP signing keys (Azure AD, Okta,
etc.) were accepted as long as their signature checked out, even
though their `aud` and `iss` claims pointed at unrelated apps. The
proxy then fell into the no-team / no-user branch where access checks
default-allow.

This change:

1. Adds support for the `JWT_ISSUER` env var. When set, PyJWT verifies
   the token's `iss` claim — turning on the same defense for tokens
   that share an audience but come from a different IdP tenant.
2. Refactors the duplicated `jwt.decode` calls (RSA/EC/OKP path and
   x509 path) into a single `_build_decode_kwargs` helper that
   computes audience, issuer, and the corresponding `verify_*` opt-outs
   once per call.
3. Logs a single startup-time warning when JWT auth is enabled but
   neither `JWT_AUDIENCE` nor `JWT_ISSUER` is configured, so operators
   running the insecure default see a flag in their logs without
   getting spammed per-request.

Default behavior (no env vars) is preserved for backward compatibility.
Setting `JWT_AUDIENCE` and/or `JWT_ISSUER` opts into the verification.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-01 21:10:19 +00:00
harish-berri
1d62ca0e23
Merge branch 'litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_token_verification_query_opt 2026-04-28 17:34:17 -07:00
harish-berri
18996326ef update test cases to fix handle_jwt test cases 2026-04-28 21:17:53 +00:00
milan-berri
3c0d172d4e
fix(proxy): single-team DB fallback when JWT has no team_id (#26418)
* fix(proxy): infer team from DB when JWT has no team and user has one team

- When team_id is unset after JWT auth but the user row has exactly one
  team, set team_id, team_object, and team_membership from DB.
- Skip when zero or multiple teams (ambiguous).
- Add parametrized unit tests in test_handle_jwt.py.

Made-with: Cursor

* fix(proxy): JWT single-team DB fallback: catch errors, tests match get_team_object

- Wrap get_team_object + get_team_membership in one try/except; log and skip on failure (stale/missing team id no longer fails auth).
- Parametrize tests: HTTP 404/500, membership error; use side_effect not return_value=None for missing team row.

Made-with: Cursor

* refactor(jwt): extract single-team fallback into _resolve_single_team_fallback helper

Made-with: Cursor
2026-04-24 17:51:42 -07:00
Ryan Crabbe
e1bb542556
chore: fix linting (ruff PLR0915, black) on admin team-header fix
Extract the admin team-header attachment into a helper so
auth_builder stays under the 50-statement lint threshold; apply
black formatting to the two files flagged on the prior commit.
No behavior change.
2026-04-24 13:38:28 -07:00
Ryan Crabbe
6ea95a6379
fix(jwt-auth): apply team TPM/RPM + attribution for admins using x-litellm-team-id
Scope the header-driven team fetch to LLM API routes so admin
management routes keep the pre-existing bypass behavior (no
phantom teams, no 404s on mgmt calls). Team context is threaded
onto UserAPIKeyAuth so spend logs, rate limits, and team_models
attribution are correctly applied when admins act on behalf of
a team via x-litellm-team-id.
2026-04-24 09:40:59 -07:00
Ishaan Jaffer
e8461b5b97
style: run black formatter on files from main merge 2026-04-17 13:02:59 -07:00
Krrish Dholakia
4c00a14ce0 fix: fix ci/cd + handle oidc jwt tokens 2026-03-30 16:12:58 -07:00
Ryan Crabbe
dd11e77852
fix: add explicit TTL to cache writes and test coverage for user cache invalidation
Add DEFAULT_MANAGEMENT_OBJECT_IN_MEMORY_CACHE_TTL to both async_set_cache
calls in sync_user_role_and_teams for consistency with all other user cache
writes. Add 3 tests covering cache invalidation on role change, team change,
and no-op when nothing changes.
2026-03-27 19:45:13 -07:00
Julio Quinteros Pro
a07d041881 fix: apply same AsyncMock pattern to remaining OIDC discovery test
Address Greptile review: test_resolve_jwks_url_resolves_oidc_discovery_document
also used the inconsistent patch.object pattern.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-03 19:56:51 -03:00
Julio Quinteros Pro
eb658693a3 fix: use direct AsyncMock assignment instead of patch.object in JWT tests
The patch.object with new_callable=AsyncMock can behave inconsistently
across Python versions, causing mock_response.status_code to return a
MagicMock instead of the assigned value. Direct assignment is simpler
and more reliable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-03 19:51:09 -03:00
Jaeyeon Kim(김재연)
6bcba46dda
fix: set mock status_code in JWT OIDC discovery tests (#22361)
The _resolve_jwks_url method checks response.status_code != 200, but
MagicMock returns a MagicMock object for status_code which is always
truthy (!= 200). Explicitly set mock_response.status_code = 200 so the
tests exercise the intended code path.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-02 21:57:54 -08:00
Shivaang
5f28422f49 fix(types): filter null fields from reasoning output items (#22370)
* fix(image_generation): propagate extra_headers to OpenAI image generation

Add headers parameter to image_generation() and aimage_generation() methods
in OpenAI provider, and pass headers from images/main.py to ensure custom
headers like cf-aig-authorization are properly forwarded to the OpenAI API.
Aligns behavior with completion() method and Azure provider implementation.

* test(image_generation): add tests for extra_headers propagation

Verify that extra_headers are correctly forwarded to OpenAI's
images.generate() in both sync and async paths, and that they
are absent when not provided.

* Add Prometheus child_exit cleanup for gunicorn workers

When a gunicorn worker exits (e.g. from max_requests recycling), its
per-process prometheus .db files remain on disk. For gauges using
livesum/liveall mode, this means the dead worker's last-known values
persist as if the process were still alive. Wire gunicorn's child_exit
hook to call mark_process_dead() so live-tracking gauges accurately
reflect only running workers.

* docs: update AssemblyAI docs with Universal-3 Pro, Speech Understanding, and LLM Gateway (#21130)

* docs: update AssemblyAI docs with Universal-3 Pro, Speech Understanding, and LLM Gateway provider config

* feat: add AssemblyAI LLM Gateway as OpenAI-compatible provider

* fix(mcp): update test mocks to use renamed filter_server_ids_by_ip_with_info

Tests were mocking the old method name `filter_server_ids_by_ip` but production
code at server.py:774 calls `filter_server_ids_by_ip_with_info` which returns
a (server_ids, blocked_count) tuple. The unmocked method on AsyncMock returned
a coroutine, causing "cannot unpack non-iterable coroutine object" errors.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): update realtime guardrail test assertions for voice violation behavior

Tests were asserting no response.create/conversation.item.create sent to
backend when guardrail blocks, but the implementation intentionally sends
these to have the LLM voice the guardrail violation message to the user.

Updated assertions to verify the correct guardrail flow:
- response.cancel is sent to stop any in-progress response
- conversation.item.create with violation message is injected
- response.create is sent to voice the violation
- original blocked content is NOT forwarded

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(bedrock): restore parallel_tool_calls mapping in map_openai_params

The revert in 8565c70e53 removed the parallel_tool_calls handling from
map_openai_params, and the subsequent fix d0445e1e33 only re-added the
transform_request consumption but forgot to re-add the map_openai_params
producer that sets _parallel_tool_use_config. This meant parallel_tool_calls
was silently ignored for all Bedrock models.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): update Azure pass-through test to mock litellm.completion

Commit 99c62ca40e removed "azure" from _RESPONSES_API_PROVIDERS,
routing Azure models through litellm.completion instead of
litellm.responses. The test was not updated to match, causing it
to assert against the wrong mock.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add in_flight_requests metric to /health/backlog + prometheus (#22319)

* feat: add in_flight_requests metric to /health/backlog + prometheus

* refactor: clean class with static methods, add tests, fix sentinel pattern

* docs: add in_flight_requests to prometheus metrics and latency troubleshooting

* fix(db): add missing migration for LiteLLM_ClaudeCodePluginTable

PR #22271 added the LiteLLM_ClaudeCodePluginTable model to
schema.prisma but did not include a corresponding migration file,
causing test_aaaasschema_migration_check to fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: update stale docstring to match guardrail voicing behavior

Addresses Greptile review feedback.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(caching): store background task references in LLMClientCache._remove_key to prevent unawaited coroutine warnings

Fixes #22128

* [Feat] Agent RBAC Permission Fix - Ensure Internal Users cannot create agents (#22329)

* fix: enforce RBAC on agent endpoints — block non-admin create/update/delete

- Add /v1/agents/{agent_id} to agent_routes so internal users can
  access GET-by-ID (previously returned 403 due to missing route pattern)
- Add _check_agent_management_permission() guard to POST, PUT, PATCH,
  DELETE agent endpoints — only PROXY_ADMIN may mutate agents
- Add user_api_key_dict param to delete_agent so the role check works
- Add comprehensive unit tests for RBAC enforcement across all roles

Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: mock prisma_client in internal user get-agent-by-id test

Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(ui): hide agent create/delete controls for non-admin users

Match MCP servers pattern: wrap '+ Add New Agent' button in
isAdmin conditional so internal users see a read-only agents view.
Delete buttons in card and table were already gated.
Update empty-state copy for non-admin users.
Add 7 Vitest tests covering role-based visibility.

Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: Add PROXY_ADMIN role to system user for key rotation (#21896)

* fix: Add PROXY_ADMIN role to system user for key rotation

The key rotation worker was failing with 'You are not authorized to regenerate this key'
when rotating team keys. This was because the system user created by
get_litellm_internal_jobs_user_api_key_auth() was missing the user_role field.

Without user_role=PROXY_ADMIN, the system user couldn't bypass team permission checks
in can_team_member_execute_key_management_endpoint(), causing authorization failures
for team key rotation.

This fix adds user_role=LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN to the system user, allowing
it to bypass team permission checks and successfully rotate keys for all teams.

* test: Add unit test for system user PROXY_ADMIN role

- Verify internal jobs system user has PROXY_ADMIN role
- Critical for key rotation to bypass team permission checks
- Regression test for PR #21896

* fix: populate user_id and user_info for admin users in /user/info (#22239)

* fix: populate user_id and user_info for admin users in /user/info endpoint

Fixes #22179

When admin users call /user/info without a user_id parameter, the endpoint
was returning null for both user_id and user_info fields. This broke
budgeting tooling that relies on /user/info to look up current budget and spend.

Changes:
- Modified _get_user_info_for_proxy_admin() to accept user_api_key_dict parameter
- Added logic to fetch admin's own user info from database
- Updated function to return admin's user_id and user_info instead of null
- Updated unit test to verify admin user_id is populated

The fix ensures admin users get their own user information just like regular users.

* test: make mock get_data signature match real method

- Updated MockPrismaClientDB.get_data() to accept all parameters that the real method accepts
- Makes mock more robust against future refactors
- Added datetime and Union imports
- Mock now returns None when user_id is not provided

* [Fix] Pass MCP auth headers from request into tool fetch for /v1/responses and chat completions (#22291)

* fixed dynamic auth for /responses with mcp

* fixed greptile concern

* fix(bedrock): filter internal json_tool_call when mixed with real tools

Fixes #18381: When using both tools and response_format with Bedrock
Converse API, LiteLLM internally adds json_tool_call to handle structured
output. Bedrock may return both this internal tool AND real user-defined
tools, breaking consumers like OpenAI Agents SDK.

Changes:
- Non-streaming: Added _filter_json_mode_tools() to handle 3 scenarios:
  only json_tool_call (convert to content), mixed (filter it out), or
  no json_tool_call (pass through)
- Streaming: Added json_mode tracking to AWSEventStreamDecoder to suppress
  json_tool_call chunks and convert to text content
- Fixed optional_params.pop() mutation issue

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: extract duplicated JSON unwrapping into helper method

Addresses review comment from greptile-apps:
https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/21107#pullrequestreview-3796085353

Changes:
- Added `_unwrap_bedrock_properties()` helper method to eliminate code duplication
- Replaced two identical JSON unwrapping blocks (lines 1592-1601 and 1612-1620)
  with calls to the new helper method
- Improves maintainability - single source of truth for Bedrock properties unwrapping logic

The helper method:
- Parses JSON string
- Checks for single "properties" key structure
- Unwraps and returns the properties value
- Returns original string if unwrapping not needed or parsing fails

No functional changes - pure refactoring.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: use correct class name AmazonConverseConfig in helper method calls

Fixed MyPy errors where BedrockConverseConfig was used instead of
AmazonConverseConfig in the _unwrap_bedrock_properties() calls.

Errors:
- Line 1619: BedrockConverseConfig -> AmazonConverseConfig
- Line 1631: BedrockConverseConfig -> AmazonConverseConfig

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: shorten guardrail benchmark result filenames for Windows long path support

Fixes #21941

The generated result filenames from _save_confusion_results contained
parentheses, dots, and full yaml filenames, producing paths that exceed
the Windows 260-char MAX_PATH limit. Rework the safe_label logic to
produce short {topic}_{method_abbrev} filenames (e.g. insults_cf.json)
while preserving the full label inside the JSON content.

Rename existing tracked result files to match the new naming convention.

* Update litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/litellm_content_filter/guardrail_benchmarks/test_eval.py

Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Remove Apache 2 license from SKILL.md (#22322)

* fix(mcp): default available_on_public_internet to true (#22331)

* fix(mcp): default available_on_public_internet to true

MCPs were defaulting to private (available_on_public_internet=false) which
was a breaking change. This reverts the default to public (true) across:
- Pydantic models (AddMCPServerRequest, UpdateMCPServerRequest, LiteLLM_MCPServerTable)
- Prisma schema @default
- mcp_server_manager.py YAML config + DB loading fallbacks
- UI form initialValue and setFieldValue defaults

* fix(ui): add forceRender to Collapse.Panel so toggle defaults render correctly

Ant Design's Collapse.Panel lazy-renders children by default. Without
forceRender, the Form.Item for 'Available on Public Internet' isn't
mounted when the useEffect fires form.setFieldValue, causing the Switch
to visually show OFF even though the intended default is true.

Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): update remaining schema copies and MCPServer type default to true

Missed in previous commit per Greptile review:
- schema.prisma (root)
- litellm-proxy-extras/litellm_proxy_extras/schema.prisma
- litellm/types/mcp_server/mcp_server_manager.py MCPServer class

* ui(mcp): reframe network access as 'Internal network only' restriction

Replace scary 'Available on Public Internet' toggle with 'Internal network only'
opt-in restriction. Toggle OFF (default) = all networks allowed. Toggle ON =
restricted to internal network only. Auth is always required either way.

- MCPPermissionManagement: new label/tooltip/description, invert display via
  getValueProps/getValueFromEvent so underlying available_on_public_internet
  value is unchanged
- mcp_server_view: 'Public' → 'All networks', 'Internal' → 'Internal only' (orange)
- mcp_server_columns: same badge updates

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(jwt): OIDC discovery URLs, roles array handling, dot-notation error hints (#22336)

* fix(jwt): support OIDC discovery URLs, handle roles array, improve error hints

Three fixes for Azure AD JWT auth:

1. OIDC discovery URL support - JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL can now be set to
   .well-known/openid-configuration endpoints. The proxy fetches the
   discovery doc, extracts jwks_uri, and caches it.

2. Handle roles claim as array - when team_id_jwt_field points to a list
   (e.g. AAD's "roles": ["team1"]), auto-unwrap the first element instead
   of crashing with 'unhashable type: list'.

3. Better error hint for dot-notation indexing - when team_id_jwt_field is
   set to "roles.0" or "roles[0]", the 401 error now explains to use
   "roles" instead and that LiteLLM auto-unwraps lists.

* Add integration demo script for JWT auth fixes (OIDC discovery, array roles, dot-notation hints)

Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add demo_servers.py for manual JWT auth testing with mock JWKS/OIDC endpoints

Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add demo screenshots for PR comment

Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add integration test results with screenshots for PR review

Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* address greptile review feedback (greploop iteration 1)

- fix: add HTTP status code check in _resolve_jwks_url before parsing JSON
- fix: remove misleading bracket-notation hint from debug log (get_nested_value does not support it)

* Update tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_handle_jwt.py

Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* remove demo scripts and assets

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* perf: streaming latency improvements — 4 targeted hot-path fixes (#22346)

* perf: raise aiohttp connection pool limits (300→1000, 50/host→500)

* perf: skip model_copy() on every chunk — only copy usage-bearing chunks

* perf: replace list+join O(n²) with str+= O(n) in async_data_generator

* perf: cache model-level guardrail lookup per request, not per chunk

* test: add comprehensive Vitest coverage for CostTrackingSettings

Add 88 tests across 9 test files for the CostTrackingSettings component directory:
- provider_display_helpers.test.ts: 9 tests for helper functions
- how_it_works.test.tsx: 9 tests for discount calculator component
- add_provider_form.test.tsx: 7 tests for provider form validation
- add_margin_form.test.tsx: 9 tests for margin form with type toggle
- provider_discount_table.test.tsx: 12 tests for table editing and interactions
- provider_margin_table.test.tsx: 13 tests for margin table with sorting
- use_discount_config.test.ts: 11 tests for discount hook logic
- use_margin_config.test.ts: 12 tests for margin hook logic
- cost_tracking_settings.test.tsx: 15 tests for main component and role-based rendering

All tests passing. Coverage includes form validation, user interactions, API calls, state management, and conditional rendering.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* [Feature] Key list endpoint: Add project_id and access_group_id filters

Add filtering capabilities to /key/list endpoint for project_id and access_group_id parameters. Both filters work globally across all visibility rules and stack with existing sort/pagination params. Added comprehensive unit tests for the new filters.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* [Feature] UI - Projects: Add Project Details page with Edit modal

- Add ProjectDetailsPage with header, details card, spend/budget progress,
  model spend bar chart, keys placeholder, and team info card
- Refactor CreateProjectModal into base form pattern (ProjectBaseForm)
  shared between Create and Edit flows
- Add EditProjectModal with pre-filled form data from backend
- Add useProjectDetails and useUpdateProject hooks
- Add duplicate key validation for model limits and metadata
- Wire project ID click in table to navigate to detail view
- Move pagination inline with search bar

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Update ui/litellm-dashboard/src/components/Projects/ProjectModals/CreateProjectModal.tsx

Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(types): filter null fields from reasoning output items in ResponsesAPIResponse

When providers return reasoning items without status/content/encrypted_content,
Pydantic's Optional defaults serialize them as null. This breaks downstream SDKs
(e.g., the OpenAI C# SDK crashes on status=null).

Add a field_serializer on ResponsesAPIResponse.output that removes null
status, content, and encrypted_content from reasoning items during
serialization. This mirrors the request-side filtering already done in
OpenAIResponsesAPIConfig._handle_reasoning_item().

Fixes https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/16824

---------

Co-authored-by: Zero Clover <zero@root.me>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Crabbe <rcrabbe@berkeley.edu>
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe <128659760+ryan-crabbe@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Dylan Duan <dylan.duan@assemblyai.com>
Co-authored-by: Julio Quinteros Pro <jquinter@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaanjaffer0324@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: milan-berri <milan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Shivam Rawat <161387515+shivamrawat1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brian Caswell <bcaswell@microsoft.com>
Co-authored-by: Brian Caswell <bcaswell@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: rasmi <rrelasmar@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng.jiang@gmail.com>
2026-03-02 19:21:25 +05:30
Ishaan Jaff
3ff70598ad
fix: bump litellm-proxy-extras to 0.4.50 and fix 3 failing tests (#22417)
* fix(ci): handle inline table in pyproject.toml for litellm-proxy-extras version check

* fix: bump litellm-proxy-extras to 0.4.50 in pyproject.toml, requirements.txt, and poetry.lock

* fix(tests): set status_code=200 on JWT mocks and pass pii_tokens through data in presidio test
2026-02-28 10:20:03 -08:00
Ishaan Jaff
ee703cea99
fix(jwt): OIDC discovery URLs, roles array handling, dot-notation error hints (#22336)
* fix(jwt): support OIDC discovery URLs, handle roles array, improve error hints

Three fixes for Azure AD JWT auth:

1. OIDC discovery URL support - JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL can now be set to
   .well-known/openid-configuration endpoints. The proxy fetches the
   discovery doc, extracts jwks_uri, and caches it.

2. Handle roles claim as array - when team_id_jwt_field points to a list
   (e.g. AAD's "roles": ["team1"]), auto-unwrap the first element instead
   of crashing with 'unhashable type: list'.

3. Better error hint for dot-notation indexing - when team_id_jwt_field is
   set to "roles.0" or "roles[0]", the 401 error now explains to use
   "roles" instead and that LiteLLM auto-unwraps lists.

* Add integration demo script for JWT auth fixes (OIDC discovery, array roles, dot-notation hints)

Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add demo_servers.py for manual JWT auth testing with mock JWKS/OIDC endpoints

Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add demo screenshots for PR comment

Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add integration test results with screenshots for PR review

Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>

* address greptile review feedback (greploop iteration 1)

- fix: add HTTP status code check in _resolve_jwks_url before parsing JSON
- fix: remove misleading bracket-notation hint from debug log (get_nested_value does not support it)

* Update tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_handle_jwt.py

Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* remove demo scripts and assets

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaff <ishaan-jaff@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-27 20:30:47 -08:00
Lukas de Boer
edc8413f1e
Add Kubernetes ServiceAccount JWT authentication support (#18055)
* Allow get_nested_value dot notation to support escaping for Kubernetes JWT Support

* Add support for team and org alias fields, add docs, tests

* Fix lint issue with max statements in handle jwt logic
2026-01-02 14:02:31 +05:30
Ishaan Jaff
d38f241032
[Feat] JWT Auth - auth allow selecting team_id from request header (#17884)
* feat: add get_team_id_from_header for JWT Auth

* fix Auth builder JWT Auth

* test_get_team_id_from_header

* test_auth_builder_uses_team_from_header_e2e

* Select Team via Request Header
2025-12-12 10:18:20 -08:00
Ishaan Jaff
24f847b84c
[Feat] JWT Auth - AI Gateway, allow using regular OIDC flow with user info endpoints (#17324)
* feat: allow fetching OIDC user info

* test: use test_auth_builder_with_oidc_userinfo_enabled gets user info when enabled

* fix tool permission doc

* docs fix diagram
2025-12-01 13:59:00 -08:00
Ishaan Jaff
086621e3d3 test_handle_jwt.py 2025-08-13 17:27:50 -07:00
Ishaan Jaff
8e76f8e7d0
[Feat] Team Member Rate Limits + Support for using with JWT Auth (#13601)
* fix - assign tpm/rpm limit onJWT

* add team member rpm/tpm limits

* update - rate limiter v3 with team member rate limits

* update utils

* fixes for LiteLLM_BudgetTable

* undo change

* add TeamMemberBudgetHandler

* add _process_team_member_budget_data

* add get_team_membership

* add safe_get_team_member_rpm_limit and safe_get_team_member_tpm_limit

* LiteLLM_TeamMembership

* add LiteLLM_TeamMembership rate limit for JWTs

* fix

* tests
2025-08-13 17:21:36 -07:00
Ishaan Jaff
f60a9cf908
[Bug]: Fix JWTs access not working with model groups (#13474)
* fix can_team_access_model

* test_find_team_with_model_access_model_group
2025-08-09 16:14:51 -07:00
Cole McIntosh
8826e02a98
feat: Add dot notation support for all JWT fields (#13013)
* feat: Add dot notation support for all JWT fields

- Updated all JWT field access methods to use get_nested_value for dot notation support
- Enhanced get_team_id to properly handle team_id_default fallback with nested fields
- Added comprehensive unit tests for nested JWT field access and edge cases
- Updated documentation to reflect dot notation support across all JWT fields
- Maintains full backward compatibility with existing flat field configurations

Supported fields with dot notation:
- team_id_jwt_field, team_ids_jwt_field, user_id_jwt_field
- user_email_jwt_field, org_id_jwt_field, object_id_jwt_field
- end_user_id_jwt_field (roles_jwt_field was already supported)

Example: user_id_jwt_field: 'user.sub' accesses token['user']['sub']

* fix: Add type annotations to resolve mypy errors

- Add explicit type annotation for team_ids variable in get_team_ids_from_jwt
- Add type ignore comment for sentinel object return in get_team_id
- Resolves mypy errors while maintaining functionality

* fix: Resolve mypy type error in get_team_ids_from_jwt

- Remove explicit List[str] type annotation that conflicts with get_nested_value return type
- Simplify return logic to use 'team_ids or []' ensuring always returns List[str]
- Fixes: Incompatible types in assignment (expression has type 'list[str] | None', variable has type 'list[str]')

* fix: Add proper type annotation for team_ids variable

- Use Optional[List[str]] type annotation to satisfy mypy requirements
- Resolves: Need type annotation for 'team_ids' [var-annotated]
- Maintains functionality while ensuring type safety

* refactor: remove outdated JWT unit tests and consolidate JWT-related functionality

- Deleted the test_jwt.py file as it contained outdated and redundant tests.
- Consolidated JWT-related tests into test_handle_jwt.py for better organization and maintainability.
- Updated tests to ensure proper functionality of JWT handling, including token validation and role mapping.
- Enhanced test coverage for JWT field access and nested claims handling.

* test: add comprehensive unit tests for JWT authentication

- Introduced a new test file `test_jwt.py` containing unit tests for JWT authentication.
- Implemented tests for loading configuration with custom role names, validating tokens, and handling team tokens.
- Enhanced coverage for JWT field access, nested claims, and role-based access control.
- Added fixtures for Prisma client and public JWT key generation to support testing.
- Ensured proper handling of valid and invalid tokens, including user and team scenarios.

* revert test_handle_jwt.py

* rename file

* test: remove outdated JWT nesting tests and add new nested field access tests

- Deleted the `test_jwt_nesting.py` file as it contained outdated tests.
- Introduced new tests in `test_handle_jwt.py` to verify nested JWT field access.
- Enhanced coverage for accessing nested values using dot notation and ensured backward compatibility with flat field names.
- Added tests for handling missing nested paths and appropriate default values.
- Improved handling of metadata prefixes in nested field access.

* restore file
2025-07-29 16:51:17 -07:00
Ishaan Jaff
738db9336e
[Feat] JWT - Sync user roles and team memberships when JWT Auth is used (#11994)
* add JWTLiteLLMRoleMap

* test_sync_user_role_and_teams

* add sync_user_role_and_teams

* test_sync_user_role_and_teams

* fix types

* Sync User Roles and Teams with IDP

* Add test for JWT role mapping to LiteLLM roles
2025-07-05 08:58:34 -07:00
Krish Dholakia
30b431681e
JWT Auth - correctly return user email + UI Model Update - Allow editing model access group for existing model (#11783)
* fix(handle_jwt.py): check user object, if jwt user is proxy admin

correctly return user role - if jwt user has role updated in UI

* test(test_handle_jwt.py): add unit test for passing correct user role

* feat(model_info_view.tsx): separate UI component for updating edit model component

* feat(model_info_view.tsx): allow updating model access group on UI

show all available access groups in ui component

* docs: minor fixes
2025-06-16 22:11:04 -07:00
Ishaan Jaff
c40580f892
[Fix] JWT - Fix error when team member already part of team (#11735)
* fix _check_member_duplication

* fix map_user_to_teams

* test_map_user_to_teams_handles_already_in_team_exception

* test_team_endpoints.py
2025-06-14 15:50:16 -07:00
Krish Dholakia
ef42461c1e
Litellm fix GitHub action testing (#11163)
* test: add __init__.py files

* refactor: rename test folder to avoid naming conflict

* test: update workflows

* test: update tests

* test: update imports

* test: update tests

* test: remove unused import

* ci(test-litellm.yml): add pytest retry to github workflow

* test: fix test
2025-05-26 14:41:42 -07:00
Renamed from tests/litellm/proxy/auth/test_handle_jwt.py (Browse further)