* fix(proxy): stop leaking internal exception details to clients
Public error responses could disclose internal details in two places.
A proxy-layer exception with no recognized provider status code (a bug
in a custom callback, a hook, or litellm's own code) forwarded its raw
str() text verbatim on a 5xx, including any embedded credential,
filesystem path, or internal hostname, or a full stack trace; the
same client-facing message now runs through a redaction layer built
on top of the credential redaction that already runs on log output,
so it also drops an embedded traceback and scrubs path-shaped and
hostname-shaped substrings. It intentionally never runs on server-side
logs, which must keep full detail for debugging.
exception_type(), litellm's core exception mapper, is shared by direct
SDK callers (litellm.completion()) and the proxy, and it deliberately
embeds a traceback into an unmapped exception's message as a debugging
aid for library users; a first pass at this fix stripped that
traceback inside exception_type() itself and broke that convention
(caught by tests asserting on the traceback frame). The traceback stays
in exception_type()'s own output; only the proxy's client-facing
response boundary (and the streaming response generator, which never
needs to embed one at all) strips it.
Full generic-message replacement for the unclassified-exception case
was tried first and reverted too: several routes deliberately raise a
bare exception as an informative, secret-free validation message (e.g.
the OCR endpoint's rejection of provider-native file IDs), and
replacing those wholesale broke that convention; targeted redaction
leaves them untouched.
Also stops the default uvicorn-based proxy from sending a Server
response header.
Resolves LIT-6747
* refactor(proxy): drop the unrelated error-message constant and trim redaction comments
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(http_handler): honor HTTP(S)_PROXY / NO_PROXY when force_ipv4 uses the httpx transport
Passing an explicit transport to httpx.AsyncClient / httpx.Client disables its
automatic environment proxy mounts, so force_ipv4 on the httpx path sent every
LLM request direct and silently bypassed HTTPS_PROXY. Mount the same env-derived
proxy transports next to the IPv4-pinned direct transport in AsyncHTTPHandler,
HTTPHandler and the OpenAI async client factory.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(http_handler): carry the client's TLS verify and cert settings onto env proxy mounts
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The default password policy from #39381 (12+ chars with upper, lower, number, and special) makes globalSetup's POST /user/update with password "test" fail with a 400, so every role login in the UI e2e suite has been failing since that merge. Seed the roles, the noteam@test.local login, and the second-admin spec with policy-compliant passwords and update the scrypt hash in seed.sql to match.
* fix(ollama_chat): stamp finish_reason tool_calls when tool calls streamed before the done chunk
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ollama_chat): trim finish_reason override comment
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mubashir1osmani <mubashir.osmani777@gmail.com>
* fix(proxy): mark session/SSO/SAML cookies Secure behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy
litellm only sees a plain-HTTP hop when TLS terminates at a reverse proxy,
so cookie Secure attributes previously derived from (or defaulted without
regard to) the literal request scheme could be dropped in production. The
token session cookie set by every login path never carried Secure/HttpOnly/
SameSite at all.
Adds IPAddressUtils.is_request_https, a single trust-aware resolver used by
every cookie-setting call site: PROXY_BASE_URL, then X-Forwarded-Proto only
from a configured trusted proxy (general_settings.use_x_forwarded_for +
mcp_trusted_proxy_ranges), then the literal scheme. An unconfigured or
untrusted caller cannot spoof the header to force Secure on.
Resolves LIT-6748
* fix(proxy): make the shared session-cookie helper public, type new test helpers
set_session_token_cookie is imported across modules (ui_sso.py ->
proxy_server.py), so the leading underscore was misleading and breached
basedpyright's reportPrivateUsage budget with zero headroom. Also adds
missing parameter/return type annotations to the new test helper functions
per repo convention.
* refactor(python-bridge): split non-streaming bridge modules
* refactor(python-bridge): bring shared function tracing into route layer
* feat(dev): list Python route functions and call sites
* feat(dev): list Rust route functions and call sites
* docs(dev): record OCR parity gaps across Python and Rust
* feat(dev): list executed SDK calls with runtime tracing
* feat(dev): report Python vs Rust SDK pipeline steps in one CLI
* feat(dev): side-by-side pipeline step report in compare CLI
* fix(dev): drop invalid Final annotations in compare cell loop
* feat(dev): blue python-only and yellow rust-only steps in compare CLI
* feat(dev): vertical layout with section spacing in compare CLI
* fix(dev): validate SDK trace stages across sync and async routes
* refactor(rust): align SDK route call structure with Python
* refactor(python-bridge): share sync and async route call wrappers
* refactor(dev): split compare CLI into fixtures, runtime, and report modules
* fix(ci): run SDK trace tests and satisfy test lint
