GitNexus/docs/deployment.md
Gergő Magyar 48f108a58a
docs: simplify guides and verify receiver gaps (#3694)
* docs: align resolution architecture and roadmap

* docs: add language ingestion gap inventories

* test: audit receiver gap targets and coverage

Check exact declaration IDs, expose the Dart await wrong-owner edge, and execute previously excluded C++, Rust, PHP, Dart and Vue shapes. Refresh the baseline and all language inventories from fresh measurements; call-drop counts remain unchanged.

* docs: focus roadmap and shorten project README

Keep the resolution roadmap limited to future work and acceptance criteria. Move detailed editor, CLI, MCP, deployment and wiki instructions into linked guides, preserve their command examples, and correct stale onboarding claims.

* docs: correct setup and audit descriptions

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Co-authored-by: Gergo Magyar <gergomagyar0@gmail.com>
2026-10-23 09:06:03 +01:00

9.8 KiB

Deployment

Back to GitNexus

Deploy to Render

Deploy GitNexus in one click:

Deploy to Render

The Blueprint creates two services. gitnexus-server runs gitnexus serve as a private service: no public URL, reachable only over Render's private network, with a persistent disk for indexes and cloned repos. gitnexus-web is the public one. It serves the UI and reverse-proxies /api/* to the server, so the browser talks to a single origin.

At the Blueprint's defaults this runs about $35/month: $25 for the server's standard instance, $7 for the web service's starter instance, and $2.50 for the 10 GB disk. See Render's pricing for other plans.

The deploy generates an access token, and the UI asks for it on first use:

  1. Open the gitnexus-web service in your Render dashboard.
  2. Copy GITNEXUS_SERVE_AUTH_TOKEN from its Environment tab.
  3. Load the site and paste the token into the prompt (or the settings panel).

Every /api/* request carries that token as a header, and the proxy answers 401 without it. The browser keeps it in sessionStorage, so a new tab asks again. To rotate it, edit the environment variable and redeploy.

The proxy strips Origin before forwarding, so the server's CSRF guard does nothing for proxied traffic; it passes Origin-less requests through by design. The token is the only control on this deploy, not a second layer behind the guard. Anyone holding it can read every indexed repo. See SECURITY.md.

Indexing is memory-bound. If gitnexus-server runs out of memory on a large repo, raise its plan, which sets available RAM: standard is 2 GB, pro is 4 GB. Raise sizeGB only if the disk fills with clones and indexes.

Deploy to RepoCloud

Deploy on RepoCloud

Docker

Run Compose commands from the repository root.

docker compose up -d

This starts the server on http://localhost:4747 and the web UI on http://localhost:4173. The UI auto-detects the server because the browser runs on the host and reaches the container via the mapped port.

The official setup ships two signed images, published identically to GitHub Container Registry (GHCR) and Docker Hub — same build, same digest, same Cosign signature:

Purpose GHCR (default in docker-compose.yaml) Docker Hub mirror
CLI / gitnexus serve backend (HTTP API on port 4747, MCP, indexer) ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus:latest akonlabs/gitnexus:latest
Static web UI (port 4173) ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus-web:latest akonlabs/gitnexus-web:latest

A named volume (gitnexus-data) persists the global registry, indexes, and cloned repos at /data/gitnexus inside the server container. To make repos on your host machine indexable, set WORKSPACE_DIR before bringing the stack up:

WORKSPACE_DIR=$HOME/code docker compose up -d
# Inside the server container the directory is mounted read-only at /workspace.
docker compose exec gitnexus-server gitnexus index /workspace/my-repo

Heads-up — image rename. Earlier releases published the web UI under ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus. That slug now hosts the CLI/server image and the UI moved to ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus-web. Previous tags remain pullable, but new versions are only published under the new slugs — update your docker run / compose files (or just adopt the bundled compose).

Direct docker run & env file

# Server
docker run --rm -d \
  --name gitnexus-server \
  -p 4747:4747 \
  -v gitnexus-data:/data/gitnexus \
  ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus:latest

# Web UI
docker run --rm -d \
  --name gitnexus-web \
  -p 4173:4173 \
  ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus-web:latest

Optional env file (override image tags, container names, ports, workspace dir):

cp .env.example .env
docker compose --env-file .env up -d

Files:

  • Dockerfile.web — builds gitnexus-shared and gitnexus-web, then serves the production frontend.
  • Dockerfile.cli — builds the CLI/server (with its native deps) and runs gitnexus serve --host 0.0.0.0. Local embeddings are not in the image (onnxruntime-node is opt-in; runtime npm is stripped). Bind-mount a prefix or set GITNEXUS_EMBEDDING_URL.
  • docker-compose.yaml — starts both signed images side by side.
  • .env.example — overrides for image names, container names, ports, and the workspace mount.

Versioning & supply-chain protection (Cosign signatures, provenance, Kubernetes admission policy)

The Docker images are version-locked to the npm package:

  • Stable images are only published from vX.Y.Z git tags (via docker.yml triggered directly by the tag push), and the workflow refuses to build unless the tag exactly matches gitnexus/package.json's version. So ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus:1.6.2 (and its Docker Hub mirror akonlabs/gitnexus:1.6.2) is byte-for-byte the same release as npm install gitnexus@1.6.2 — no drift, no floating builds from main. Both registries receive the same digest from a single build step, so you can pull from either and the signature verifies identically.
  • Release-candidate images (e.g. :1.7.0-rc.1) are published alongside each RC npm release. They are built by publish.yml calling docker.yml as a reusable workflow after the RC tag is created and pushed.
  • :latest is auto-promoted only from non-prerelease tags by the Docker metadata action, so it always points at a real, npm-published version.

Both images are signed with Cosign keyless signing using the workflow's GitHub OIDC identity, and shipped with build provenance and SBOM attestations. This is your protection against supply-chain attacks: even if an attacker republishes a same-named image elsewhere (or somehow pushes to a typo-squatted registry), they cannot forge a Cosign signature tied to abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus's docker.yml. Always verify before pulling into sensitive environments.

Stable releases — signed from the v* tag ref:

cosign verify ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus:1.6.2 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github\.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/\.github/workflows/docker\.yml@refs/tags/v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[a-zA-Z0-9.]+)?$' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# Same signature verifies the Docker Hub mirror (identical digest):
cosign verify docker.io/akonlabs/gitnexus:1.6.2 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github\.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/\.github/workflows/docker\.yml@refs/tags/v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[a-zA-Z0-9.]+)?$' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

The regex pins the certificate identity to this repo's docker.yml workflow run from a v* tag — rejecting unsigned images, images signed by other workflows, and images signed from unprotected refs. It is identical for both registries because both sets of tags were signed at the same digest in one workflow run.

Release candidates — signed from refs/heads/main (the caller's ref when publish.yml invokes docker.yml as a reusable workflow):

cosign verify ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus:1.7.0-rc.1 \
  --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/.github/workflows/docker.yml@refs/heads/main' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

You can also inspect the build provenance and SBOM:

cosign download attestation ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus:1.6.2 \
  --predicate-type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1

Kubernetes: enforce signatures at admission. Ship the bundled ClusterImagePolicy so the Sigstore policy-controller rejects any GitNexus pod whose image is not signed by this repo's docker.yml running from a vX.Y.Z tag — the same identity the cosign verify snippet above pins.

# 1. Install the controller (one-time, cluster-wide)
helm repo add sigstore https://sigstore.github.io/helm-charts && helm repo update
helm install policy-controller -n cosign-system --create-namespace \
  sigstore/policy-controller

# 2. Opt your namespace in
kubectl label namespace <your-ns> policy.sigstore.dev/include=true

# 3. Apply the policy
kubectl apply -f deploy/kubernetes/cluster-image-policy.yaml

After this, attempting to deploy an unsigned image — or one signed by anything other than abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus's docker.yml at a v* tag — fails the admission webhook before a pod is ever created. This turns the verifiable signature into an enforced policy, which is the supply-chain control most clusters actually need.

Run the frontend locally

git clone https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus.git
cd gitnexus/gitnexus-web && npm install
# Compile sibling gitnexus-shared with this package's TypeScript 7 (do not npm ci shared).
cd ../gitnexus-shared && node ../gitnexus-web/node_modules/typescript/lib/tsc.js
cd ../gitnexus-web && npm run dev
# Then in another terminal, start the backend the frontend connects to:
npx gitnexus@latest serve