diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
index 4247deaf..5a3f31e8 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ jobs:
           node --test
           scripts/check-actions-pinned.test.mjs
           scripts/check-delivery-cadence.test.mjs
+          scripts/check-security-gates.test.mjs
           scripts/select-ci-test-scope.test.mjs
           scripts/verify-full-suite-job-evidence.test.mjs
 
@@ -85,6 +86,9 @@ jobs:
       - name: Guard immutable GitHub Actions references
         run: node scripts/check-actions-pinned.mjs
 
+      - name: Guard continuous security gates
+        run: node scripts/check-security-gates.mjs
+
       - name: Find reviewed full-suite evidence
         id: reviewed_full
         if: github.event_name == 'push'
diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a123dd12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+name: Security Gates
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '17 9 * * 3'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  codeql:
+    name: CodeQL
+    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      security-events: write
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
+      - name: Initialize CodeQL
+        uses: github/codeql-action/init@db488ddef3bf6cb639b32c2e9a7c0a7ea8271d28 # v4.37.8
+        with:
+          languages: javascript-typescript
+          build-mode: none
+          queries: security-extended
+      - name: Analyze JavaScript and TypeScript
+        uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@db488ddef3bf6cb639b32c2e9a7c0a7ea8271d28 # v4.37.8
+        with:
+          category: '/language:javascript-typescript'
+
+  gitleaks:
+    name: Gitleaks
+    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+    env:
+      GITLEAKS_VERSION: 8.30.1
+      GITLEAKS_LINUX_X64_SHA256: 551f6fc83ea457d62a0d98237cbad105af8d557003051f41f3e7ca7b3f2470eb
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
+      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@0977fd99725f1db4007ccb2928dbb4e90d06cc86 # v6.0.10
+      - name: Download verified gitleaks release
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          archive="$RUNNER_TEMP/gitleaks.tar.gz"
+          curl --fail --silent --show-error --location \
+            "https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_linux_x64.tar.gz" \
+            --output "$archive"
+          echo "${GITLEAKS_LINUX_X64_SHA256}  ${archive}" | sha256sum --check --status
+          tar -xzf "$archive" -C "$RUNNER_TEMP" gitleaks
+      - name: Guard security workflow policy
+        run: pnpm check:security-gates
+      - name: Scan reviewed tree and test detection
+        env:
+          GITLEAKS_BIN: ${{ runner.temp }}/gitleaks
+        run: pnpm check:gitleaks
diff --git a/.gitleaksignore b/.gitleaksignore
index 4e679601..8472e9b6 100644
--- a/.gitleaksignore
+++ b/.gitleaksignore
@@ -1,22 +1,53 @@
-# Gitleaks False Positives
-# Updated: 2026-01-29 (post-history-rewrite)
-# All entries below are placeholder/example/test values, NOT real secrets.
+# CLI snapshot uses an intentionally synthetic API key in serialized output.
+cli/src/__tests__/snapshot.test.ts:generic-api-key:220
 
-# Documentation example: "your-admin-key" placeholder in deployment guide
-39423f74cf3849684e8de4ebf746156a6be0ea00:docs/DEPLOYMENT.md:curl-auth-header:557
+# API documentation contains non-functional response examples.
+docs/API-REFERENCE.md:generic-api-key:991
+docs/API-WORKFLOWS.md:generic-api-key:1460
 
-# Documentation example: "dev-admin-key" placeholder in security audit
-f01a0157f1d1612ab7bea646cf7265ec018e1d9a:docs/SECURITY_AUDIT_2026-01-28.md:curl-auth-header:135
+# Operator documentation uses placeholders in curl authentication examples.
+docs/DEPLOYMENT.md:curl-auth-header:891
+docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:curl-auth-header:229
+docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:curl-auth-header:257
+docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:curl-auth-header:260
+docs/features/prd-driven-development.md:curl-auth-header:95
+docs/features/prd-driven-development.md:curl-auth-header:775
+docs/guides/SELF_HOST.md:curl-auth-header:738
+docs/security.md:curl-auth-header:51
+docs/security.md:curl-auth-header:58
 
-# Test fixture: hardcoded test JWT secret (not used in production)
-f01a0157f1d1612ab7bea646cf7265ec018e1d9a:server/src/__tests__/routes/auth.test.ts:generic-api-key:28
-f01a0157f1d1612ab7bea646cf7265ec018e1d9a:server/src/__tests__/routes/auth.test.ts:generic-api-key:29
-f01a0157f1d1612ab7bea646cf7265ec018e1d9a:server/src/__tests__/routes/auth.test.ts:generic-api-key:60
+# Demo seeding passes the operator-provided key variable to curl.
+seed-demo-data.sh:curl-auth-header:45
 
-# .env.example placeholder values ("your-api-key")
-55c742c2dfd731069505e1baab16bb4c328234bd:server/.env.example:curl-auth-header:43
-55c742c2dfd731069505e1baab16bb4c328234bd:server/.env.example:curl-auth-header:46
+# Environment template documents shell-variable authentication examples.
+server/.env.example:curl-auth-header:127
+server/.env.example:curl-auth-header:130
 
-# Documentation placeholder values ("your-api-key")
-55c742c2dfd731069505e1baab16bb4c328234bd:docs/security.md:curl-auth-header:40
-55c742c2dfd731069505e1baab16bb4c328234bd:docs/security.md:curl-auth-header:47
+# Compatibility test verifies redaction of a deliberately synthetic value.
+server/src/__tests__/buzz-compatibility-service.test.ts:generic-api-key:477
+
+# Governance trace test verifies Stripe-shaped token redaction.
+server/src/__tests__/governance-trace-service.test.ts:stripe-access-token:22
+
+# Log redaction tests require JWT- and Stripe-shaped synthetic fixtures.
+server/src/__tests__/log-redaction.test.ts:jwt:17
+server/src/__tests__/log-redaction.test.ts:stripe-access-token:30
+server/src/__tests__/log-redaction.test.ts:stripe-access-token:31
+
+# Completion service test verifies JWT-shaped output redaction.
+server/src/__tests__/provider-completion-service.test.ts:jwt:314
+
+# Local admission tests use synthetic idempotency keys, not credentials.
+server/src/__tests__/routes/agents-local-capability.test.ts:generic-api-key:606
+server/src/__tests__/routes/agents-local-capability.test.ts:generic-api-key:619
+
+# Authentication route tests require a synthetic JWT signing value.
+server/src/__tests__/routes/auth.test.ts:generic-api-key:29
+server/src/__tests__/routes/auth.test.ts:generic-api-key:31
+server/src/__tests__/routes/auth.test.ts:generic-api-key:80
+
+# Skill capability test verifies Stripe-shaped token redaction.
+server/src/__tests__/skill-capability-service.test.ts:stripe-access-token:63
+
+# Multi-user UI test renders a non-secret token prefix fixture.
+web/src/__tests__/multi-user-tab.test.tsx:generic-api-key:123
diff --git a/.pre-commit-config.yaml b/.pre-commit-config.yaml
index 6553ffbe..5a8d2dd9 100644
--- a/.pre-commit-config.yaml
+++ b/.pre-commit-config.yaml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 # Pre-commit hooks for veritas-kanban
 # Install: pip install pre-commit && pre-commit install
-# Or standalone gitleaks hook (no pre-commit framework needed):
-#   gitleaks protect --staged --verbose
+# Or scan the reviewed tree without the pre-commit framework:
+#   gitleaks dir . --redact=100
 
 repos:
   - repo: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks
-    rev: v8.21.2
+    rev: 83d9cd684c87d95d656c1458ef04895a7f1cbd8e # v8.30.1
     hooks:
       - id: gitleaks
diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index df6cb50f..2e473b8a 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ pnpm lint:fix
 pnpm check:actions-pinned       # Rejects mutable external GitHub Action references
 pnpm check:pnpm-settings        # Validates package manager fields match this file
 pnpm check:delivery-cadence     # Prevents verification and review policy drift
+pnpm check:security-gates       # Validates CodeQL/gitleaks workflow and exact suppressions
+pnpm check:gitleaks             # Scans reviewed tree and proves new-secret detection
 pnpm check:vite-native-config   # Loads web build and test configs with Vite's native loader
 pnpm test:ci-scope              # Validates path-aware CI test selection
 pnpm smoke:cli-mcp              # CLI ↔ MCP compatibility smoke test
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index 4ff32500..33a0080a 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -69,6 +69,34 @@ pnpm check:actions-pinned
 Dependabot retains the `github-actions` ecosystem entry so reviewed updates can
 advance both the immutable commit and its release comment.
 
+## Continuous Security Gates
+
+The `Security Gates` workflow runs CodeQL and gitleaks for pull requests, main
+branch updates, and a weekly schedule. CodeQL uses the extended JavaScript and
+TypeScript security query suite. Repository merge protection blocks CodeQL
+errors and high-or-critical security alerts. Gitleaks scans the current tree,
+accepts only the exact reviewed fingerprints in `.gitleaksignore`, and proves
+that a newly introduced synthetic secret is still rejected.
+
+Brad Groux owns Dependabot and GitHub security alert triage. New dependency,
+code-scanning, or secret-scanning alerts must be reviewed privately within two
+working days. Confirm exploitability and affected releases before opening a
+public issue. Track confirmed vulnerabilities in a private GitHub security
+advisory, prioritize critical and high findings for the next safe patch, and
+record false positives at the narrowest available fingerprint or path. Do not
+disable a detector class to clear a gate.
+
+Dependabot vulnerability alerts and security updates, GitHub secret scanning,
+and push protection must remain enabled. Security-update pull requests use the
+existing `BradGroux` reviewer assignment in `.github/dependabot.yml`.
+
+Run the repository controls locally with:
+
+```bash
+pnpm check:security-gates
+pnpm check:gitleaks
+```
+
 ## Scope
 
 This policy applies to:
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 2594fa43..6a82b092 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
     "lint:fix": "eslint . --fix",
     "check:delivery-cadence": "node --test scripts/check-delivery-cadence.test.mjs && node scripts/check-delivery-cadence.mjs",
     "check:actions-pinned": "node --test scripts/check-actions-pinned.test.mjs && node scripts/check-actions-pinned.mjs",
+    "check:security-gates": "node --test scripts/check-security-gates.test.mjs && node scripts/check-security-gates.mjs",
+    "check:gitleaks": "node scripts/check-gitleaks.mjs",
     "check:vite-native-config": "pnpm --filter @veritas-kanban/web exec vite build --configLoader native && vitest run --configLoader native web/src/lib/__tests__/client-policy.test.ts",
     "check:pnpm-settings": "node scripts/check-pnpm-settings.mjs",
     "check:security-artifacts": "node scripts/check-security-artifacts.mjs",
diff --git a/scripts/check-gitleaks.mjs b/scripts/check-gitleaks.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b487e968
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/check-gitleaks.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+
+import {
+  copyFileSync,
+  lstatSync,
+  mkdirSync,
+  mkdtempSync,
+  readlinkSync,
+  rmSync,
+  writeFileSync,
+} from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
+
+const binary = process.env.GITLEAKS_BIN || 'gitleaks';
+
+function runGitleaks(args, cwd) {
+  return spawnSync(binary, args, { cwd, encoding: 'utf8', env: process.env });
+}
+
+function fail(message, result) {
+  console.error(message);
+  if (result?.error?.code === 'ENOENT') {
+    console.error(`Gitleaks binary not found at ${binary}. Install gitleaks or set GITLEAKS_BIN.`);
+  } else if (result?.stderr) {
+    console.error(result.stderr.trim());
+  }
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+function stageScannableSource() {
+  const repositoryRoot = process.cwd();
+  const listing = spawnSync(
+    'git',
+    ['ls-files', '--cached', '--others', '--exclude-standard', '-z'],
+    { cwd: repositoryRoot, encoding: 'utf8' }
+  );
+  if (listing.status !== 0) fail('Could not inventory Git-managed source files.', listing);
+
+  const stagingDirectory = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'veritas-gitleaks-source-'));
+  for (const relativePath of listing.stdout.split('\0').filter(Boolean)) {
+    const source = resolve(repositoryRoot, relativePath);
+    const destination = resolve(stagingDirectory, relativePath);
+    mkdirSync(dirname(destination), { recursive: true });
+    const stats = lstatSync(source);
+    if (stats.isSymbolicLink()) {
+      writeFileSync(destination, readlinkSync(source));
+    } else if (stats.isFile()) {
+      copyFileSync(source, destination);
+    }
+  }
+  return stagingDirectory;
+}
+
+const sourceDirectory = stageScannableSource();
+const fixtureDirectory = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'veritas-gitleaks-regression-'));
+try {
+  const repositoryScan = runGitleaks(
+    ['dir', '.', '--no-banner', '--redact=100', '--gitleaks-ignore-path', '.gitleaksignore'],
+    sourceDirectory
+  );
+  if (repositoryScan.status !== 0) {
+    fail('Gitleaks found a secret outside the reviewed fingerprint baseline.', repositoryScan);
+  }
+
+  const syntheticToken = ['sk', '_live_', '51Z9Y8X7W6V5U4T3S2Q1P0N9'].join('');
+  writeFileSync(join(fixtureDirectory, 'new-secret.env'), `payment_token=${syntheticToken}\n`);
+  const regressionScan = runGitleaks(
+    ['dir', '.', '--no-banner', '--redact=100', '--gitleaks-ignore-path', '/dev/null'],
+    fixtureDirectory
+  );
+  if (regressionScan.status !== 1) {
+    fail(
+      `Gitleaks regression fixture was not rejected (expected exit 1, got ${String(regressionScan.status)}).`,
+      regressionScan
+    );
+  }
+} finally {
+  rmSync(sourceDirectory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  rmSync(fixtureDirectory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+}
+
+console.log('Gitleaks accepted the reviewed baseline and rejected a newly introduced test secret.');
diff --git a/scripts/check-security-gates.mjs b/scripts/check-security-gates.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dfdb8933
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/check-security-gates.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';
+
+function yamlBlock(content, key, indentation) {
+  const prefix = ' '.repeat(indentation);
+  const startPattern = new RegExp(`^${prefix}${key}:\\s*$`, 'm');
+  const match = startPattern.exec(content);
+  if (!match) return '';
+
+  const rest = content.slice(match.index + match[0].length + 1);
+  const endPattern = new RegExp(`^${prefix}\\S`, 'm');
+  const end = endPattern.exec(rest);
+  return end ? rest.slice(0, end.index) : rest;
+}
+
+function normalizedPermissionLines(block) {
+  return block
+    .split('\n')
+    .map((line) => line.trim())
+    .filter(Boolean)
+    .sort();
+}
+
+export function findSecurityWorkflowViolations(content) {
+  const violations = [];
+  const hasRequiredEvents =
+    /^on:\s*$/m.test(content) &&
+    /^\s{2}pull_request:\s*$/m.test(content) &&
+    /^\s{2}push:\s*$/m.test(content) &&
+    /^\s{4}branches:\s*\[main\]\s*$/m.test(content) &&
+    /^\s{2}schedule:\s*$/m.test(content) &&
+    /^\s{4}- cron:\s*['"][^'"]+['"]\s*$/m.test(content);
+  if (!hasRequiredEvents) {
+    violations.push('security workflow must run for pull requests, main pushes, and a schedule');
+  }
+
+  const topPermissions = normalizedPermissionLines(yamlBlock(content, 'permissions', 0));
+  if (
+    topPermissions.length !== 1 ||
+    topPermissions[0] !== 'contents: read' ||
+    /^permissions:\s+write-all\s*$/m.test(content)
+  ) {
+    violations.push('top-level workflow permissions must be contents: read only');
+  }
+
+  const codeqlJob = yamlBlock(content, 'codeql', 2);
+  const codeqlPermissions = normalizedPermissionLines(yamlBlock(codeqlJob, 'permissions', 4));
+  if (
+    codeqlPermissions.length !== 2 ||
+    !codeqlPermissions.includes('contents: read') ||
+    !codeqlPermissions.includes('security-events: write')
+  ) {
+    violations.push('CodeQL job must grant only contents: read and security-events: write');
+  }
+  if (
+    !/uses:\s*github\/codeql-action\/init@[0-9a-f]{40}\s+#\s*\S+/.test(codeqlJob) ||
+    !/uses:\s*github\/codeql-action\/analyze@[0-9a-f]{40}\s+#\s*\S+/.test(codeqlJob)
+  ) {
+    violations.push('CodeQL init and analyze actions must both be present');
+  }
+
+  const gitleaksJob = yamlBlock(content, 'gitleaks', 2);
+  const gitleaksJobEnvironment = yamlBlock(gitleaksJob, 'env', 4);
+  if (/\$\{\{\s*runner\./.test(gitleaksJobEnvironment)) {
+    violations.push('runner context must not be used in job-level environment values');
+  }
+  const gitleaksPermissions = normalizedPermissionLines(yamlBlock(gitleaksJob, 'permissions', 4));
+  if (
+    gitleaksPermissions.length !== 1 ||
+    gitleaksPermissions[0] !== 'contents: read' ||
+    !/run:\s*pnpm check:gitleaks\s*$/.test(gitleaksJob)
+  ) {
+    violations.push('gitleaks job must run pnpm check:gitleaks with contents: read permission');
+  }
+
+  return violations;
+}
+
+export function findGitleaksIgnoreViolations(content) {
+  const violations = [];
+  let hasReviewComment = false;
+
+  content.split('\n').forEach((line, index) => {
+    const trimmed = line.trim();
+    if (!trimmed) {
+      hasReviewComment = false;
+      return;
+    }
+    if (trimmed.startsWith('#')) {
+      hasReviewComment = true;
+      return;
+    }
+    if (!hasReviewComment) {
+      violations.push(
+        `line ${index + 1}: every ignored fingerprint needs a preceding review comment`
+      );
+    }
+    if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_.\u002f-]+:[a-z0-9-]+:[1-9][0-9]*$/.test(trimmed)) {
+      violations.push(`line ${index + 1}: ignore must be an exact path:rule:line fingerprint`);
+    }
+  });
+
+  return violations;
+}
+
+export function checkSecurityGates({ workflow, gitleaksIgnore }) {
+  return [
+    ...findSecurityWorkflowViolations(workflow).map(
+      (message) => `.github/workflows/security.yml: ${message}`
+    ),
+    ...findGitleaksIgnoreViolations(gitleaksIgnore).map((message) => `.gitleaksignore: ${message}`),
+  ];
+}
+
+function main() {
+  const violations = checkSecurityGates({
+    workflow: readFileSync('.github/workflows/security.yml', 'utf8'),
+    gitleaksIgnore: readFileSync('.gitleaksignore', 'utf8'),
+  });
+
+  if (violations.length > 0) {
+    console.error('Security gate policy violations:');
+    for (const violation of violations) console.error(`- ${violation}`);
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  console.log('Security workflow and exact gitleaks fingerprint policy verified.');
+}
+
+if (process.argv[1] && pathToFileURL(process.argv[1]).href === import.meta.url) {
+  main();
+}
diff --git a/scripts/check-security-gates.test.mjs b/scripts/check-security-gates.test.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..019629a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/check-security-gates.test.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import test from 'node:test';
+
+import {
+  findGitleaksIgnoreViolations,
+  findSecurityWorkflowViolations,
+} from './check-security-gates.mjs';
+
+const SHA = 'db488ddef3bf6cb639b32c2e9a7c0a7ea8271d28';
+
+test('accepts a least-privilege scheduled CodeQL and gitleaks workflow', () => {
+  const workflow = `
+name: Security Gates
+on:
+  pull_request:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '17 9 * * 3'
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+jobs:
+  codeql:
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      security-events: write
+    steps:
+      - uses: github/codeql-action/init@${SHA} # v4.37.8
+      - uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@${SHA} # v4.37.8
+  gitleaks:
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+    steps:
+      - run: pnpm check:gitleaks
+`;
+
+  assert.deepEqual(findSecurityWorkflowViolations(workflow), []);
+});
+
+test('rejects missing schedules, broad permissions, and incomplete gates', () => {
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    findSecurityWorkflowViolations(`
+name: Security Gates
+on: [pull_request]
+permissions: write-all
+jobs:
+  codeql:
+    steps:
+      - uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4
+  gitleaks:
+    env:
+      GITLEAKS_BIN: \${{ runner.temp }}/gitleaks
+`),
+    [
+      'security workflow must run for pull requests, main pushes, and a schedule',
+      'top-level workflow permissions must be contents: read only',
+      'CodeQL job must grant only contents: read and security-events: write',
+      'CodeQL init and analyze actions must both be present',
+      'runner context must not be used in job-level environment values',
+      'gitleaks job must run pnpm check:gitleaks with contents: read permission',
+    ]
+  );
+});
+
+test('accepts exact gitleaks fingerprints with review comments', () => {
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    findGitleaksIgnoreViolations(
+      `# Reviewed synthetic fixture\nserver/src/example.test.ts:generic-api-key:42\n`
+    ),
+    []
+  );
+});
+
+test('rejects broad or undocumented gitleaks suppressions', () => {
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    findGitleaksIgnoreViolations(`server/.*\n# documented\n.*:generic-api-key:42\n`),
+    [
+      'line 1: every ignored fingerprint needs a preceding review comment',
+      'line 1: ignore must be an exact path:rule:line fingerprint',
+      'line 3: ignore must be an exact path:rule:line fingerprint',
+    ]
+  );
+});