feat(skills): improve DoubleClickjacking detection and coverage

strix/skills/coordination/root_agent.md

@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ Structure agents by function:
 - Business logic flaws
 - Infrastructure vulnerabilities
 
+**Sensitive Browser Confirmations**
+- For every browser workflow containing a security-sensitive or consequential user action—whether authenticated or unauthenticated—assign `browser_security` to the agent testing that workflow or create a dedicated UI-redressing agent. This includes actions that change protected state, grant authority, submit credentials, expose sensitive data, or cross a trust boundary.
+- Its task must cover both iframe and cross-window/DoubleClickjacking paths; framing protections close only iframe coverage.
+- A workflow crossing origins or ports remains eligible when every involved origin is an explicit scan target. Same-origin policy blocks DOM reads, not top-level navigation, popups, opener relationships, focus changes, or window closing; cross-origin separation alone does not close UI-redressing coverage.
+- Never expand authorization from a link alone. If a required origin is not an explicit target, leave the path `needs_follow_up` and do not claim clickjacking or the related workflow is cleared; scope expansion must come from scan configuration.
+
 **Exploitation and Validation**
 - Proof-of-concept development
 - Impact demonstration

strix/skills/vulnerabilities/browser_security.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: browser-security
-description: Browser-internals security testing for browsing-context relationships, postMessage, client-side path traversal, XS-Leaks, service workers, Web Workers, navigation behavior, CSP interactions, caches, and cross-origin state machines
+description: Browser-internals security testing for clickjacking, UI redressing, DoubleClickjacking, browsing-context relationships, postMessage, client-side path traversal, XS-Leaks, service workers, Web Workers, navigation behavior, CSP interactions, caches, and cross-origin state machines
 ---
 
 # Browser Security
@@ -43,6 +43,14 @@ Draw the context graph. Security checks on `event.origin`, `event.source`, or a
 - Check whether a blocked intermediate frame leaves a useful browsing-context relationship intact.
 - Use random per-flow names or `_blank` with `noopener` where an opener relationship is unnecessary.
 
+### Clickjacking and UI Redressing
+
+- **UI-redressing closure gate:** Never mark clickjacking as ruled out from `X-Frame-Options` or CSP `frame-ancestors` alone. Before closure, test both frame embedding and cross-window/popup retargeting.
+- Do not treat a different origin or port as protection against UI redressing. Same-origin policy blocks DOM access, not top-level navigation, `window.open()`, opener relationships, focus changes, or window closing. Test only explicitly authorized targets; if a required origin is outside scope, keep the path `needs_follow_up` and do not claim the vulnerability class is cleared.
+- For framed cases, prove the overlay and sensitive click. For DoubleClickjacking, use two real browser clicks and trace click 1 → window/focus/navigation/positioning change → click 2 → sensitive control. Never substitute scripted `.click()` calls.
+- Reproduce in the victim state required by the workflow—authenticated when necessary—with realistic user activation and stable geometry; capture window bounds and timing.
+- Verify a repeatable sensitive server-side state change with a recording or deterministic event trace and a negative control. If the sequence cannot be tested, record `needs_follow_up`, not `ruled_out`; unstable coordinates or no second-click impact are false positives.
+
 ### Client-Side Path Traversal
 
 Trace the complete source-to-request pipeline:
@@ -146,7 +154,7 @@ Also inspect DevTools network initiators, service workers, storage, CSP violatio
 
 ### Source Review
 
-- Search for `postMessage`, message listeners, `window.open`, named targets, opener/parent access, frame creation, and sandbox attributes.
+- Search for `postMessage`, message listeners, `window.open`, named targets, opener/parent access, frame creation, `dblclick`, `mousedown`/`mouseup`, focus/blur, move/resize, navigation handlers, and sandbox attributes.
 - Search for router parameter APIs flowing into `fetch`, Axios, navigation, or HTML rendering.
 - Search for service-worker registration, Cache API writes, worker constructors, Blob URLs, and dynamic imports.
 - Search for raw HTML sinks and trust escape hatches in every supported frontend framework.
@@ -161,7 +169,7 @@ Also inspect DevTools network initiators, service workers, storage, CSP violatio
 5. **Prove the primitive** - Data transfer, path change, state oracle, cache modification, or context capture.
 6. **Escalate deliberately** - Chain to a privileged action, sensitive disclosure, SSRF, or executable DOM sink.
 7. **Cross-browser check** - At minimum record Chromium/Firefox/Safari applicability when the primitive is browser-specific.
-8. **State interaction requirements** - Click, drag, popup permission, timing window, login state, and visual deception.
+8. **State interaction requirements** - Record each physical click or drag, popup permission state, active context, focus, geometry, navigation, timing window, login state, and visual deception.
 
 ## Validation
 
@@ -171,7 +179,7 @@ Also inspect DevTools network initiators, service workers, storage, CSP violatio
 4. For XS-Leaks, repeat randomized success/failure trials and quantify separation and noise.
 5. For workers/caches, show which later context consumes the modified data.
 6. For client-side traversal, capture the final network request and the security-relevant response/action.
-7. For interaction-dependent chains, provide a screen recording or deterministic event trace.
+7. For interaction-dependent chains, show both click targets, intermediate context changes, and the resulting sensitive state change in a recording or deterministic event trace.
 
 ## False Positives