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Merge b199b32dfd into ffa35e22d3
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4 changed files with 172 additions and 2 deletions
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@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ The skills are dynamically injected into the agent's system prompt, allowing it
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Notable source-aware skills:
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- `source_aware_whitebox` (coordination): white-box orchestration playbook
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- `source_aware_sast` (custom): semgrep/AST/secrets/supply-chain static triage workflow
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- `source_aware_sast` (custom): semgrep/Bandit/AST/secrets/supply-chain static triage workflow
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- `bandit` (tooling): Python AST triage, configuration/suppression review, scan completeness, and source-to-runtime validation
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- `dependency_cve_scanning` (custom): trivy-based SCA workflow for reporting known dependency CVEs via `create_dependency_report`
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- `npx_confusion` (custom): npx/npm exec/bunx fallback and adjacent package-runner identity confusion, with runner-specific registry and reporting gates
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- `semantic_confusion` (vulnerabilities): cross-boundary parser, normalization, and representation mismatch analysis
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@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ Increase white-box coverage by combining source-aware triage with dynamic valida
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## Source-Aware Triage Stack
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- `semgrep`: fast security-first triage and custom pattern scans
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- `bandit`: Python AST triage when Python source is present; load the `bandit`
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skill for scan-completeness checks and source-to-runtime validation
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- `ast-grep` (`sg`): structural pattern hunting and targeted repo mapping
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- `tree-sitter`: syntax-aware parsing support for symbol and route extraction
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- `gitleaks` + `trufflehog`: complementary secret detection (working tree and history coverage)
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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---
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name: source-aware-sast
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description: Practical source-aware SAST and AST playbook for semgrep, ast-grep, gitleaks, and trivy fs
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description: Practical source-aware SAST and AST playbook for semgrep, Python Bandit, ast-grep, gitleaks, and trivy fs
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---
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# Source-Aware SAST Playbook
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@ -78,6 +78,21 @@ semgrep scan --config auto --json --output /workspace/.source-aware/semgrep-auto
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If diff scope is active, restrict to changed files first, then expand only when needed.
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## Python-Specific Triage
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When the source map includes Python, use `load_skill(["bandit"])` and add a
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scoped Bandit pass alongside Semgrep. Bandit is already installed in the
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sandbox. The playbook covers JSON output, scan errors, configuration and
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`# nosec` suppressions, and the source-to-runtime handoff.
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Keep each service's artifacts separate. Check per-file metrics against
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`errors[]` and the expected scope before describing coverage: files that fail
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parsing can still have metrics, and an empty result list or a zero exit status
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can coexist with skipped files. Treat rule matches as hypotheses,
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trace the caller and closest control, and dynamically validate before reporting.
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Python authorization and business-logic paths still need manual review even
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when both scanners return no candidates.
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## AST-Grep Structural Mapping
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Use `sg` for structure-aware code hunting:
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152
strix/skills/tooling/bandit.md
Normal file
152
strix/skills/tooling/bandit.md
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@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
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---
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name: bandit
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description: Python source triage with Bandit, structured output, suppression review, and source-to-runtime validation without promoting scanner matches to confirmed vulnerabilities
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---
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# Bandit Python Triage
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Use Bandit when the source map includes Python. It is installed in the sandbox
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alongside Semgrep. Bandit recognizes Python AST patterns; it does not establish
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interprocedural taint flow, runtime reachability, or authorization coverage.
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Official references:
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- https://bandit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/man/bandit.html
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- https://bandit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/config.html
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- https://bandit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/formatters/json.html
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## Scoped First Pass
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Run from the Python repository root. For a monorepo, scan each relevant Python
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service separately. The command below scans the whole service. For a diff-scoped
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review, replace `-r .` with explicit changed Python file paths; Bandit does not
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infer Git diff scope. If that list is empty, skip the pass instead of falling
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back to a full-tree scan. Expand into callers and controls only as needed.
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Review the exclusions against the source map before running.
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```bash
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(
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set -eu
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ART_ROOT=/workspace/.source-aware
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mkdir -p "$ART_ROOT"
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ART=$(mktemp -d "$ART_ROOT/bandit-python.XXXXXX")
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printf 'Bandit artifacts: %s\n' "$ART"
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pwd -P > "$ART/source-root.txt"
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bandit --version > "$ART/bandit.version" 2>&1
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bandit_status=0
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bandit -r . --format json \
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--exclude '*/.venv/*,*/venv/*,*/node_modules/*,*/build/*,*/dist/*' \
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> "$ART/bandit.json" 2> "$ART/bandit.log" || bandit_status=$?
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printf '%s\n' "$bandit_status" > "$ART/bandit.exit"
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case "$bandit_status" in
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0|1) ;;
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*) cat "$ART/bandit.log" >&2; exit "$bandit_status" ;;
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esac
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)
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```
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Each run prints its artifact directory, records the source root, and preserves
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the scanner status. Findings can still make the scanner exit `1`; the shell
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block accepts `0`/`1` so the JSON can be inspected, and propagates other statuses.
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This does not classify coverage: check `errors[]` even when the block succeeds.
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Keep the default severity/confidence thresholds for the first pass; filtering
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can hide useful leads. To narrow a follow-up, select relevant test IDs with
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`--tests B307,B602` or prioritize with
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`--severity-level medium --confidence-level high`. Record the filters and any
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configuration restrictions with that run.
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## Configuration and Suppressions
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- Recursive scans can discover a repository's `.bandit` INI file. Inspect its
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`tests`, `skips`, and exclusions before interpreting the result.
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- YAML/TOML configuration requires an explicit `-c`, for example
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`bandit -r . -c pyproject.toml --format json`. Inspect the configuration first;
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a project's lint policy is not necessarily a sufficient security review.
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- `# nosec` suppresses matches. Review suppressed security-sensitive paths with
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a separate `--ignore-nosec` pass using the same scope and exclusions. Record
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the justification instead of assuming suppression proves safety.
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`--ignore-nosec` does not restore excluded files or skipped test IDs.
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- A JSON baseline supplied with `--baseline` hides existing matches. Do not use
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it as repository-wide coverage evidence, or add skips just to obtain a clean
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report.
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## Read Findings and Coverage Separately
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Exit code `1` can mean Bandit found candidates, not that execution failed. Do not
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hide the status with `--exit-zero` or an unconditional `|| true`.
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Inspect all of the following before claiming a pass completed:
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| Evidence | Interpretation |
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| --- | --- |
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| Exit status and stderr | Distinguish reported matches from configuration or execution failures |
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| `errors[]` | Files that could not be scanned, including syntax errors; mark their coverage incomplete even if exit status is zero |
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| Per-file entries in `metrics` | Files with recorded metrics, including files that failed parsing; cross-check against `errors[]` and the expected scope |
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| `results[]` | Candidate locations, not a list of verified vulnerabilities |
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Missing/invalid JSON, unexpected status, skipped expected files, or no analyzed
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Python files require investigation. An empty `results` array does not prove the
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repository is secure. Preserve version, target paths, configuration, exclusions,
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and filters with the output.
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For each candidate retain `test_id`, `filename`, `line_number`, `line_range`,
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`issue_severity`, `issue_confidence`, and any `issue_cwe`. Read the referenced
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function and callers locally. Raw JSON can contain source snippets and secrets;
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share only the minimal redacted evidence needed for validation.
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Rule severity and match confidence are separate from demonstrated impact and
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the final vulnerability severity.
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## Prioritize by Trust Boundary
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| Signal | Follow-up needed |
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| --- | --- |
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| `B307` (`eval`) | Trace the evaluated value back to an attacker-controlled entrypoint; distinguish literal expressions from untrusted input |
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| `B602` (`subprocess` with a shell) | Determine which command bytes an attacker controls and which validation runs before execution |
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| `B301` / `B506` (pickle / YAML loading) | Identify the input's origin, loader, and deployment preconditions before attempting deserialization validation |
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| `B608` (SQL construction) | Inspect the final database call and parameter binding; a string-construction match alone is insufficient |
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Import-only warnings, example credentials, and constant inputs are not enough to
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establish an exploit. Conversely, `shell=False` does not rule out argument
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injection, and an unreported wrapper is not proven safe. Keep manual source
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review and the relevant vulnerability skill in the workflow.
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## Source-to-Runtime Handoff
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For each plausible candidate, record:
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1. **Location:** repository-relative file, line, test ID, and dangerous operation.
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2. **Path:** entrypoint, caller chain, attacker-controlled value, and closest
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validation/authorization control. Inspect each reachable caller separately.
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3. **Preconditions:** account/role, deployment settings, and required input form.
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4. **Validation:** a bounded runtime test in the authorized target, the observed
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effect, and a negative control. Deduplicate with Semgrep only when the actual
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path and broken control are the same.
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For example, `bandit --tests B307 --format json example.py` flags both calls here:
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```python
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import ast
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def parse_value(text):
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return eval(text)
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def constant_value():
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return eval("42")
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def literal_value(text):
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return ast.literal_eval(text)
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```
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`parse_value` is a lead only if untrusted input reaches it. `constant_value`
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matches the same rule without establishing an attacker-controlled expression.
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`literal_value` is a negative control for B307, not proof against resource
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exhaustion or other vulnerability classes. Do not execute the suspicious code
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merely to collect scanner output; Bandit can analyze these functions statically.
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Load the matching vulnerability skill for dynamic validation. Promote a
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candidate to `create_vulnerability_report` only after the exploit is confirmed.
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If execution is unavailable or blocked, retain the hypothesis and explain the
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coverage limitation instead of reporting a verified vulnerability.
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