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docs: add a security policy
There is no SECURITY.md in any of the three locations GitHub reads, so the repository has no Security policy link and no documented private channel. A reporter is left choosing between a public issue, Discord, or the general hi@usestrix.com inbox. Add a SECURITY.md pointing at GitHub private vulnerability reporting and the public org address, with what to include, scope, and disclosure expectations. Scope is written around the boundary that matters for this project: Strix runs untrusted target content through an agent and writes artifacts a human later opens, so sandbox escape, credential and CA-key exposure, injection reached through the generated reports, and prompt injection escalating outside the sandbox are called out explicitly. It also states that findings Strix reports about a user's own target are not vulnerabilities in Strix.
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SECURITY.md
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# Security Policy
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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**Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues,
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pull requests, or Discord.**
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Report privately through one of these channels:
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1. **GitHub private vulnerability reporting** — open the
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[Security tab](https://github.com/usestrix/strix/security) and use *Report a
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vulnerability*. This keeps the report private, gives you a thread with the
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maintainers, and can lead to a published advisory and a CVE.
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2. **Email** — [hi@usestrix.com](mailto:hi@usestrix.com), with `SECURITY` in the
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subject line.
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## What to include
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A report is easiest to act on when it contains:
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- the affected component — the CLI, the sandbox container, the agent runtime,
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the report writer, or the viewer;
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- the version, from `strix --version`, and how it was installed;
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- what an attacker gains, and what access they need to start;
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- steps to reproduce, ideally a minimal case;
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- any logs, scan artifacts, or proof-of-concept output.
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Redact scan artifacts before sending them. A run directory can contain target
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hostnames, captured credentials, and request bodies from whatever was scanned.
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## Scope
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Strix runs untrusted target content through an agent and writes artifacts a
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human later opens, so the parts most worth reporting are the ones crossing that
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boundary:
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- sandbox escape, or anything giving the container more host access than the
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documented mounts and network policy;
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- exposure of LLM API keys, proxy-captured credentials, or the MITM CA key;
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- code execution or injection reached through scanned target content, including
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the generated reports — CSV, Markdown, PDF, SARIF and JSON;
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- prompt injection from a target that escalates into actions outside the
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sandbox.
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Findings that Strix reports about *your own* scan target are not
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vulnerabilities in Strix. Neither is a scan running against a host you are not
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authorised to test.
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## Supported versions
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Fixes land on the latest release. Given the current release cadence, upgrading
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to the newest version is the supported path rather than backports to older
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tags.
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## Disclosure
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Please give the maintainers a chance to ship a fix before publishing details.
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If you would like credit in the advisory, say so in your report.
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