Merge 6bb668ec2a into 976835194d

tests/conftest.py

@@ -2,9 +2,18 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import errno
+import os
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
 import pytest
 
 
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+    from pathlib import Path
+
+
 @pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
 def _isolate_mcp_config(
     monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path_factory: pytest.TempPathFactory
@@ -51,3 +60,94 @@ def _isolate_wallet_config(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
     """
     for name in ("MPPX_ACCOUNT", "MPPX_STRIPE_SECRET_KEY", "MPPX_STRIPE_PAYMENT_METHOD"):
         monkeypatch.delenv(name, raising=False)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _isolate_git_config(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path_factory: pytest.TempPathFactory
+) -> None:
+    """Run every `git` subprocess against empty global and system config.
+
+    Several tests build a throwaway repository and assert on what Git reports
+    about it. Git layers the developer's own configuration under that, so a
+    global `core.excludesFile` silently removes files from the source
+    selection tests, and `commit.gpgSign` or a `core.hooksPath` can fail the
+    commit outright. Point both config layers at a path that does not exist
+    and supply the identity the commits need, so the repository a test sees is
+    the one it created.
+    """
+    empty = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("git-isolation") / "absent.gitconfig"
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL", str(empty))
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM", str(empty))
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM", "1")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GIT_AUTHOR_NAME", "Strix Tests")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL", "tests@example.com")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GIT_COMMITTER_NAME", "Strix Tests")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL", "tests@example.com")
+
+
+# Errors that mean "this name is not representable here", as opposed to a
+# filesystem that is full, read-only, or otherwise broken.
+_REJECTED_NAME_ERRNOS = frozenset(
+    {errno.EINVAL, errno.EILSEQ, errno.ENAMETOOLONG},
+)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def write_control_character_file() -> Callable[[Path, str, str], Path]:
+    """Create a file whose *name* carries terminal control characters, or skip.
+
+    A few tests prove that Strix never echoes a filename back to the terminal
+    with its escape sequences intact, so they need a hostile name on disk to
+    have something to render. Windows rejects those characters in a filename
+    outright, so the file cannot be created and the injection the test guards
+    against is not reachable on that platform. Skip with the real `OSError`
+    rather than assert, so the POSIX contract keeps being exercised where it
+    applies and Windows does not report a product failure it does not have.
+    """
+
+    def _write(directory: Path, name: str, content: str = "{}") -> Path:
+        path = directory / name
+        try:
+            path.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
+        except OSError as exc:  # pragma: no cover - platform dependent
+            # Only "the name itself is unacceptable" is a reason to skip. A
+            # full disk or an unwritable temp directory must still fail these
+            # security tests rather than quietly reporting them as skipped.
+            if exc.errno not in _REJECTED_NAME_ERRNOS:
+                raise
+            pytest.skip(f"this filesystem rejects control characters in filenames: {exc}")
+        return path
+
+    return _write
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def assert_secret_file_permissions() -> Callable[[Path], None]:
+    """Assert a secret file is owner-only, or skip where that cannot hold.
+
+    `write_secret_text` opens secret files with `SECRET_FILE_MODE` (0o600).
+    Windows does not implement POSIX mode bits: `os.open` maps the mode down to
+    a single read-only flag, so `stat()` reports 0o666 no matter what was
+    requested, and confidentiality comes from the ACL on the user profile
+    instead. Asserting 0o600 there would fail forever without saying anything
+    about whether the file is actually protected.
+
+    Keep the POSIX assertion exact, and on Windows skip with that reason
+    spelled out, so the mode check is never quietly downgraded to something
+    weaker that still looks green.
+    """
+
+    def _assert(path: Path) -> None:
+        assert path.is_file(), f"{path} was not written"
+        if os.name == "nt":  # pragma: no cover - platform dependent
+            pytest.skip(
+                "Windows ignores POSIX mode bits, so a secret file always reports "
+                "0o666; its confidentiality comes from the user-profile ACL, which "
+                "this test does not assert"
+            )
+        assert path.stat().st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600, (
+            f"{path} is {path.stat().st_mode & 0o777:#o}, expected 0o600"
+        )
+
+    return _assert

tests/test_cloud_cli_runtime.py

@@ -282,11 +282,11 @@ def test_human_rendering_neutralizes_osc_and_csi_control_sequences() -> None:
 
 
 def test_source_prompt_shows_paths_and_literal_confirmation(
-    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, write_control_character_file: Any
 ) -> None:
     (tmp_path / "app.py").write_text("print('ok')\n", encoding="utf-8")
     dangerous_name = "visible\x1b]52;c;copied\x07\x1b[2J.py"
-    (tmp_path / dangerous_name).write_text("print('safe')\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    write_control_character_file(tmp_path, dangerous_name, "print('safe')\n")
     output = io.StringIO()
     console = Console(file=output, width=100)
     prompts: list[tuple[str, bool]] = []

tests/test_cloud_session.py

@@ -163,4 +163,12 @@ def test_cli_device_identity_is_stable_and_privacy_safe(
     second = platform_identity.read_or_create_identity(device_name="  Build   laptop  ")
     assert second["client_instance_id"] == first["client_instance_id"]
     assert second["device_name"] == "Build laptop"
-    assert path.stat().st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600
+
+
+def test_cli_identity_file_is_owner_only(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, assert_secret_file_permissions: Any
+) -> None:
+    path = tmp_path / "cli-identity.json"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(platform_identity, "IDENTITY_PATH", path)
+    platform_identity.read_or_create_identity()
+    assert_secret_file_permissions(path)

tests/test_completions.py

@@ -128,12 +128,12 @@ def test_filesystem_completion_for_source_output_and_data(tmp_path: Any, monkeyp
 
 
 def test_filesystem_completion_omits_terminal_control_names(
-    tmp_path: Any, monkeypatch: Any, capsys: Any
+    tmp_path: Any, monkeypatch: Any, capsys: Any, write_control_character_file: Any
 ) -> None:
     monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
     (tmp_path / "safe.json").write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")
-    (tmp_path / "unsafe\nname.json").write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")
-    (tmp_path / "unsafe\x1b]52;c;payload\x07.json").write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")
+    write_control_character_file(tmp_path, "unsafe\nname.json")
+    write_control_character_file(tmp_path, "unsafe\x1b]52;c;payload\x07.json")
 
     words = ["cloud", "scans", "start", "--data", "@"]
     assert completion_candidates(words) == ["@safe.json"]

tests/test_local_sources.py

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import argparse
+import os
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
@@ -177,8 +178,24 @@ def test_check_mountable_dir_accepts_a_project_under_the_home_root(
 
 
 def test_infer_target_type_applies_the_mount_policy() -> None:
+    # `infer_target_type` only reaches the mount policy for a path that exists,
+    # so pick a protected system directory this platform actually has. The
+    # policy itself already knows about both families (`_FORBIDDEN_MOUNT_TREES`
+    # and `_FORBIDDEN_WINDOWS_TREE_NAMES`); only the fixture was Unix-only.
+    if os.name == "nt":
+        # Ask Windows where it is installed. Deriving the drive from the
+        # checkout would look for D:\Windows on a repo cloned to D:, miss, and
+        # skip the very branch this test exists to cover.
+        system_root = os.environ.get("SYSTEMROOT") or os.environ.get("WINDIR")
+        candidates = [Path(system_root)] if system_root else []
+    else:
+        candidates = [Path("/etc"), Path("/usr")]
+    system_dir = next((p for p in candidates if p.is_dir()), None)
+    if system_dir is None:
+        pytest.skip("no protected system directory on this platform")
+
     with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Refusing to mount"):
-        infer_target_type("/etc")
+        infer_target_type(str(system_dir))
 
 
 def test_read_target_list_file_strips_blank_lines(tmp_path: Path) -> None:

tests/test_threat_model_tool.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import shutil
 import subprocess
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
 
@@ -46,8 +47,14 @@ self-scoped information leak. Low: verbose errors.
 """
 
 
+_GIT = shutil.which("git")
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(_GIT is None, reason="these tests need a git executable")
+
+
 def _git(repo: Path, *args: str) -> None:
-    subprocess.run(["/usr/bin/env", "git", *args], cwd=repo, check=True)  # noqa: S603
+    assert _GIT is not None
+    subprocess.run([_GIT, *args], cwd=repo, check=True)  # noqa: S603
 
 
 def _make_repo(tmp_path: Path, name: str = "repo") -> Path:

tests/test_viewer_auth.py

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import stat
 from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
 
@@ -86,10 +85,9 @@ def test_is_verified_accepts_epoch_expiry() -> None:
     assert auth.is_verified() is True
 
 
-def test_write_auth_is_0600() -> None:
+def test_write_auth_is_0600(assert_secret_file_permissions: Any) -> None:
     auth.write_auth(email="a@b.com", token="t", verified_at="")  # nosec B106
-    mode = stat.S_IMODE(auth.AUTH_PATH.stat().st_mode)
-    assert mode == 0o600
+    assert_secret_file_permissions(auth.AUTH_PATH)
 
 
 def test_read_auth_rejects_incomplete_record() -> None: