The deletion-safety thread guarded the CLI (`--force`) and the MCP tool
(`confirm_space`), but `DELETE /api/v2/repos/{id}` itself still cascade-
deleted a fully populated space — every checkpoint, session, and turn —
with no server-side check. Any client that bypassed the CLI/MCP guards
(a direct API call, the web UI, a future client) reopened the incident
path.
Gate the route: `delete_repo` now counts the space's checkpoints and
refuses with 409 plus a structured detail (`message`, `checkpoint_count`,
`requires_force`) unless `?force=true` is passed — the same shape as the
`checkpoint delete` dependent-guard. An empty space still deletes with no
force.
Wire the existing clients through the new signal so their behavior is
unchanged: the CLI passes `force=args.force` (its own `--force` gate),
the MCP tool passes `force=true` after its `confirm_space` gate, and
quickstart passes `force=true` to tear down its own demo space.
A destructive-operations incident: `smriti space delete <space> -y`
cascade-deleted a fully populated space. `-y` skipped the only gate (the
confirmation prompt), and `cmd_space_delete` never checked how much the
space held — so one flag irreversibly deleted the space and every
checkpoint, session, and turn under it.
Gate destructive deletes in `cmd_space_delete`: a space that holds
checkpoints, or that the current repo is attached to (.smriti.json), now
requires an explicit `--force` — `-y` alone is refused, with a message
naming the reason and the flag. `--force` and `-y` stay orthogonal, the
same shape as `checkpoint delete --cascade`. Empty, unattached spaces keep
the existing `-y` convenience. CLI-side only; no backend change.