- Remove 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval' from script-src directive
- Restrict connect-src to 'self' only
- Disable nginx server_tokens to hide version information
Signed-off-by: wurongjie <wurongjie@uniontech.com>
RouteSecurityPolicyRegistry keeps two policy lists — AUTHORIZATION_POLICIES for
session/cookie access and API_TOKEN_POLICIES for Bearer tokens — with nothing
keeping them in step. Routes the authorization list opens but the token list
never registers fall through to the catch-all and answer
API token cannot access endpoint: <path>.
Register the routes reported in #713 (/api/v1/labels, the star and rating
writes) plus the same-class gaps for /api/v1/auth/methods and paths below
/api/v1/download, and add a guard test that walks the authorization list and
fails when a route is neither token-reachable nor declared session-only.
DELETE /api/v1/skills/{id}/star also matched the SUPER_ADMIN rule for
DELETE /api/v1/skills/*/*, so un-starring was refused for ordinary accounts on
the session path too. Star and rating writes now have their own authorization
entries ahead of that rule.
Closes#713
Signed-off-by: FenjuFu <fufenjupku@gmail.com>
A deployment that stands up its own organisation-wide namespace — to use
instead of the built-in global one — finds it invisible to everybody. The
namespace listing only returns namespaces the caller belongs to, and the
only thing that ever added members automatically was hard-wired to the slug
"global".
Make that list a setting. namespace.default-membership holds the slugs every
newly activated account is enrolled in, defaulting to ["global"], which is
what every deployment did before. Publishing only requires membership of any
role, so being enrolled is enough to publish there; no extra grant needed.
GlobalNamespaceMembershipService becomes DefaultNamespaceMembershipService,
since it no longer means one specific namespace.
Where the strictness sits:
- Saving validates every slug resolves to an ACTIVE namespace, so a typo
fails at the moment an administrator makes it.
- Enrolling tolerates a slug that no longer resolves: it logs and skips.
A namespace that was deleted or renamed must not cost somebody their
login.
Adding a namespace to the list after people have signed up leaves them out,
the same trap the personal-namespace work hit, so this ships with the same
preview-then-apply backfill.
Verified against a real PostgreSQL, end to end: create a namespace, reject an
unknown slug, save with whitespace and duplicates and see them normalised,
preview, apply, re-preview showing nothing left, and a fresh registration
landing in the global namespace, the new shared one, and its own personal one
at once.
Self-hosted deployments want every new account to have somewhere of its
own to publish, without asking an administrator for a namespace first and
without pushing drafts into `global`.
Add an operator-controlled policy, off by default so upgrading changes no
behaviour. When enabled, an account that becomes usable gets a namespace
it owns. "Private" here means a team namespace whose only member is that
account: namespaces have no visibility flag, and skill visibility stays a
property of each skill.
Trigger points. UserActivatedEvent is published wherever an account first
becomes usable:
- LocalAuthService.register
- IdentityBindingService.bindOrCreate, for ACTIVE first logins
- AdminUserAppService.updateUserStatus, on a transition into ACTIVE
The third matters for deployments that gate access behind approval: those
accounts are created PENDING at the first OAuth attempt and only become
usable when an administrator approves them.
Why an AFTER_COMMIT listener rather than a call alongside
GlobalNamespaceMembershipService.ensureMember. Both namespace.created_by
and namespace_member.user_id reference user_account(id), which rules out
each obvious alternative:
- Joining the registration transaction lets a slug clash roll the
registration back, so a namespace failure costs the user their account
— or, on OAuth, their login.
- Suspending it with REQUIRES_NEW leaves the new transaction unable to see
the uncommitted user_account row, so the foreign key check blocks on the
outer transaction's row lock and the two wait on each other.
Provisioning after commit avoids both. The listener is deliberately not
@Async, so the namespace exists by the time the user's next request
arrives, and it swallows failures.
Naming. Two templates over ${username}, ${email_prefix} and ${user_id};
unknown placeholders are left in place so a typo is visible rather than
silently dropped. ${username} falls back to the email local part and then
to the user id. Slugs go through the existing slug rules, which is why the
console renders a live preview: underscores are not legal in a slug, so
`${username}_space` yields `alice-space`. A taken or reserved candidate
gets a numeric suffix, so `admin` becomes `admin-2`. Owning any non-global
namespace already skips provisioning, which keeps re-enabling an account
from handing out a second one.
The templates are not exposed in application.yml: they contain ${...},
which Spring would resolve as property references, and Boot 3.2 predates
placeholder escaping. Only the enable flag lives there; templates are set
in the console and default from PersonalNamespaceProvisioningProperties.
Updating the policy writes an audit entry with the before and after.
OAuth2AuthorizationRequestRedirectFilter invokes the resolver on every
request in the chain and the delegate answers null for anything that is
not an authorization request. Recording the return target on those calls
cleared it again on the next request without a returnTo parameter — the
provider callback included, which this filter processes before login
succeeds. The success handler therefore always found an empty session
attribute and fell back to the default target, so returnTo never worked.
Guard the write on a non-null authorization request. As a side effect,
anonymous API requests no longer allocate a session via getSession().
Signed-off-by: Gal Eyal <gal.e@popai.health>
* fix(api): tell callers why a request was forbidden
The scope filter already computes an exact reason ("Missing API token
scope: skill:delete", "API token cannot access endpoint: /x") and the
access-denied handler discarded it, returning a bare "Forbidden" for
every case: missing scope, endpoint closed to API tokens, and paths
that simply don't exist. Clients cannot tell those apart, so they
guess — the published CLI reports every 403 as "token may lack
required scope", which sent us debugging token scopes for an hour when
the real causes were a revoked token and a mistyped namespace path.
The reason now rides in the response via a new error.forbidden.detail
message (en + zh), and is logged alongside the exception type.
Signed-off-by: Gal Eyal <gal.e@popai.health>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): safely expose API token denial reasons
Signed-off-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
The shared RedisTemplate uses GenericJackson2JsonRedisSerializer with
the application ObjectMapper, which embeds no type information, so
stored DeviceCodeData deserializes as a LinkedHashMap. The typed casts
in pollToken and authorizeDeviceCode then throw ClassCastException on
every call, making the whole device authorization flow unusable
(every poll returns 500).
Convert the raw value with ObjectMapper.convertValue instead of
casting; this reads both the current untyped map format and any typed
format, so no stored-data migration is needed. Adds bean setters to
DeviceCodeData for map conversion and regression tests that feed the
service exactly what Redis returns in production (untyped maps).
Fixes#604
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Gal Eyal <gal.e@popai.health>
* fix(auth): use SimpleUrlAuthenticationSuccessHandler for OAuth2 login
Replace SavedRequestAwareAuthenticationSuccessHandler with
SimpleUrlAuthenticationSuccessHandler to prevent redirecting to
saved API requests after OAuth2 login.
Previously, when a user accessed a protected API endpoint (e.g.,
/api/web/skills) without authentication, Spring Security would save
that request. After OAuth2 login, the handler would redirect back to
the API endpoint instead of the dashboard.
Now the handler only uses:
- returnTo parameter from session (if present)
- default target URL (/dashboard) as fallback
* test(auth): add regression for OAuth2 success redirect; restore clearAuthenticationAttributes
Cover the no-returnTo + cached-API-request branch with HttpSessionRequestCache so
the original bug (post-login redirect resolving to /api/web/skills) cannot be
silently reintroduced. Also restore clearAuthenticationAttributes() in the
returnTo branch so it stays symmetric with the default branch (super clears it).
---------
Co-authored-by: xiose <huyanlin@nuaa.edu.cn>
ApiTokenAuthenticationFilter authenticates /api/cli/** Bearer tokens
but ApiTokenScopeFilter.shouldNotFilter() previously skipped them.
The result: API token requests on CLI routes were authenticated and
authorization-policy-checked, but scope enforcement never ran. Tokens
without skill:publish or skill:delete could call /publish, /publish/validate,
and DELETE despite the policy table requiring those scopes.
Add /api/cli/ to the scope filter's covered prefixes and a filter-level
test that confirms a token missing skill:publish is rejected on the new
validate endpoint. Update the existing CLI controller tests to grant
the appropriate SCOPE_* authorities to their api_token principals so
they continue to pass under enforced scopes.
Fix three blockers and one contract drift issue surfaced in code review:
1. API token policy: add skill:publish scope policy and authentication
policy for /api/cli/v1/skills/*/publish/validate. Without these the
AntPathMatcher pattern /publish would not cover /publish/validate,
so Bearer-token requests would be rejected by the scope filter.
2. Warnings semantics: dry-run now treats warnings as making valid=false.
The CLI publish flow uses confirmWarnings=false, so the real publish
rejects any warnings; dry-run must mirror that to avoid false positives.
3. Visibility parameter: validate endpoint now accepts the same
visibility multipart field as publish. The CLI forwards --visibility
so invalid values are caught at dry-run time rather than at publish.
4. Schema drift: resolvedSlug and resolvedVersion are nullable in
practice (returned as null when validation fails before resolution).
Updated schema.d.ts to reflect string | null instead of optional string.
Tests added:
- RouteSecurityPolicyRegistryTest: validate endpoint scope check
- CliDryRunValidateTest: custom + invalid visibility cases
- publish-dry-run.test.ts: --visibility forwarded to server
* feat(publish): increase max file count from 100 to 500
Configurable via SKILLHUB_PUBLISH_MAX_FILE_COUNT env var.
* feat(publish): support SKILL.md in subdirectory with warning for ignored files
When SKILL.md is found in a single subdirectory (e.g. my-skill/SKILL.md),
promote that directory's contents to root and discard files outside it.
Discarded files are reported as warnings through the existing confirm flow.
* feat(publish): pass extraction warnings through confirm flow
When files are ignored during SKILL.md subdirectory promotion,
warnings are surfaced to the user via the existing precheck confirm dialog.
* fix(security): add invalidSessionStrategy to return 401 on expired session
Handles the case where Spring Security detects an invalid session cookie,
returning a clean 401 JSON response instead of triggering cascading exceptions.
Closes#360 (part 1/2)
* fix(security): handle session invalidation IllegalStateException as 401
Catches IllegalStateException with "Session was invalidated" message and
returns 401 instead of letting it fall through to the generic 500 handler.
Non-session IllegalStateExceptions are re-thrown to the catch-all handler.
Closes#360 (part 2/2)
* feat(publish): filter macOS metadata and add integration tests
Skip __MACOSX/, .DS_Store, and ._ resource fork entries during zip
extraction. Add integration tests for nested SKILL.md warning flow,
session invalidation 401 response, and macOS metadata filtering.
* test(publish): add real-world macOS zip and edge case integration tests
Covers: macOS zip with nested SKILL.md + __MACOSX + .DS_Store + stray files,
simple macOS single-folder case, and missing SKILL.md fallback behavior.
Enable API token authentication for CLI endpoints by adding /api/cli/
to the filter's path whitelist. Previously, CLI endpoints were not
processed by the token authentication filter, causing all Bearer token
requests to fail with 401.
Revert emailVerified check in EmailDomainAccessPolicy to preserve
backward compatibility with GitHub/GitLab OAuth users. Instead, null
unverified emails in CustomOidcUserService.toOAuthClaims() so
EmailDomainAccessPolicy naturally denies them via null email.
Add SLF4J logging to CustomOidcUserService for OIDC authentication
flow tracing and failure diagnostics.
Add registration ID collision warning to deployment docs.
- Add null/blank validation for OIDC sub claim in CustomOidcUserService
- Throw OAuth2AuthenticationException when sub is missing or blank
- Complete .env.release.example with all required OIDC environment variables
- Add test cases for sub validation and providerLogin fallback scenarios
- All 5 tests passing
