* feat(auth): expose skill lifecycle routes to API tokens
With an API token, v0.2.19 can remove a whole skill (DELETE
/api/v1/skills/{ns}/{slug} with skill:delete) but cannot archive or
unarchive a skill, nor delete a single draft/rejected version. Those
three routes are opened by AUTHORIZATION_POLICIES (authenticated
fallback) yet have no entry in API_TOKEN_POLICIES, so a bearer request
falls through to "unsupported" and is rejected with 403.
That contradicts the contract written above SESSION_ONLY_ROUTES in
RouteSecurityPolicyRegistry: bearer tokens are rejected on exactly the
listed session-only routes and nowhere else, and anything else the
authorization list opens must be reachable with a token holding the
required scope.
Add API-token policies for both the /api/v1 and /api/web prefixes that
SkillLifecycleController serves:
- POST .../skills/{ns}/{slug}/archive and .../unarchive require
skill:publish. They are owner-level operations, gated by the same
assertCanManageLifecycle check as publishing, so they sit at the same
scope tier.
- DELETE .../skills/{ns}/{slug}/versions/{version} requires
skill:delete, matching the existing whole-skill delete.
Whole-skill DELETE on /api/web stays session-only as documented; the
new version-delete pattern does not overlap it. No scope allow-list
exists outside the registry (TokenController and ApiTokenScopeService
accept any scope string), so no other change is needed for tokens to
carry these scopes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DdnYX4jTS3JwMMP9JCGxzU
* feat(skills): let skill owners yank a published version
Yanking a published version is only available through
POST /api/v1/admin/skills/versions/{versionId}/yank, which is
session-only (SESSION_ONLY_ROUTES covers /api/v1/admin/**) and requires
SKILL_ADMIN or SUPER_ADMIN. A skill owner therefore cannot pull a
broken release themselves, neither from the web surface nor from a
script holding an API token.
In package registries yank is an act of the publisher: `cargo yank`
and PyPI's "yank release" are performed by the package owner, not by a
registry admin, because the goal is to stop new installs of a bad
release while keeping the artifact available for lock files. SkillHub
already lets owners archive, unarchive, rerelease and delete draft
versions through SkillLifecycleController under the
assertCanManageLifecycle rule (owner, or namespace ADMIN/OWNER); yank
belongs on the same surface with the same rule.
Changes:
- SkillGovernanceService: add an owner-checked yankVersion(skill,
version, actor, roles, ip, ua, reason) that runs
assertCanManageLifecycle and then the same yank logic as the admin
variant, now shared in yankVersionInternal. The admin entry point is
unchanged for AdminSkillController.
- SkillLifecycleAppService / GovernanceWorkflowAppService: resolve
skill and version by namespace/slug/version, delegate to the new
domain method, and return SkillLifecycleMutationResponse with action
YANK and the resulting version status. The YANK_SKILL_VERSION audit
record and SkillVersionYankedEvent are emitted by the domain service
exactly as for the admin path.
- SkillLifecycleController: POST /{namespace}/{slug}/versions/{version}/yank
on both /api/v1/skills and /api/web/skills, optional body
AdminSkillActionRequest (reason).
- RouteSecurityPolicyRegistry: require skill:yank for the new route on
both prefixes, so tokens can reach it as the SESSION_ONLY_ROUTES
comment promises for every route the authorization list opens. The
admin yank stays session-only. No allow-list of scopes exists outside
the registry; the docs' scope enumeration is updated to include
skill:yank.
- Tests: RouteSecurityPolicyRegistryTest (scope required on both
prefixes, admin route still closed), SkillGovernanceServiceTest
(owner and namespace ADMIN allowed, MEMBER forbidden, unpublished
rejected), SkillLifecycleControllerTest (envelope with and without
body).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DdnYX4jTS3JwMMP9JCGxzU
* fix(auth): complete API token lifecycle access
Signed-off-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(skills): align owner lifecycle token access
Signed-off-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Thiago Nascimento Nogueira <thiago.nascimento.nogueira@emeal.nttdata.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(auth): expose skill lifecycle routes to API tokens
With an API token, v0.2.19 can remove a whole skill (DELETE
/api/v1/skills/{ns}/{slug} with skill:delete) but cannot archive or
unarchive a skill, nor delete a single draft/rejected version. Those
three routes are opened by AUTHORIZATION_POLICIES (authenticated
fallback) yet have no entry in API_TOKEN_POLICIES, so a bearer request
falls through to "unsupported" and is rejected with 403.
That contradicts the contract written above SESSION_ONLY_ROUTES in
RouteSecurityPolicyRegistry: bearer tokens are rejected on exactly the
listed session-only routes and nowhere else, and anything else the
authorization list opens must be reachable with a token holding the
required scope.
Add API-token policies for both the /api/v1 and /api/web prefixes that
SkillLifecycleController serves:
- POST .../skills/{ns}/{slug}/archive and .../unarchive require
skill:publish. They are owner-level operations, gated by the same
assertCanManageLifecycle check as publishing, so they sit at the same
scope tier.
- DELETE .../skills/{ns}/{slug}/versions/{version} requires
skill:delete, matching the existing whole-skill delete.
Whole-skill DELETE on /api/web stays session-only as documented; the
new version-delete pattern does not overlap it. No scope allow-list
exists outside the registry (TokenController and ApiTokenScopeService
accept any scope string), so no other change is needed for tokens to
carry these scopes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DdnYX4jTS3JwMMP9JCGxzU
* fix(auth): complete API token lifecycle access
Signed-off-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Thiago Nascimento Nogueira <thiago.nascimento.nogueira@emeal.nttdata.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(api): tell callers why a request was forbidden
The scope filter already computes an exact reason ("Missing API token
scope: skill:delete", "API token cannot access endpoint: /x") and the
access-denied handler discarded it, returning a bare "Forbidden" for
every case: missing scope, endpoint closed to API tokens, and paths
that simply don't exist. Clients cannot tell those apart, so they
guess — the published CLI reports every 403 as "token may lack
required scope", which sent us debugging token scopes for an hour when
the real causes were a revoked token and a mistyped namespace path.
The reason now rides in the response via a new error.forbidden.detail
message (en + zh), and is logged alongside the exception type.
Signed-off-by: Gal Eyal <gal.e@popai.health>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): safely expose API token denial reasons
Signed-off-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: XiaoSeS <87064762+XiaoSeS@users.noreply.github.com>
