open-webui/backend
Classic298 e038bab66d
Authorize POST /api/v1/images/edit (enforce ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT + image-gen permission) (#26009)
The direct image-edit route was the only image-edit surface with no authorization: it ran
on get_verified_user alone, while POST /generations enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_GENERATION +
features.image_generation and the built-in edit_image tool enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT +
features.image_generation. A verified non-admin user could therefore reach the configured
image-edit provider (spending IMAGES_EDIT_OPENAI_API_KEY) even when the administrator had
globally disabled image editing (ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False) or denied the user image
generation.

Split the route from the shared impl (mirroring generate_images/image_generations): the new
/edit wrapper enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT and the per-user image-generation permission, then
delegates to image_edits(). The internal callers (the edit_image tool and the chat
middleware) already gate themselves and call image_edits() directly, so they are unaffected.

Co-authored-by: jagstack <52110932+jagstack@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-17 03:05:41 +02:00
..
data refac: mv backend files to /open_webui dir 2024-09-04 16:54:48 +02:00
open_webui Authorize POST /api/v1/images/edit (enforce ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT + image-gen permission) (#26009) 2026-06-17 03:05:41 +02:00
.dockerignore fix: litellm config issue 2024-02-24 22:35:11 -08:00
.gitignore refac 2024-09-06 04:59:20 +02:00
dev.sh refac 2026-03-24 19:43:30 -05:00
requirements-min.txt refac 2026-04-24 18:20:10 +09:00
requirements.txt refac 2026-06-01 12:24:45 -07:00
start.sh refac 2026-06-17 03:01:11 +02:00
start_windows.bat refac 2026-06-17 03:01:11 +02:00