The history diff, delete, and version-restore routes authorize the URL
prompt_id but then act on a caller-supplied history/version id without
checking it belongs to that prompt (IDOR). Filter by prompt_id in
compute_diff and delete_history_entry, and reject a cross-prompt version_id
in update_prompt_version.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
update_chat_by_id re-derived assistant content from `output` on every
save (serialize_output) so frontend edits to output items reflect in
content. But it ran unconditionally, so content set independently of
output — an __event_emitter__ {"type":"replace"} from an Action, or an
outlet filter footer — was reverted to the original output-derived text
on the next save. The reload reads chat.chat directly, so the change
vanished after navigating away (regression vs 0.9.2, which predates the
output mechanism).
Re-derive only when the message's `output` actually changed versus what's
stored, which still reflects genuine output edits but leaves
independently-set content intact.
Fixes#24585
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Symptom
On a fresh install (zero users) the frontend shows the mandatory
"Create Admin Account" onboarding screen, but POST
/api/v1/auths/signup returns 403 ACCESS_PROHIBITED ("You do not have
permission to access this resource."). Wiping the database does not
help when the config layer is backed by Redis (the value survives in
the Redis/valkey volume), or when only the user table is cleared (the
config row survives in Postgres). The instance is then unrecoverable
through the UI.
Root cause
signup_handler() auto-sets request.app.state.config.ENABLE_SIGNUP =
False immediately after the first admin is created. That value is
persisted by the config layer (the Postgres config table, and Redis
when REDIS_URL is set). On a later zero-user database the persisted
False is read back, so ENABLE_SIGNUP resolves False even though no
users exist. The old gate was:
if WEBUI_AUTH:
if not ENABLE_SIGNUP or not ENABLE_LOGIN_FORM:
if has_users or not ENABLE_INITIAL_ADMIN_SIGNUP:
403
ENABLE_INITIAL_ADMIN_SIGNUP defaults to False, so with zero users the
inner test (has_users or not ENABLE_INITIAL_ADMIN_SIGNUP) is True, and
a stale ENABLE_SIGNUP=False trips the outer test, producing a 403 on
the only UI path that can create the first admin. The frontend decides
to show onboarding purely from user_count == 0, so frontend and
backend disagree and the instance bricks.
Change
Split the gate by has_users. Subsequent signups (has_users True) are
unchanged: still gated by ENABLE_SIGNUP and ENABLE_LOGIN_FORM. The
first user (has_users False, the bootstrap admin the onboarding screen
invites) is gated only by the admin-chosen ENABLE_LOGIN_FORM (the
documented SSO-only hard-disable) unless ENABLE_INITIAL_ADMIN_SIGNUP is
set. It is no longer gated by ENABLE_SIGNUP, which in the zero-user
state is never an admin decision but the post-first-admin auto-disable
leaking across a database reset.
Why this is safe (full case analysis)
For WEBUI_AUTH the gate has 16 input combinations over (has_users,
ENABLE_SIGNUP, ENABLE_LOGIN_FORM, ENABLE_INITIAL_ADMIN_SIGNUP). Old and
new are identical in 15 of them:
* All 8 has_users=True cases: both reduce to "403 iff not
ENABLE_SIGNUP or not ENABLE_LOGIN_FORM". Unchanged.
* 7 of the 8 has_users=False cases: identical.
The only changed case is has_users=False, ENABLE_SIGNUP=False,
ENABLE_LOGIN_FORM=True, ENABLE_INITIAL_ADMIN_SIGNUP=False: old
behaviour 403, new behaviour allow. The new condition is a strict
subset of the old (new-403 implies old-403), so the change never newly
blocks any request that previously succeeded; it only stops blocking
that one bootstrap state.
That state has no legitimate deployment. With the login form enabled
and zero users the onboarding form is already served, and the only
operator-configurable way to keep the first signup closed (SSO-only:
ENABLE_LOGIN_FORM=False, optionally with ENABLE_INITIAL_ADMIN_SIGNUP)
is preserved byte for byte. ENABLE_SIGNUP=False with zero users is not
an operator choice, it is the automatic post-first-admin disable, so
the old behaviour there was purely a brick with no recovery path. No
security control is weakened: ENABLE_LOGIN_FORM and
ENABLE_INITIAL_ADMIN_SIGNUP keep their exact meaning, and the
WEBUI_AUTH=False path is untouched.
This is not Redis-specific: it reproduces with Redis disabled through
the Postgres config table alone (clear the user table, keep the config
row).
Verification
Drove the real signup endpoint across a 10-case matrix on freshly
migrated databases, including the full end-to-end first-admin creation
(returns role=admin, row persisted as admin) and the preserved
SSO-only, subsequent-signup and no-auth behaviours. All pass.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
aiohttp's ClientResponse.json() validates the Content-Type header against
'application/json' by default and raises ContentTypeError for any other
value — including 'application/x-ndjson', which Ollama returns for its
OpenAI-compatible /v1/images/generations endpoint.
Pass content_type=None to skip this check while keeping all other parsing
behaviour unchanged. The fix covers image generation (openai, gemini,
automatic1111 engines) and image editing (openai, gemini engines).
The proxy gathered _client_to_upstream and _upstream_to_client with
return_exceptions=True. When upstream sends a graceful CLOSE,
_upstream_to_client returns but gather keeps waiting on
_client_to_upstream, which is blocked in ws.receive() until the browser
disconnects. The handler stays pending and the finally: session.close()
cleanup is deferred, leaking a ClientSession and an open browser socket.
Use asyncio.wait(return_when=FIRST_COMPLETED) and cancel the pending
sibling, so the proxy unwinds as soon as either direction finishes. The
pumps' bare except Exception already lets CancelledError (a BaseException)
propagate, so cancellation is clean and they need no change.
Fixes#25464
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
_sanitize_proxy_path decoded the proxy path once before the '..' check, so a double-encoded payload (%252e%252e) survived the check as %2e%2e and was then re-decoded into '..' by the upstream terminal server, defeating the traversal guard. Decode until stable so no encoded traversal sequence can reach the upstream. Single-encoded payloads were already rejected; this closes the double (and deeper) encoding bypass.
Co-authored-by: sermikr0 <230672901+sermikr0@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
bypass_system_prompt is an internal flag used by utils/middleware.py and utils/chat.py to skip applying the model system prompt on recursive base-model calls, but it was still declared as a positional argument on the openai/ollama chat-completion route handlers, so FastAPI bound it from the query string. Move it to request.state so external clients cannot set it, matching how bypass_filter is handled.
Drop the argument from both route signatures and read getattr(request.state, 'bypass_system_prompt', False); utils/chat.py sets request.state.bypass_system_prompt alongside bypass_filter and drops the kwarg from the two route-handler calls (the recursive self-calls keep it). Mirrors c0385f60b.
Co-authored-by: anishgirianish <161533316+anishgirianish@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ModelMeta.profile_image_url now runs validate_profile_image_url, rejecting SVG/script data URIs (matching UserUpdateForm and ChannelWebhookForm). The /model/profile/image endpoint enforces the PROFILE_IMAGE_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES allowlist and sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, so an SVG data URI can no longer be served inline on-origin. Closes the fourth profile-image XSS sink missed by the user and webhook fixes.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The lookup-prompt-by-command endpoint's only frontend wrapper,
getPromptByCommand, is dead: nothing imports or calls it, the path is
referenced nowhere else, and the route handler has no internal caller
(slash-command resolution happens client-side from the loaded prompt
list). Removes the route handler, its section header, and the dead
wrapper.
The shared Prompts.get_prompt_by_command data-layer method is kept: it
is still used by create/update prompt validation (prompts.py:175, 275,
340). PromptAccessResponse and AccessGrants are untouched.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
update_event only verified write access on the event's source calendar.
CalendarEventUpdateForm accepts a new calendar_id which the model layer
applies unconditionally, so a user with write access to their own calendar
could move (inject) an event into any other user's calendar. Mirror the
destination check create_event already performs.
The bulk-clear-chat-tags endpoint's only frontend wrapper,
deleteTagsById in src/lib/apis/chats/index.ts, is dead: nothing imports
or calls it, the path is referenced nowhere else, and the route handler
has no internal caller. Removes the route handler, the dead wrapper, and
the now-orphaned Chats.delete_all_tags_by_id_and_user_id model method
(its sole caller was this route). The shared
Chats.delete_orphan_tags_for_user method is untouched.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /utils/markdown rendered a markdown string to HTML server-side. Its
only frontend wrapper, getHTMLFromMarkdown in src/lib/apis/utils/index.ts,
is dead: nothing imports or calls it, the route is hit by no other code
path, and the path string appears nowhere else in the repo (no direct
fetch, no test, no docs). Markdown is rendered client-side in the UI, so
this endpoint was redundant.
Fully self-contained removal: the endpoint, its MarkdownForm model, the
now-orphaned 'import markdown' in the utils router (used only here), and
the dead getHTMLFromMarkdown wrapper. Nothing else depends on any of them.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /evaluations/feedbacks/all returned the entire feedback table in a
single response (flagged as a Medium OOM risk for admins in
open-webui#22206). Its only frontend wrapper, getAllFeedbacks in
src/lib/apis/evaluations/index.ts, is dead: nothing imports or calls it
anywhere in the codebase. The endpoint is a redundant view-only twin of
GET /evaluations/feedbacks/all/export, which is what the admin Feedbacks
UI actually uses.
Removes the endpoint, the now-unused FeedbackResponse import in the
evaluations router, and the dead getAllFeedbacks frontend wrapper. The
shared Feedbacks.get_all_feedbacks data-layer method is kept, since the
live /feedbacks/all/export endpoint still uses it.
Ref: open-webui#22206
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/v1/chats/new and POST /api/v1/chats/{id}/folder accepted a
caller-supplied folder_id with no validation — neither ownership, nor
existence, nor UUID format. The row was persisted with the supplied
value verbatim, so the DB ended up with chat rows whose folder_id
referenced another user's folder, a non-existent UUID, or even a
non-UUID string.
No read path surfaces this across users — every chat-folder read is
user_id-filtered on both sides — so this is referential-integrity
hardening rather than a security boundary fix. But there's no reason
to accept dangling references either, and the downstream consumers
shouldn't have to assume the column is clean.
Add a Folders.get_folder_by_id_and_user_id() lookup at both writers:
if a folder_id is supplied, it must match a folder owned by the
caller. None remains allowed (chat-without-folder is the default).
Non-existent and non-UUID values fall through to 404.
Reported by ShigekiTsuchiyama in GHSA-4vrg-2vcq-q7jc.
Co-authored-by: ShigekiTsuchiyama <ShigekiTsuchiyama@users.noreply.github.com>
