_process_picture_url validated the initial picture URL with validate_url()
but then aiohttp followed 3xx redirects without re-validating the target,
so a validate_url-passing public URL could 302 to an internal address and
the body was base64-stored in the user's profile_image_url. This is the
sixth call site of the CVE-2026-45401 redirect-bypass cohort; the other
five already pass allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS. Apply
the same.
validate_url() resolves DNS to check IPs but discards the result; the
HTTP client resolves again independently. Between those two lookups an
attacker can swap the DNS record from a public IP to an internal one
(DNS rebinding).
Push the IP-is-global check into the actual connection layer so the
validated resolution is the one used for the TCP connect:
- aiohttp (_fetch): _SSRFSafeResolver wraps DefaultResolver and rejects
non-global IPs at resolve time (zero TOCTOU window).
- requests (_scrape): _SSRFSafeAdapter mounts custom urllib3 connection
classes whose _new_conn resolves, validates, and connects to the
validated IP in one shot (zero TOCTOU window).
Both paths respect ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH (skip validation when on).
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
has_access_to_file granted access whenever the file was attached to a
shared chat the user could read, ignoring the requested access_type. A
read-only shared-chat recipient therefore satisfied write and delete
checks and could delete or mutate the chat owner's attached file. Gate
the shared-chat branch on read access, matching the channels branch
directly above it.
Co-authored-by: oxsignal <oxsignal@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SafePlaywrightURLLoader validated only the initially submitted URL and
then let the browser follow HTTP redirects and client-side navigations
without re-checking them, so a public URL could redirect into the
internal network (cloud metadata, RFC1918, loopback). Intercept
document-type requests, re-run validate_url on each, and apply the same
redirect policy as the requests loader (blocked unless
AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS). Sub-resource requests pass through
unchanged so page rendering performance is unaffected.
Co-authored-by: POV9en <POV9en@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
update_event only verified write access on the event's source calendar.
CalendarEventUpdateForm accepts a new calendar_id which the model layer
applies unconditionally, so a user with write access to their own calendar
could move (inject) an event into any other user's calendar. Mirror the
destination check create_event already performs.
The __main__ block called search_bing() with 4 positional arguments, but
the function requires 5 (subscription_key, endpoint, locale, query,
count). Running `python -m open_webui.retrieval.web.bing` raised a
TypeError and, before failing, silently misrouted every argument. Read
the key/endpoint from environment variables, matching config.py defaults.
Closes#24765
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bulk-clear-chat-tags endpoint's only frontend wrapper,
deleteTagsById in src/lib/apis/chats/index.ts, is dead: nothing imports
or calls it, the path is referenced nowhere else, and the route handler
has no internal caller. Removes the route handler, the dead wrapper, and
the now-orphaned Chats.delete_all_tags_by_id_and_user_id model method
(its sole caller was this route). The shared
Chats.delete_orphan_tags_for_user method is untouched.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /utils/markdown rendered a markdown string to HTML server-side. Its
only frontend wrapper, getHTMLFromMarkdown in src/lib/apis/utils/index.ts,
is dead: nothing imports or calls it, the route is hit by no other code
path, and the path string appears nowhere else in the repo (no direct
fetch, no test, no docs). Markdown is rendered client-side in the UI, so
this endpoint was redundant.
Fully self-contained removal: the endpoint, its MarkdownForm model, the
now-orphaned 'import markdown' in the utils router (used only here), and
the dead getHTMLFromMarkdown wrapper. Nothing else depends on any of them.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /evaluations/feedbacks/all returned the entire feedback table in a
single response (flagged as a Medium OOM risk for admins in
open-webui#22206). Its only frontend wrapper, getAllFeedbacks in
src/lib/apis/evaluations/index.ts, is dead: nothing imports or calls it
anywhere in the codebase. The endpoint is a redundant view-only twin of
GET /evaluations/feedbacks/all/export, which is what the admin Feedbacks
UI actually uses.
Removes the endpoint, the now-unused FeedbackResponse import in the
evaluations router, and the dead getAllFeedbacks frontend wrapper. The
shared Feedbacks.get_all_feedbacks data-layer method is kept, since the
live /feedbacks/all/export endpoint still uses it.
Ref: open-webui#22206
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args: free_disk:false name:main suffix:]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true
USE_CUDA_VER=cu126
free_disk:true name:cuda126 suffix:-cuda126]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true free_disk:true name:cuda suffix:-cuda]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_OLLAMA=true free_disk:false name:ollama suffix:-ollama]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_SLIM=true free_disk:false name:slim suffix:-slim]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args: free_disk:false name:main suffix:]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true
USE_CUDA_VER=cu126
free_disk:true name:cuda126 suffix:-cuda126]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true free_disk:true name:cuda suffix:-cuda]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_OLLAMA=true free_disk:false name:ollama suffix:-ollama]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_SLIM=true free_disk:false name:slim suffix:-slim]) (push) Waiting to run
* fix: enforce features.direct_tool_servers on chat-completion tool_servers
The features.direct_tool_servers per-user permission was correctly
enforced on the storage path (routers/users.py user/settings/update,
which strips toolServers from saved settings when the caller lacks the
permission), but the inference path (/api/chat/completions) popped
tool_servers straight from the request body into metadata with no
permission check. The middleware (utils/middleware.py:2799) then
consumed direct_tool_servers to inject system_prompt into the message
array and register external tool specs that get invoked during the
completion. End result: any authenticated user could bypass the
admin-set per-user feature toggle and use inline tool_servers in their
chat-completion requests, even when admin had explicitly denied the
permission.
Default for USER_PERMISSIONS_FEATURES_DIRECT_TOOL_SERVERS is False
(config.py:2750), so under default config no regular user is supposed
to be able to use direct tool servers — making this a real boundary
bypass on out-of-the-box deployments rather than a corner case.
Mirror the storage-side behaviour at the inference entry point: pop
tool_servers from the request body, then silently drop the value if
the caller is non-admin and lacks features.direct_tool_servers. Admins
always pass; users with the explicit grant always pass; everyone else
gets None propagated into metadata, which the middleware already
handles as the no-tool-servers case.
Reported by berkant-koc in GHSA-f582-c373-jjf6.
Co-authored-by: berkant-koc <berkant-koc@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: trim verbose comment on tool_servers permission check
---------
Co-authored-by: berkant-koc <berkant-koc@users.noreply.github.com>
