MCP tool servers using OAuth 2.1 with dynamic client registration authorized without any scope when the authorization server left scope out of its registration response, which RFC 7591 allows (Atlassian and Notion do). Consent completed and the tool showed as connected, but the issued token lacked the scopes the resource requires, so every tool call was refused. Discovered scopes and the custom OAuth Scopes field were both affected.
The stored client now falls back to the scope sent in the registration request when the response has none. A scope the server does return is kept as is.
Connections registered before this fix already have a null scope stored. The protected resource metadata recovery that static-credential clients already use now also runs for dynamically registered clients, so those connections pick up the discovered scopes on the next load without registering again.
Fixes#29967
Attach Webpage fails with 403 Forbidden on sites that reject the bare aiohttp user agent, Wikipedia among them, even when USER_AGENT is set. The web loader sends USER_AGENT, but the request that runs first to decide whether the URL is a page or a file does not, so the attachment fails before the loader is ever reached.
The pre-check now sends USER_AGENT as the request User-Agent when it is set. With it unset the request is unchanged and keeps the aiohttp default.
Verified against the real _fetch_url with https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenAI: 403 before, page detected after; USER_AGENT unset still returns the same 403 as before, and a direct PDF URL is still detected as a file.
Fixes#29617
Generated images that come back as bare base64 (OpenAI b64_json, Gemini
bytesBase64Encoded and inlineData, Automatic1111) were always stored as
generated-image.png with content type image/png, even when the provider
returned JPEG or WebP, for example with {"output_format": "jpeg"} in the
OpenAI extra params. The image still rendered because browsers read the
bytes, but the download name, the served Content-Type and the type sent
along on a later image edit were wrong.
Bare base64 carries no format, so the type is now read from the bytes with
Pillow, the same way the file already inspects images elsewhere. A response
that is not an image at all now fails the generation instead of storing a
broken png. The file extension comes from the module's own extension map
first, because the Python 3.11 Docker image has no mime database entry for
WebP and would otherwise name the file generated-imageNone.
Fixes#29948
The native edit_image tool fails with "400: [ERROR: Error loading image]" whenever the model hands it an absolute URL for an image Open WebUI already stores. Such a URL is treated as local only when its host string matches the incoming request's host exactly, so a default-port form, a container name or any host the model composed itself falls through to an outbound HTTP fetch instead. That fetch asks /api/v1/files/{id}/content without a session, gets a 401, and the user sees the generic 400.
Match the file URL on its path and let the existing local branch resolve it. Fetching that endpoint over the network can never succeed for a local or a remote instance, because it requires an authenticated user, so the host comparison only decided which way the request failed. Access control is unchanged: the local branch still goes through get_file_content_by_id, which enforces owner, admin or shared access.
Fixes#29220
Forking returned 409 "Wait for the current response to finish before forking." forever once any assistant message anywhere in the chat was left at done = false, with nothing generating and even when that message sat on a branch that was not being forked. Interrupted turns leave the flag behind and nothing clears it, so an affected chat could never be forked again.
The endpoint now refuses only while a task is actually running, which is the check /compact has always relied on by itself. A message still unfinished on the forked branch is marked done in the copy so the fork does not open showing a spinner, while a turn paused waiting on tool approval keeps its unfinished state and its pending call so the fork still shows the prompt. The source chat is left untouched either way.
The client-side check had the same shape of bug: it read history.currentId instead of the message actually being forked, so a paused last turn also blocked forking earlier, finished messages. It now reads the message it is about to fork.
Fixes#30128
On a connection with API type "responses", a forced tool choice sent in
the Chat Completions shape was forwarded to the provider unchanged, so
providers that validate the Responses API schema rejected the request.
A non-streaming reply that carried a function call was also flattened
to empty text with finish_reason "stop", so API clients never saw the
tool call.
The request converter now flattens a forced function choice to the
Responses API shape, and the result converter turns every function_call
output item into a Chat Completions tool_calls entry, mirroring the
existing Responses output mapping in utils/misc.py.
Fixes#30085
European deployments that need EU data residency have no hosted web search option out of the box: every plug-and-play provider shipped today is US-based, and the only sovereign alternative is self-hosting SearXNG, which means running and maintaining that infrastructure yourself. Staan (staan.ai) is a European search API with EU data residency, so adding it gives those deployments a drop-in choice.
It is configured like any other provider, through the admin UI or STAAN_API_KEY, STAAN_MARKET and STAAN_MAX_SNIPPETS. Market sets the region and language of the results and defaults to en-us. Max snippets asks Staan to fetch each result page and return semantically scored chunks of it, which get merged into that result's snippet so retrieval has more to work with; leaving it at 0 uses the plain search endpoint.
Wired the same way as Tavily and Exa, with domain filtering going through the shared get_filtered_results.
Requested in #26006.
A fork copied the source chat's folder id unchanged. It now keeps that folder only when the caller has write access to it, matching what chat creation and chat moves already do, and is created outside any folder otherwise.
Fixes#27750
When a model runs on the Responses API, every Chat Completions style tool (workspace tools, MCP and OpenAPI servers) is converted to the Responses tool shape. Only an explicit strict value was carried over, so tools without one were sent with strict omitted. Chat Completions defaults strict to false, the Responses API defaults it to true, so the conversion silently switched loose schemas into strict mode. The model then filled every optional property (empty strings, zeros, false, empty arrays) and combined mutually exclusive filters, and those arguments went to the tool unchanged. Search and filter tools received meaningful values where omission was intended and rejected the call or returned wrong results.
The converter now defaults strict to false when the source tool does not set it. Explicit true or false values are still preserved and already native Responses tools are passed through untouched, matching what the same tool definition gets on Chat Completions.
A slow Redis freezes the whole worker during sign-in, not just the user signing in. RateLimiter held a synchronous redis-py client and signin called is_limited inline from a coroutine, so every attempt did blocking round trips on the event-loop thread, with REDIS_SOCKET_TIMEOUT defaulting to None so nothing bounded the wait. Its Redis methods are now async and take the handle as their first argument, and both handlers pass request.app.state.redis, the async client the lifespan already creates. Building one in the limiter instead would pin its pooled connection to the first event loop that used it.
Without Redis, which is the default single-instance setup, the fallback store leaked. It was keyed by the rate-limit key and pruned a key's expired buckets only when that same key was checked again, so a login email never seen again was never reclaimed, and that email comes straight from an unauthenticated request body. It is now keyed by bucket, so one prune drops every key an expired bucket held, and it lives on the instance: pruning uses the per-instance num_buckets, so a shared store would let a limiter with a short window delete buckets a longer-windowed one still needs.
With a Redis costing a second per call, the widest event-loop tick gap drops from 2.010s to 0.010s and a concurrent request is answered at 0.05s instead of 2.05s, at no cost to the caller's own latency. Across 20,000 distinct keys the store goes from 40,000 entries and 6.4 MB, growing linearly, to a flat 1,004 entries and 100 KB. Rate-limiting decisions are unchanged across 700,000 randomised calls over 14 window, bucket and limit combinations, against a real Redis and the in-memory fallback alike, and sign-in still returns its first 429 on attempt 16.
Two behaviour changes worth naming. Pruning is now global rather than per key, so a wall clock that jumps forward past a full window and back forgets a hit it previously kept. The two limiters also stop sharing a store, which previously let a sign-in attempt with an IP-shaped email touch the token-exchange limiter's counters.
Deleting a tool or a function leaves its full source text in memory for the life of the process. Each delete handler pops the module cache and leaves the matching content cache untouched, so the code of every plugin ever deleted stays resident.
Both handlers now pop the content cache next to the module cache. Measured over 200 deletes of an 8.8KB plugin: 1.78 MB of source retained per kind before, nothing after.
This is memory only, never a stale module. A cache hit needs the id present in both caches and delete already popped the module cache, so the leftover source could not have produced one.
The two routers are one change because it is the same pair of lines at the same point in sibling handlers, with no per-site reasoning and no reason to revert one without the other.
Setting ENABLE_PROFILE_IMAGE_URL_FORWARDING=false stops the user and model profile image endpoints from redirecting browsers to external avatar URLs, but channel webhook avatars kept redirecting regardless. An operator who turned the setting off precisely to stop clients leaking their IP, User-Agent and Referer to outside origins still leaked all three whenever anyone viewed a channel message posted by a webhook with an external profile image URL.
The webhook profile image endpoint now reads the same setting the user and model endpoints already read, and serves the bundled default image instead of the redirect when forwarding is off. Stored URLs are untouched, so turning the setting back on restores the previous behaviour.
Verified against the real handler with seeded webhook rows: with the setting unset or true the endpoint still returns the 302 with the original Location, with it false it returns the default favicon as image/png with no Location and no header carrying the external host, and the data URI, no image and unknown webhook responses are byte identical in both states.
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args: free_disk:false name:main suffix:]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true
USE_CUDA_VER=cu126
free_disk:true name:cuda126 suffix:-cuda126]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true free_disk:true name:cuda suffix:-cuda]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_OLLAMA=true free_disk:false name:ollama suffix:-ollama]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_SLIM=true free_disk:false name:slim suffix:-slim]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args: free_disk:false name:main suffix:]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true
USE_CUDA_VER=cu126
free_disk:true name:cuda126 suffix:-cuda126]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true free_disk:true name:cuda suffix:-cuda]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_OLLAMA=true free_disk:false name:ollama suffix:-ollama]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_SLIM=true free_disk:false name:slim suffix:-slim]) (push) Waiting to run
Streamed chat completions and the other proxied OpenAI and Ollama responses
went out with two Server and two Date headers: the upstream's copies, forwarded
verbatim, plus uvicorn's own. nginx in front of Open WebUI logs "upstream sent
duplicate header line" for both on every streamed request.
Server and Date belong to whoever terminates the connection, so both proxies now
drop the upstream's copies next to the encoding headers they already stripped.
The filter also compares header names case-insensitively. Before, it matched
title-case names only, so uvicorn-based upstreams such as vLLM and LiteLLM,
which send lowercase header names, had none of their headers stripped at all,
including the Content-Encoding entry the filter exists for.
Same fix as #29824 for the terminal proxy, applied to the other two proxy paths.
Proxied terminal responses (GET /api/v1/terminals/{id}/ports and every other
proxied route) went out with two Server and two Date headers: the terminal
server's copies, forwarded verbatim, plus uvicorn's own. nginx in front of Open
WebUI logs "upstream sent duplicate header line" for both on every request, and
the ports route is polled often enough to fill gigabytes of error log per day.
Server and Date belong to whoever terminates the connection, so the proxy now
drops the upstream's copies next to the framing headers it already stripped.
uvicorn's own values still go out, once. Everything else, including custom
upstream headers and TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS, passes through unchanged.
The OpenAI and Ollama proxies forward upstream Server and Date the same way and
are left for a separate change.
Fixes#29824
