* fix: enforce features.direct_tool_servers on chat-completion tool_servers
The features.direct_tool_servers per-user permission was correctly
enforced on the storage path (routers/users.py user/settings/update,
which strips toolServers from saved settings when the caller lacks the
permission), but the inference path (/api/chat/completions) popped
tool_servers straight from the request body into metadata with no
permission check. The middleware (utils/middleware.py:2799) then
consumed direct_tool_servers to inject system_prompt into the message
array and register external tool specs that get invoked during the
completion. End result: any authenticated user could bypass the
admin-set per-user feature toggle and use inline tool_servers in their
chat-completion requests, even when admin had explicitly denied the
permission.
Default for USER_PERMISSIONS_FEATURES_DIRECT_TOOL_SERVERS is False
(config.py:2750), so under default config no regular user is supposed
to be able to use direct tool servers — making this a real boundary
bypass on out-of-the-box deployments rather than a corner case.
Mirror the storage-side behaviour at the inference entry point: pop
tool_servers from the request body, then silently drop the value if
the caller is non-admin and lacks features.direct_tool_servers. Admins
always pass; users with the explicit grant always pass; everyone else
gets None propagated into metadata, which the middleware already
handles as the no-tool-servers case.
Reported by berkant-koc in GHSA-f582-c373-jjf6.
Co-authored-by: berkant-koc <berkant-koc@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: trim verbose comment on tool_servers permission check
---------
Co-authored-by: berkant-koc <berkant-koc@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds an IFRAME_CSP environment variable that injects a Content-Security-Policy
<meta> tag into all srcdoc iframes rendering untrusted content:
- Artifacts (LLM-generated HTML previews)
- FullHeightIframe (tool/embed output)
- FilePreview (user-uploaded HTML files)
- CitationModal (RAG document HTML)
Shared utility in src/lib/utils/csp.ts handles injection with HTML-safe
attribute escaping. URL-based iframes (src=) are correctly excluded.
Env-var only — no PersistentConfig, no admin UI, no DB. Set once at deploy
time, requires restart. Empty string (default) means no CSP restriction.
asyncio.wait_for() and asyncio.shield() create new asyncio Tasks which
violate anyio cancel-scope task-ownership rules. The MCPClient's
exit_stack contains anyio resources (streamable_http transport) that
use anyio cancel scopes. When exited from a different task, anyio raises
'Attempted to exit a cancel scope that isn't the current task's current
cancel scope' as a BaseException.
This BaseException propagates through the finally block, discards the
completed response return value, and surfaces as a 500 Internal Server
Error / 'No response returned.' - silently swallowing successful MCP
tool calls and blocking the chat endpoint.
Fix: call client.disconnect() directly in a simple loop. MCPClient.disconnect()
already catches BaseException internally (see prior commit), so no
wrapper is needed.
Signed-off-by: Adam Tao <tcx4c70@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Tim Baek <tim@openwebui.com>
Co-authored-by: joaoback <156559121+joaoback@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Algorithm5838 <108630393+Algorithm5838@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kylapaallikko <Kylapaallikko@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Teay <pythontogoplease@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: tcx4c70 <tcx4c70@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: goodbey857 <76645482+goodbey857@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jacob Leksan <63938553+jmleksan@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: RomualdYT <romuald@gameurnews.fr>
Co-authored-by: Lucas <lucas@vanosenbruggen.com>
Co-authored-by: Classic298 <27028174+Classic298@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Constantine <Runixer@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Circe (Claude Code Sonnet 4.6) <circe@athena-council.org>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add configurable reranker batch size (env var RAG_RERANKING_BATCH_SIZE,
default 32) following the same pattern as RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE.
- config.py: PersistentConfig for RAG_RERANKING_BATCH_SIZE
- main.py: import, state init, pass to get_reranking_function
- colbert.py: accept batch_size param in predict() (was hardcoded 32)
- utils.py: get_reranking_function passes batch_size at call time
- retrieval.py: expose in config GET/POST endpoints and ConfigForm
- Documents.svelte: add Reranking Batch Size input in admin settings
Closes#23730
* fix(middleware): replace BaseHTTPMiddleware HTTP middlewares with pure ASGI implementations
Starlette's BaseHTTPMiddleware (and the @app.middleware('http')
decorator that uses it) wraps the downstream app in an anyio task
group whose cancel scope tears down the inner task on every exit —
client disconnect, response complete, or any outer middleware bailing.
That CancelledError gets injected into whatever the inner task was
awaiting, so DB queries, embedding calls, and other long awaits get
killed mid-flight. Under aiosqlite the cleanup path then logs a
multi-page `terminate_force_close() not implemented` traceback at
ERROR for every cancelled DB call.
Open WebUI had four such middlewares stacked
(`commit_session_after_request`, `check_url`, `inspect_websocket`,
`RedirectMiddleware`) so a single cancellation would compound through
all four.
Move the four middlewares to a new `open_webui.utils.asgi_middleware`
module as plain ASGI classes (`__call__(scope, receive, send)`):
* `CommitSessionMiddleware` — was `commit_session_after_request`;
now also rolls back if commit fails
before releasing the connection.
* `AuthTokenMiddleware` — was `check_url`; sets request.state
token + enable_api_keys + stamps
X-Process-Time via a wrapped send.
* `WebsocketUpgradeGuardMiddleware`
— was `inspect_websocket`; rejects
/ws/socket.io HTTP requests that
claim transport=websocket without a
proper Upgrade/Connection header.
* `RedirectMiddleware` — was the BaseHTTPMiddleware subclass;
same /watch + share-target rewrites.
Pure ASGI does not introduce a cancel scope around the downstream app,
so client disconnects propagate via `receive()` (the way ASGI was
designed) instead of being injected as CancelledError. Middleware
ordering is preserved.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01JSr4NZSskEUQvoJnavVXh8
* fix(middleware): CommitSessionMiddleware — rollback on downstream error, never commit failed requests
The first cut put commit() in a finally block, which meant that even
when a downstream handler raised, the middleware would still commit
whatever partial sync writes that handler had made before the
failure. That regressed the previous BaseHTTPMiddleware semantics
where commit only ran on the success path.
Restructure the failure handling:
* Downstream raised → rollback any pending sync work, release the
connection, re-raise so the outer error middleware turns it into
an error response. We never commit a request that did not complete.
* Downstream returned → commit. On commit failure, log loudly,
rollback, and re-raise. ScopedSession.remove() always runs in
finally so the connection cannot leak.
Document the inherent pure-ASGI limitation explicitly: by the time
`await self.app(...)` returns the response messages have already
been emitted, so a commit failure can no longer change what the
client sees on the wire. Buffering the response to gate it on commit
success would break streaming responses (chat completions, SSE) which
are core to Open WebUI; the trade-off is intentional. Routes that
need commit-before-send must manage the sync session explicitly.
Also drop unused `typing` imports flagged by review.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01JSr4NZSskEUQvoJnavVXh8
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Add ownership checks to global task endpoints
- Restrict GET /api/tasks and POST /api/tasks/stop/{task_id} to admin-only
- Add new scoped POST /api/tasks/chat/{chat_id}/stop endpoint with ownership
check so regular users can stop their own chat tasks
- Allow admins to access the scoped chat task endpoints alongside owners
- Update frontend to use the new scoped stop endpoint when a chatId is available
https://claude.ai/code/session_01K7zPDvvjRu8AxJ4Br2HhZc
* Handle temporary (local:) chat IDs in scoped task endpoints
Temporary chats use local:<socketId> as chat_id which doesn't exist in
the DB. The scoped endpoints now skip ownership checks for local: IDs
(they aren't enumerable) and use {chat_id:path} to handle the colon in
the URL path.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01K7zPDvvjRu8AxJ4Br2HhZc
* Verify session ownership for local: chat IDs and URL-encode chat_id
- For local:<socketId> chat IDs, look up the socket's owner in
SESSION_POOL and verify it matches the requesting user (or admin)
- URL-encode chat_id in frontend fetch calls to handle special
characters (colon in local: IDs) safely
https://claude.ai/code/session_01K7zPDvvjRu8AxJ4Br2HhZc
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The APIKeyRestrictionMiddleware only inspected the Authorization header for sk- tokens, but get_current_user also reads API keys from cookies and x-api-key headers. This allowed complete bypass of endpoint restrictions by sending the key via an alternate transport.
Moves the restriction check into get_current_user_by_api_key so it runs regardless of how the API key was delivered. Removes the now-redundant middleware.
