Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args: free_disk:false name:main suffix:]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true
USE_CUDA_VER=cu126
free_disk:true name:cuda126 suffix:-cuda126]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true free_disk:true name:cuda suffix:-cuda]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_OLLAMA=true free_disk:false name:ollama suffix:-ollama]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_SLIM=true free_disk:false name:slim suffix:-slim]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args: free_disk:false name:main suffix:]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true
USE_CUDA_VER=cu126
free_disk:true name:cuda126 suffix:-cuda126]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true free_disk:true name:cuda suffix:-cuda]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_OLLAMA=true free_disk:false name:ollama suffix:-ollama]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_SLIM=true free_disk:false name:slim suffix:-slim]) (push) Waiting to run
The decode-until-stable loops in _sanitize_proxy_path (terminals.py, cap 8) and
_safe_static_redirect_path (models.py, cap 2) proceed with whatever remains after the
cap instead of rejecting it. A path encoded more times than the cap therefore exits the
loop still percent-encoded, passes the literal '..' / prefix checks (the dots are still
%2E, not '..'), and is forwarded to the upstream terminal server, or emitted as a
redirect Location, which then decodes it once more and resolves the traversal. This is
the residual of the decode-until-stable hardening added for CVE-2026-54017: the cap is a
fixed depth, not a true stability guarantee.
Reject when the value is still not stable after the cap (unquote(x) != x), so anything
encoded more deeply than the cap fails closed rather than being forwarded. Legitimate
paths stabilize within a pass or two and are unaffected.
Co-authored-by: DavidCarliez <271374756+DavidCarliez@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ModelMeta.profile_image_url now runs validate_profile_image_url, rejecting SVG/script data URIs (matching UserUpdateForm and ChannelWebhookForm). The /model/profile/image endpoint enforces the PROFILE_IMAGE_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES allowlist and sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, so an SVG data URI can no longer be served inline on-origin. Closes the fourth profile-image XSS sink missed by the user and webhook fixes.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /api/v1/models/model?id=<model_id> at routers/models.py:412
returned the full model.model_dump() to any caller with read access,
including the params dict that holds the admin-curated system prompt
and other behavior config. The user-facing /api/models endpoint
already strips this via utils/models.py:170,210 with the comment
"Remove params to avoid exposing sensitive info", and /api/v1/models/list
gates by write permission so non-curators don't see the model in their
workspace listing at all. The per-id endpoint missed the same gate, so
a user with read-only access (e.g. granted access to use the model in
chat) could open /workspace/models/edit?id=<not-mine> in the browser
and read the system prompt verbatim from the network response, even
though saving was correctly blocked.
Compute write_access once at the top of the handler so it can serve
both the response-shape decision and the response field. When the
caller lacks write access, replace params with an empty dict in the
serialised response. Owners, admins under BYPASS_ADMIN_ACCESS_CONTROL,
and explicit write-grant holders still get the full payload so the
workspace edit UI keeps working for users who legitimately curate the
model.
Read-permission users continue to receive everything else they need to
chat with the model — the chat path resolves prompt/params server-side
from the stored ModelModel and never echoes them back through this
endpoint.
Reported by destination-one in GHSA-h2cw-7qw9-56xr.
Co-authored-by: destination-one <destination-one@users.noreply.github.com>
* refac(routers): reject external URLs in profile/model image handlers
* refac(ui): centralize image URL validation in safeImageUrl helper
* refac(auths): make signout POST-only
* refac: gate external profile image redirect behind ENABLE_PROFILE_IMAGE_URL_FORWARDING
Restore the 302 redirect for external http(s) profile image URLs in
the user and model profile-image endpoints, but gate it behind a new
ENABLE_PROFILE_IMAGE_URL_FORWARDING env flag (default: True).
Existing deployments that rely on external profile image forwarding
continue to work unchanged. Operators who want to suppress the
redirect (to prevent client-side IP/UA/Referer leaks) can set the
flag to False.
- Return 302 to /static/favicon.png instead of streaming the same PNG per
model id so browsers can cache one asset for default avatars.
- Validate stored /static/ paths with decode, normpath, and /static
prefix checks; invalid paths fall back to favicon.
Made-with: Cursor
Pass the request-scoped AsyncSession into Models.get_model_by_id so the
endpoint no longer opens a fresh DB session on every call, avoiding an
extra connection acquisition per profile image request.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sharePublic prop in editor components (Knowledge, Tools, Skills,
Prompts, Models) incorrectly included an "|| edit" / "|| write_access"
condition, allowing users with write access to see and use the "Public"
sharing option regardless of their actual public sharing permission.
Additionally, all backend access/update endpoints only verified write
authorization but did not check the corresponding sharing.public_*
permission, allowing direct API calls to bypass frontend restrictions
entirely.
Frontend: removed the edit/write_access bypass from sharePublic in all
five editor components so visibility is gated solely by the user's
sharing.public_* permission or admin role.
Backend: added has_public_read_access_grant checks to the access/update
endpoints in knowledge.py, tools.py, prompts.py, skills.py, models.py,
and notes.py. Public grants are silently stripped when the user lacks
the corresponding permission.
Fixes#21356
* feat: Add read-only access support for Models
- Backend: Add write_access field to ModelAccessResponse
- Backend: Update /models/list to return ModelAccessListResponse
- Frontend: Display Read Only badge in Models list
- Frontend: Disable inputs and save button when no write access
- Frontend: Hide action buttons for read-only models
* fix: Handle ModelAccessListResponse format in getModels API
- Backend returns {items, total} instead of {data}
- Update getModels API to handle both formats for backward compatibility
* fix: Show read-only shared models in workspace list
- Backend: Change search_models permission from 'write' to 'read' to include shared models
- Backend: Keep user_id filter to only show owned/shared models (not all public)
- Frontend: Handle ModelAccessListResponse format in getModels API
* fix: Align Read Only badge inline with model name
* fix: Correct badge placement and fix syntax error
* fix: Resolve badge truncation in Models list
- Add w-full to flex container for proper spacing
- Wrap Badge in div to prevent truncation
- Match Knowledge.svelte badge pattern
* fix: Align Read Only badge with Knowledge.svelte pattern
- Match Knowledge.svelte structure for badge placement
- Actions only show when write_access or admin
- Remove w-full from container to prevent right-overflow
* fix: Return write_access from getModelById endpoint
fix: Return write_access from getModelById endpoint
- Use ModelAccessResponse instead of raw dict
- Remove inefficient getModels call in edit page
* revert
* fix
* fix
* fix
Fix implicit None returns in get_model_by_id, get_knowledge_by_id, get_tools_by_id, and get_prompt_by_command. Now properly returns 401 for access denied and 404 for not found instead of silently returning None.
- Changed default sort order in 'Edit Group' modal to 'created_at' (newest first).
Previously it sorted by group membership, causing toggled users to invisible jump
to the top of the list (often changing pages). using a stable sort fixes this UX issue.
- Removed unnecessary `page = 1` reset in toggleMember function so admins
don't lose their place when selecting multiple users.
Bug 2 - Model Image Display Bug:
- Added `Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate` headers to the model profile
image endpoint. This ensures that when a model avatar is updated, the browser
fetches the new image instead of serving a stale cached version (favicon).
Fixes#19885
