The bulk tool export returned every tool the caller could read, while the per-tool export path returns only what the caller can write. This aligns the two, matching how model export already scopes its query.
Callers still export their own tools and any tool shared with them for writing; admins running with BYPASS_ADMIN_ACCESS_CONTROL are unaffected.
* fix: do not expose tool source code to read-only users
The tool read endpoints build their responses from a content-bearing model via
model_dump() under ConfigDict(extra='allow'). ToolResponse deliberately omits
content (the Python source) and specs, but extra='allow' re-admits both, and the
get_tools defer_content flag was a no-op, so GET /tools/, GET /tools/list and GET
/tools/id/{id} returned a tool's full source to any caller with mere read access,
including any authenticated user for a publicly read-shared tool. Tool source
commonly embeds hard-coded credentials and internal URLs.
Strip content and specs for callers without write access across the three read
endpoints. Tool execution loads source server-side, so tool use is unaffected,
and writers still receive content where they did before. The duplicated
write-access check is extracted into a small helper.
Co-authored-by: bogdancherniy11-sudo <229690748+bogdancherniy11-sudo@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: limit the tool source strip to the per-id endpoint
Upstream dev has since fixed the defer_content no-op in Tools.get_tools, so the list endpoints (GET /tools/ and GET /tools/list) no longer fetch tool source at all and the stripping added there is redundant. Stripping specs also broke the chat Available Tools modal, which lists a tool's functions from specs for every user who can use the tool.
Reduce the change to the one remaining leak: GET /tools/id/{id} builds its response from a full model_dump() and ConfigDict(extra='allow') re-admits content, so drop content there for callers without write access. Specs stay visible to read users as before and the helper functions are no longer needed.
---------
Co-authored-by: bogdancherniy11-sudo <229690748+bogdancherniy11-sudo@users.noreply.github.com>
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args: free_disk:false name:main suffix:]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true
USE_CUDA_VER=cu126
free_disk:true name:cuda126 suffix:-cuda126]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true free_disk:true name:cuda suffix:-cuda]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_OLLAMA=true free_disk:false name:ollama suffix:-ollama]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/amd64 runner:ubuntu-latest], map[build_args:USE_SLIM=true free_disk:false name:slim suffix:-slim]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args: free_disk:false name:main suffix:]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true
USE_CUDA_VER=cu126
free_disk:true name:cuda126 suffix:-cuda126]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_CUDA=true free_disk:true name:cuda suffix:-cuda]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_OLLAMA=true free_disk:false name:ollama suffix:-ollama]) (push) Waiting to run
Create and publish Docker images with specific build args / build (map[arch:linux/arm64 runner:ubuntu-24.04-arm], map[build_args:USE_SLIM=true free_disk:false name:slim suffix:-slim]) (push) Waiting to run
* fix: gate tool content updates behind workspace.tools to match create endpoint
`update_tools_by_id` (routers/tools.py:452) authorizes a caller as long as
they are the tool's owner, hold a `write` access grant on the tool, or are
an admin. This means a verified user who has been given a write grant on
a tool — typically as part of a metadata-collaboration workflow (edit
description, adjust valves, manage access grants) — can also overwrite
the tool's Python source. Because `load_tool_module_by_id` further down
calls `exec(content, module.__dict__)` at module-import time, anything
the new content puts outside the `class Tools:` body executes immediately
on the server with the worker's privileges (root in the default Docker
deployment).
The `create_new_tools` endpoint already requires
`workspace.tools` (or `workspace.tools_import`) precisely because creating
a tool means submitting executable code. The update endpoint did not
mirror that check, producing an asymmetric authorization surface in which
a write-grantee with no workspace permission can still reach the same
exec sink as a workspace.tools-trusted creator. SECURITY.md frames
`workspace.tools` as the trust signal an admin uses to delegate
code-execution capability; the previous behavior let that signal be
bypassed by a per-resource share.
Fix: after the existing ownership / write-grant / admin gate, add a
content-change check. If `form_data.content != tools.content`, require
`workspace.tools` or `workspace.tools_import` (or admin role). Metadata
edits — `name`, `description`, valves config, access grants — continue
to flow through the existing gate, so the legitimate share-for-
collaboration workflow is unaffected.
Reported by KadirArslan in GHSA-p4fx-23fq-jfg6 with a working three-user
PoC (Alice trusted with workspace.tools creates a tool and shares write
to Bob; Bob updates content and the new code runs as root inside the
container, with Burp Collaborator confirming outbound exfiltration).
Co-authored-by: KadirArslan <KadirArslan@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: trim comment
---------
Co-authored-by: KadirArslan <KadirArslan@users.noreply.github.com>
The sharePublic prop in editor components (Knowledge, Tools, Skills,
Prompts, Models) incorrectly included an "|| edit" / "|| write_access"
condition, allowing users with write access to see and use the "Public"
sharing option regardless of their actual public sharing permission.
Additionally, all backend access/update endpoints only verified write
authorization but did not check the corresponding sharing.public_*
permission, allowing direct API calls to bypass frontend restrictions
entirely.
Frontend: removed the edit/write_access bypass from sharePublic in all
five editor components so visibility is gated solely by the user's
sharing.public_* permission or admin role.
Backend: added has_public_read_access_grant checks to the access/update
endpoints in knowledge.py, tools.py, prompts.py, skills.py, models.py,
and notes.py. Public grants are silently stripped when the user lacks
the corresponding permission.
Fixes#21356
