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Changing a password left every other logged-in device working until the JWT expired on its own, up to four weeks with the default settings. The hardening docs already promise the opposite: with Redis configured a password change is supposed to put the user's tokens on the revocation list, but only sign-out and OIDC back-channel logout ever wrote to it.
Both password-change paths, self-service and an admin resetting someone's password, now stamp the per-user revocation marker that token validation already checks, so every session issued before the change stops working. The acting device is signed out as well and asked to sign in again, which is the safer default when the password is being changed precisely because the old one may be compromised. Without Redis nothing can be revoked, as before, and the backend now logs a warning saying so.
The marker is written through one shared helper, so its lifetime follows the configured JWT lifetime instead of a fixed 30 days and never expires at all when JWT_EXPIRES_IN disables expiry. Back-channel logout picks that up too, where a long or disabled JWT lifetime previously let the marker expire while the tokens it revoked were still valid. API keys keep working, they are separate credentials with their own lifecycle.
Discussed in #28647.
With ENABLE_OAUTH_GROUP_MANAGEMENT enabled, every SSO login reconciles the user's group membership against the IdP claims, adding and removing them from groups and, with ENABLE_OAUTH_GROUP_CREATION, creating groups that do not exist yet. None of it emitted an event, so the same membership change was observable when an admin made it through the UI or when it arrived over SCIM, but invisible when the IdP drove it. That is the path that changes membership most often.
Emits group.member_added and group.member_removed per membership transition and group.created for each auto-created group, using the same payload keys as the groups router. The member events are published only when the write returned a group, so a failed or no-op write emits nothing, and both loops already run only on an actual transition. update_user_groups takes the request so the events can be published; it has a single caller.
Logging in through CyberArk Identity dies at the callback with "Unsupported {'app_id'} in header" and the user sees "The email or password provided is incorrect". Any provider that puts a vendor-specific parameter in the ID token header hits this; CAS was already patched by name, CyberArk is the next one.
Authlib 1.7 verifies ID tokens with joserfc, which rejects header parameters it does not recognise. The old fix registered `client_id` so CAS would work, which only ever fixes one provider at a time. This turns off the unknown-header rejection instead, so any private header parameter is ignored rather than fatal. Signature verification, the algorithm allowlist, `crit` handling and value validation of registered headers all still run, so nothing that actually protects the token is relaxed.
Fixes#28062
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Raising GLOBAL_LOG_LEVEL to WARNING buys quieter output but not less work: 241 INFO call sites interpolate their payload into an f-string before the logging call gets to drop it. The heaviest is get_doc, which logs every chunk id and metadata dict in a collection, so on the full-context retrieval path that is the entire knowledge base, once per chat request.
That one line at WARNING, CPython 3.12:
| knowledge base | payload | before | after |
| -------------- | ------- | -------- | ------- |
| top-k of 3 | 1.2 kB | 3.8 us | 0.07 us |
| 500 chunks | 201 kB | 583.6 us | 0.08 us |
| 5000 chunks | 2.0 MB | 5.8 ms | 0.15 us |
The lazy form log.info('query_doc:result %s %s', result.ids, result.metadatas) hands the payload to record.getMessage(), which the InterceptHandler only reaches once a record has passed the level check. Output at INFO is byte-identical. Two sites that already built their message eagerly, one str concat and one % operator, move to the same lazy form.
GLOBAL_LOG_LEVEL defaults to INFO, so every log.debug(...) in the backend is discarded, but the message is built first: 187 call sites interpolate their payload into an f-string before the logging call runs, so the work happens on every request and the result is thrown away. The worst one sits in process_chat_payload and stringifies the whole request body, full conversation history included, once per chat completion.
That one line with DEBUG disabled, CPython 3.12:
| conversation | payload | before | after |
| ------------ | ------- | -------- | ------- |
| 4 messages | 1.2 kB | 3.4 us | 0.07 us |
| 20 messages | 17 kB | 24.8 us | 0.07 us |
| 60 messages | 123 kB | 216.6 us | 0.07 us |
The lazy form log.debug('form_data: %s', form_data) hands the payload to record.getMessage(), which the InterceptHandler only reaches once a record has passed the level check. With DEBUG enabled the emitted lines are byte-identical, f'{x=}' sites included: those map to %r. MistralLoader._debug_log callers get the same treatment, since that wrapper already forwards *args.
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_process_picture_url validated the picture URL with validate_url() but then fetched it with a plain aiohttp session that resolves the hostname again at connect time, leaving a DNS-rebinding TOCTOU window (the same gap already closed for the RAG loader, the content probe, the image fetches and webhook delivery). Routing the fetch through get_ssrf_safe_session() pins the connect-time resolution via _SSRFSafeResolver and rejects non-global addresses, so a rebinding host can no longer redirect the fetch to loopback, RFC1918 or cloud-metadata endpoints. It also stops the forwarded OAuth access_token from leaking to a rebound internal target.
`_normalize_token_expiry()` derived the session expiry from the access token alone, and that value is what `oauth_session.expires_at` stores and what both `get_oauth_token()` implementations check to decide whether to refresh five minutes ahead. Providers that issue a shorter-lived id_token than access token (Microsoft Entra ID: roughly 60 minutes against 75) therefore left a window where the session still looked valid while the id_token had already expired, so pipes and tools reading `__oauth_token__["id_token"]` forwarded a dead JWT and downstream services rejected it with 401.
The stored expiry is now capped at the id_token's `exp` claim whenever that JWT expires first, which moves the refresh ahead of the earliest expiring token in the set. This is applied in the single function every session write already passes through, so it covers both the SSO manager and the MCP client manager on their callback and refresh paths alike. Sessions without an id_token, with an opaque one, or with no `exp` claim are unaffected.
Fixes#27066
The OAuth / OIDC section in Admin Settings > Authentication had no
enable/disable switch, unlike the LDAP section above it. Add one that
persists via the existing Save flow and actually gates OAuth sign-in,
mirroring how the LDAP toggle works.
- config: new ENABLE_OAUTH persistent config ('oauth.enable'), defaulting
to True so existing deployments with a provider configured keep working.
- oauth: expose ENABLE_OAUTH via the OAuth runtime config and reject the
login and callback handlers with 404 when it is disabled.
- /api/config: report no OAuth providers when disabled so the login page
hides the OAuth buttons (and cannot auto-redirect), without clearing the
admin's provider configuration.
- auths: expose ENABLE_OAUTH through the admin OAuth config get/update
endpoints (OAuthConfigForm + OAUTH_CONFIG_KEYS).
- Authentication.svelte: bind the OAuth / OIDC header Switch to the
persisted oauthConfig.ENABLE_OAUTH and collapse the section when off,
matching the LDAP header (size, weight, alignment).
get_protected_resource_metadata() only attempted RFC 9728 discovery when
the anonymous `initialize` probe returned 401 with a WWW-Authenticate
header. Some remote MCP servers — notably Google's Gmail/Drive/Calendar
MCPs (gmailmcp.googleapis.com, etc.) — answer 200 to an anonymous
initialize, so OAuth scope and authorization-server discovery silently
failed and connections to them could not be established.
Run the discovery regardless of the probe's HTTP status: prefer the
resource_metadata URL from WWW-Authenticate when present, and otherwise
fall back to the RFC 9728 §4.2 well-known URIs. The trade-off is a couple
of extra well-known GETs during MCP connection setup for servers that
expose no PRM document; behavior for 401-responding servers is unchanged.
validate_url() calls socket.getaddrinfo() for SSRF protection, which
blocks the event loop for 100-700ms per DNS lookup. This affects:
- Image generation (get_image_data) — every external image URL
- Image editing (load_url_image) — every external image URL
- OAuth profile pictures (_process_picture_url) — every login
- Webhook delivery (post_webhook) — every notification
- Image base64 conversion (get_image_base64_from_url) — chat images
Wrap all 5 async call sites in asyncio.to_thread() so DNS resolution
runs in the thread pool. The event loop remains free to serve other
requests during the lookup.
Benchmark (3 domains, 3 trials averaged):
- BEFORE: max jitter 479ms, 1 blocked ping per trial
- AFTER: max jitter 1ms, 0 blocked pings (324x improvement)
Co-authored-by: Tim Baek <tim@openwebui.com>
* fix(oauth): use Protected Resource Metadata scopes in MCP DCR flow
The Dynamic Client Registration flow seeded the registration request
`scope` from the Authorization Server's `scopes_supported` (RFC 8414),
which is a full catalog of every scope the AS can grant across all
resources. Per RFC 9728 and the MCP Scope Selection Strategy, the
resource-specific Protected Resource Metadata `scopes_supported` is the
correct, least-privilege source.
The PRM is already fetched in this function; this change prefers its
`scopes_supported` and keeps the AS `scopes_supported` only as a
fallback when the PRM advertises none. Mirrors the static-credentials
fix in #24690.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(oauth): trim DCR scope comment per review feedback
Shortens the inline comment per review feedback on #25958.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The static credentials OAuth flow currently sets scope=None, relying on
the OAuth provider's default scopes. This breaks providers like GitHub
that default to minimal/public-only access when no scope is requested.
This change reads scopes_supported from the Protected Resource Metadata
document (RFC 9728) and uses them in the authorization request. Unlike
the Authorization Server's scopes_supported (a full catalog of every
scope the AS can grant), the PRM scopes_supported represents what the
specific resource requires — making it safe to request without breaking
providers like Entra ID that reject broad scope requests.
Fixes the regression introduced in 349ea4ea where all scope handling was
removed from the static flow.
_process_picture_url validated the initial picture URL with validate_url()
but then aiohttp followed 3xx redirects without re-validating the target,
so a validate_url-passing public URL could 302 to an internal address and
the body was base64-stored in the user's profile_image_url. This is the
sixth call site of the CVE-2026-45401 redirect-bypass cohort; the other
five already pass allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS. Apply
the same.
