From a8f7b743ff92882ff600d1c9294d0cb4e9f77bc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: DrMelone <27028174+Classic298@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2026 22:47:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] fix: use exact matches and anchored regex, eliminate all
 prefix wildcarding

Replace all startswith-based path checks with:
- frozenset exact matches for static assets (/user.png, /favicon.png,
  /static/favicon.png)
- Anchored regex for the OWUI profile image API route that accepts
  only /api/v1/users/{id}/profile/image (no trailing components,
  no path traversal across segments)

This eliminates every prefix-based attack surface:
- /api/v1/users/{id}/anything-else is rejected
- /static/../../etc/passwd is rejected
- /api/v1/users/../../admin/config is rejected
- Arbitrary internal GET triggers are no longer possible
---
 backend/open_webui/utils/validate.py | 61 +++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/backend/open_webui/utils/validate.py b/backend/open_webui/utils/validate.py
index 1482eeb4b2..ae9d2ef4b2 100644
--- a/backend/open_webui/utils/validate.py
+++ b/backend/open_webui/utils/validate.py
@@ -3,26 +3,28 @@
 import re
 from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
-# Validates the MIME type and structure of base64 data URIs, not payload
-# integrity — corrupt base64 simply produces a broken image, same as a 404 URL.
-# SVG is intentionally excluded: it can carry embedded scripts.
+# Matches the OWUI-generated profile image route.  The ``[^/]+`` segment
+# accepts any user-ID without allowing path-traversal across segments,
+# and the ``$`` anchor rejects trailing path components.
+_USER_PROFILE_IMAGE_RE = re.compile(r'^/api/v1/users/[^/]+/profile/image$')
+
+# Validates MIME type and structure of base64 data URIs.  Only the prefix
+# is checked — validating the full base64 payload would mean running a
+# regex across megabytes of data on every Pydantic instantiation for zero
+# security benefit (corrupt base64 simply renders a broken image, same as
+# a 404 URL).  SVG is intentionally excluded: it can carry embedded scripts.
 _SAFE_DATA_URI_RE = re.compile(
     r'^data:image/(png|jpeg|gif|webp);base64,', re.IGNORECASE
 )
 
-# Relative path prefixes that are safe to accept as profile image URLs.
-# These are the only patterns OWUI itself generates; arbitrary relative
-# paths are rejected to prevent authenticated GET triggers against
-# internal endpoints when other users view a profile.
-_SAFE_RELATIVE_PATH_PREFIXES = (
-    '/api/v1/users/',  # OWUI-generated profile image routes
-    '/static/',        # Static assets served by the frontend
-)
-
-# Exact relative paths accepted (default avatars).
-_SAFE_RELATIVE_PATHS = frozenset({
+# Exact relative paths accepted as profile images.  These are the only
+# static-asset paths OWUI itself assigns; no prefix/wildcard matching is
+# used so that arbitrary relative paths cannot trigger authenticated GETs
+# against internal endpoints when rendered as ``<img>`` sources.
+_SAFE_STATIC_PATHS = frozenset({
     '/user.png',
     '/favicon.png',
+    '/static/favicon.png',
 })
 
 
@@ -32,25 +34,30 @@ def validate_profile_image_url(url: str) -> str:
 
     Allowed formats:
     - Empty string (falls back to default avatar)
-    - Known-safe relative paths (default avatars, static assets,
-      and OWUI profile image API routes)
-    - ``http://`` and ``https://`` URLs with a valid host
+    - Known static-asset paths assigned by OWUI (exact match)
+    - The OWUI profile-image API route ``/api/v1/users/{id}/profile/image``
+    - ``http://`` and ``https://`` URLs with a valid hostname
     - ``data:image/{png,jpeg,gif,webp};base64,...`` URIs
 
-    All other schemes (javascript:, file:, ftp:, etc.) are rejected.
-    SVG data URIs are rejected because SVG can contain embedded scripts.
-    Arbitrary relative paths are rejected to prevent authenticated GET
-    requests against internal endpoints.
+    Everything else is rejected, including:
+    - Dangerous schemes (javascript:, file:, ftp:, …)
+    - SVG data URIs (can contain embedded scripts)
+    - Arbitrary relative paths (prevents authenticated GET triggers)
+    - Scheme-relative URLs (``//host/path``)
     """
     if not url:
         return url
 
-    # Known-safe relative paths generated by OWUI itself.
-    if url in _SAFE_RELATIVE_PATHS:
+    # --- Relative paths (exact match + anchored regex only) -----------
+
+    if url in _SAFE_STATIC_PATHS:
         return url
-    if any(url.startswith(prefix) for prefix in _SAFE_RELATIVE_PATH_PREFIXES):
+
+    if _USER_PROFILE_IMAGE_RE.match(url):
         return url
 
+    # --- Absolute URLs -------------------------------------------------
+
     # urlparse normalises the scheme to lowercase, giving us
     # case-insensitive scheme matching for free.
     parsed = urlparse(url)
@@ -66,8 +73,8 @@ def validate_profile_image_url(url: str) -> str:
         return url
 
     # Base64-encoded raster images uploaded via the frontend.
-    # The regex enforces format boundaries (;base64,) and is
-    # case-insensitive per the data URI / MIME type specs.
+    # The regex enforces the ;base64, boundary and is case-insensitive
+    # per the data-URI / MIME-type specs.
     if _SAFE_DATA_URI_RE.match(url):
         return url
 
@@ -75,5 +82,3 @@ def validate_profile_image_url(url: str) -> str:
         'Invalid profile image URL: must be a known internal path, '
         'an HTTP(S) URL with a host, or a data:image URI (png/jpeg/gif/webp).'
     )
-
-