diff --git a/backend/open_webui/routers/skills.py b/backend/open_webui/routers/skills.py
index 490d1706d5..ede5afd814 100644
--- a/backend/open_webui/routers/skills.py
+++ b/backend/open_webui/routers/skills.py
@@ -176,6 +176,19 @@ async def create_new_skill(
             detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.ID_TAKEN,
         )
 
+    # Strip public/user grants the requesting user is not permitted to assign
+    # (matches the channel/notes/calendar pattern). Without this, a user with
+    # workspace.skills permission could attach principal_id='*' read/write
+    # grants in the create payload, bypassing the sharing.public_skills gate
+    # that the dedicated /access/update endpoint already enforces.
+    form_data.access_grants = await filter_allowed_access_grants(
+        request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS,
+        user.id,
+        user.role,
+        form_data.access_grants,
+        'sharing.public_skills',
+    )
+
     try:
         skill = await Skills.insert_new_skill(user.id, form_data, db=db)
         if skill:
@@ -276,6 +289,19 @@ async def update_skill_by_id(
             detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.UNAUTHORIZED,
         )
 
+    # Strip public/user grants the requesting user is not permitted to assign
+    # (matches the channel/notes/calendar pattern). The access check above only
+    # restricts WHO can write to the skill; this filter restricts WHICH grants
+    # they may set, so a non-admin owner cannot make their own skill publicly
+    # readable/writable without sharing.public_skills permission.
+    form_data.access_grants = await filter_allowed_access_grants(
+        request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS,
+        user.id,
+        user.role,
+        form_data.access_grants,
+        'sharing.public_skills',
+    )
+
     try:
         updated = {
             **form_data.model_dump(exclude={'id'}),