fix: use ipaddress stdlib for IPv6 SSRF protection

The validators.ipv6(ip, private=True) call always returns a falsy ValidationError because validators==0.35.0 does not support the private kwarg for IPv6. This means any hostname resolving to a private IPv6 address (::1, fd00::*, ::ffff:169.254.169.254) bypasses SSRF protection entirely, circumventing the fix for CVE-2025-65958.

Replace both the IPv4 and IPv6 validators-based private checks with Python's stdlib ipaddress module using an allowlist approach (not addr.is_global). This blocks all non-globally-routable addresses — private, loopback, link-local, reserved, multicast, and unspecified — for both IPv4 and IPv6, including IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses.
This commit is contained in:
DrMelone 2026-04-06 16:04:55 +02:00
parent 6fdd19bf14
commit 7094edb54d

View file

@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import asyncio
import ipaddress
import logging
import socket
import ssl
@ -84,11 +85,9 @@ def validate_url(url: Union[str, Sequence[str]]):
ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses = resolve_hostname(parsed_url.hostname)
# Check if any of the resolved addresses are private
# This is technically still vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks, as we don't control WebBaseLoader
for ip in ipv4_addresses:
if validators.ipv4(ip, private=True):
raise ValueError(ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_URL)
for ip in ipv6_addresses:
if validators.ipv6(ip, private=True):
for ip in ipv4_addresses + ipv6_addresses:
addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
if not addr.is_global:
raise ValueError(ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_URL)
return True
elif isinstance(url, Sequence):