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c2e06890ad
* fix: redact config and MCP secrets in read-only admin views GET /config/field/info and the MCP server list/detail endpoints returned secret-bearing fields to any caller with an admin view, including read-only admins. They now return those fields in full only to a full PROXY_ADMIN; every other caller gets the reduced, non-admin view, while non-sensitive fields remain readable. Regression tests cover the role-based visibility on both endpoints, including that a full admin still sees everything needed to populate the edit form. * fix: redact nested secrets in config field info for non-admins /config/field/info returned structured general_settings fields verbatim to any admin-view caller, so a view-only admin reading database_args received the nested aws_web_identity_token (a DynamoDB role-assumption credential) in plaintext. Recurse into dict/list field values and redact secret leaves for non-PROXY_ADMIN callers, leaving non-secret siblings and full-admin reads unchanged * fix: redact secret config values in /config/list for non-admins /config/list shared the same _user_has_admin_view gate as /config/field/info but returned each field value unredacted, so a view-only admin reading the list received pass_through_endpoints upstream Authorization headers verbatim. Route every general_settings value through a shared role-aware redactor (extracted from /config/field/info) covering the top-level and nested field paths, so non-PROXY_ADMIN callers get secret-bearing fields redacted while full-admin reads stay unchanged * chore(ci): allowlist _redact_secret_values_in_obj in recursive_detector The config secret redactor recurses over JsonValue, which is acyclic, and its depth is bounded by the operator-authored general_settings schema. Add it to the recursive_detector ignore list alongside the other bounded nested-redaction helpers (mask_dict, _redact_sensitive_litellm_params) * proxy: cap recursive secret redaction depth at 10 Match the cap on _redact_sensitive_litellm_params (the closest analog in the proxy, also recursive, key-name driven, returns a sentinel). The previous justification — bounded by operator-authored schema depth, JsonValue acyclic — is true today but is a property of the threat model, not an enforced invariant of the function. If a code path is ever added that pipes external input into general_settings (config import, migration tooling, JWT-driven settings, …) the assumption silently breaks. A local cap makes the invariant local. The cap branch fails closed: at _REDACT_SECRET_MAX_DEPTH the whole subtree is replaced with 'REDACTED' rather than returned verbatim. A future refactor that flips this to fail-open would let a deeply nested credential leak; the new regression test test_redact_secret_values_in_obj_fails_closed_at_max_depth guards against that. Updates the recursive_detector ignore-list rationale to point at the numeric cap rather than the structural argument. * test: actually exercise the depth cap in fails-closed test The previous fixture stored the leaf under the secret-named key 'aws_web_identity_token', which the recursor's key-name short-circuit redacts regardless of the cap — so the test passed both with and without the cap in place. Empirically confirmed: under an uncapped mutant the old fixture still hides the secret (key-name catches it), the new fixture leaks it (only the cap can stop it). Swap the leaf key to a non-secret name so the cap is the only redaction path exercised, making the test fail on mutation as advertised. |
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| .. | ||
| azure_client_usage_test.py | ||
| ban_constant_numbers.py | ||
| ban_copy_deepcopy_kwargs.py | ||
| bedrock_pricing.py | ||
| callback_manager_test.py | ||
| check_data_replace_usage.py | ||
| check_endpoint_coverage.py | ||
| check_fastuuid_usage.py | ||
| check_get_model_cost_key_performance.py | ||
| check_guardrail_apply_decorator.py | ||
| check_licenses.py | ||
| check_provider_folders_documented.py | ||
| check_spanattributes_value_usage.py | ||
| check_unsafe_enterprise_import.py | ||
| code_qa_check_tests.py | ||
| enforce_llms_folder_style.py | ||
| ensure_async_clients_test.py | ||
| info_log_check.py | ||
| liccheck.ini | ||
| license_cache.json | ||
| litellm_logging_code_coverage.py | ||
| log.txt | ||
| memory_test.py | ||
| pass_through_code_coverage.py | ||
| prevent_key_leaks_in_exceptions.py | ||
| recursive_detector.py | ||
| router_code_coverage.py | ||
| router_enforce_line_length.py | ||
| test_aio_http_image_conversion.py | ||
| test_ban_set_verbose.py | ||
| test_chat_completion_imports.py | ||
| test_proxy_types_import.py | ||
| test_router_strategy_async.py | ||
| user_api_key_auth_code_coverage.py | ||