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* fix(guardrails): walk Responses-API text taxonomy in shared content helpers
Every guardrail sharing litellm/proxy/guardrails/_content_utils.py silently
drops all text on the /v1/responses path. AIM turns it into a loud 422 (
{"error":"No messages in the request"}); every other guardrail (Lakera v2,
Cato, Lasso, Repello, IBM, Azure Content Safety, enterprise secret
detection) scans an empty payload and lets the request through unscanned.
Three defects, all in _content_utils.py:
1. _iter_text_parts_in_content recognised only part.type == "text", but the
Responses API uses input_text (request) and output_text (assistant).
2. _coerce_input_to_messages gated on "every item has a role key"; any
Responses input list containing a function_call or function_call_output
item failed the check and was wrapped as one opaque blob.
3. build_inspection_messages forwarded any role through, including a bare
tool role missing tool_call_id, which validators like AIM's /fw/v1/analyze
reject with a schema error.
Fix walks the actual Responses item taxonomy (message, function_call,
function_call_output, bare content parts and strings), recognises
{text, input_text, output_text} everywhere, and coerces any role outside
{system, user, assistant} to user in the outbound inspection payload.
* style: ruff-format changed guardrail files
* test(guardrails): cover function_call_output string form; drop em-dash in new docstring
* fix(guardrails): map function_call_output straight to user role
Avoids ever materialising a schema-invalid bare tool message. The
downstream role-safety coercion in build_inspection_messages still
guards genuinely caller-supplied non-standard roles (developer,
function, custom values); add a regression test covering that path
so the coercion has real coverage after this simplification.
* test(guardrails): pin chat-completions tool-role coercion in build_inspection_messages
* docs(test): soften AIM-specific claims in LIT-4294 test docstrings
Ryan's review flagged that several test docstrings assert AIM's
/fw/v1/analyze validates + rejects specific schema violations. That
behavior is customer-reported in the LIT-4294 writeup, not directly
verified by us. Rephrase to attribute the AIM 422 to the customer's
writeup and describe the underlying constraint as the OpenAI chat
schema; any downstream API that validates against that schema rejects
the same shape.
* refactor(guardrails): move unsupported-role coercion into AIM only
The generic coercion in build_inspection_messages collapsed any role
outside {system, user, assistant} to user for every caller of the
helper. Combined with the pre-existing apply_redacted_messages_back
write-back behavior in Lakera/AIM/Cato, that turned a loud OpenAI 400
on chat-completions tool-message masking into a silent semantic
corruption of the outbound request (role tool with tool_call_id got
rewritten to bare role user, dropping the assistant + tool_calls
sibling).
AIM specifically requires the coercion because its /fw/v1/analyze
validates the payload against the OpenAI chat schema; other guardrails
either do not validate roles or do their own reconstruction. Move the
coercion to AimGuardrail._build_aim_inspection_messages so the shared
helper keeps caller roles intact and no new cross-guardrail role
corruption is introduced. The pre-existing apply_redacted_messages_back
structural flatten remains as separate follow-up work.
function_call_output items still synthesise role user in the shared
helper because they have no natural role field, which is a different
concern from coercing a caller-supplied role.
* refactor(guardrails): preserve role fidelity in shared _content_utils
Shared inspection helpers should extract text and preserve semantic
role signals; role coercion for third-party schema safety stays inside
the guardrail that needs it (AIM).
Three shared-helper changes:
- Bare content-part dicts (input_text/output_text) with an explicit role
keep it; only role-less parts default to user.
- Responses message items already had their role preserved; the
behavior is now covered by an explicit test.
- function_call_output items default to role tool (semantic equivalent
of the chat-completions tool message shape) instead of role user, so
Responses and chat completions produce symmetric inspection payloads.
A caller-supplied role on the item is still preserved.
AIM's schema-safe coercion in _build_aim_inspection_messages already
handles the resulting role tool: it collapses to user before the POST
to /fw/v1/analyze so AIM's OpenAI-schema validator does not reject the
bare tool message (no tool_call_id can survive the flatten). Added a
regression test in test_aim.py covering that path.
526 lines
19 KiB
Python
526 lines
19 KiB
Python
"""Tests for the shared guardrail content extraction helpers."""
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from litellm.proxy.guardrails._content_utils import (
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apply_redacted_messages_back,
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build_inspection_messages,
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has_non_string_content,
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iter_message_text,
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walk_user_text,
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)
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# ── iter_message_text ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_iter_message_text_string_messages():
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data = {
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"messages": [
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{"role": "user", "content": "hello"},
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{"role": "assistant", "content": "hi"},
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]
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}
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assert list(iter_message_text(data)) == ["hello", "hi"]
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def test_iter_message_text_multimodal_list_content():
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"""VERIA-11: list-format content must be inspected, not silently skipped."""
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data = {
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"messages": [
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{
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"role": "user",
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"content": [
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{"type": "text", "text": "AWS_KEY=AKIA..."},
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{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "..."}},
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{"type": "text", "text": "more secrets"},
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],
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}
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]
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}
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assert list(iter_message_text(data)) == ["AWS_KEY=AKIA...", "more secrets"]
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def test_iter_message_text_responses_api_string_input():
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"""fniVO9-F: Responses-API ``input`` must be inspectable when ``messages`` absent."""
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data = {"input": "tell me a secret"}
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assert list(iter_message_text(data)) == ["tell me a secret"]
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def test_iter_message_text_responses_api_list_input_messages():
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data = {
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"input": [
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{"role": "user", "content": "first"},
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{"role": "user", "content": "second"},
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]
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}
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assert list(iter_message_text(data)) == ["first", "second"]
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def test_iter_message_text_responses_api_list_input_content_parts():
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data = {
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"input": [
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{"type": "text", "text": "alpha"},
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{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "..."}},
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{"type": "text", "text": "beta"},
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]
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}
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assert list(iter_message_text(data)) == ["alpha", "beta"]
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def test_iter_message_text_responses_api_list_input_mixed_dicts_and_strings():
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"""Greptile P2: mixed-list ``input`` with content-part dicts AND bare
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strings must yield every text fragment — read helpers used to truncate
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the bare strings."""
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data = {
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"input": [
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{"type": "text", "text": "from-dict"},
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"from-bare-string",
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{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "..."}},
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"another-bare-string",
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]
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}
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assert list(iter_message_text(data)) == [
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"from-dict",
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"from-bare-string",
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"another-bare-string",
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]
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def test_iter_message_text_walks_messages_and_input_independently():
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"""When both are present (rare), every fragment from either field is
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inspected — a stricter guarantee than "first one wins"."""
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data = {
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"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "msg-content"}],
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"input": "input-content",
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}
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assert list(iter_message_text(data)) == ["msg-content", "input-content"]
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def test_iter_message_text_empty_data():
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assert list(iter_message_text({})) == []
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assert list(iter_message_text({"messages": []})) == []
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assert list(iter_message_text({"input": ""})) == []
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def test_iter_message_text_responses_api_input_text_and_output_text_parts():
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"""LIT-4294: Responses-API content parts use ``input_text`` (request) and
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``output_text`` (assistant); reading only ``type == "text"`` skipped every
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``/v1/responses`` body and every text guardrail was a no-op on that path."""
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data = {
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"input": [
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{
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"type": "message",
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"role": "user",
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"content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "user text"}],
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},
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{
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"type": "message",
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"role": "assistant",
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"content": [{"type": "output_text", "text": "assistant text"}],
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},
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]
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}
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assert list(iter_message_text(data)) == ["user text", "assistant text"]
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def test_iter_message_text_responses_api_tool_call_taxonomy():
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"""LIT-4294: a Responses ``input`` list freely mixes message items,
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``function_call`` (no ``role``), and ``function_call_output`` items. The
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old ``all(item has 'role')`` gate wrapped the whole list as one blob and
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yielded nothing; every text fragment must be visited independently."""
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data = {
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"input": [
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{
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"type": "message",
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"role": "user",
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"content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "hello"}],
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},
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{
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"type": "function_call",
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"call_id": "c1",
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"name": "get_weather",
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"arguments": "{}",
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},
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{
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"type": "function_call_output",
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"call_id": "c1",
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"output": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "sunny"}],
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},
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]
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}
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assert list(iter_message_text(data)) == ["hello", "sunny"]
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# ── walk_user_text ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_walk_user_text_redacts_string_messages_in_place():
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data = {
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"messages": [
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{"role": "user", "content": "leak: AKIAEXAMPLE"},
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{"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
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]
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}
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visited = walk_user_text(data, lambda s: s.replace("AKIAEXAMPLE", "[REDACTED]"))
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assert visited == 2
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assert data["messages"][0]["content"] == "leak: [REDACTED]"
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assert data["messages"][1]["content"] == "ok"
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def test_walk_user_text_redacts_multimodal_text_parts():
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"""VERIA-11: list-content text parts must be mutable for in-place redaction."""
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data = {
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"messages": [
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{
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"role": "user",
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"content": [
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{"type": "text", "text": "AKIAEXAMPLE here"},
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{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "..."}},
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{"type": "text", "text": "no secret"},
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],
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}
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]
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}
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visited = walk_user_text(data, lambda s: s.replace("AKIAEXAMPLE", "[REDACTED]"))
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assert visited == 2
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parts = data["messages"][0]["content"]
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assert parts[0] == {"type": "text", "text": "[REDACTED] here"}
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# Non-text part must be left untouched.
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assert parts[1] == {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "..."}}
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assert parts[2] == {"type": "text", "text": "no secret"}
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def test_walk_user_text_redacts_responses_api_string_input():
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data = {"input": "leak AKIAEXAMPLE"}
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visited = walk_user_text(data, lambda s: s.replace("AKIAEXAMPLE", "[REDACTED]"))
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assert visited == 1
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assert data["input"] == "leak [REDACTED]"
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def test_walk_user_text_redacts_responses_api_list_input():
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data = {
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"input": [
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{"type": "text", "text": "AKIAEXAMPLE"},
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{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "..."}},
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]
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}
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visited = walk_user_text(data, lambda s: f"[redacted]{s}[/]")
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assert visited == 1
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assert data["input"][0] == {"type": "text", "text": "[redacted]AKIAEXAMPLE[/]"}
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assert data["input"][1] == {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "..."}}
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def test_walk_user_text_redacts_responses_input_text_and_output_text_parts():
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"""LIT-4294: ``walk_user_text`` must recognise the Responses text-part
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variants so masking guardrails (secret detection, PII) actually redact
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``/v1/responses`` bodies instead of no-op'ing on them."""
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data = {
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"input": [
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{
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"type": "message",
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"role": "user",
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"content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "AKIAEXAMPLE"}],
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},
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{
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"type": "message",
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"role": "assistant",
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"content": [{"type": "output_text", "text": "AKIAEXAMPLE too"}],
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},
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]
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}
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visited = walk_user_text(data, lambda s: s.replace("AKIAEXAMPLE", "[REDACTED]"))
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assert visited == 2
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assert data["input"][0]["content"][0] == {
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"type": "input_text",
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"text": "[REDACTED]",
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}
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assert data["input"][1]["content"][0] == {
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"type": "output_text",
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"text": "[REDACTED] too",
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}
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def test_walk_user_text_redacts_function_call_output_text():
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"""LIT-4294: tool-call round-trips carry secrets in
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``function_call_output.output``; the redact walker must descend into it
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while leaving ``function_call`` items (call_id, arguments) untouched."""
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data = {
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"input": [
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{
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"type": "message",
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"role": "user",
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"content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "AKIAEXAMPLE user"}],
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},
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{
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"type": "function_call",
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"call_id": "c1",
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"name": "get_weather",
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"arguments": '{"AKIAEXAMPLE": 1}',
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},
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{
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"type": "function_call_output",
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"call_id": "c1",
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"output": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "AKIAEXAMPLE tool"}],
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},
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]
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}
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visited = walk_user_text(data, lambda s: s.replace("AKIAEXAMPLE", "[REDACTED]"))
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assert visited == 2
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assert data["input"][0]["content"][0]["text"] == "[REDACTED] user"
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assert data["input"][1] == {
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"type": "function_call",
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"call_id": "c1",
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"name": "get_weather",
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"arguments": '{"AKIAEXAMPLE": 1}',
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}
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assert data["input"][2]["output"][0]["text"] == "[REDACTED] tool"
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def test_walk_user_text_redacts_function_call_output_string_output():
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"""LIT-4294: ``function_call_output.output`` is also a plain string in
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OpenAI's Responses spec; the redact walker must handle both forms."""
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data = {
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"input": [
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{
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"type": "function_call_output",
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"call_id": "c1",
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"output": "AKIAEXAMPLE tool",
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},
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]
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}
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visited = walk_user_text(data, lambda s: s.replace("AKIAEXAMPLE", "[REDACTED]"))
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assert visited == 1
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assert data["input"][0]["output"] == "[REDACTED] tool"
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def test_walk_user_text_redacts_mixed_list_input():
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"""Read and write helpers must agree on coverage — bare strings inside
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a mixed ``input`` list are inspected by both."""
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data = {
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"input": [
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{"type": "text", "text": "secret-one"},
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"secret-two",
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{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "..."}},
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]
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}
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visited = walk_user_text(data, lambda s: f"<{s}>")
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assert visited == 2
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assert data["input"][0] == {"type": "text", "text": "<secret-one>"}
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assert data["input"][1] == "<secret-two>"
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assert data["input"][2] == {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "..."}}
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# ── build_inspection_messages ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_build_inspection_messages_chat_completion_passthrough():
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data = {
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"messages": [
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{"role": "system", "content": "be helpful"},
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{"role": "user", "content": "hi"},
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]
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}
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assert build_inspection_messages(data) == [
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{"role": "system", "content": "be helpful"},
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{"role": "user", "content": "hi"},
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]
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def test_build_inspection_messages_joins_multimodal_text_parts():
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data = {
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"messages": [
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{
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"role": "user",
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"content": [
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{"type": "text", "text": "first part"},
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{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "..."}},
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{"type": "text", "text": "second part"},
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],
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}
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]
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}
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assert build_inspection_messages(data) == [{"role": "user", "content": "first part\nsecond part"}]
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def test_build_inspection_messages_lifts_responses_api_input():
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"""fniVO9-F: ``input`` must be visible to hooks that POST messages to a remote API."""
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data = {"input": "responses-api content"}
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assert build_inspection_messages(data) == [{"role": "user", "content": "responses-api content"}]
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def test_build_inspection_messages_drops_messages_with_no_text():
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data = {
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"messages": [
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{"role": "user", "content": ""},
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{
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"role": "user",
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"content": [{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "..."}}],
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},
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{"role": "user", "content": "kept"},
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]
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}
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assert build_inspection_messages(data) == [{"role": "user", "content": "kept"}]
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def test_build_inspection_messages_responses_api_tool_call_taxonomy():
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"""LIT-4294: mixed Responses ``input`` (message + function_call +
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function_call_output) must produce a non-empty inspection list. The
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customer's writeup reproduced a 422 from AIM's ``/fw/v1/analyze``
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(``No messages in the request``) when this synthesised list came back
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empty; every other guardrail silently scanned nothing on the same
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input."""
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data = {
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"input": [
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{
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"type": "message",
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"role": "user",
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"content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "hello"}],
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},
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{
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"type": "function_call",
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"call_id": "c1",
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"name": "get_weather",
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"arguments": "{}",
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},
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{
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"type": "function_call_output",
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"call_id": "c1",
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"output": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "sunny"}],
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},
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]
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}
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assert build_inspection_messages(data) == [
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{"role": "user", "content": "hello"},
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{"role": "tool", "content": "sunny"},
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]
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def test_build_inspection_messages_function_call_output_defaults_to_tool():
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"""LIT-4294: a Responses ``function_call_output`` item is the semantic
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equivalent of a chat-completions ``role: "tool"`` message, so the shared
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helper synthesises ``role: "tool"`` when the item has no explicit role.
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AIM's schema-safe coercion happens at the AIM call site, not here."""
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data = {
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"input": [
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{
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"type": "function_call_output",
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"call_id": "c1",
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"output": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "tool text"}],
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},
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]
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}
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assert build_inspection_messages(data) == [{"role": "tool", "content": "tool text"}]
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def test_build_inspection_messages_function_call_output_preserves_explicit_role():
|
|
"""When ``function_call_output`` carries a caller-supplied ``role`` the
|
|
shared helper preserves it rather than synthesising ``tool``."""
|
|
data = {
|
|
"input": [
|
|
{
|
|
"type": "function_call_output",
|
|
"role": "assistant",
|
|
"call_id": "c1",
|
|
"output": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "tool text"}],
|
|
},
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
assert build_inspection_messages(data) == [{"role": "assistant", "content": "tool text"}]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_build_inspection_messages_bare_content_part_preserves_explicit_role():
|
|
"""A bare content-part dict with an explicit ``role`` keeps it. Only
|
|
absent roles get defaulted to ``user``."""
|
|
data = {
|
|
"input": [
|
|
{"type": "input_text", "text": "no role"},
|
|
{"type": "output_text", "role": "assistant", "text": "with role"},
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
assert build_inspection_messages(data) == [
|
|
{"role": "user", "content": "no role"},
|
|
{"role": "assistant", "content": "with role"},
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_build_inspection_messages_message_item_preserves_role():
|
|
"""Responses message items carry a role explicitly; the shared helper
|
|
passes it through untouched."""
|
|
data = {
|
|
"input": [
|
|
{"type": "message", "role": "system", "content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "sys"}]},
|
|
{"type": "message", "role": "assistant", "content": [{"type": "output_text", "text": "asst"}]},
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
assert build_inspection_messages(data) == [
|
|
{"role": "system", "content": "sys"},
|
|
{"role": "assistant", "content": "asst"},
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_build_inspection_messages_empty_data():
|
|
assert build_inspection_messages({}) == []
|
|
assert build_inspection_messages({"messages": []}) == []
|
|
assert build_inspection_messages({"input": ""}) == []
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── has_non_string_content ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_has_non_string_content_string_messages():
|
|
data = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}]}
|
|
assert has_non_string_content(data) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_has_non_string_content_multimodal_messages():
|
|
data = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": [{"type": "text", "text": "hi"}]}]}
|
|
assert has_non_string_content(data) is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_has_non_string_content_responses_api_string_input():
|
|
assert has_non_string_content({"input": "plain string"}) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_has_non_string_content_responses_api_list_input():
|
|
assert has_non_string_content({"input": ["a", "b"]}) is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_has_non_string_content_empty_data():
|
|
assert has_non_string_content({}) is False
|
|
assert has_non_string_content({"messages": []}) is False
|
|
assert has_non_string_content({"input": ""}) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── apply_redacted_messages_back ──────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_apply_redacted_messages_back_chat_completion():
|
|
data = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "secret"}]}
|
|
apply_redacted_messages_back(data, [{"role": "user", "content": "[REDACTED]"}])
|
|
assert data["messages"] == [{"role": "user", "content": "[REDACTED]"}]
|
|
assert "input" not in data
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_apply_redacted_messages_back_responses_api_string_input():
|
|
"""A Responses-API request reads ``data["input"]``; writing only to
|
|
``messages`` would let unredacted text reach the LLM."""
|
|
data = {"input": "secret payload"}
|
|
apply_redacted_messages_back(data, [{"role": "user", "content": "[REDACTED]"}])
|
|
assert data["input"] == "[REDACTED]"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_apply_redacted_messages_back_both_fields():
|
|
"""Defensive: when both fields are present, both are updated."""
|
|
data = {
|
|
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "old"}],
|
|
"input": "old",
|
|
}
|
|
apply_redacted_messages_back(data, [{"role": "user", "content": "[REDACTED]"}])
|
|
assert data["messages"] == [{"role": "user", "content": "[REDACTED]"}]
|
|
assert data["input"] == "[REDACTED]"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_apply_redacted_messages_back_skips_input_when_not_string():
|
|
"""List ``input`` (multimodal Responses-API) is left alone — the
|
|
multimodal-degrades-to-block guard runs upstream."""
|
|
data = {"input": [{"type": "text", "text": "leak"}]}
|
|
apply_redacted_messages_back(data, [{"role": "user", "content": "[REDACTED]"}])
|
|
assert data["input"] == [{"type": "text", "text": "leak"}]
|