litellm/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth
yucheng-berri 90731576e3
feat(team): let a team admin manage their own team's logging callbacks (#37667)
* feat(team): let a team admin manage their own team's logging callbacks

The team callback endpoints already authorize correctly: POST, GET and DELETE
each call _verify_team_access, which admits a proxy admin, an org admin for the
team, or an admin of that team, and 403s everyone else. The route-permission
layer never let a team admin reach them, so it answered 401 naming proxy admin
and the handler's own check was dead code for the caller it was written for.

Adding the two paths to self_managed_routes is how every other team-admin route
works: /team/member_add, /team/member_delete, /team/member_update and
/team/permissions_update all sit in that list and scope per team inside the
handler. The entries use the :path converter the routes are registered with, so
a team id containing a slash resolves the same way at the gate as at the router.

Because any authenticated caller now reaches these handlers, an unknown team had
to stop being distinguishable from one the caller may not manage. All three
handlers looked the team up and raised a distinct 'does not exist' before the
access check, which would have let any valid key probe for team ids. That branch
now returns the same 403 body _verify_team_access raises, and keeps the
diagnosable error for a proxy admin.

disable_logging stays out of the grant. That is a scope decision rather than a
security boundary, since a team admin holding DELETE can clear callbacks one at
a time; it differs only in also clearing the deprecated callback_settings shape.

* fix(team): reach the callback routes for a team id containing a colon

The route gate expands {team_id:path} to "[^:]+" so a colon-suffixed provider
route is not swallowed, which means the two entries added here matched a team
id with a slash but not one with a colon, while the router accepts both.
team_id is a free-form string, so a team whose id contains a colon kept the
old proxy-admin-only denial and its admin could not manage its own callbacks.
List both spellings rather than relaxing the shared matcher, which every
":path" route depends on. The comment claimed the two matchers agree; they do
not, so it now says what each placeholder actually accepts.

* fix(auth): match a :path placeholder the way the router's converter does

A team id may carry a slash, a colon, or both. The gate expanded {x:path}
to "[^:]+", so an id with a colon in it matched no self_managed_routes
entry and its team admin got the proxy-admin-only denial on a route the
router had already resolved for them. Listing a second {x} spelling covered
a colon or a slash but never both.

Expand {x:path} to ".+" instead, except when the template puts a ":"
literal of its own after the placeholder, which is where the narrower form
was earning its keep: the Google routes end in ":generateContent" and
friends, and there the value has to stop before that suffix rather than
swallow it and match a different verb.

That lets self_managed_routes drop back to the two :path spellings the
router itself mounts.

* test(auth): pin that the callback grant reaches no neighbouring team route

The grant is two templates ending in the callback suffix, and the
placeholder now takes slashes and colons. Every other route under
/team/{team_id} registers an ordinary single-segment placeholder, so no
URL the router sends to one of them can end in the callback suffix.

Pin that, so adding a path-converter route beside these fails here
rather than by handing a caller a handler the grant never covered.

* fix(team): make one entry own a credential family end to end

Every stored entry's callback_vars are flattened into one dict before a
request reads them, and that dict is what the exporter authenticates and
addresses with. So an entry naming only a destination is enough to
redirect a credential written somewhere else: a host on a second entry
pairs with the key pair from the first, and the request carries that key
pair to the new host. A team admin cannot read the team's masked Langfuse
secret, but could add such an entry and receive it.

Reject, for writers who are not proxy admins, an entry using a credential
family another entry already holds. Family rather than callback name,
because langfuse and langfuse_otel configure one Langfuse project and
would otherwise redirect each other, and because a destination like
dd_agent_host that no integration registry lists still pairs with the
Datadog credentials beside it.

A proxy admin already holds every credential the proxy has, so the rule
would buy nothing there and would break configs that predate it. A team
admin who does want to move a family deletes the entry holding it first,
which reveals nothing.

* fix(team): let one integration cover both callback events

The family rule compared variable names only, so a team admin who registered
an integration for the success event could not register the same integration,
with the same values, for the failure event.

Compare the values as well: repeating what the owning entry already stores
flattens to the same dict, so there is nothing to redirect. The stored side is
decrypted first, because the credentials are encrypted at rest and ciphertext
never equals the plaintext coming in.

* fix(team): compare the family's values, not its variable names

Comparing per variable rejected a credential written under its other spelling:
langfuse_secret and langfuse_secret_key are one key, so repeating the stored
secret under the other name read as a new value.

Ask instead whether the value is one the owning entries already carry. A
destination the caller controls is by definition not, so the redirect stays
closed, and no alias table has to stay complete for that to hold.

* fix(team): pin the family's configured variables as well as its values

Asking only whether a value is one the family holds let a held variable be
given another of the family's values, so the exporter would address or
authenticate with it.

Keep the value membership rule for a variable the family does not configure
yet, which is what lets one credential go in under its other spelling, and
require a variable it does configure to keep the value it has. Between them no
value the caller chose can enter the family.

* fix(auth): keep a newline in a :path value visible to the route gate

"." stops at a newline and the router's path converter does not, so a %0A
anywhere in a :path segment left the route unmatched here while still reaching
the handler. Every list built on this matcher inherited that: on a proxy with
DISABLE_ADMIN_ENDPOINTS set, DELETE /v1/mcp/server/abc%0Adef reached the MCP
handler instead of the 403 the same request gets without the %0A.

Match with a class that spans newlines.
2026-09-08 15:58:58 -07:00
..
test_admin_viewer_handler_access.py test: drop the cwd-relative sys.path.insert calls from the test suite (#37802) 2026-08-22 09:25:58 -07:00
test_auth_checks.py fix(proxy): only a provably missing user row counts as unrestricted in the websocket passthrough gate 2026-09-04 19:35:08 -07:00
test_auth_exception_handler.py fix(proxy): word database 503s by whether the fault is transient (#39256) 2026-09-02 15:05:55 -07:00
test_auth_hot_path_network_requests.py test: drop the cwd-relative sys.path.insert calls from the test suite (#37802) 2026-08-22 09:25:58 -07:00
test_auth_utils.py fix(proxy): log budget reservation notice once at config load (#40167) 2026-09-07 18:18:28 -07:00
test_banned_params_extra_body.py fix(proxy): ban caller-supplied aws identity selectors in request bodies 2026-08-10 22:05:49 -07:00
test_cli_auth.py test: assert the poll call shape after the timeout refactor 2026-08-25 11:00:29 -07:00
test_custom_auth_end_user_budget.py fix(proxy): registry caches stop per-request tag and end-user Postgres reads in auth (#36801) 2026-08-17 18:52:13 +00:00
test_fallback_model_access.py feat(proxy): gate fallback model access enforcement behind enforce_fallback_model_access 2026-08-27 15:45:10 -07:00
test_handle_jwt.py test: require a match= on broad pytest.raises, and drop duplicate parametrize cases (#37769) 2026-08-20 20:24:49 -07:00
test_info_routes.py style: run black formatter on files from main merge 2026-04-17 13:02:59 -07:00
test_litellm_license.py feat(router): meter auto-router tier and prompt customization against the auto_router license feature (#39674) 2026-09-05 09:51:23 -07:00
test_login_utils.py feat(auth): enforce configurable password policy and SSO-only login (#39381) 2026-09-02 14:28:13 -07:00
test_mcp_ip_filtering.py fix(proxy): mark session/SSO/SAML cookies Secure behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy (#39391) 2026-09-02 16:42:29 -07:00
test_model_access_group_budgets.py fix(budgets): make the model access group ceiling exclusive 2026-08-29 15:20:10 -07:00
test_model_checks.py refactor(azure_ai): type the Foundry param mapping override and drop test docstrings 2026-09-05 19:21:34 -07:00
test_model_checks_fallbacks.py perf: build log messages lazily so filtered-out log records cost nothing (#35703) 2026-08-04 04:34:52 +00:00
test_multi_budget_windows.py fix(proxy): enforce budgets against authoritative DB spend when the cross-pod counter is unreliable (#30684) 2026-06-18 10:35:41 -07:00
test_network.py feat(auth): resolve caller identity once into a Principal at the auth seam (#30887) 2026-06-20 18:49:41 -07:00
test_oauth2_proxy_hook.py test: drop the cwd-relative sys.path.insert calls from the test suite (#37802) 2026-08-22 09:25:58 -07:00
test_object_permission_loading.py test: drop the cwd-relative sys.path.insert calls from the test suite (#37802) 2026-08-22 09:25:58 -07:00
test_onboarding.py feat(auth): enforce configurable password policy and SSO-only login (#39381) 2026-09-02 14:28:13 -07:00
test_organization_budget_enforcement.py test: drop the cwd-relative sys.path.insert calls from the test suite (#37802) 2026-08-22 09:25:58 -07:00
test_password_hashing.py chore: fixes 2026-03-30 18:36:58 -07:00
test_password_policy.py feat(auth): enforce configurable password policy and SSO-only login (#39381) 2026-09-02 14:28:13 -07:00
test_resolvers_exceptions.py feat(auth): resolve caller identity once into a Principal at the auth seam (#30887) 2026-06-20 18:49:41 -07:00
test_resolvers_models.py feat(auth): resolve caller identity once into a Principal at the auth seam (#30887) 2026-06-20 18:49:41 -07:00
test_resolvers_seam.py feat(auth): resolve caller identity once into a Principal at the auth seam (#30887) 2026-06-20 18:49:41 -07:00
test_resolvers_store.py feat(auth): resolve caller identity once into a Principal at the auth seam (#30887) 2026-06-20 18:49:41 -07:00
test_route_checks.py feat(team): let a team admin manage their own team's logging callbacks (#37667) 2026-09-08 15:58:58 -07:00
test_router_override_fallback_auth.py chore(proxy): clean up request parameter validation and provider destination handling (#34189) 2026-07-22 00:57:58 +00:00
test_team_member_budget.py Fix team member budget enforcement without user row (#27273) 2026-05-06 11:42:29 -07:00
test_unmapped_model_budget_enforcement.py fix(router): never price a strategy-router alias (#36691) 2026-08-12 14:26:30 -07:00
test_user_api_key_auth.py fix(proxy): keep team member budget enforced at the cap and across Redis counter expiry (#40304) 2026-09-08 15:06:20 -07:00