* feat(anthropic): workload identity federation and pluggable identity sources Backend half of #38818 (internal copy of the fork PR #38013), rebuilt as one commit on top of litellm_internal_staging without the dashboard changes. Deployments on anthropic/ without a static api_key can exchange an OIDC workload assertion for a short-lived sk-ant-oat01 token through a shared RFC 7523 JWT-bearer engine. The assertion comes from a mounted token file, an env token, a LiteLLM-signed issuer, or Keycloak, chosen per deployment, per named credential, or through ANTHROPIC_IDENTITY_SOURCE. The federation fields are server-owned: refused inline in request bodies and on POST /model/new, proxy-admin only on credentials, and the token exchange is pinned to api.anthropic.com unless LITELLM_ANTHROPIC_WIF_ALLOWED_HOSTS adds a host. GET /credentials/{name}/jwks exports the public key set of a LiteLLM-signed credential for the Claude Console. The OpenAI federation trio from #39613 rides along on the backend side with the same server-owned handling. Fixes #28607 Resolves LIT-6107 Co-authored-by: derhornspieler <15236687+derhornspieler@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(anthropic): let batch-result downloads mint from deployment params and accept host:port allowlist entries The files handler enabled workload identity on batch-result downloads but never received the deployment's litellm_params, so a deployment authenticating through a named credential could only mint from process-wide env vars. It now threads litellm_params through to the auth header the way the batch retrieve path already does. LITELLM_ANTHROPIC_WIF_ALLOWED_HOSTS entries written as host:port were read by urlsplit as a scheme, so the allowlist kept the raw entry while the exchange compared bare hostnames and refused the gateway. Entries are now parsed as network locations whether or not they carry a scheme. * fix(types): move the WIF kwargs key sets to a leaf module so the kwargs funnel imports without a cycle * test(anthropic): pin case-insensitive matching of WIF exchange-host allowlist entries * fix(anthropic): end workload identity federation errors without a period so the router suffix reads cleanly * fix(proxy): decrypt stored litellm_params before the WIF write gate * fix(proxy): hide WIF secret references from /health output * fix(proxy): keep the proxy error shape on credential endpoint refusals * fix(proxy): hide identity token file paths from /health output * fix(anthropic): rename the federation workspace param so Bedrock's anthropic_workspace_id keeps working The Bedrock Claude Platform route already reads anthropic_workspace_id from optional_params, so banning that spelling as a server-owned federation parameter broke a pre-existing client capability. The federation field is now anthropic_federation_workspace_id (env ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_WORKSPACE_ID), which restores the base branch's behavior for Bedrock callers, drops the Bedrock-specific hint from the refusal message, and deletes the unconditional ban constant that no longer had a reader * fix(auth): share one exchanged token across workers reading the same assertion Anthropic accepts each identity assertion exactly once, so two uvicorn workers reading the same token file both minting from it means the second exchange is denied with jti_reused. Minted tokens now land in a per-user 0700 cache directory guarded by a file lock, so workers on the same host reuse one exchange until the token expires or the assertion rotates. A 401 is only retried when the re-read assertion actually differs, and the denial hint explains jti_reused. LITELLM_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_CACHE_DIR moves the cache and an empty value disables it * fix: keep anthropic federation from being shadowed or leaked An empty or whitespace-only ANTHROPIC_API_KEY counted as set, so a federated deployment sent an empty x-api-key on every call instead of minting a token. Blank values now read as unset, and a real static key on a federated deployment logs once that it outranks federation and nothing is being federated. The exchange-host allowlist matched hostnames only, so a second process on another port of an allowed host was trusted with the workload's identity token. An entry that names a port now trusts that port alone, while a bare host still trusts every port. The shared token store exists so the workers reading one projected token file do not each spend its single-use jti. A source that mints its own assertion per exchange shares nothing with another worker, so it no longer writes a live token to disk for a lookup that can never hit. * fix: unlink a staged token file a failed write leaves behind The 401 denial hint now also says federation ignores ANTHROPIC_WORKSPACE_ID, which the Bedrock Claude platform provider already reads. * refactor: move anthropic jwks derivation behind a provider-owned tagged union * fix: unlink the staged token file when its write fails at close A buffered write only reaches the disk when the handle closes, so a full disk surfaces at close and left the staging file behind holding a usable token. * fix(anthropic): close the staging descriptor before writing the shared token file * fix(wif): judge federation writes by what they set, not what is stored The admin gate read the stored deployment, so a team admin lost edit, delete and Test Connection on any deployment carrying federation params. It now returns early unless the submitted fields touch the federation surface, and a Test Connection probe that points the deployment at its own api_base is still refused, with the 403 no longer wrapped into a 500 The rest of the same review pass: POST /model/new refuses only a blocking value of `blocked`, so a client that always sends `blocked: false` is not turned away; a request body can no longer pick which federated identity to mint as by naming a stored credential; an advisory refresh the executor refuses disarms the entry instead of wedging the identity until the follower timeout; the static-key shadow warning resolves its env fallback inside the cache instead of once per request; credential writes drop nulls before storing them; the token exchange validates the endpoint URL before reading an assertion and keeps refusing redirects across a client heal; /health hides every server-owned federation field from non-admins; and the async create_file and create_batch paths say which setting is missing when the provider resolves no URL * fix(proxy): let a deployment write name a federated credential reject_federated_credential_reference runs from is_request_body_safe, which pre_db_read_auth_checks calls on every route, so it also fired on POST /model/new, /model/update, /model/{id}/update and /health/test_connection. A proxy admin could no longer attach a federated credential to a deployment over the API or the Admin UI, leaving a static config.yaml entry as the only way to configure the feature the rejection told the caller to go configure, and _reject_non_admin_wif_write never got to make the call it exists to make. is_request_body_safe now takes the route and skips only the credential-reference check on the routes that reach can_user_make_model_call. Federation fields typed inline into a body stay refused everywhere, and a call naming a federated credential still cannot pick the identity it mints as. * refactor(proxy): derive health display policy from the federation key sets The health check module hand-copied the five workload identity fields whose value is a credential, so a shared proxy surface named provider-specific parameters and a newly added secret-bearing field would have gone on being displayed until someone remembered both places WIF_SECRET_BEARING_KEYS now sits beside the key sets it splits out of, types/utils derives secret_bearing_wif_litellm_params from it, and the health layer splats that tuple the same way it already splats the admin-only one * fix(anthropic_wif): treat blank identity-source fields as unset * test(proxy): classify the federation params in the credential slot registry main's registry test (#43298) now fails the build for any credential-named deployment param without a classification. The five federation fields that carry a token, a token file path, or a signing or client secret reference are Unplanted, matching WIF_SECRET_BEARING_KEYS; the four remaining Keycloak settings name a URL, a client id, an auth method, or a scope and are NotSecret * fix(anthropic_wif): declare federation params as owned connection leaves and chart their metrics Register the 18 Anthropic and 3 OpenAI federation params as frozen ConnectionSettings leaves so the owned-kwarg registry, the kwargs funnel and the request-body ban list read one declaration. Pass the deployment api_base through to the count-tokens handler instead of a pre-suffixed URL, which doubled the /count_tokens path on main's prompt-cache predictor. Add the five litellm_anthropic_wif_* families to the all-metrics Grafana dashboard. * fix(credentials): gate PATCH on WIF fields resolved from model_id The credential PATCH handler checked server-owned workload identity federation fields only on the values the caller sent, while a body that named a deployment through model_id had its credential values resolved after that check. A non-admin could therefore copy a federated deployment's WIF fields onto an ordinary credential. Resolve the incoming values first and run the non-admin gate on them, matching the POST path * fix(anthropic): count tokens with ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN through the shared auth header Count-tokens walked its own credential ladder: a static key, else skip minting when ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN is set, else mint a federated token. With only the auth token set it forwarded nothing and the proxy silently fell back to its local tokenizer while chat on the same deployment authenticated with that token. The handler now takes the auth header that AnthropicModelInfo.aget_auth_header resolves, the same ladder chat, files, batches and skills use, and merges the oauth beta a minted or consumer token carries with the token-counting beta --------- Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: derhornspieler <15236687+derhornspieler@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <happymvw@gmail.com> |
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| examples | ||
| litellm | ||
| tools | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .goreleaser.yml | ||
| CHANGELOG.md | ||
| go.mod | ||
| go.sum | ||
| LICENSE | ||
| main.go | ||
| Makefile | ||
| README.md | ||
| RELEASING.md | ||
| terraform-registry-manifest.json | ||
LiteLLM Terraform Provider
This Terraform provider allows you to manage LiteLLM resources through Infrastructure as Code. It provides support for managing models, teams, team members, API keys, users, organizations, budgets, tags, projects, guardrails, prompts, agents, search tools, access groups, fallbacks, MCP servers, credentials and vector stores via the LiteLLM REST API, along with read-only data sources for each of them.
Source of truth
This directory (terraform/provider/ in BerriAI/litellm) is the source of truth for the provider. BerriAI/terraform-provider-litellm is a thin release mirror that the public Terraform Registry ingests from; do not open PRs there. Changes land here, where CI builds the provider, runs its tests, and statically audits every endpoint the provider calls against the proxy's generated OpenAPI schema (tools/endpointaudit/), so the provider cannot drift from the LiteLLM API silently. The same audit runs in reverse as a coverage gate: every management endpoint in the schema must be covered by a resource or data source, or carry a documented entry in tools/endpointaudit/coverage_allowlist.txt, and stale allowlist entries fail CI. Releases are published by mirroring this directory into the split repo and tagging it, which triggers the goreleaser workflow there (see RELEASING.md)
Versioning
The provider version is the LiteLLM version. Every LiteLLM release (dev, rc and stable) publishes the provider at the same version as the proxy, built from the same commit, so 1.99.0 of the provider is the one that shipped with 1.99.0 of the proxy and was audited against that proxy's API. Pin the provider to the line your proxy runs:
version = "~> 1.99.0"
Pre-release versions (1.99.0-rc.1, 1.99.0-dev.1) are published too; Terraform only selects one when it is pinned exactly.
Versions 0.1.0 through 0.4.0 predate this scheme and sit on their own line. They stay in the registry, but a ~> 0.4 constraint will never pick up another release: re-pin to the LiteLLM version to keep receiving updates.
Features
- Manage LiteLLM model configurations
- Associate models with specific teams
- Create and manage teams
- Configure team members and their permissions
- Set usage limits and budgets
- Control access to specific models
- Specify model modes (e.g., completion, embedding, image generation)
- Manage API keys with fine-grained controls
- Support for reasoning effort configuration in the model resource
Requirements
Using the Provider
To use the LiteLLM provider in your Terraform configuration, you need to declare it in the terraform block:
terraform {
required_providers {
litellm = {
source = "BerriAI/litellm"
version = "~> 1.99.0" # the LiteLLM version your proxy runs
}
}
}
provider "litellm" {
api_base = var.litellm_api_base
api_key = var.litellm_api_key
}
Then, you can use the provider to manage LiteLLM resources. Here's an example of creating a model configuration:
resource "litellm_model" "gpt4" {
model_name = "gpt-4-proxy"
custom_llm_provider = "openai"
model_api_key = var.openai_api_key
model_api_base = "https://api.openai.com/v1"
base_model = "gpt-4"
tier = "paid"
mode = "chat"
reasoning_effort = "medium" # Optional: "low", "medium", or "high"
input_cost_per_million_tokens = 30.0
output_cost_per_million_tokens = 60.0
}
For full details on the litellm_model resource, see the model resource documentation.
Here's an example of creating an API key with various options:
resource "litellm_key" "example_key" {
models = ["gpt-4", "claude-3.5-sonnet"]
max_budget = 100.0
user_id = "user123"
team_id = "team456"
max_parallel_requests = 5
tpm_limit = 1000
rpm_limit = 60
budget_duration = "monthly"
key_alias = "prod-key-1"
duration = "30d"
metadata = {
environment = "production"
}
allowed_cache_controls = ["no-cache", "max-age=3600"]
soft_budget = 80.0
aliases = {
"gpt-4" = "gpt4"
}
config = {
default_model = "gpt-4"
}
permissions = {
can_create_keys = "true"
}
model_max_budget = jsonencode({
"gpt-4" = {
budget_limit = 50.0
time_period = "30d"
}
})
model_rpm_limit = {
"claude-3.5-sonnet" = 30
}
model_tpm_limit = {
"gpt-4" = 500
}
guardrails = ["content_filter", "token_limit"]
blocked = false
tags = ["production", "api"]
}
The litellm_key resource supports the following options:
models: List of allowed models for this keymax_budget: Maximum budget for the keyuser_idandteam_id: Associate the key with a user and teammax_parallel_requests: Limit concurrent requeststpm_limitandrpm_limit: Set tokens and requests per minute limitsbudget_duration: Specify budget duration (e.g., "monthly", "weekly")key_alias: Set a friendly name for the keyduration: Set the key's validity periodmetadata: Add custom metadata to the keyallowed_cache_controls: Specify allowed cache control directivessoft_budget: Set a soft budget limitaliases: Define model aliasesconfig: Set configuration optionspermissions: Specify key permissionsmodel_max_budget,model_rpm_limit,model_tpm_limit: Set per-model limitsguardrails: Apply specific guardrails to the keyblocked: Flag to block/unblock the keytags: Add tags for organization and filtering
For full details on the litellm_key resource, see the key resource documentation.
Available Resources
litellm_model: Manage model configurations. Documentationlitellm_team: Manage teams. Documentationlitellm_team_member: Manage team members. Documentationlitellm_team_member_add: Add multiple members to teams. Documentationlitellm_key: Manage API keys. Documentationlitellm_mcp_server: Manage MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers. Documentationlitellm_credential: Manage credentials for secure authentication. Documentationlitellm_vector_store: Manage vector stores for embeddings and RAG. Documentationlitellm_jwt_key_mapping: Map JWT claim values to virtual keys for per-client budgets and limits. Documentation
Available Data Sources
litellm_credential: Retrieve information about existing credentials. Documentationlitellm_vector_store: Retrieve information about existing vector stores. Documentation
Development
Project Structure
The project is organized as follows:
terraform-provider-litellm/
├── litellm/
│ ├── provider.go
│ ├── resource_model.go
│ ├── resource_model_crud.go
│ ├── resource_team.go
│ ├── resource_team_member.go
│ ├── resource_key.go
│ ├── resource_key_utils.go
│ ├── types.go
│ └── utils.go
├── main.go
├── go.mod
├── go.sum
├── Makefile
└── ...
Building the Provider
- Clone the repository:
git clone https://github.com/your-username/terraform-provider-litellm.git
- Enter the repository directory:
cd terraform-provider-litellm
- Build and install the provider:
make install
Development Commands
The Makefile provides several useful commands for development:
make build: Builds the providermake install: Builds and installs the providermake test: Runs the test suitemake fmt: Formats the codemake vet: Runs go vetmake lint: Runs golangci-lintmake clean: Removes build artifacts and installed provider
Testing
To run the tests:
make test
Contributing
Contributions are welcome! Please read our contributing guidelines first.
License
This project is licensed under the Apache License 2.0 - see the LICENSE file for details.
Notes
- Always use environment variables or secure secret management solutions to handle sensitive information like API keys and AWS credentials.
- Refer to the comprehensive documentation in the
docs/directory for detailed usage examples and configuration options. - Keep the provider version in step with the LiteLLM version your proxy runs; see Versioning.
- The provider now supports AWS cross-account access with
aws_session_nameandaws_role_nameparameters in the model resource. - All example configurations have been consolidated into the documentation for better organization and maintenance.