litellm/tests/integration
devin-ai-integration[bot] 0b74ae9c5c
feat(mcp): hand listed-tool description and input schema to pre-call hooks per caller (#41162)
* feat(mcp): hand listed-tool metadata to pre-call hooks with per-caller catalog identity

Track the tools each MCP server listed per caller identity so pre_mcp_call and during_mcp_call hooks receive the tool description and input schema the client saw. Servers with no caller-dependent inputs share one slot; user identity, forwarded headers, stdio env, relayed bearers, and server-specific auth get their own. Local registry and OpenAPI paths pass the registered metadata and admin description overrides. The Agent 365 guardrail reads the new fields into its evaluate payload.

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* refactor(mcp): drop the listed-tools empty sentinel and routine test docstrings

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): mark the listed-tools cache digest as a non-security hash

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): key the listed-tools cache by the OBO subject token

token_exchange servers list upstream with the caller's own Entra bearer, so two callers on one
LiteLLM key with different subjects were sharing a catalog slot

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): resolve the BYOK credential before keying the listed-tools slot

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): drop the OAuth discovery cache when a server definition changes

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* refactor(mcp): drop a diff-narrating comment

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): never validate a supplied header on the tools/list BYOK path

The pre-listing resolver ran the tool-call byok_auth_required check even
when the caller already supplied x-mcp-auth, and it ran outside the
per-server error boundary, so a single deprecated-header caller dropped
the server from the aggregate list. Listing now returns a supplied header
unchanged and falls back to the stored credential without raising

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(mcp): assert the BYOK listing lands in the caller's listed-tool slot

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(mcp): cover the deprecated string x-mcp-auth header on a BYOK tools/list

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): key the per-caller listed-tool slot by the hashed token

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): key discovery cache by the hashed token

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): key discovery caches per caller correctly and drop stale caches on server updates

Discovery-list cache identity now uses the hashed token instead of the raw
api_key and treats MCPJWTSigner-signed servers as per caller. Server
definition changes also drop the cached upstream OAuth metadata. OpenAPI
listings look tools up under the normalized registry prefix with the
separator, so an overlapping sibling prefix no longer leaks into the list.

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): keep the discovery cache digest call unchanged so CodeQL matches the existing alert

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* refactor(mcp): derive the listed-tool caller identity from the discovery cache key

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): guard OAuth metadata cache writes with a per-server generation and drop unproven per-caller discovery keys

An upstream metadata fetch that started before a server edit could store its stale reply after
invalidate_oauth_metadata_cache ran. Invalidation now bumps a per-server generation and the fetch
only stores when the generation it captured before I/O is unchanged.

The MCPJWTSigner-based per-caller discovery classification and the api_key to token key change had no
reproduction (the signer only injects on tools/list, and UserAPIKeyAuth hashes api_key in place), so
both go back to the merge-base behavior.

Integration coverage under tests/integration/mcp: overlapping OpenAPI aliases, a config-declared
server name with a space, OAuth metadata refetch after a save, and the in-flight stale-write race

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): keep OAuth metadata generations only while a fetch is in flight

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): count queued OAuth metadata fetchers so invalidation survives lock handoff

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): keep a held OAuth metadata lock registered even when no fetcher slot claims it

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(mcp): prove a peer worker drops stale upstream OAuth metadata after a save elsewhere

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(mcp): return one masked text per scanned string in the selected-guardrail REST test

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): fold the signed caller into the discovery digest instead of a second key hash

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): satisfy type discipline gate on listed-tool identity

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): hand tools/call hooks the exact catalog entry tools/list served

get_listed_tool re-applied the admin description override on top of the cached listing, so a
guardrail-masked description was restored to its original wording at call time, and the OpenAPI /
local-registry call path built its metadata from the registry instead of the guarded caller catalog.
Both paths now return the cached entry as served, falling back to the registry only when no listing
was recorded

Adds tests/integration/mcp/test_mcp_listed_tool_metadata.py (red on the prior head for the two
regressions, red on the merge base for the feature, green on this head)

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): key OpenAPI listed-tool entries per caller so tools/call reads its own guarded listing

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(mcp): align listed-tool slot tests with per-caller keying

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): keep oauth2 listing on the minted or signed credential, not the stored BYOK secret

The listing helper that keys the per-caller catalog by the stored BYOK credential also handed that
credential to the upstream client, which on an oauth2 server short-circuited the client_credentials
mint and the MCPJWTSigner gate. Split the two: the catalog identity keeps the stored credential so
tools/call finds the caller's slot, while an oauth2 server's tools/list sends only the per-request
header, letting the M2M mint or signed JWT proceed as on main

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(mcp): oauth2 BYOK listing sends the minted token, not the stored secret, through the real proxy

Integration cell for the listing fix: a client_credentials BYOK server with a stored user credential,
one tools/list as that user, the peer must see a live minted bearer and one /token mint. Red at the
pre-fix tip (zero mints, stored secret upstream), green at the fixed head and at the merge base

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): keep the stored BYOK credential for catalog identity only on tools/list

Listing used the resolved stored credential both to key the caller's catalog slot and as the
upstream transport header, so REST api_key and bearer_token listings sent the user's secret
instead of the server's static token and the MCPJWTSigner gate went quiet. The upstream client
and the signer gate now read the caller-supplied mcp_auth_header for every auth type, exactly
as before the catalog existed, and the stored credential only names the slot tools/call reads

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): type the listed-tool metadata read from pre-call kwargs for the basedpyright gate

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): hand never-listed tools/call hooks name and arguments only

The local-registry call path fell back to the registry entry with the admin description override
when no tools/list had been recorded for the caller, so a pre_mcp_call guardrail scanned a
description the caller was never served and blocked OpenAPI calls that passed before, and base's
own selected-guardrail REST test failed on the two-text redaction. _registered_tool_metadata now
returns the listed entry or None, so a tools/call with no prior listing sends name and arguments
only as promised, and that REST test double goes back to its base shape

* fix(mcp): keep during_mcp_call hooks on name and arguments only

call_tool handed the caller's listed entry to the during-hook task as well, so during_mcp_call
guardrails scanned the description line and schema leaves of any listed tool after the upstream
call had already run, blocking calls that passed before whenever the policy matched the
description, returned a fixed-length texts list, or hit the depth guard on a deep schema. The
listed entry is only disclosed for pre_mcp_call, so the during task no longer receives it and its
request object carries no description or schema, as before

* fix(mcp): key the BYOK catalog slot by the client's header, not the stored credential

tools/list resolved the stored BYOK credential to pick the caller's catalog slot, which read the
credential store before the classified try block. With Postgres down and a cold per-worker cache
that made every REST tools/list on an is_byok server fail with tools=[] and no upstream call, and
the read seeded the per-worker cache (including a negative entry), so a tools/call on another
worker after a store, rotate or revoke on this one kept using the stale value.

The slot is now keyed by what the client supplied plus the caller's hashed key, on both sides.
_get_tools_from_server and call_tool take a keyword-only catalog_auth_header that defaults to
mcp_auth_header as received (the default is the builtin Ellipsis so it survives a module reload).
The /mcp fan-out and execute_mcp_tool, which swap the resolved credential into mcp_auth_header,
pass the client's value explicitly. What goes upstream is unchanged. _byok_catalog_auth_header is
gone.

* fix(mcp): drop a listed catalog recorded across a server save

_record_listed_tools ran after the awaited upstream fetch, so a PUT /v1/mcp/server that landed
mid-fetch had its invalidation undone when the fetch completed: hooks then saw the pre-save
description next to the post-save definition until the next listing, instead of name and
arguments only.

The manager now keeps a per-server listed-tools generation, bumped by
_invalidate_server_definition_caches. _get_tools_from_server reads it before the fetch and
_record_listed_tools skips the write when it moved; the next listing records normally.

* fix(mcp): drop the catalog again once a saved OpenAPI server's registry is rebuilt

add_server and update_server publish the saved definition before the OpenAPI registry entries are
rebuilt from the spec, so a listing recorded during that fetch held the pre-save entries under the
new generation. The generation is bumped a second time after the registry refresh.

The during-hook task no longer accepts a listed entry, the one-line wrapper over get_listed_tool is
inlined at its two call sites, and the per-server generation map is a plain dict.

* fix(mcp): keep discovery and OAuth metadata caches across an OpenAPI spec re-read

add_server and update_server ran the full server-definition invalidation a
second time after the awaited OpenAPI spec fetch, which also dropped the
prompts/resources/templates discovery entries and the OAuth protected-resource
metadata filled under the already-published definition, so the next request
went upstream again. Only the listed-tool catalog recorded during the fetch
holds pre-save entries, so the post-fetch pass now drops just that catalog
and bumps its generation via the new _drop_listed_tools helper, which the
full invalidation also calls.

* fix(mcp): look a called tool up in the listed catalog by its bare name only

get_listed_tool stripped the server prefix a second time when the exact
name was absent from the caller's listing, so a never-listed upstream tool
whose bare name starts with the server prefix resolved to the listed
sibling and that sibling's description and input schema reached the
pre-call hooks for a call to a different tool. Every caller already passes
the once-stripped bare name, so the lookup is now exact.

Tests that looked the catalog up by a prefixed name now use the bare name
the callers pass; two new tests pin the never-listed sibling case at the
manager and at the tools/call path.

* fix(mcp): record a listed-tool catalog only for a listing the caller is served

_get_tools_from_server now records the catalog into the caller's
listed-tools slot only when asked (record_listing=True), which the
served listings pass: the /mcp and Responses API tools/list handlers via
_get_tools_from_mcp_servers, MCPServerManager.list_tools, and the REST
listing via _list_server_tools. Four internal listings stop recording,
so a later tools/call hands pre_mcp_call hooks name and arguments only,
as on main:

- _list_tools_before_first_call, the implicit listing inside tools/call
  when this worker does not yet expose the tool
- fetch_pinnable_tool_catalog, the admin pin snapshot listed without the
  catalog guard and without description overrides
- _initialize_tool_name_to_mcp_server_name_mapping, the startup fill
- get_tools_for_server, used by the semantic tool filter

_create_prefixed_tools returns to its tool-name mapping job only; the
record follows it in _get_tools_from_server.

* fix(mcp): opt every listing out of catalog recording unless it is served

The aggregate listing and _list_mcp_tools now default to record_listing=False,
so a catalog fetched inside a tools/call no longer fills the caller's
listed-tools slot. The /mcp/proxy meta-tools (call_tool, search_tools,
get_tool_schema) and the tool-search virtual tool stop recording: /mcp/proxy
serves only the meta-tools and the search serves only its hits, so a later
pre_mcp_call hook was reading a description the caller never listed.

The tools/list handler, the Responses MCP handler and the /v1/mcp/tools
management listing opt in with record_listing=True, since each serves the
catalog to the caller.

* fix(mcp): key the listed-tool slot by the caller's admission identity and forwarded bearer

The slot a tools/list records for a later tools/call was keyed by (user_id, api_key)
only, so every team-only JWT caller shared one slot and one JWT user acting in two
teams shared a slot; a tools/call then handed pre_mcp_call hooks a description another
caller was served. The slot is now keyed by the hashed key, user, team and organization,
plus the admission credential of a caller admitted with neither a key nor a user.

The caller bearer split the slot only on client-forwarded-token and token-exchange
servers; a legacy delegated oauth2 server (delegate_auth_to_upstream without client
credentials) also forwards it upstream and served a different catalog per bearer into
one slot. The bearer now splits the slot on every server whose egress forwards it
(_consumes_caller_authorization) or exchanges it.

* fix(mcp): record only tools served by the bridge

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): keep bridge tool metadata request-local

* refactor(mcp): centralize listed catalog recording guard

* fix(mcp): preserve base TPM reservations for listed tool calls

* fix(mcp): preserve project token reservations for listed calls

* fix(mcp): record served catalogs and preserve call message bytes

* test(mcp): align listing expectation with deferred recording

* test(mcp): audit listed metadata across callers and bridge lifecycles

* test(mcp): preserve guardrail fixture worker affinity

* refactor(mcp): expose listed catalog recording API

* feat(mcp): pass served_tools through the anthropic messages bridge

/v1/messages auto-execution now hands this request's resolved tool
definitions to _execute_tool_calls, matching the Responses and chat
completions bridges: the pre_mcp_call hook receives the description
and input schema the model was shown for that call. Request-local
only; the shared listed-tools catalog is untouched.

* test(mcp): pin served_tools handoff on the anthropic messages bridge

Mirrors the credentials-forwarding test: the request's resolved tool
definitions must reach _execute_tool_calls under served_tools so
pre_mcp_call hooks judge the call on the description and input schema
the model was shown. Fails without the previous commit's one-liner.

* style(mcp): sort the local import block ruff flagged

* fix(mcp): keep the admin include_disabled_tools view off the listed-tools catalog

GET /mcp-rest/tools/list?include_disabled_tools=true is the admin-only
configuration view: apply_tool_filters is False, so it serves the full
server catalog. Recording that response into the caller's listed-tools
slot warmed tools/call metadata no runtime listing ever served,
breaking the only-a-served-listing-records invariant (Bugbot).

The record is now gated on apply_tool_filters; disabled tools stay
unreachable (the call-time allowlist 403 fires before hooks), so the
observable fix is the slot no longer warming from a settings view.
Verified live: the new test fails on the unfixed head and passes here,
and the rest of the listed-tool-metadata suite is unchanged.

---------

Co-authored-by: yucheng <yucheng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-04 00:53:58 -07:00
..
_support feat(mcp): hand listed-tool description and input schema to pre-call hooks per caller (#41162) 2026-10-04 00:53:58 -07:00
authorization fix(auth): resolve hidden model_group_alias entries in the zero-cost budget check (#43741) 2026-10-03 16:35:11 -07:00
compatibility feat(proxy): serve a Codex-native model catalog with per-model service_tiers from /v1/models (#44136) 2026-10-03 20:42:55 +00:00
configuration feat(proxy): serve a Codex-native model catalog with per-model service_tiers from /v1/models (#44136) 2026-10-03 20:42:55 +00:00
cost_calculation test(cost): pin OpenAI reported web search count with mixed actions (#44414) 2026-10-03 11:31:45 -07:00
database fix(proxy-extras): log v1 migration failures at ERROR so LITELLM_LOG=ERROR shows them (#44202) 2026-10-03 22:45:16 -07:00
management feat(decisions): add unified /v1/decisions endpoint for Jev-compatible providers (#44236) 2026-10-03 17:38:38 +00:00
mcp feat(mcp): hand listed-tool description and input schema to pre-call hooks per caller (#41162) 2026-10-04 00:53:58 -07:00
messages_endpoint feat(bedrock): serve gpt-5.6+ chat completions natively by default, with chat_completions/ opt-in for gpt-oss and grok (#44307) 2026-10-02 19:55:54 -07:00
observability test(integration): opt the config pass-through spend-log case into auth (#44265) 2026-10-02 23:12:15 +00:00
pricing fix(router): bill service tiers at catalog rates for custom-priced deployments (#43890) 2026-09-30 16:06:37 -07:00
providers test(ci): fix six CircleCI test regressions on main (#44429) 2026-10-03 20:55:01 -07:00
routing fix(caching): count tool_call cache_control marks in the injection census (#43556) 2026-10-03 17:33:48 -07:00
sandbox test: finish the non-proxy half of tests/test_litellm (#43281) 2026-09-25 22:43:41 -07:00
sdk fix(caching): count tool_call cache_control marks in the injection census (#43556) 2026-10-03 17:33:48 -07:00
security test(ci): repair stale tests and move retired OpenAI text-completion fixtures (#43958) 2026-09-30 19:19:59 -07:00
spend feat(roi): measure shipping velocity, quality, and recorded spend (#44426) 2026-10-03 23:07:34 +00:00
streaming test(integration): regression tests for July provider translation, routing and streaming bugs (#42693) 2026-09-23 09:51:06 -07:00
translation test(integration): exact four-part translation cases on a shared fake provider and shared YAML deployment (#44451) 2026-10-04 00:09:58 +00:00
__init__.py test: add CircleCI integration contract foundation 2026-09-14 03:30:52 -07:00
AGENTS.md test(integration): add MCP gateway coverage wave 1 with a dedicated mcp shard and proxy coverage artifact (#42711) 2026-09-23 07:48:46 -07:00
conftest.py test(integration): exact four-part translation cases on a shared fake provider and shared YAML deployment (#44451) 2026-10-04 00:09:58 +00:00
coordination_redis_proxy_config.yaml fix(proxy): publish auth cache invalidations in the background so a wedged coordination Redis cannot stall user updates (#42534) 2026-09-22 23:33:32 -07:00
mcp_coverage.toml test(integration): add MCP gateway coverage wave 1 with a dedicated mcp shard and proxy coverage artifact (#42711) 2026-09-23 07:48:46 -07:00
oci_proxy_test_config.yaml CI: copy of #25177 (OCI GenAI: embeddings, streaming/reasoning fixes, model catalog) (#28223) 2026-05-23 12:15:41 -07:00
proxy_config.yaml test(integration): exact four-part translation cases on a shared fake provider and shared YAML deployment (#44451) 2026-10-04 00:09:58 +00:00
README.md test(integration): exact four-part translation cases on a shared fake provider and shared YAML deployment (#44451) 2026-10-04 00:09:58 +00:00
run.py test(integration): exact four-part translation cases on a shared fake provider and shared YAML deployment (#44451) 2026-10-04 00:09:58 +00:00
test_oci_integration.py test: drop the cwd-relative sys.path.insert calls from the test suite (#37802) 2026-08-22 09:25:58 -07:00
test_oci_proxy_integration.py feat: litellm oss 110626 (#30202) 2026-06-11 22:30:26 -07:00

Integration contracts

These tests exercise a running gateway, PostgreSQL and Redis with an owned local upstream. CircleCI owns this suite. Tests are grouped by behavior, with no automatic test retries or fallback to paid provider calls

The ROI database contracts in database/test_roi_observed.py run in the GitHub Actions roi-database Postgres shard and upload coverage on each PR. They own temporary databases and script only the external provider transport. GITHUB_FILES in run.py assigns these files to GitHub Actions and excludes them from the CircleCI selection

The cost group is driven by cost_tracking_cases.json, which contains the cost map, literal requests, literal provider responses and expected accounting values. Each case has a name, contract ID, cost-map model, optional deployment overrides, request body, tagged response and exact or recount expectations. Request bodies use $MODEL for the registered proxy model, while responses use $REQUEST_ID for the per-run scenario ID. To add a case, add a cost-map entry when the model is new, add the request body and exact provider response data, and add hand-computed expected values. The upstream serves each stored response for any path under /<scenario_id>, while the test-owned cost map is served over loopback through LITELLM_MODEL_COST_MAP_URL

Use tests/integration/run.py management, accounting, database, providers, extensions, mcp, sdk or cost to run a selected group. The group to directory mapping is the GROUPS literal at the top of run.py; a new directory needs a GROUPS entry and an OWNED_DIRECTORIES entry in _support/manifest.py. Set INTEGRATION_WORKERS above 1 to run a group under pytest-xdist; the mcp job does this in CI, so MCP tests must own their resources per scenario. Set INTEGRATION_PROXY_URL, INTEGRATION_UPSTREAM_URL, INTEGRATION_MASTER_KEY and DATABASE_URL to an isolated test deployment. When that deployment runs more than one proxy worker, set INTEGRATION_PROXY_WORKERS to the count so a test that writes a model and then calls it waits out the config reload interval, the only cross-worker convergence bound the wire exposes. The runner selects the new domain directories explicitly; the legacy OCI and sandbox selections remain separate

Management also requires INTEGRATION_PEER_URL, REDIS_HOST and REDIS_PORT. CircleCI starts two directly addressed proxy processes sharing only that job's stores. The test-only CLI wrapper supplies enterprise route entitlement, following the existing behavior suite's convention. It does not qualify license validation; run it with one worker and no reload

The generated lifecycle models use 20 examples, eight steps, generation and shrinking, with isolated resources per example. HTTP operation caps include generation and shrinking and exempt cleanup. Local qualification defaults to seed 4106601 and canonical order; CircleCI derives exploration and ordering seeds from the checked-out revision and workflow ID. The ordering seed shuffles the file order and the test order inside each file but keeps each file's tests together, so module fixtures are built once per file. Use --seed and --order-seed to reproduce a run. Actual installed Hypothesis version, settings, seeds and collected order are written beside the execution manifest

Reuse the existing canned provider handlers through _support/upstream.py. It rejects internal request fields and exposes actual received requests for independent assertions. Register every created resource for cleanup immediately, keep expected values independent of production calculations, and assert readback plus the runtime effect of a change

The CircleCI workflow starts its own database and Redis, restricts test-phase egress to its owned services and writes JUnit plus an executed-node manifest. Missing setup, failed cleanup or a selected test with neither a passed call nor a skip fail qualification. Skipped nodes are listed under skipped in execution.json, so the skip reasons double as the open bug list. GitHub Actions runs only the explicit GITHUB_FILES set in run.py

There is no per-node manifest. A positional argument is a file of the group or a pytest node id inside one (path::test[param]), so one cell of a parametrized file can run alone. The runner fails only when pytest fails, when collection errors, or when a selected file collects zero tests. Older tests still carry @pytest.mark.covers(...) decorators; the marker stays registered so they collect, but the IDs are not checked against anything and new tests should not use it. The GitHub Actions coverage census reads the GROUPS literal in run.py and treats every tests/integration/<directory>/test_*.py file in a scheduled group as owned by CircleCI

Provider sentinels currently use the controlled server, not live recordings. The provider shard also runs the existing strict replay controls for changed requests, exhausted interactions, leftover interactions and no provider connection. Future recorded scenarios must use that replay-only implementation; missing recordings cannot fall back to a real provider. The observation endpoint is destructive and the current selection runs serially against one owned upstream

Translation tests in translation/ compare exact provider requests and LiteLLM responses against a shared fake provider; translation/README.md has their rules

Fixtures must contain synthetic data only. Keep private incident records and source documents out of code, fixtures, logs and PR descriptions

Database cases own their temporary schemas, roles, constraints and proxy processes. They prove reader-versus-writer execution with PostgreSQL lock observations, exercise real transaction wait limits and verify rollback after a reached database failure

Accounting cases compare persisted input and output cost components against literal rates, including zero and default prices. Cache state models assert actual upstream calls, response identity and every persisted charge. Generated accounting tests have a 180-second test limit to accommodate the asynchronous spend writer

Provider contracts exercise actual TCP requests with synthetic credentials and local protocol peers. The S3 verifier uses independently implemented equations, a published known-answer vector, a fixed signing clock and deliberately invalid signed requests. Bedrock cases clear ambient AWS credential sources and check the literal model path, loaded role references, STS requests and bearer-only behavior

Streaming checks send real HTTP transfer chunks, including one-byte partitions, fragmented tools, incomplete transfers and a cancellation barrier. They assert meaningful text, tool arguments, final usage and persisted cost. The Redis recovery case owns a separate database and Redis process, uses the supported one-second circuit-breaker recovery setting, waits for the real subscriber and verifies response data in Redis after restart. CircleCI reuses its existing Redis image for that extra process; it never pulls an image during tests

The messages_endpoint/ directory holds /v1/messages endpoint contracts: native-provider backends under providers/ (anthropic, bedrock, gemini) and the translation bridges (responses_bridge, chat_bridge) at the top level. It runs in the providers shard; run.py selects test files recursively under each scheduled directory

The sdk shard exercises the SDK's own HTTP clients against local protocol peers with no gateway in the path, so a case here fails only when the client library or its wire behavior changes. The HTTP/2 case runs a hypercorn TLS peer offering h2 and http/1.1 over ALPN, drives the sync and async httpx handlers at it with LITELLM_HTTP2 off and on, and asserts the version both the client and the peer observed on the wire. Put a test here only when it needs no proxy or database. CircleCI starts a local Redis for this shard like the others, so SDK-side caching cases that need a real Redis server belong here too; a case that reaches the gateway belongs in one of the other shards

The extensions shard uses the built-in generic callback and guardrail transports. It checks callback correlation and credential exclusion, guardrail rewriting and denial, retained OpenAI consumers and A2A wire versions. CircleCI runs it on parallel nodes, and each node starts its own database, Redis, upstream and proxy and runs its share of the group's files serially, split by recorded timings with circleci tests split. Tests keep the isolation of a serial run; they still must not assume a particular set of sibling files. run.py <group> --list prints a group's files and run.py <group> <file>... runs a subset of them

The mcp shard runs the MCP gateway against SDK peers owned by each test (_support/mcp.py): streamable HTTP, SSE and stdio peers, an OpenAPI-spec app, and an OAuth 2.1 authorization-server double. Every peer records the requests it receives so a test can assert what reached the peer, not only what the proxy answered. The shard runs with INTEGRATION_WORKERS set and with INTEGRATION_COVERAGE=1, which starts the proxy under coverage run --parallel-mode limited to the MCP modules and stores coverage.txt plus an HTML report with the job artifacts. A test that fails because the product is wrong is skipped with pytest.skip("BUG: <symptom>") so the skip list in execution.json is the open MCP bug list

Browser contracts live in tests/e2e/ui/tests/integrationCritical and run only through tests/e2e/ui/integration.config.ts. The expected browser results are listed in expected.json in that directory and checked by .circleci/scripts/verify_integration_browser.py. The CircleCI browser shard builds the checked-out dashboard, starts the owned proxy with that build, and verifies one exact browser result without retries or skips. The default Playwright selection excludes this directory. The focused project flow asserts the submitted create and clear values, fresh SQL state and actual blocked/restored serving while preserving model restrictions

Two always-on -replica CircleCI jobs (management, database) run their groups in replica mode, where every proxy connects through a real litellm_writer role and a real read-only litellm_reader role against the same PostgreSQL. Nothing is captured there: the job passes when the tests pass, and a write routed to the read-only reader fails the test that issued it. A deeper check runs on demand as the routing_parity workflow, triggered through the CircleCI API v2 pipeline endpoint on the PR branch with {"parameters": {"routing_parity_base": "<40-hex merge-base sha>"}}. The workflow fans out over the seven groups, and each routing-parity-<group> job runs its own group twice against the same test harness, once with litellm/, enterprise/, and litellm-proxy-extras/ checked out from the base revision and once from the head, with a pytest plugin snapshotting pg_stat_statements into routing-observed.json per side. The check step then compares the two observations and writes routing-diff.txt: a statement seen on both sides fails when its role set changed, globally or for the same test (per-test capture is skipped under xdist), unless it is listed in tests/integration/routing/either_role.json, where each entry names the statement and a one-line reason it legitimately runs on whichever role asks for it, printed under == either role ==. Queries seen on only one side are listed, never failed, pg_stat_statements evictions and a role that never ran a statement are failures