* ci(image-scan): add Grype image scan for OS + library CVEs
Builds each of the 6 Dockerfiles via a matrix and scans the resulting image
with Grype (pinned v0.114.0, sha256 verified), failing on fixable HIGH or
CRITICAL across both OS/apk and language packages. This catches the layer
osv-scan is structurally blind to (Wolfi/apk OS packages and vendored deps
like prisma's node engine), which is the structural reason the openssl CVE
slipped past CI and a customer's image scanner flagged it.
Skipped on fork PRs so an outside contributor cannot run arbitrary code on
our hosted runner via a malicious Dockerfile RUN line. The same pattern is
used by guard-fork-dependencies.yml.
Grype runs as a pinned binary with a verified checksum, so there is no
mutable-tag GitHub Action in the dependency chain and no vendor credentials
in the scan job. The job uses read-only contents permissions and an empty
top-level permissions block.
* ci(image-scan): scan only Dockerfile.non_root (rootless target)
All Dockerfile variants share the same wolfi base and apk set today, so a single scan of Dockerfile.non_root gives the same OS-layer coverage at one-sixth the build cost. Dockerfile.non_root is the rootless variant we ship (USER 65534), so the scan tracks the image customers actually run. Matrix-scan if the variants ever diverge.
* ci: retrigger checks (proxy_pass_through_endpoint_tests flaked on prior run)
e64cec5add