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* fix(guardrails): don't inspect embeddings in the AIM and Cato hooks `pre_call_hook` fires for /embeddings as well as chat. An embeddings body carries `input` — documents being indexed, not a prompt — which `build_inspection_messages` lifts into synthetic chat messages, so both hooks inspect it as a conversation and a policy verdict on that text breaks a request that was never one: - AIM, anonymize + batched `input`: `has_non_string_content` is true for any list, so `_anonymize_request` raises 400 "...multimodal input...". - AIM, anonymize + single-string `input`: no error — the input is rewritten to redacted text and the caller embeds text it never sent. - AIM and Cato, block: the embeddings request is blocked outright. Gate both hooks on a new `NON_CONVERSATIONAL_CALL_TYPES` deny-list. This is deliberately not `TEXT_CONTENT_CALL_TYPES`: that allow-list omits `anthropic_messages`, `responses` and `call_mcp_tool`, so gating on it would stop these guardrails inspecting real chat traffic. An unrecognised or newly added call type is still inspected. * feat(guardrails): add inspect_embeddings toggle for AIM and Cato * fix(guardrails): redact batched embedding input on anonymize A list of plain strings is the /embeddings batch shape. AIM rejected it as multimodal and Cato forwarded the original strings, so anonymize never reached the provider for batched input. Redactions are now written back element-wise, one redacted message per non-empty element, so a fully redacted element cannot shift the following documents into the wrong slot. * fix(guardrails): reject partial embedding redactions * fix(guardrails): avoid unnecessary batch type check * style(tests): drop trailing blank line in cato guardrail tests * fix(guardrails): reject malformed batch redactions * fix(guardrails): reject malformed batch redactions * fix(guardrails): reject aim redactions with no text content The anonymize path read role and content off every entry of the vendor's redacted_chat before the shared write-back helper could refuse the payload, so a message missing content, or a bare string in place of a message, raised out of the hook as a 500. Validate the vendor list first and return the 400 the guardrail already uses for an unusable redaction. * fix(guardrails): validate all aim redaction paths Validate AIM redaction containers before request or output rewrites, reject cardinality mismatches and empty output, and cover malformed vendor payloads with regression tests. * fix(guardrails): preserve aim output redaction alignment AIM returns the inspected request messages followed by the assistant output. Validate that full response and select the final redacted message instead of requiring a single entry. * test(guardrails): cover aim output anonymize alignment and malformed redactions --------- Co-authored-by: Guy Levi <guy.levi@catonetworks.com> |
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