litellm/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental
user 6df38ecc1d
chore(mcp): close redirect-bypass + name-lookup variants of the SSRF/IP gating
Two follow-ups to address Veria-AI findings on the PR.

(1) Disable redirect-following on the OAuth outbound POSTs.
validate_url only inspects the initial URL; httpx clients default to
follow_redirects=True, so a malicious 30x from the validated host could
bounce the proxy to an internal target. Add follow_redirects to the
AsyncHTTPHandler.post wrapper (mirroring the existing get) and pass
follow_redirects=False from both /token and /register flows.

(2) Make get_mcp_server_by_name fail closed on None client_ip. The
wrapper previously translated None to INTERNAL_REQUEST internally to
preserve the "None means internal" convention, but that meant any
external request handler that forgot to pass an IP silently bypassed
gating. Update the wrapper to require an explicit sentinel for
internal callers; update the four external callers in
auth/user_api_key_auth_mcp.py and rest_endpoints.py to pass
INTERNAL_REQUEST (where the lookup is metadata-only) or the real
extracted client_ip.

Adjust the test fixture in test_discoverable_endpoints.py to return
INTERNAL_REQUEST instead of None so OAuth flow tests bypass IP gating
explicitly. Update two stub lambdas in test_rest_endpoints.py to accept
the new client_ip kwarg (CLAUDE.md: keep monkeypatch stubs in sync with
real signatures).
2026-05-11 20:14:48 +00:00
..
mcp_server chore(mcp): close redirect-bypass + name-lookup variants of the SSRF/IP gating 2026-05-11 20:14:48 +00:00