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5ad351bbd2
The cron systemd unit's `ProtectHome=read-only` blocks writes to
/home/mateo but still allows reads. With `HOME=/home/mateo` forwarded
to the `claude` subprocess, a compromised @anthropic-ai/claude-code
release (running during the `claude --version` probe) — or a
model-directed `Read` tool call during a PDF cell (which passes
`--allowed-tools Read`) — could read host credential files like
~/.config/gh/hosts.yml (gh-host token), ~/.ssh/, or ~/.bash_history
and exfiltrate them.
Two complementary mitigations, addressing veria's exact recommendation:
1. Per-invocation isolated HOME for every `claude` subprocess:
* cli_driver.py: drop HOME from _CLI_ENV_ALLOWLIST; create a
fresh empty tmpdir under tempfile.gettempdir() (`PrivateTmp=true`
keeps it on a service-private tmpfs) and pass it as HOME to
each `claude` invocation. Cleaned up in a `finally` so
timeouts and CLI-not-found don't leak tmpdirs.
* run_daily.sh: the up-front `claude --version` probe also runs
under $CLAUDE_PROBE_HOME (a per-run dir under ${WORKDIR}) so
the probe can never reach the runtime user's real home; the
existing `cleanup` trap removes ${WORKDIR}.
* Closes the `os.path.expanduser('~/.config/gh/hosts.yml')`-style
attack from a compromised CLI / model.
2. Filesystem-level hiding of credential dotdirs in the systemd unit:
* Add `InaccessiblePaths=-/home/mateo/.config/gh -/home/mateo/.ssh
-/home/mateo/.aws -/home/mateo/.docker -/home/mateo/.kube
-/home/mateo/.gnupg`. The kernel hides these paths from every
process in the unit's mount namespace, defeating the absolute-path
attack (`Read('/home/mateo/.config/gh/...')`) that the per-
invocation HOME override alone cannot block.
* Drop `/home/mateo/.config/gh` from `ReadWritePaths=` (it's
now hidden, and we pass GH_TOKEN inline to every `gh` call).
* Pass GH_TOKEN inline to `gh repo clone` in run_daily.sh
(was relying on host gh-cli config); the docs repo is public
so this is a no-op functionally, but it lets us drop the
~/.config/gh dependency entirely.
Tests:
* test_run_claude_uses_isolated_per_invocation_home: pin that the
CLI subprocess never sees the parent's $HOME, and that the
isolated HOME is a fresh tmpdir prefixed claude-cli-home-.
* test_run_claude_isolated_home_is_distinct_per_invocation: pin that
each call gets its own dir (no cross-call planting).
* test_run_claude_isolated_home_cleaned_up_after_run / on_subprocess
_failure: pin that the tmpdir is rm-rf'd on both the happy path
and the timeout/CLI-error path.
* test_version_probe_uses_isolated_home_not_runtime_user_home: pin
that run_daily.sh's probe forwards $CLAUDE_PROBE_HOME, not
${HOME}, into its `env -i` block.
* test_systemd_unit_credential_isolation.py (new): pin that
InaccessiblePaths covers all credential dotdirs, that
.config/gh is not under ReadWritePaths, and that ProtectHome
stays at least read-only.
All 349 existing claude_code unit tests still pass.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
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| .. | ||
| build_matrix.py | ||
| litellm-compat-matrix.env.example | ||
| litellm-compat-matrix.service | ||
| litellm-compat-matrix.timer | ||
| run_daily.sh | ||