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* feat(mcp): startup backfill stamping oauth2_flow on legacy null rows Rows created before the write-side stamps carry a null oauth2_flow and rely on read-time field-shape inference, which cannot tell a DCR-registered interactive server (client creds + token_url, no persisted authorization_url) from an M2M server unless endpoint discovery succeeds first; on a transient discovery failure those servers flip to client_credentials for that registry load The backfill classifies each null oauth2 row once, at rest, ordered by signal strength: per-user token rows (only the interactive flow mints them, so this is definitive and catches the DCR-trap cohort), then a persisted authorization_url, then a persisted registration_url (DCR implies interactive; this covers registered-but-never-signed-in rows), then the M2M credential shape mirroring the legacy inference, else the interactive default that matches how needs_user_oauth_token treats a null flow. Every stamp is logged with the rule that fired and written with updated_by=oauth2_flow_backfill for auditability Runs in _init_mcp_servers_in_db before the registry load so the first build of the boot classifies from the column, is isolated so a failure cannot block server loading, and is idempotent: a healed fleet exits after one indexed query. This unblocks deleting the read-time inference for DB rows in the follow-up Third step of the oauth2_flow persistence sequence, after #32283 and #32288 * fix(mcp): backfill leaves the ambiguous M2M shape unstamped instead of guessing client_credentials The credential shape (client_id + client_secret + token_url, no interactive signal) is shared by real M2M servers and DCR-registered interactive servers nobody has signed into: the DCR persist writes creds and token_url but not authorization_url or registration_url. Stamping client_credentials from that shape permanently mislabeled the interactive cohort, and once explicit the value is authoritative, so per-user traffic would run on the proxy's stored client credential with no discovery rescue and no backstop (it only guards null rows) The backfill now stamps only what it can prove. Interactive signals keep stamping authorization_code; the ambiguous shape is left null with an actionable warning naming the server and the fix (set oauth2_flow via the dashboard or PUT /v1/mcp/server). A true M2M row keeps working per-request through the security backstop while the warning nags; an interactive row keeps its Authorize button (null renders interactive), and one completed sign-in creates the per-user token that stamps it authorization_code at the next boot. Mirrors the config-level rule: M2M is asserted by a human, never guessed Raised by review on the PR * perf(mcp): batch the backfill stamps into one update_many per flow value The per-row update loop issued one DB round-trip per legacy row at startup; rows sharing a stamped value now go out as a single update_many, so the DB cost is constant in fleet size. Per-row logging keeps the rule that fired for each server Raised by review on the PR * fix(mcp): backfill stamps only rows still null at write time and counts only real OAuth token rows as sign-in proof Two review findings. The batched update_many matched on server_id alone, so an explicit oauth2_flow set between the backfill's read and its write (an admin PUT or a sign-in's DCR stamp landing in the boot window) would be overwritten with the inferred value; the where clause now also requires oauth2_flow to still be null, so an explicit value can never be clobbered under any interleaving And the per_user_tokens rule counted any LiteLLM_MCPUserCredentials row as proof of an interactive sign-in, but that table doubles as BYOK storage for user-supplied API keys; a BYOK-flavored row would have stamped an M2M-shaped server authorization_code. The rule now counts only rows whose payload decodes as a type oauth2 token via the existing _decode_oauth_payload discriminator, so bare keys, undecodable rows, and stale leftovers from a BYOK-to-oauth2 auth switch prove nothing Raised by review on the PR |
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| .. | ||
| _experimental/mcp_server | ||
| a2a | ||
| agent_endpoints | ||
| anthropic_endpoints | ||
| auth | ||
| batches_endpoints | ||
| client | ||
| common_utils | ||
| db | ||
| discovery_endpoints | ||
| experimental/mcp_server | ||
| google_endpoints | ||
| guardrails | ||
| health_endpoints | ||
| hooks | ||
| image_endpoints | ||
| logging_endpoints | ||
| management_endpoints | ||
| management_helpers | ||
| memory | ||
| middleware | ||
| openai_files_endpoint | ||
| pass_through_endpoints | ||
| policy_engine | ||
| prompts | ||
| proxy_server | ||
| public_endpoints | ||
| rag_endpoints | ||
| realtime_endpoints | ||
| response_api_endpoints | ||
| shutdown | ||
| spend_tracking | ||
| test_configs | ||
| types_utils | ||
| ui_crud_endpoints | ||
| utils | ||
| vector_store_endpoints | ||
| video_endpoints | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| conftest.py | ||
| test_aiohttp_cleanup_closed.py | ||
| test_aiohttp_session_recovery.py | ||
| test_api_key_masking_in_errors.py | ||
| test_audio_speech_prometheus_hooks.py | ||
| test_batch_expiry.py | ||
| test_batch_metadata_none_fix.py | ||
| test_batch_retrieve_bedrock.py | ||
| test_batch_x_litellm_model_encoding.py | ||
| test_blocked_response_usage.py | ||
| test_budget_reservation.py | ||
| test_caching_routes.py | ||
| test_chat_completion_metadata.py | ||
| test_common_request_processing.py | ||
| test_component_allowlists.py | ||
| test_cors_config.py | ||
| test_custom_proxy.py | ||
| test_dynamic_mcp_route.py | ||
| test_empty_model_list.py | ||
| test_enforce_user_param.py | ||
| test_fallback_management_endpoints.py | ||
| test_fastapi_offline_routes.py | ||
| test_filter_models_by_team_access_group.py | ||
| test_health_check_functions.py | ||
| test_health_check_max_tokens.py | ||
| test_langfuse_passthrough_security.py | ||
| test_lazy_openapi_snapshot.py | ||
| test_litellm_pre_call_utils.py | ||
| test_max_budget_env_var.py | ||
| test_mcp_asgi_response.py | ||
| test_model_based_routing_files_batches.py | ||
| test_model_dump_with_preserved_fields.py | ||
| test_model_id_header_propagation.py | ||
| test_model_info_default_limits.py | ||
| test_model_level_guardrails.py | ||
| test_model_list_healthy_only.py | ||
| test_modify_response_streaming_passthrough.py | ||
| test_openapi_schema_validation.py | ||
| test_plugin_routes.py | ||
| test_pricing_field_strip.py | ||
| test_prometheus_cleanup.py | ||
| test_provider_url_destination_guard.py | ||
| test_proxy_cli.py | ||
| test_proxy_logging_hook_detection.py | ||
| test_proxy_server.py | ||
| test_proxy_types.py | ||
| test_proxy_utils.py | ||
| test_pyroscope.py | ||
| test_read_model_list.py | ||
| test_redis_auth_cache_flag.py | ||
| test_response_model_sanitization.py | ||
| test_route_a2a_models.py | ||
| test_route_llm_request.py | ||
| test_sensitive_route_auth.py | ||
| test_shared_health_check.py | ||
| test_spend_log_cleanup.py | ||
| test_swagger_chat_completions.py | ||
| test_team_member_update.py | ||
| test_team_org_move.py | ||
| test_tools_allowlist_enforcement.py | ||
| test_update_llm_router_resilience.py | ||