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* refactor(proxy): route every team-admin decision through auth/team_access.py Move the six team-admin helpers out of common_utils, team_endpoints and key_management_endpoints into litellm/proxy/auth/team_access.py under public names, and point every management route and helper at them. The key routes keep checking team admin before org admin, so a team admin whose user row is gone still passes as before. Status codes and bodies are unchanged, which the 223-case team-admin matrix confirms at the merge base and at the tip common_utils keeps `_is_user_team_admin` as an alias because the published litellm-enterprise 0.1.71 wheel still imports it from there * refactor(proxy): answer every team access check with TeamAccess.allows Replace the six helpers in auth/team_access.py with one resolver in litellm/proxy/management/teams/access.py. Each route passes the roles it accepts (TEAM_OR_ORG_ADMIN or TEAM_ADMIN_ONLY), and /team/update and /team/info rank roles through strongest_role so org admin still outranks team admin there The org lookup moves behind an OrgRoles protocol, implemented by PrismaOrgRoles in management/users/service.py, and get_team_access in management/teams/dependencies.py is the only place that reads proxy_server globals. _check_key_admin_access keeps its name and body from main Routes that checked org admin first now read the roster first, so a team admin whose org lookup errors now passes on /team/delete, /team/block, /team/unblock, member reset_spend and reset_budget, and the team callback routes. No allowed caller is denied
86 lines
3.8 KiB
Python
86 lines
3.8 KiB
Python
import pytest
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from .actors import Actor
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio(loop_scope="session")
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# GET /team/info — actor x team-target authz matrix, pinned against
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# validate_membership(): a team is readable by a proxy admin, a key whose
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# own team_id matches, a listed member, or an org admin of the team's org;
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# everything else is 403. TEAM_GAMMA has no members, so only PROXY_ADMIN
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# and ORG_A's org admin can read it.
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_SCENARIOS = [
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("alpha/proxy_admin", Actor.PROXY_ADMIN, "alpha", 200),
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("alpha/org_admin", Actor.ORG_ADMIN, "alpha", 200),
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("alpha/team_admin", Actor.TEAM_ADMIN, "alpha", 200),
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("alpha/internal_user", Actor.INTERNAL_USER, "alpha", 200),
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("alpha/owner", Actor.OWNER, "alpha", 200),
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("alpha/unrelated_same_org", Actor.UNRELATED_SAME_ORG, "alpha", 200),
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("alpha/cross_org_user", Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER, "alpha", 403),
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("alpha/service_account", Actor.SERVICE_ACCOUNT, "alpha", 200),
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("alpha/org_b_admin", Actor.ORG_B_ADMIN, "alpha", 403),
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("gamma/proxy_admin", Actor.PROXY_ADMIN, "gamma", 200),
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("gamma/org_admin", Actor.ORG_ADMIN, "gamma", 200),
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("gamma/team_admin", Actor.TEAM_ADMIN, "gamma", 403),
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("gamma/internal_user", Actor.INTERNAL_USER, "gamma", 403),
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("gamma/owner", Actor.OWNER, "gamma", 403),
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("gamma/unrelated_same_org", Actor.UNRELATED_SAME_ORG, "gamma", 403),
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("gamma/cross_org_user", Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER, "gamma", 403),
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("gamma/service_account", Actor.SERVICE_ACCOUNT, "gamma", 403),
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("gamma/org_b_admin", Actor.ORG_B_ADMIN, "gamma", 403),
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("beta/proxy_admin", Actor.PROXY_ADMIN, "beta", 200),
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("beta/org_admin", Actor.ORG_ADMIN, "beta", 403),
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("beta/team_admin", Actor.TEAM_ADMIN, "beta", 403),
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("beta/internal_user", Actor.INTERNAL_USER, "beta", 403),
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("beta/owner", Actor.OWNER, "beta", 403),
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("beta/unrelated_same_org", Actor.UNRELATED_SAME_ORG, "beta", 403),
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("beta/cross_org_user", Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER, "beta", 200),
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("beta/service_account", Actor.SERVICE_ACCOUNT, "beta", 403),
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("beta/org_b_admin", Actor.ORG_B_ADMIN, "beta", 200),
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]
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"actor,target,expected_status",
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[(a, t, s) for (_id, a, t, s) in _SCENARIOS],
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ids=[s[0] for s in _SCENARIOS],
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)
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async def test_team_info_authz_matrix(
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actor: Actor, target: str, expected_status: int, proxy_client, world
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):
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caller = world.keys[actor]
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target_team_id = {
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"alpha": world.team_alpha_id,
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"gamma": world.team_gamma_id,
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"beta": world.team_beta_id,
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}[target]
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resp = await proxy_client.get(
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f"/team/info?team_id={target_team_id}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {caller.cleartext}"},
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)
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assert (
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resp.status_code == expected_status
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), f"{actor.value} -> {target}: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}"
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if expected_status == 200:
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body = resp.json()
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assert body["team_id"] == target_team_id
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assert body["team_info"]["team_id"] == target_team_id
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# Phase 4 F6 — explicit pin on the `team_access_denied` 403 message string.
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# alpha/org_b_admin already covers the branch in the matrix; this guard
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# turns a silent rename of the exception detail into a CI red, which is the
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# behavior tripwire that the matrix's status-only assertion cannot catch.
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async def test_team_info_org_admin_cross_org_rejection_detail(proxy_client, world):
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resp = await proxy_client.get(
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f"/team/info?team_id={world.team_alpha_id}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {world.keys[Actor.ORG_B_ADMIN].cleartext}"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text
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# validate_membership() at GET /team/info raises with this exact phrase.
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# Pinning it lock-step locks down the visible auth message — a rename
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# would flip CI red even when the status stays 403.
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assert "not authorized to access this team" in resp.text, resp.text
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