litellm/tests/test_litellm/test_logging.py
yucheng-berri b4f5b6aa94
fix(logging): redact credential query params from the uvicorn access log (#39293)
* fix(logging): redact credential query params from the uvicorn access log

Raw virtual keys reached container stdout two ways:

- `GET /key/info?key=sk-...`, `/global/spend/report?api_key=sk-...`,
  `/key/spend/report`, `/spend/logs`, `/user/daily/activity` and the Gemini
  passthrough routes all put the credential in the request target, and
  `uvicorn.access` had no redaction filter (only `uvicorn.error` did).
- the key budget error interpolates `LiteLLM_VerificationToken.key_name`,
  a column with no enforced shape, into a message that is both logged and
  returned to the caller.

`SecretRedactionFilter` cannot be reused on an access logger: it collapses the
record into `record.msg` and clears `record.args`, and uvicorn's AccessFormatter
unpacks those args at emit time, so every access line would raise TypeError.
`AccessLogRedactionFilter` scrubs the positional args in place instead.

An access line is the one input to the secret regex an unauthenticated caller
controls end to end, so two bounds go with it. The request target is cut back to
a whole query parameter under 512 characters before it is scanned, since a half
parameter is too short to match its own pattern and would be logged raw, and the
dropped tail is not logged at all. The connection-string pattern is bounded too,
because its user half could previously re-scan the rest of the string from every
`://`: a 16 KB URL of `a://` pairs took 314s and now takes 0.12s, with the caps
set high enough that an RDS IAM auth token used as a DSN password still redacts.

Credential query params are terminated by `&` like the existing `key=` and
`sig=` patterns, so redacting one param no longer swallows the rest of the
request line, and a second credential in the same query string is now redacted
on its own instead of surviving once the first one stops the span. `key_name` is
echoed into the budget error only when it still has the masked `sk-...abcd`
shape `abbreviate_api_key` writes, so a value put there by a direct DB write or
a migration falls back to the key alias.

Also point the `/key/info` and spend-report examples at the sha256 hash both
endpoints already accept, so callers stop putting raw keys in URLs that
third-party access logs record.

Resolves LIT-5909

* test(logging): assert on emitted access lines instead of filter registration

The two registration tests checked that an AccessLogRedactionFilter instance
sits in uvicorn.access.filters, which is the shape of the code rather than its
behavior. Handing the logger a real access record and reading what a handler
wrote covers the same wiring and still fails when the registration is removed.

* fix(logging): redact percent-encoded credentials from access logs

?k%65y=sk%2D... is a working credential once the request parser decodes it,
but the redaction patterns match literal text and never see it. Decode the
request target as a detector and drop the query when decoding reveals a
secret. The decoded text is never logged back, so a %0A cannot forge a
following log line

Also accept any four non-space characters in the masked key_name check, since
abbreviate_api_key copies the last four characters of a custom key verbatim
and those can be punctuation or non-ASCII

* fix(auth): keep control codes out of the masked key label

/key/generate accepts a custom key ending in an escape sequence, and
abbreviate_api_key copies those four characters into key_name verbatim, so
the over-budget message carried them to a terminal and a log viewer. Bar
whitespace and C0/C1 control codes from the four, and keep everything else
2026-09-02 15:10:36 -07:00

1180 lines
43 KiB
Python

import ast
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import re
import sys
import time
from io import StringIO
from pathlib import Path
from typing import List
import pytest
import litellm
from litellm._logging import (
_COLOR_LOG_FORMAT,
_MAX_SCRUBBED_ACCESS_ARG,
_PLAIN_LOG_FORMAT,
ALL_LOGGERS,
AccessLogRedactionFilter,
CorrelationContextFilter,
CorrelationPlainFormatter,
JsonFormatter,
LevelRoutingStreamHandler,
SecretRedactionFilter,
StdoutLogTruncationFilter,
_get_uvicorn_json_log_config,
_initialize_loggers_with_handler,
_parse_json_logs_env,
_plain_log_format,
_stdout_truncation_marker,
_turn_on_json,
session_id_var,
set_session_id,
set_trace_id,
trace_id_var,
verbose_logger,
verbose_proxy_logger,
verbose_router_logger,
)
from litellm.constants import LITELLM_TRUNCATED_PAYLOAD_FIELD
from litellm.integrations.custom_logger import CustomLogger
from litellm.types.utils import StandardLoggingPayload
class CacheHitCustomLogger(CustomLogger):
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
self.logged_standard_logging_payloads: List[StandardLoggingPayload] = []
async def async_log_success_event(self, kwargs, response_obj, start_time, end_time):
standard_logging_payload = kwargs.get("standard_logging_object", None)
if standard_logging_payload:
self.logged_standard_logging_payloads.append(standard_logging_payload)
def test_json_mode_emits_one_record_per_logger(capfd):
# Turn on JSON logging
_turn_on_json()
# Make sure our loggers will emit INFO-level records
for lg in (verbose_logger, verbose_router_logger, verbose_proxy_logger):
lg.setLevel(logging.INFO)
# Log one message from each logger at different levels
verbose_logger.info("first info")
verbose_router_logger.info("second info from router")
verbose_proxy_logger.info("third info from proxy")
# All three records are INFO, so they must route to stdout and none to stderr
out, err = capfd.readouterr()
assert [raw for raw in err.splitlines() if raw.strip()] == []
lines = [raw for raw in out.splitlines() if raw.strip()]
# Expect exactly three JSON lines
assert len(lines) == 3, f"got {len(lines)} lines, want 3: {lines!r}"
# Each line must be valid JSON with the required fields
for line in lines:
obj = json.loads(line)
assert "message" in obj, "`message` key missing"
assert "level" in obj, "`level` key missing"
assert "timestamp" in obj, "`timestamp` key missing"
def test_json_formatter_parses_embedded_json_message():
"""
Test that JsonFormatter parses embedded JSON in the message field and promotes
sub-fields to first-class JSON properties for downstream querying.
"""
formatter = JsonFormatter()
record = logging.LogRecord(
name="LiteLLM",
level=logging.DEBUG,
pathname="",
lineno=0,
msg='{"event": "giveup", "exception": "Connection failed", "model_name": "gpt-4"}',
args=(),
exc_info=None,
)
output = formatter.format(record)
obj = json.loads(output)
# Standard fields preserved
assert "message" in obj
assert obj["level"] == "DEBUG"
assert "timestamp" in obj
# Embedded JSON fields promoted to top-level for querying
assert obj["event"] == "giveup"
assert obj["exception"] == "Connection failed"
assert obj["model_name"] == "gpt-4"
def test_json_formatter_includes_extra_attributes():
"""
Test that JsonFormatter includes extra attributes from logger.debug("msg", extra={...}).
"""
formatter = JsonFormatter()
record = logging.LogRecord(
name="LiteLLM",
level=logging.DEBUG,
pathname="",
lineno=0,
msg="POST Request Sent from LiteLLM",
args=(),
exc_info=None,
)
record.api_base = "https://api.openai.com"
record.authorization = "Bearer sk-***"
output = formatter.format(record)
obj = json.loads(output)
assert obj["message"] == "POST Request Sent from LiteLLM"
assert obj["api_base"] == "https://api.openai.com"
assert obj["authorization"] == "Bearer sk-***"
def test_json_formatter_plain_message_unchanged():
"""
Test that non-JSON messages are passed through as-is in the message field.
"""
formatter = JsonFormatter()
record = logging.LogRecord(
name="LiteLLM",
level=logging.INFO,
pathname="",
lineno=0,
msg="Cache hit!",
args=(),
exc_info=None,
)
output = formatter.format(record)
obj = json.loads(output)
assert obj["message"] == "Cache hit!"
assert "event" not in obj
assert "exception" not in obj
def test_json_formatter_parses_embedded_python_dict_repr():
"""
Test that JsonFormatter parses Python dict repr (str/deployment) embedded in
plain text, e.g. from get_available_deployment logs.
Reproduces Roni's reported case.
"""
formatter = JsonFormatter()
msg = (
"get_available_deployment for model: text-embedding-3-large, "
"Selected deployment: {'model_name': 'text-embedding-3-large', "
"'litellm_params': {'api_key': 'sk**********', 'tpm': 1000000, 'rpm': 2000, "
"'use_in_pass_through': False, 'use_litellm_proxy': False, "
"'merge_reasoning_content_in_choices': False, 'model': 'text-embedding-3-large'}, "
"'model_info': {'id': 'a624b057aec64ada48311', 'db_model': False}} "
"for model: text-embedding-3-large"
)
record = logging.LogRecord(
name="LiteLLM Router",
level=logging.INFO,
pathname="",
lineno=0,
msg=msg,
args=(),
exc_info=None,
)
output = formatter.format(record)
obj = json.loads(output)
assert "message" in obj
assert obj["level"] == "INFO"
# Python dict parsed and promoted to first-class properties
assert obj["model_name"] == "text-embedding-3-large"
assert "litellm_params" in obj
# Redacted, not passed through: SecretRedactionFilter already collapses this
# pair in the plain path before any formatter sees it, so the JSON path matching
# it is production parity. The key survives because redaction is per-value here.
assert obj["litellm_params"]["api_key"] == "REDACTED"
assert obj["litellm_params"]["tpm"] == 1000000
assert obj["litellm_params"]["use_in_pass_through"] is False
assert "model_info" in obj
assert obj["model_info"]["id"] == "a624b057aec64ada48311"
assert obj["model_info"]["db_model"] is False
def test_json_formatter_output_stays_parseable_when_a_secret_is_redacted():
"""Redaction must collapse the value only, never the surrounding JSON member.
Redacting the serialized document turned '"api_key": "sk-..."' into a bare
REDACTED token, so the line stopped being valid JSON entirely.
"""
formatter = JsonFormatter()
record = logging.LogRecord(
name="LiteLLM",
level=logging.INFO,
pathname="",
lineno=0,
msg="calling deployment",
args=(),
exc_info=None,
)
record.deployment = {
"api_key": "sk-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789",
"aws_secret_access_key": "wJalrXUtnFEMIQAfakeKEYbPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY",
"aws_region_name": "us-east-1",
"nested": {"tokens": ["Bearer abcdefghijklmnop", "keep-me"]},
}
obj = json.loads(formatter.format(record))
assert obj["deployment"]["api_key"] == "REDACTED"
assert obj["deployment"]["aws_secret_access_key"] == "REDACTED"
# Non-secret siblings stay legible so the logs remain useful
assert obj["deployment"]["aws_region_name"] == "us-east-1"
assert obj["deployment"]["nested"]["tokens"] == ["REDACTED", "keep-me"]
def test_json_formatter_includes_component_field():
"""
Test that JsonFormatter always emits a 'component' field equal to the logger name.
This allows filtering by component (e.g. "LiteLLM Proxy") in Datadog / third-party log services.
"""
formatter = JsonFormatter()
for logger_name in ("LiteLLM Proxy", "LiteLLM Router", "LiteLLM"):
record = logging.LogRecord(
name=logger_name,
level=logging.ERROR,
pathname="proxy_server.py",
lineno=42,
msg="something went wrong",
args=(),
exc_info=None,
)
output = formatter.format(record)
obj = json.loads(output)
assert obj["component"] == logger_name, f"Expected component={logger_name!r}, got {obj.get('component')!r}"
def test_json_formatter_includes_logger_field():
"""
Test that JsonFormatter always emits a 'logger' field with filename:lineno.
This allows pinpointing the exact source of a log line in third-party services.
"""
formatter = JsonFormatter()
record = logging.LogRecord(
name="LiteLLM Proxy",
level=logging.INFO,
pathname="/app/litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py",
lineno=123,
msg="request received",
args=(),
exc_info=None,
)
output = formatter.format(record)
obj = json.loads(output)
assert obj["logger"] == "proxy_server.py:123", f"Expected logger='proxy_server.py:123', got {obj['logger']!r}"
def test_json_formatter_extra_component_not_overwritten():
"""
User-supplied extra={"component": "..."} must not be silently dropped.
"""
formatter = JsonFormatter()
record = logging.LogRecord(
name="LiteLLM Proxy",
level=logging.INFO,
pathname="proxy_server.py",
lineno=1,
msg="event",
args=(),
exc_info=None,
)
record.component = "auth-service"
obj = json.loads(formatter.format(record))
assert obj["component"] == "auth-service", f"User-supplied component was overwritten, got {obj['component']!r}"
def test_initialize_loggers_with_handler_sets_propagate_false():
"""
Test that the initialize_loggers_with_handler function sets propagate to False for all loggers
"""
# Initialize loggers with the test handler
_initialize_loggers_with_handler(logging.StreamHandler())
# Check that propagate is set to False for all loggers
for logger in ALL_LOGGERS:
assert logger.propagate is False, (
f"Logger {logger.name} has propagate set to {logger.propagate}, expected False"
)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_cache_hit_includes_custom_llm_provider():
"""
Test that when there's a cache hit, the standard logging payload includes the custom_llm_provider
"""
# Set up caching and custom logger
litellm.cache = litellm.Cache()
test_custom_logger = CacheHitCustomLogger()
original_callbacks = litellm.callbacks.copy() if litellm.callbacks else []
litellm.callbacks = [test_custom_logger]
try:
# First call - should be a cache miss
response1 = await litellm.acompletion(
model="gpt-3.5-turbo",
messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "test cache hit message"}],
mock_response="test response",
caching=True,
)
# Wait for logging to complete
await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
# Second identical call - should be a cache hit
response2 = await litellm.acompletion(
model="gpt-3.5-turbo",
messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "test cache hit message"}],
mock_response="test response",
caching=True,
)
# Wait for logging to complete
await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
# Verify we have logged events
assert len(test_custom_logger.logged_standard_logging_payloads) >= 2, (
f"Expected at least 2 logged events, got {len(test_custom_logger.logged_standard_logging_payloads)}"
)
# Find the cache hit event (should be the second call)
cache_hit_payload = None
for payload in test_custom_logger.logged_standard_logging_payloads:
if payload.get("cache_hit") is True:
cache_hit_payload = payload
break
# Verify cache hit event was found
assert cache_hit_payload is not None, "No cache hit event found in logged payloads"
# Verify custom_llm_provider is included in the cache hit payload
assert "custom_llm_provider" in cache_hit_payload, (
"custom_llm_provider missing from cache hit standard logging payload"
)
# Verify custom_llm_provider has a valid value (should be "openai" for gpt-3.5-turbo)
custom_llm_provider = cache_hit_payload["custom_llm_provider"]
assert custom_llm_provider is not None and custom_llm_provider != "", (
f"custom_llm_provider should not be None or empty, got: {custom_llm_provider}"
)
print(
f"Cache hit standard logging payload with custom_llm_provider: {custom_llm_provider}",
json.dumps(cache_hit_payload, indent=2),
)
finally:
# Clean up
litellm.callbacks = original_callbacks
litellm.cache = None
LITELLM_LOGGER_NAMES = frozenset(
{"verbose_logger", "verbose_proxy_logger", "verbose_router_logger", "logger", "logging"}
)
LOG_LEVEL_METHODS = frozenset({"debug", "info", "warning", "error", "exception", "critical"})
LITELLM_PACKAGE_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "litellm"
def _receiver_name(node: ast.expr) -> str:
if isinstance(node, ast.Name):
return node.id
if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute):
return node.attr
return ""
def _is_logging_call(node: ast.AST) -> bool:
return (
isinstance(node, ast.Call)
and isinstance(node.func, ast.Attribute)
and node.func.attr in LOG_LEVEL_METHODS
and _receiver_name(node.func.value) in LITELLM_LOGGER_NAMES
)
def _has_format_spec(message: ast.JoinedStr) -> bool:
return any(isinstance(value, ast.FormattedValue) and value.format_spec is not None for value in message.values)
def _eager_logging_calls(source: str, path: Path) -> tuple[str, ...]:
return tuple(
f"{path}:{node.lineno}"
for node in ast.walk(ast.parse(source))
if _is_logging_call(node)
and node.args
and isinstance(node.args[0], ast.JoinedStr)
and not _has_format_spec(node.args[0])
)
def test_logging_calls_do_not_build_their_message_eagerly():
"""A discarded log record must not have cost anything to build.
`log.debug(f"payload: {body}")` interpolates before the call runs, so the message is
built and thrown away on every request the level filters out; `log.debug("payload: %s", body)`
defers that to `record.getMessage()`, which only runs once the record passes the level check.
f-strings carrying a format spec are exempt: `%`-style has no faithful equivalent for
specs like `{ratio:.1%}`, and those sites interpolate scalars rather than payloads.
"""
offenders = tuple(
offender
for path in sorted(LITELLM_PACKAGE_ROOT.rglob("*.py"))
for offender in _eager_logging_calls(
path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), path.relative_to(LITELLM_PACKAGE_ROOT.parent)
)
)
assert offenders == (), (
"these logging calls build their message eagerly; pass the values as %-style arguments instead:\n"
+ "\n".join(offenders)
)
class _JsonCapture(logging.Handler):
def __init__(self):
super().__init__()
self.formatter = JsonFormatter()
self.records: list[dict] = []
self.addFilter(CorrelationContextFilter())
def emit(self, record):
self.records.append(json.loads(self.formatter.format(record)))
def _make_capture_logger(name: str) -> tuple[logging.Logger, _JsonCapture]:
lg = logging.getLogger(name)
cap = _JsonCapture()
lg.addHandler(cap)
lg.setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
return lg, cap
def test_trace_id_injected_into_json_record(monkeypatch):
"""trace_id set via set_trace_id() appears in every JSON record in that context."""
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "request_correlation_in_logs", True)
lg, cap = _make_capture_logger("test.trace_inject")
set_trace_id("trace-abc-123")
try:
lg.info("test message")
assert len(cap.records) == 1
assert cap.records[0]["trace_id"] == "trace-abc-123"
finally:
trace_id_var.set("")
def test_session_id_injected_when_set(monkeypatch):
"""session_id set via set_session_id() appears in JSON record."""
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "request_correlation_in_logs", True)
lg, cap = _make_capture_logger("test.session_inject")
set_session_id("sess-xyz-456")
try:
lg.info("another message")
assert cap.records[0]["session_id"] == "sess-xyz-456"
finally:
session_id_var.set("")
def test_trace_id_and_session_id_cannot_be_spoofed_by_message_content(monkeypatch):
"""A log message that happens to parse as JSON/dict with "trace_id"/"session_id"
keys (e.g. the proxy logging a raw request-header dict) must not override the
real correlation ids set via set_trace_id()/set_session_id()."""
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "request_correlation_in_logs", True)
lg, cap = _make_capture_logger("test.spoof_attempt")
set_trace_id("real-trace-id")
set_session_id("real-session-id")
try:
lg.info('{"trace_id": "attacker-supplied-trace", "session_id": "attacker-supplied-session"}')
assert cap.records[0]["trace_id"] == "real-trace-id"
assert cap.records[0]["session_id"] == "real-session-id"
finally:
trace_id_var.set("")
session_id_var.set("")
def test_trace_id_and_session_id_cannot_be_injected_with_no_active_context(monkeypatch):
"""A message that happens to parse as JSON/dict with "trace_id"/"session_id" keys
must not surface those fields at all when CorrelationContextFilter hasn't stamped
this record - e.g. a log line emitted before Logging.__init__() runs for a request
(request_correlation_in_logs on, but no genuine trace/session id active yet)."""
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "request_correlation_in_logs", True)
lg, cap = _make_capture_logger("test.no_context_spoof_attempt")
trace_id_var.set("")
session_id_var.set("")
lg.info('{"trace_id": "attacker-supplied-trace", "session_id": "attacker-supplied-session"}')
assert "trace_id" not in cap.records[0]
assert "session_id" not in cap.records[0]
def test_trace_id_and_session_id_are_redacted_when_credential_shaped(monkeypatch):
"""A caller-controlled trace_id/session_id (e.g. from x-litellm-trace-id or a W3C
baggage header) that happens to look like a real credential must not reach log
records unredacted. CorrelationContextFilter stamps trace_id/session_id onto the
record after SecretRedactionFilter has already run, so those two fields would
otherwise bypass credential redaction entirely - the fix redacts at set_trace_id()/
set_session_id() time instead, before the value ever reaches a log record."""
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "request_correlation_in_logs", True)
lg, cap = _make_capture_logger("test.credential_shaped_correlation_id")
poisoned_trace_id = "sk-ant-api03-" + "A" * 40
poisoned_session_id = "AKIA" + "B" * 16
set_trace_id(poisoned_trace_id)
set_session_id(poisoned_session_id)
try:
lg.info("some benign log line")
assert cap.records[0]["trace_id"] == "REDACTED"
assert cap.records[0]["session_id"] == "REDACTED"
assert poisoned_trace_id not in json.dumps(cap.records[0])
assert poisoned_session_id not in json.dumps(cap.records[0])
finally:
trace_id_var.set("")
session_id_var.set("")
def test_session_id_absent_when_not_set():
"""session_id must NOT appear in JSON record when not set for this context."""
lg, cap = _make_capture_logger("test.no_session")
session_id_var.set("")
lg.info("no session message")
assert "session_id" not in cap.records[0]
def test_trace_id_absent_when_not_set():
"""trace_id must NOT appear when not set."""
lg, cap = _make_capture_logger("test.no_trace")
trace_id_var.set("")
lg.info("no trace message")
assert "trace_id" not in cap.records[0]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_contextvar_isolation_between_tasks():
"""Two concurrent async tasks each see only their own trace_id."""
results: dict[str, str] = {}
async def task(task_id: str, trace_id: str) -> None:
set_trace_id(trace_id)
await asyncio.sleep(0)
results[task_id] = trace_id_var.get()
await asyncio.gather(
task("A", "trace-for-A"),
task("B", "trace-for-B"),
)
assert results["A"] == "trace-for-A"
assert results["B"] == "trace-for-B"
def test_trace_id_not_in_log_when_flag_disabled(monkeypatch):
"""When request_correlation_in_logs is False (default), trace_id must not appear in JSON records even when set."""
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "request_correlation_in_logs", False)
lg, cap = _make_capture_logger("test.no_trace_gated")
set_trace_id("trace-should-not-appear")
try:
lg.info("message")
assert "trace_id" not in cap.records[0]
finally:
trace_id_var.set("")
def test_session_id_not_in_log_when_flag_disabled(monkeypatch):
"""When request_correlation_in_logs is False (default), session_id must not appear in JSON records even when set."""
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "request_correlation_in_logs", False)
lg, cap = _make_capture_logger("test.no_session_gated")
set_session_id("sess-should-not-appear")
try:
lg.info("message")
assert "session_id" not in cap.records[0]
finally:
session_id_var.set("")
class _PlainCapture(logging.Handler):
def __init__(self):
super().__init__()
self.formatter = CorrelationPlainFormatter("%(message)s")
self.records: list[str] = []
self.addFilter(CorrelationContextFilter())
def emit(self, record):
self.records.append(self.formatter.format(record))
def _make_plain_capture_logger(name: str) -> tuple[logging.Logger, _PlainCapture]:
lg = logging.getLogger(name)
cap = _PlainCapture()
lg.addHandler(cap)
lg.setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
return lg, cap
def test_plain_formatter_appends_trace_id_and_session_id(monkeypatch):
"""CorrelationPlainFormatter must append trace_id/session_id to non-JSON log lines too."""
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "request_correlation_in_logs", True)
lg, cap = _make_plain_capture_logger("test.plain_trace_session")
set_trace_id("plain-trace-1")
set_session_id("plain-session-1")
try:
lg.info("plaintext message")
assert cap.records[0] == "plaintext message [trace_id=plain-trace-1 session_id=plain-session-1]"
finally:
trace_id_var.set("")
session_id_var.set("")
def test_plain_formatter_appends_only_trace_id_when_session_id_absent(monkeypatch):
"""Only trace_id is appended when session_id was never set."""
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "request_correlation_in_logs", True)
lg, cap = _make_plain_capture_logger("test.plain_trace_only")
set_trace_id("plain-trace-2")
session_id_var.set("")
try:
lg.info("plaintext message")
assert cap.records[0] == "plaintext message [trace_id=plain-trace-2]"
finally:
trace_id_var.set("")
def test_plain_formatter_unchanged_when_flag_disabled(monkeypatch):
"""When request_correlation_in_logs is False, plain log lines are unmodified even if the contextvars are set."""
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "request_correlation_in_logs", False)
lg, cap = _make_plain_capture_logger("test.plain_flag_off")
set_trace_id("should-not-appear")
set_session_id("should-not-appear")
try:
lg.info("plaintext message")
assert cap.records[0] == "plaintext message"
finally:
trace_id_var.set("")
session_id_var.set("")
def test_set_trace_id_strips_control_characters():
"""set_trace_id() must strip \\r/\\n/escape sequences so a caller-controlled
trace id can't forge fake log entries when interpolated into plain-text logs."""
token = set_trace_id('evil\r\n{"level": "CRITICAL", "message": "forged"}')
try:
value = trace_id_var.get()
assert "\r" not in value
assert "\n" not in value
finally:
trace_id_var.reset(token)
_MARKER_RE = re.compile(rf"\.\.\. \({LITELLM_TRUNCATED_PAYLOAD_FIELD} skipped (\d+) chars\..*?\) \.\.\.", re.S)
def _extract_marker(text: str) -> "re.Match[str] | None":
return _MARKER_RE.search(text)
def _make_record(level: int, msg: str, args=(), exc_info=None) -> logging.LogRecord:
return logging.LogRecord(
name="LiteLLM Router",
level=level,
pathname="",
lineno=0,
msg=msg,
args=args,
exc_info=exc_info,
)
def test_oversized_info_record_is_truncated(monkeypatch):
"""An error string echoing a huge request payload must not reach stdout in full."""
monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_STRING_LENGTH_STDOUT_LOG", "500")
payload = "p" * 100_000
record = _make_record(logging.INFO, "litellm.acompletion(model=%s) Exception %s", ("gpt-4", payload))
assert StdoutLogTruncationFilter().filter(record) is True
message = record.getMessage()
assert LITELLM_TRUNCATED_PAYLOAD_FIELD in message
assert len(message) <= 500
assert message.startswith("litellm.acompletion(model=gpt-4) Exception ppp")
assert message.endswith("ppp")
marker = _extract_marker(message)
assert marker is not None
kept, skipped = len(message) - len(marker.group(0)), int(marker.group(1))
assert kept + skipped == 43 + len(payload)
def test_truncated_message_fits_the_configured_cap(monkeypatch):
"""The cap is the whole point of the setting, so the marker has to be paid for out of
the budget instead of appended on top of a limit-sized head and tail."""
monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_STRING_LENGTH_STDOUT_LOG", "500")
record = _make_record(logging.ERROR, "Exception %s", ("p" * 2000,))
assert StdoutLogTruncationFilter().filter(record) is True
message = record.getMessage()
assert _extract_marker(message) is not None
assert len(message) == 500
@pytest.mark.parametrize("payload_len", [501, 512, 1000, 9999, 100_000])
def test_truncated_message_never_exceeds_the_cap(monkeypatch, payload_len):
monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_STRING_LENGTH_STDOUT_LOG", "500")
record = _make_record(logging.ERROR, "%s", ("p" * payload_len,))
assert StdoutLogTruncationFilter().filter(record) is True
assert len(record.getMessage()) <= 500
_NO_BUDGET_PAYLOAD = "p" * 2000
_MARKER_SIZED_CAP = len(_stdout_truncation_marker(len(_NO_BUDGET_PAYLOAD)))
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cap", [_MARKER_SIZED_CAP, _MARKER_SIZED_CAP - 1, 100])
def test_cap_leaving_no_room_for_the_marker_still_bounds_output(monkeypatch, cap):
"""An operator can set the cap at or below the marker's own length, leaving nothing to
spend on a head and tail, and the output still has to fit."""
monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_STRING_LENGTH_STDOUT_LOG", str(cap))
record = _make_record(logging.ERROR, "%s", (_NO_BUDGET_PAYLOAD,))
assert StdoutLogTruncationFilter().filter(record) is True
assert len(record.getMessage()) == cap
def test_debug_record_is_not_truncated(monkeypatch):
"""--detailed_debug exists to dump full payloads, so DEBUG records pass through."""
monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_STRING_LENGTH_STDOUT_LOG", "500")
payload = "p" * 100_000
record = _make_record(logging.DEBUG, "raw request %s", (payload,))
assert StdoutLogTruncationFilter().filter(record) is True
assert record.getMessage() == f"raw request {payload}"
def test_truncation_disabled_by_zero_limit(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_STRING_LENGTH_STDOUT_LOG", "0")
payload = "p" * 100_000
record = _make_record(logging.ERROR, "Exception %s", (payload,))
assert StdoutLogTruncationFilter().filter(record) is True
assert record.getMessage() == f"Exception {payload}"
def test_oversized_traceback_is_truncated(monkeypatch):
"""verbose_proxy_logger.exception() re-logs the payload inside the traceback too."""
monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_STRING_LENGTH_STDOUT_LOG", "500")
try:
raise ValueError("payload " + "p" * 100_000)
except ValueError:
exc_info = sys.exc_info()
record = _make_record(logging.ERROR, "Exception occured", exc_info=exc_info)
assert StdoutLogTruncationFilter().filter(record) is True
assert record.exc_text is not None
assert LITELLM_TRUNCATED_PAYLOAD_FIELD in record.exc_text
assert len(record.exc_text) <= 500
assert "Traceback (most recent call last)" in record.exc_text
def test_falsy_exc_info_is_not_formatted(monkeypatch):
"""Callers pass exc_info=False, which logging leaves on the record as a bool."""
monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_STRING_LENGTH_STDOUT_LOG", "500")
record = _make_record(logging.WARNING, "skipping malformed endpoint %s", ("p" * 100_000,), exc_info=False)
assert StdoutLogTruncationFilter().filter(record) is True
assert record.exc_text is None
assert LITELLM_TRUNCATED_PAYLOAD_FIELD in record.getMessage()
def test_secret_filter_keeps_truncated_traceback(monkeypatch):
"""SecretRedactionFilter runs after truncation, so it must redact the capped
traceback instead of reformatting the full one from exc_info."""
monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_STRING_LENGTH_STDOUT_LOG", "500")
try:
raise ValueError("sk-1234567890abcdefghij payload " + "p" * 100_000)
except ValueError:
exc_info = sys.exc_info()
record = _make_record(logging.ERROR, "Exception occured", exc_info=exc_info)
assert StdoutLogTruncationFilter().filter(record) is True
assert SecretRedactionFilter().filter(record) is True
assert record.exc_text is not None
assert len(record.exc_text) <= 500
assert "sk-1234567890abcdefghij" not in record.exc_text
def test_truncation_filter_survives_json_reconfiguration():
"""The cap lives on the loggers, so swapping handlers (JSON mode) can't drop it."""
_turn_on_json()
for lg in (verbose_logger, verbose_router_logger, verbose_proxy_logger):
assert any(isinstance(f, StdoutLogTruncationFilter) for f in lg.filters), f"{lg.name} lost stdout truncation"
def test_oversized_error_is_truncated_end_to_end(monkeypatch, caplog):
"""The router's own exception log line must come out bounded, not just the filter in isolation."""
monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_STRING_LENGTH_STDOUT_LOG", "500")
with caplog.at_level(logging.INFO, logger="LiteLLM Router"):
verbose_router_logger.info("litellm.acompletion(model=%s) Exception %s", "gpt-4", "p" * 100_000)
emitted = "".join(record.getMessage() for record in caplog.records)
assert LITELLM_TRUNCATED_PAYLOAD_FIELD in emitted
assert len(emitted) <= 500
def test_set_session_id_bounds_length():
"""set_session_id() must bound length so an oversized caller-supplied value
isn't repeated across every log line for the request."""
token = set_session_id("a" * 1000)
try:
assert len(session_id_var.get()) == 256
finally:
session_id_var.reset(token)
class _FakeStream:
def __init__(self, tty: bool) -> None:
self._tty = tty
def isatty(self) -> bool:
return self._tty
def test_records_below_warning_go_to_stdout_and_the_rest_to_stderr(capsys):
logger = logging.getLogger("test_level_routing")
logger.handlers.clear()
logger.propagate = False
logger.setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
handler = LevelRoutingStreamHandler()
handler.setFormatter(logging.Formatter("%(levelname)s %(message)s"))
logger.addHandler(handler)
try:
logger.debug("d")
logger.info("i")
logger.warning("w")
logger.error("e")
logger.critical("c")
finally:
logger.handlers.clear()
out, err = capsys.readouterr()
assert out.splitlines() == ["DEBUG d", "INFO i"]
assert err.splitlines() == ["WARNING w", "ERROR e", "CRITICAL c"]
def test_verbose_loggers_route_records_by_level():
for lg in (verbose_logger, verbose_router_logger, verbose_proxy_logger):
assert any(isinstance(h, LevelRoutingStreamHandler) for h in lg.handlers), lg.name
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"stdout_tty, stderr_tty, no_color, want_color",
[
(True, True, None, True),
(False, False, None, False),
(False, True, None, False),
(True, False, None, False),
(True, True, "1", False),
(True, True, "", True),
],
)
def test_plain_log_format_colorizes_only_for_a_terminal(monkeypatch, stdout_tty, stderr_tty, no_color, want_color):
if no_color is None:
monkeypatch.delenv("NO_COLOR", raising=False)
else:
monkeypatch.setenv("NO_COLOR", no_color)
fmt = _plain_log_format(_FakeStream(stdout_tty), _FakeStream(stderr_tty))
assert fmt == (_COLOR_LOG_FORMAT if want_color else _PLAIN_LOG_FORMAT)
assert ("\033[" in fmt) is want_color
def test_plain_format_carries_no_ansi_codes():
assert "\033[" not in _PLAIN_LOG_FORMAT
class _Brokenstream:
"""A write-only shim without isatty, like GUI log redirectors install."""
class _ClosedStream:
closed = True
def isatty(self) -> bool:
raise ValueError("I/O operation on closed file")
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"stdout, stderr",
[
(None, None),
(_FakeStream(True), None),
(_Brokenstream(), _FakeStream(True)),
(_ClosedStream(), _FakeStream(True)),
],
)
def test_plain_log_format_survives_hostile_streams(stdout, stderr):
"""sys.stdout/sys.stderr can be None, shimmed, or closed; import must not crash."""
assert _plain_log_format(stdout, stderr) == _PLAIN_LOG_FORMAT
def test_level_routing_handler_falls_back_to_stderr_when_stdout_is_unusable(monkeypatch, capsys):
logger = logging.getLogger("test_level_routing_fallback")
logger.handlers.clear()
logger.propagate = False
logger.setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
handler = LevelRoutingStreamHandler()
handler.setFormatter(logging.Formatter("%(levelname)s %(message)s"))
logger.addHandler(handler)
try:
monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "stdout", None)
logger.info("stdout is gone")
finally:
logger.handlers.clear()
err = capsys.readouterr().err
assert "INFO stdout is gone" in err
assert "--- Logging error ---" not in err
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"value, want",
[
("true", True),
("True", True),
("TRUE", True),
("false", False),
("False", False),
("0", False),
("1", False),
("", False),
(None, False),
],
)
def test_parse_json_logs_env_enables_only_on_true(value, want):
"""JSON_LOGS=false / 0 must not enable JSON logs (LIT-5558)."""
assert _parse_json_logs_env(value) is want
def test_plain_log_format_survives_none_streams():
"""sys.stdout/sys.stderr can be None in embedded interpreters; import must not crash."""
assert _plain_log_format(None, None) == _PLAIN_LOG_FORMAT
assert _plain_log_format(_FakeStream(True), None) == _PLAIN_LOG_FORMAT
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Access-log redaction (LIT-5909)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_LEAKED_KEY = "sk-mx5ous1o9Iezz5fj3pkLuA"
def _access_record(full_path: str) -> logging.LogRecord:
"""A record shaped exactly like the one uvicorn.access emits per request."""
return logging.LogRecord(
name="uvicorn.access",
level=logging.INFO,
pathname="",
lineno=0,
msg='%s - "%s %s HTTP/%s" %d',
args=("127.0.0.1:1", "GET", full_path, "1.1", 200),
exc_info=None,
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"full_path",
[
f"/key/info?key={_LEAKED_KEY}",
f"/global/spend/report?api_key={_LEAKED_KEY}&start_date=2026-08-01",
f"/key/spend/report?api_key={_LEAKED_KEY}",
f"/spend/logs?api_key={_LEAKED_KEY}",
f"/user/daily/activity?api_key={_LEAKED_KEY}",
f"/gemini/v1beta/models/gemini-2.0-flash:generateContent?key={_LEAKED_KEY}",
],
)
def test_access_log_filter_redacts_a_credential_query_parameter(full_path):
record = _access_record(full_path)
assert AccessLogRedactionFilter().filter(record) is True
assert _LEAKED_KEY not in record.getMessage()
assert "REDACTED" in record.getMessage()
def test_access_log_filter_keeps_the_record_formattable_by_uvicorn():
"""uvicorn's AccessFormatter unpacks record.args, so the filter must scrub the
args in place rather than collapse them the way SecretRedactionFilter does."""
from uvicorn.logging import AccessFormatter
record = _access_record(f"/key/info?key={_LEAKED_KEY}")
AccessLogRedactionFilter().filter(record)
assert isinstance(record.args, tuple)
assert len(record.args) == 5
formatted = AccessFormatter('%(client_addr)s - "%(request_line)s" %(status_code)s', use_colors=False).format(record)
assert _LEAKED_KEY not in formatted
assert "GET" in formatted
assert "200 OK" in formatted
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"full_path, want",
[
# The delimiter must survive so the logged request line stays well formed.
(f"/key/info?key={_LEAKED_KEY}&page=2", "/key/info?REDACTED&page=2"),
("/download?sig=AbCd1234%2Fxy&page=2", "/download?REDACTED&page=2"),
(
f"/global/spend/report?api_key={_LEAKED_KEY}&start_date=2026-01-01",
"/global/spend/report?REDACTED&start_date=2026-01-01",
),
("/sso/callback?client_secret=abcdefgh12345&state=xyz", "/sso/callback?REDACTED&state=xyz"),
(f"/v1/models?token={_LEAKED_KEY}&page=2", "/v1/models?REDACTED&page=2"),
],
)
def test_access_log_filter_keeps_the_query_delimiter(full_path, want):
record = _access_record(full_path)
AccessLogRedactionFilter().filter(record)
assert record.args[2] == want
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"full_path, want",
[
# Both the param name and the value are encoded, so neither is literal text
# the patterns can see, yet the request parser decodes it into a working key.
(f"/key/info?k%65y=sk%2D{_LEAKED_KEY[3:]}", "/key/info?REDACTED"),
(f"/key/info?k%65y=sk%2D{_LEAKED_KEY[3:]}&page=2", "/key/info?REDACTED"),
(f"/v1/models/sk%2D{_LEAKED_KEY[3:]}", "REDACTED"),
# A decoded credential must never be echoed back: it can carry a newline and
# forge a following log line.
(f"/v1/models?k%65y=sk%2D{_LEAKED_KEY[3:]}%0AINFO:%20forged", "/v1/models?REDACTED"),
],
)
def test_access_log_filter_redacts_a_percent_encoded_credential(full_path, want):
record = _access_record(full_path)
AccessLogRedactionFilter().filter(record)
assert record.args[2] == want
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"full_path",
[
"/v1/models?filter=gpt%2D4o&page=2",
"/gemini/v1beta/models/gemini-2.0-flash%3AgenerateContent",
],
)
def test_access_log_filter_leaves_harmless_percent_encoding_alone(full_path):
"""Decoding is a detector, not a rewrite, so a request line with no credential
in it survives encoded exactly as the client sent it."""
record = _access_record(full_path)
AccessLogRedactionFilter().filter(record)
assert record.args[2] == full_path
def test_access_log_filter_caps_how_much_of_a_request_target_it_scans():
"""The request target is the only input to the secret regex an unauthenticated
caller controls end to end, so it is bounded before it is scanned, and the
dropped tail must not reach the log either."""
record = _access_record("/v1/models?u=" + "a://" * 8192 + f"&key={_LEAKED_KEY}")
started = time.perf_counter()
AccessLogRedactionFilter().filter(record)
elapsed = time.perf_counter() - started
scrubbed = record.args[2]
assert _LEAKED_KEY not in scrubbed
assert len(scrubbed) < 1024
assert elapsed < 1.0, f"scrubbing one access line took {elapsed:.2f}s"
@pytest.mark.parametrize("chars_before_the_cut", range(1, 12))
def test_access_log_filter_never_logs_a_half_scanned_credential(chars_before_the_cut):
"""Cutting mid-value would leave a prefix too short for the key= pattern to match,
and that prefix would then be logged raw, so the cut lands on a param boundary."""
prefix = "/v1/models?u="
padding = _MAX_SCRUBBED_ACCESS_ARG - len(prefix) - len("&key=") - chars_before_the_cut
record = _access_record(f"{prefix}{'a' * padding}&key={_LEAKED_KEY}")
AccessLogRedactionFilter().filter(record)
assert f"key={_LEAKED_KEY[:chars_before_the_cut]}" not in record.args[2]
def test_access_log_filter_leaves_a_credential_free_request_line_intact():
record = _access_record("/v1/chat/completions")
AccessLogRedactionFilter().filter(record)
assert record.getMessage() == '127.0.0.1:1 - "GET /v1/chat/completions HTTP/1.1" 200'
def test_access_log_filter_redacts_a_record_that_carries_no_positional_args():
record = logging.LogRecord(
name="uvicorn.access",
level=logging.INFO,
pathname="",
lineno=0,
msg=f'127.0.0.1:1 - "GET /key/info?key={_LEAKED_KEY} HTTP/1.1" 200',
args=None,
exc_info=None,
)
assert AccessLogRedactionFilter().filter(record) is True
assert _LEAKED_KEY not in record.getMessage()
def _emit_access_line(full_path: str) -> str:
"""Hand one real record to uvicorn.access and return what a handler wrote out."""
from uvicorn.logging import AccessFormatter
logger = logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access")
stream = StringIO()
handler = logging.StreamHandler(stream)
handler.setFormatter(AccessFormatter('%(client_addr)s - "%(request_line)s" %(status_code)s', use_colors=False))
saved_level, saved_propagate = logger.level, logger.propagate
logger.addHandler(handler)
logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
logger.propagate = False
try:
logger.handle(_access_record(full_path))
finally:
logger.removeHandler(handler)
logger.setLevel(saved_level)
logger.propagate = saved_propagate
return stream.getvalue()
def test_uvicorn_access_logger_redacts_a_credential_it_is_handed():
"""Registration happens at litellm import; without it the filter never runs."""
emitted = _emit_access_line(f"/key/info?key={_LEAKED_KEY}")
assert _LEAKED_KEY not in emitted
assert "REDACTED" in emitted
def test_access_redaction_survives_the_uvicorn_json_log_config():
"""litellm hands uvicorn a dictConfig when json_logs is on. dictConfig clears a
logger's handlers but not its filters, so redaction has to still be attached."""
import logging.config
names = ("uvicorn", "uvicorn.error", "uvicorn.access")
saved = tuple((logging.getLogger(n), logging.getLogger(n).handlers[:], logging.getLogger(n).level) for n in names)
try:
logging.config.dictConfig(_get_uvicorn_json_log_config())
emitted = _emit_access_line(f"/key/info?key={_LEAKED_KEY}")
assert _LEAKED_KEY not in emitted
assert "REDACTED" in emitted
finally:
for lg, handlers, level in saved:
lg.handlers[:] = handlers
lg.setLevel(level)
lg.propagate = True