litellm/tests/e2e/mcp/mcp_client.py
yuneng-jiang 36bd7f1138
fix(mcp): honor an explicit null on toolset update, cover MCP lifecycle e2e (#40022)
* fix(mcp): honor an explicit null on toolset update, cover MCP lifecycle e2e

PUT /v1/mcp/toolset dumped its payload with exclude_none, so a field sent as
null looked exactly like one the caller left out and the stored value
survived. An admin could not clear a toolset's description: the save reported
success and the old text came straight back. It now dumps with exclude_unset,
so absent keeps and null clears, which is what PUT /v1/mcp/server already did.
A null tools list clears the selection to empty, and a null toolset_name is
ignored because a toolset always has a name.

Adds create, read, partial-update, clear and delete e2e coverage for MCP
servers and toolsets, with every read-back polled on every replica so an edit
that lands on one replica and not another fails the test, plus an enforcement
test proving a key granted a toolset lists exactly that toolset's tools
against the real Datadog upstream.

* fix(e2e): refuse a read-back that no replica serves

A read-back over an empty replica mapping satisfied every predicate and
returned as if it had converged, so it would have asserted nothing and
passed. No wiring can produce that today, since the replica list always
falls back to at least one URL, but a helper whose whole job is proving a
write reached every replica should not have a shape that passes vacuously.

* fix(mcp): keep a null tools list a no-op on toolset update

Treating a null tools list as a clear meant an existing client that sends
tools=null during a partial update, meaning "leave the selection alone",
silently lost every tool the toolset grants. That is a permission surface,
so the quiet version of it is the worst version.

A toolset always has a tool list, the same way it always has a name, so a
null on either is now a no-op. Emptying the selection is an explicit [],
which cannot be confused with a field the caller left out, and which is
what the dashboard already sends.

* fix(e2e): keep MCP admin routes on the data plane

/v1/mcp/* is a lazily mounted feature, so a gateway registers it on the first
matching request, which happens after the startup route trim that drops
management endpoints. Routing it to the control plane therefore sent every MCP
call to the one backend process: the new lifecycle read-backs proved a single
process rather than every replica, and mcp_client's await_registered barrier
waited on a registry that does not serve the tools/list call it guards, so the
existing MCP suites polled a gateway that had not synced yet until poll_timeout

Verified against a two-gateway split stack (backend on 4001, gateways on 4010
and 4011, one postgres): both gateways answer /v1/mcp/server and /v1/mcp/toolset,
and each served 6 server reads and 7 toolset reads over the run

* fix(e2e): grant the toolset by the tool's own name, not the wire name

tools/list serves a tool as <prefix><tool_name>, but a toolset grants by the
tool's own name: resolve_toolset_permissions reads toolset.tools[].tool_name
straight through, and the prefix is added on the way out. The test built the
toolset from the names tools/list reported, so the grant matched nothing, the
scoped key listed no tools, and await_tools ran out its whole poll_timeout
before failing

Measure the prefix off search_datadog_logs, whose own name is known, rather than
guessing it from the alias, since the proxy can be configured to prefix with a
short server id instead. The expectation compared against tools/list stays in
wire names; only what the toolset stores crosses back

* test(mcp): build immutable lifecycle updates and replica results

* test: validate opaque stream IDs and hide log-reader credentials

* test: isolate auto-router scenarios and clean partial setup

* test: honor Datadog search rate-limit reset headers

* test: share the Datadog read-back deadline across retries

* test: preserve captured MCP toolset update fields
2026-09-08 22:50:13 -07:00

422 lines
15 KiB
Python

"""Client for the MCP e2e suite: admin server registration plus the api_key tool
surface.
An admin registers an upstream MCP server through the management API
(`/v1/mcp/server`, persisted in the DB) and grants a virtual key access to it via
`object_permission.mcp_servers`. Keys then reach the server through the REST bridge
the proxy exposes for api_key auth (`/mcp-rest/tools/list`, `/mcp-rest/tools/call`),
which `user_api_key_auth` gates the same way the JSON-RPC `/mcp` surface does. The
request/response bodies are co-located here because only this suite speaks MCP.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
import time
from collections.abc import Mapping
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
from e2e_config import settle_propagation
from e2e_http import Headers, NoBody, Result, Success, UnknownApiError, unwrap
from models import KeyGenerateBody, McpServerListResponse, McpServerRow, ObjectPermission
from proxy_client import ProxyClient
McpToolArg = str | int | float | bool | list[str] | dict[str, str]
McpToolArguments = Mapping[str, McpToolArg]
class ApiKeyHeaders(Headers):
x_litellm_api_key: str = Field(serialization_alias="x-litellm-api-key")
class McpServerNewBody(BaseModel):
server_name: str
alias: str
url: str
transport: str = "http"
auth_type: str | None = None
static_headers: dict[str, str] | None = None
allowed_tools: list[str] | None = None
mcp_access_groups: list[str] | None = None
class McpServerNewResponse(BaseModel):
server_id: str
class McpToolMcpInfo(BaseModel):
server_id: str | None = None
alias: str | None = None
class McpToolEntry(BaseModel):
name: str
description: str | None = None
mcp_info: McpToolMcpInfo | None = None
class McpToolsListResponse(BaseModel):
tools: list[McpToolEntry] = []
error: str | None = None
message: str | None = None
def tool_names_for_server(self, server_id: str) -> frozenset[str]:
return frozenset(
tool.name
for tool in self.tools
if tool.mcp_info is not None and tool.mcp_info.server_id == server_id
)
def tool_name_containing(self, server_id: str, needle: str) -> str | None:
needle_l = needle.lower()
for tool in self.tools:
if tool.mcp_info is None or tool.mcp_info.server_id != server_id:
continue
if needle_l in tool.name.lower() or tool.name.lower().endswith(needle_l):
return tool.name
return None
class BlockedWordSpec(BaseModel):
keyword: str
action: str = "BLOCK"
class ContentFilterMcpParams(BaseModel):
"""litellm_content_filter params scoped to the MCP tool-call hook. mode is
pre_mcp_call because a pre_call config silently no-ops on the tools/call path
(the event type is rewritten to pre_mcp_call for call_mcp_tool), and default_on
is required there because per-key/request guardrail selection is dropped from
the synthetic MCP request the hook sees."""
guardrail: str = "litellm_content_filter"
mode: str = "pre_mcp_call"
default_on: bool = True
blocked_words: list[BlockedWordSpec]
class GuardrailSpecBody(BaseModel):
guardrail_name: str
litellm_params: ContentFilterMcpParams
class GuardrailCreateBody(BaseModel):
guardrail: GuardrailSpecBody
class GuardrailCreateResponse(BaseModel):
guardrail_id: str
class McpCallToolBody(BaseModel):
name: str
arguments: dict[str, McpToolArg]
server_id: str
class McpCallContent(BaseModel):
type: str | None = None
text: str | None = None
class McpCallToolResponse(BaseModel):
model_config = ConfigDict(populate_by_name=True)
content: list[McpCallContent] = []
is_error: bool | None = Field(default=None, alias="isError")
@property
def first_text(self) -> str | None:
return self.content[0].text if self.content else None
@property
def all_text(self) -> str:
return "\n".join(part.text for part in self.content if part.text)
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
class McpClient:
proxy: ProxyClient
def register_server(
self,
*,
server_name: str,
alias: str,
url: str,
transport: str = "http",
auth_type: str | None = None,
static_headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
allowed_tools: list[str] | None = None,
mcp_access_groups: list[str] | None = None,
) -> str:
return unwrap(
self.proxy.transport.post(
"/v1/mcp/server",
headers=self.proxy.transport.master,
json=McpServerNewBody(
server_name=server_name,
alias=alias,
url=url,
transport=transport,
auth_type=auth_type,
static_headers=static_headers,
allowed_tools=allowed_tools,
mcp_access_groups=mcp_access_groups,
),
response_type=McpServerNewResponse,
)
).server_id
def delete_server(self, server_id: str) -> None:
_ = self.proxy.transport.delete(
f"/v1/mcp/server/{server_id}",
headers=self.proxy.transport.master,
json=NoBody(),
response_type=NoBody,
)
def registered_servers(self) -> list[McpServerRow]:
return unwrap(
self.proxy.transport.get(
"/v1/mcp/server",
headers=self.proxy.transport.master,
params=NoBody(),
response_type=McpServerListResponse,
)
).root
def await_registered(self, server_id: str) -> None:
"""Poll /v1/mcp/server until `server_id` is listed. Fails at poll_timeout.
The DB row exists the moment registration returns, but a data-plane pod
answers the listing from a registry it refreshes on a periodic DB sync, so a
pod that joined the load balancer after the write reports the server as
absent until its first sync.
"""
deadline = time.monotonic() + self.proxy.poll_timeout
while True:
registered = frozenset(row.server_id for row in self.registered_servers())
if server_id in registered:
return
if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
raise AssertionError(
f"registered server {server_id} still absent from /v1/mcp/server "
f"{self.proxy.poll_timeout}s after registration (the data plane never synced "
f"the row): {registered}"
)
time.sleep(self.proxy.poll_interval)
def generate_key(
self,
*,
user_id: str,
mcp_servers: list[str] | None,
mcp_access_groups: list[str] | None = None,
mcp_toolsets: list[str] | None = None,
models: list[str] | None = None,
) -> str:
object_permission = (
ObjectPermission(
mcp_servers=mcp_servers,
mcp_access_groups=mcp_access_groups,
mcp_toolsets=mcp_toolsets,
)
if mcp_servers is not None or mcp_access_groups is not None or mcp_toolsets is not None
else None
)
return self.proxy.generate_key(
KeyGenerateBody(
models=models if models is not None else [],
user_id=user_id,
object_permission=object_permission,
)
)
def list_tools(self, key: str) -> Result[McpToolsListResponse]:
return self.proxy.transport.get(
"/mcp-rest/tools/list",
headers=ApiKeyHeaders(x_litellm_api_key=key),
params=NoBody(),
response_type=McpToolsListResponse,
)
def await_tool(self, key: str, server_id: str, needle: str) -> str:
"""Poll tools/list until `server_id` serves a tool matching `needle`, and
return its fully-qualified name. Fails at poll_timeout.
/v1/mcp/server returns as soon as the DB row is written, but the gateway
runs the initialize + tools/list handshake against the upstream lazily on
the first request that needs it, and reports a server it has not
discovered yet exactly like a dead one: an empty tool list. Waiting is
what separates the two.
"""
deadline = time.monotonic() + self.proxy.poll_timeout
while True:
result = self.list_tools(key)
if isinstance(result, Success):
tool_name = result.data.tool_name_containing(server_id, needle)
if tool_name is not None:
return tool_name
if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
raise AssertionError(
f"server {server_id} never served a tool matching {needle!r} within "
f"{self.proxy.poll_timeout}s of registration (upstream unreachable, or "
f"the key's grant was not applied); last tools/list: {result}"
)
time.sleep(self.proxy.poll_interval)
def await_tools(self, key: str, server_id: str, *, expected: frozenset[str]) -> frozenset[str]:
"""Poll tools/list until `server_id`'s tools as `key` sees them are exactly
`expected`, and return the last listing either way, so the caller's equality
assertion names the difference. Fails at poll_timeout only when the read
itself never succeeded."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + self.proxy.poll_timeout
while True:
result = self.list_tools(key)
if isinstance(result, Success) and result.data.tool_names_for_server(server_id) == expected:
return expected
if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
return unwrap(result).tool_names_for_server(server_id)
time.sleep(self.proxy.poll_interval)
def await_call_tool(
self,
key: str,
*,
server_id: str,
name: str,
arguments: McpToolArguments,
) -> McpCallToolResponse:
"""Poll tools/call until the result is not a multi-worker registry miss.
Retries only on the gateway's own cold-worker 500 shapes (Tool <name>
not found / server_not_found). Upstream tool errors and other 500s fail
immediately so non-idempotent calls are not repeated.
"""
deadline = time.monotonic() + self.proxy.poll_timeout
last: Result[McpCallToolResponse] | None = None
while True:
last = self.call_tool(key, server_id=server_id, name=name, arguments=arguments)
if not _is_mcp_not_synced(last, tool_name=name):
return unwrap(last)
if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
raise AssertionError(
f"tools/call for {name!r} on server {server_id} still missing on the "
f"data plane after {self.proxy.poll_timeout}s (multi-worker registry lag); "
f"last result: {last}"
)
time.sleep(self.proxy.poll_interval)
def await_call_tool_denied(
self,
key: str,
*,
server_id: str,
name: str,
arguments: McpToolArguments,
) -> UnknownApiError:
"""Poll tools/call until a cold-worker miss clears and the call is 403 access_denied."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + self.proxy.poll_timeout
last: Result[McpCallToolResponse] | None = None
while True:
last = self.call_tool(key, server_id=server_id, name=name, arguments=arguments)
if isinstance(last, UnknownApiError) and last.status_code == 403:
return last
if not _is_mcp_not_synced(last, tool_name=name):
raise AssertionError(
f"ungranted key's tools/call was not 403 access_denied: {last}"
)
if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
raise AssertionError(
f"ungranted key never got 403 for {name!r} within {self.proxy.poll_timeout}s; "
f"last result: {last}"
)
time.sleep(self.proxy.poll_interval)
def register_mcp_content_filter(self, *, name: str, blocked_keyword: str) -> str:
"""Register a default-on content-filter guardrail that runs on the MCP
tool-call hook (pre_mcp_call) and blocks a single keyword. The keyword is
unique per test, so default_on only ever intercepts this test's own
banned tool call on the shared proxy."""
guardrail_id = unwrap(
self.proxy.transport.post(
"/guardrails",
headers=self.proxy.transport.master,
json=GuardrailCreateBody(
guardrail=GuardrailSpecBody(
guardrail_name=name,
litellm_params=ContentFilterMcpParams(
blocked_words=[BlockedWordSpec(keyword=blocked_keyword)],
),
)
),
response_type=GuardrailCreateResponse,
)
).guardrail_id
settle_propagation(time.monotonic())
return guardrail_id
def delete_guardrail(self, guardrail_id: str) -> None:
_ = self.proxy.transport.delete(
f"/guardrails/{guardrail_id}",
headers=self.proxy.transport.master,
json=NoBody(),
response_type=NoBody,
)
def call_tool(
self,
key: str,
*,
server_id: str,
name: str,
arguments: McpToolArguments,
) -> Result[McpCallToolResponse]:
return self.proxy.transport.post(
"/mcp-rest/tools/call",
headers=ApiKeyHeaders(x_litellm_api_key=key),
json=McpCallToolBody(
name=name, arguments=dict(arguments), server_id=server_id
),
response_type=McpCallToolResponse,
)
def _is_mcp_not_synced(
result: Result[McpCallToolResponse],
*,
tool_name: str | None = None,
) -> bool:
"""True only for gateway multi-worker registry misses, not upstream errors.
Matches the proxy's own shapes:
- ValueError ``Tool <name> not found`` wrapped as HTTP 500 (cold tool map /
unresolved server on this process)
- REST ``server_not_found`` when this worker has not loaded the MCP server row
Does not treat arbitrary 500 bodies that merely mention "tool" and "not found"
(e.g. upstream MCP payload text) as lag, so await_call_tool does not retry
real failures or non-idempotent calls.
"""
if not isinstance(result, UnknownApiError) or result.status_code != 500:
return False
body = result.body
body_l = body.lower()
if "server_not_found" in body_l:
return True
if re.search(r"mcp server ['\"][^'\"]+['\"] was not found", body_l):
return True
# Gateway: "Tool search_datadog_logs not found" (optionally inside a longer message)
if tool_name is not None:
return (
re.search(rf"\btool\s+{re.escape(tool_name)}\s+not found\b", body_l) is not None
)
return re.search(r"\btool\s+\S+\s+not found\b", body_l) is not None
def build_client(proxy: ProxyClient) -> McpClient:
return McpClient(proxy=proxy)